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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW



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EDITOR'S NOTE

Beginning with its bicentennial issue last July, *Foreign Affairs* has experimented with changes in format. In this issue, for example, in order to accommodate increased advertising, we are departing from our usual practice of grouping all advertising pages in the front and back of the journal. We expect over the next few issues to weigh other possible changes in design; but none will be made that will alter the basic character of the quarterly. We have also invited readers to express their views on these format changes, and we have had a fair amount of response—both favorable and unfavorable. These reader reactions will certainly affect further consideration of any change.

Many readers have asked us about our use of type sizes, and a word of explanation is perhaps in order. We have in the past often used a smaller type size for reports and for long articles that are extensively documented. Historical articles published recently under the rubric, "Reconsiderations," fall into this category. And the series of retrospective essays dealing with two hundred years of American foreign policy is also being set in the smaller type size. Our general articles, making up the bulk of the issue, will continue to be set in large type.

We urge our readers to continue to express their views on the style and substance of *Foreign Affairs*.


The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries FOREIGN AFFAIRS can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there. The Editors.

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TRILATERALISM: “PARTNERSHIP” FOR WHAT?

By Richard H. Ullman



“TRILATERALISM”—nature abhors labels but men insist on them—is the latest attempt both to describe and to prescribe for the relationship between the United States and the other principal democratic, industrialized, market-economy states. Under the aegis of the so-called Trilateral Commission—an organization of influential private citizens from these countries—it has been the focus of a well-organized effort over the past four years to propose a set of solutions to many of the principal common problems of international society. Trilateralism has explicitly been embraced by the Democratic candidate for the presidency as a central theme of his foreign policy. Recently it has also become a staple of Secretary of State Kissinger’s speeches. Its connotations of symmetry and order—the triangle is one of the most aesthetically satisfying of geometrical forms—contrast strikingly with the pervasive lack of evident order in human affairs.

The three points of the triangle are, of course, the United States (or, in deference to sensitivities north of the 49th parallel, North America), Western Europe, and Japan. They are also the loci of the bulk of the world’s present wealth and of its present capacity for production. Their very listing evokes images of a rich man’s club—which, for many purposes, they constitute. That they do raises questions both of equity and efficacy: the existing global distribution of wealth and power is clearly “unfair,” yet it may seem less unfair if the trilateral grouping were to serve as the engine of progress and enrichment for those less fortunate. That it can so serve—indeed, that it *must* be made to do so—is one of the central assumptions of the Trilateral Commission and its adherents.¹

¹ It should be noted that this article is about “trilateralism” as one way of organizing a portion of the international community for the conduct of public policy; it is not about the Trilateral Commission as such, nor about particular statements on policy issues made under its auspices.

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II

Between two points of the triangle—the United States and Western Europe—the connecting line has been both firm and thick since 1947–48, when the perceived need to organize against the menace of a Soviet Union then in the process of extending its control over Eastern Europe led to an American interest and involvement in the affairs of Western Europe qualitatively different from that of the prewar era. The rationale that joined together the several nations of Western Europe and that linked them all to the United States was their mutual possession of a common core of liberal, democratic values to which the collectivist, totalitarian values of Stalin's Russia were unalterably opposed. The fact that liberal democracy was a new and perhaps fragile transplant to a German Federal Republic—itself largely a creation of the Anglo-French-American occupation regime—and that during the 1930s liberal democracy had been severely shaken as a political creed throughout the rest of Western Europe and even in the United Kingdom, served only to reinforce the post-war view that special measures were necessary to assure that it would survive and prosper. Those special measures included massive American economic assistance under the Marshall Plan and a standing peacetime alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Like the American sponsorship of liberal democracy in Germany, these measures aimed also at protecting the European states against internal threats—attempts by the Communist Left (or, then less likely, the far Right) to seize power by forceful means.

The second leg of the triangle, between the United States and Japan, had similar origins. In Asia the perceived menace of the Soviet Union was compounded by that of a Communist Chinese state apparently in close alliance with Moscow. Japan became the keystone of an American security system around the Asian periphery. Even more than in the case of Western Europe, the U.S.-Japan security relationship was accompanied by (indeed, was preceded by) an intensive American effort to inculcate liberal democratic political institutions and values to serve as anchors against either a return to right-wing militarism or a move toward the Communist Left. Again, as in the case of Western Europe, the United States initially dwarfed its Japanese client in economic and military power. In the Japanese case, however, the drastic military asymmetry has remained, but the economic relationship has turned (given disparities in population size) into much more of a relationship between equals. In the boom conditions of the 1960s the U.S.-West Europe and U.S.-Japan economic

relationships were at the root of a remarkable dynamism.

American efforts to foster Japanese economic strength and political solidity took the course, initially, of allowing Japan to exempt herself from the postwar Western system of reciprocal rules and obligations governing trade and investment. Later, once Japan's full recovery was assured, American policy turned toward promoting Japanese participation in the whole network of Western economic institutions. Japan's "arrival" was symbolized by the conversion in 1960-61 of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), explicitly dropping the geographical limitation to Europe and adding the United States, Canada and Japan (and, later, Australia and New Zealand) to what now became an "advanced nation club."

However, Japan's formal admission to the "First World" (as some have called it) did not really constitute the third, West Europe-Japan side of the triangle. U.S.-Japan relations are far more rich and variegated than those between Japan and Western Europe, which are predominantly concerned with economic issues—and even in that sphere, the flows of money, goods and persons between Japan and Western Europe are considerably less dense than those between Japan and the United States. During 1975, Japan's trade with the United States was more than twice her trade with Western Europe—and her trade with Western Europe was only slightly larger than her trade with the Communist nations. Thus, despite assiduous work by private bodies like the Trilateral Commission and the Atlantic Institute—both of which have worked hard to foster linkages between elites in Western Europe and Japan—the third leg of the triangle remains far more an aspiration than an accomplished fact. Ironically enough, where commonality of purpose has been evidenced between Japan and Western Europe, it has often been catalyzed by common opposition to actions and policies of the United States.

III

Trilateralism as a linguistic expression—and the Trilateral Commission—arose in the early 1970s from the reaction of the more Atlanticist part of the American foreign policy community to the belligerent and defensive unilateralism that characterized the foreign economic policy of the Nixon Administration, then dominated by Secretary of the Treasury John Connally. That policy was based upon the assumption that Western Europe and Japan had prospered at American expense, and that the dynamism of their economies (and the apparent sluggishness of the American) had come because the

“leadership” role of the United States had prevented us at crucial moments from taking the kind of unilateral remedial measures—trade and investment restrictions, currency devaluations, and the like—to which other OECD governments so frequently resorted. The trilateralists agreed on the diagnosis: the relative balance of economic strengths had so changed that the United States could no longer play the role of economic leader. But they also argued that further American unilateralism would fuel a spiral of defensive reactions that would leave all the Western economies worse off. Their suggested remedy, instead, was much more far-reaching coordination among all the trilateral governments.

Within a very short time, however, this diagnosis came to appear only partly relevant: the recession brought on by unilateral escalation of petroleum prices in 1973–74 by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) exposed substantial economic weakness in Japan and much of Western Europe and emphasized the continuing basic underlying strengths of the American economy. Yet even that strength has been only relative, for the decade of the 1970s has been a time when the West as a whole has seemed very much at bay. The rise of OPEC has been accompanied by a new Third World militancy in the United Nations and other international forums. This militancy has in turn engendered something of a *laager* mentality and a perceived need for “hunkering down” within the Western camp. In all the Western countries (a category that, for these purposes, includes Japan), the remarkable growth in prosperity of the 1960s suddenly seemed threatened. In some, standards of living actually dropped. Where “openness”—the reduction of barriers to economic flows of all sorts—once seemed a key to rising prosperity, as a result of unilateral actions in the 1970s openness began to seem (as indeed it has always been) a source of vulnerability as well. Rather than the further reductions of barriers, “beggar-thy-neighbor” strategies reminiscent of the 1930s often seemed more in keeping with the times.

In this climate of astringency (if not gloom), a united front on the part of the advanced industrialized Western societies has seemed to many observers the only effective way both to counter the new demands and militant actions of the Third World (such as the 1973 OPEC boycott), and also to meet the prospective threat of a Soviet Union with a newly developed global military reach—witness Angola—and possibly increased ambitions. Where trilateralism began as a formula—and a forum—for coordinating economic policy among the advanced market economies, it has come to mean something much more far-reaching—“a partnership between North America, Western

Europe, and Japan," to quote Governor Carter. As such, trilateralism has two faces, one turned inward, the other outward.

The inward face has been concerned chiefly with preserving for the industrialized societies—indeed, expanding—the advantages which, during the 1960s, flowed from openness and increased interdependence, while limiting their adverse consequences. This means, of course, common—or at least closely coordinated—policies toward money, trade, energy, pollution, and many of the other issues common to the advanced nations and important in their relations with one another. And it requires a set of political leaders in the West with sufficient political power in their own societies and sufficient confidence in one another—a confidence achieved by frequent and intimate consultation—to be able to abstain from measures conducive to short-run, one-sided advantage which would harm others. This inward face is also concerned with preserving among Western countries the liberal political values and institutions which they hold in common. The demise of liberal democracy in society after society outside the trilateral geographic sphere has made this aspect of trilateralism's "inward face" seem especially urgent.

Trilateralism's outward face is turned toward the construction of a common approach to the needs and demands of the poorer nations, and the coordination of defense policies and of policies toward such highly politicized issues as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and aerial hijacking, and such highly politicized geographic areas as the Middle East or Southern Africa. Once again this means abstention from measures conducive to one-sided advantage, such as the sale of nuclear-fuel reprocessing plants, or departures from common fronts in negotiating with producers of oil or other raw materials. Above all, it means a shared perception of common long-run interests, and a willingness to abjure short-run measures which contradict that common perception.

The ultimate result—to quote Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former Director of the Trilateral Commission—would be "a community of the developed nations." The path to that community, he wrote in this journal three years ago, runs through intensive "regular and ever more formal political consultation" and "common political planning with regard to problems or areas of mutual interest" in order to achieve "a shared political perspective among the governmental bodies of the three [trilateral] units."² Governor Carter used almost the same language in addressing the Foreign Policy Association last June.

² "U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1973, p. 724.

IV

In its core emphasis on a common perspective among a set of national societies which subscribe to the same broad set of political/ethical/economic ideas, trilateralism is frankly and unabashedly ideological. The societies at the three points of the triangle differ considerably among themselves, but they share a relative openness and a relatively high willingness to tolerate dissenting views—in particular, views critical of the state and of its government. In all of them—even Japan, the outlier in this respect—there is a fairly clear-cut separation of the sphere of the state from that of the individual.

These notions, of course, are under widespread attack today—including attacks from some within the trilateral societies. The socialist states (the “Second World”) explicitly disavow such ideas as perpetuating a structure of class inequality and of domination both at home and abroad. Government after government in the Third World has also disavowed them—in many instances after initially enshrining them in constitutions and party programs—because opposition came to be seen as inconvenient, and disruptive of the processes by which they consolidated their power. The rhetoric of U.N. debates is still often larded with lip service to liberal ideas, but the resolutions of U.N. bodies such as the General Assembly, the International Labor Organization (ILO) and UNESCO show how much under siege—among governments, at least—these ideas actually are.

Emphasis by trilateralism’s spokesmen on openness and toleration domestically is matched by a concern with human rights—particularly political liberties—abroad. Thus Governor Carter called upon the trilateral states to form a “creative partnership [to] take the lead in establishing and promoting basic global standards of human rights.” He went on by inference to distinguish questions relating to human rights and adherence to representative democratic forms of government from those relating to the economic system to which a society adheres. Referring by implication to the states of southern Europe in which the Communist Party is potentially a governing party, he stated: “The democratic concert of nations should exclude only those who exclude themselves by the rejection of democracy itself.” Politics, not economics, is thus the crucial determinant.

Yet the separation of economics from politics is easier stated than made. In principle at least, a democratic political system rooted in the value of toleration is compatible with an economic structure that leaves only little scope for private ownership of the means of production. But the high degree of centralized state control of the economy thus entailed may not be at all compatible with the kind of

openness inherent in the vision of the liberal world economy which is, along with democratic politics, a vital pillar of trilateralism. Societies may wish to sacrifice some values—for example, the efficiency which comes from full participation in the international economy—in order to realize others, such as assured full employment and a radical redistribution of national wealth.³

Different domestic economic structures may also lead to different approaches to the economic demands of the Third World. Stability of supply or assurance of a market may constitute economic goals of a higher priority for a given Western government than lower prices for raw materials imports or a higher degree of mobility for capital. Unity among Western governments in the face of demands from the poorer countries (or, for that matter, from wealthy oil exporters) is thus in practice often difficult to achieve. Statements by persons who argue for (and from) a trilateral frame of reference—by the Trilateral Commission, by Governor Carter, or, for that matter, by Secretary of State Kissinger—are often ambivalent or even internally contradictory when it comes to North-South relations. “We [the ‘industrial democracies’] should regularly consult and work in close parallel in major international negotiations and conferences. . . . [These negotiations] can achieve much more if the industrial democracies approach them with a clear and coherent purpose,” Kissinger said in an address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London last June. But a few lines later he supplied what by now, in all such general pronouncements, have become virtually obligatory assurances: “Cooperation among developed countries is not confrontation between North and South, as is often alleged. The fact is that a responsible development policy is possible only if the industrial democracies pursue realistic goals with conviction, compassion, and coordination.” Thus, a primary reason for Northern unity is to be able to negotiate more effectively with the South; but such pursuit of common policies need not imply confrontation. Of course this is true, provided the united front encounters no opposition. But when opposition arises, a bloc by any other name still behaves like a bloc regarding those across the negotiating table. This is not to say that blocs are never desirable. It is to say that trilateral rhetoric (like most rhetoric) is sometimes disingenuous.

³ Indeed, one reason—perhaps the principal reason—why the Trilateral Commission has been able to attract so little participation from the leaders of organized labor in any of the trilateral countries is labor's hostility to the vision of an international economy in which unemployment may be the price of the fact that labor is not in practice as free to move across national frontiers as goods, capital or technology, the other factors of production.

A final area for shared trilateral concern, and for trilateral coordination of policies, is security. The original links between the United States and Western Europe and the United States and Japan were shaped by the security concerns of the cold-war period. In an era of détente they still exist, their form expressed in the treaties which extend the American nuclear umbrella across the Atlantic and the Pacific, their content, however, altered in several important respects. One respect is the awkwardness and vague sense of embarrassment which increasing numbers of Japanese public figures feel called upon to express regarding the continuation of an explicit military relationship with the United States when memories of Indochina—and the American use of Japanese bases to pursue an Asian war opposed by the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people—are still fresh, and images of thralldom to Lockheed are newly evoked. Japanese sensitivities are reflected in the delicate phrasing of Secretary Kissinger's IISS speech. "Security is the bedrock of all that we [the 'industrial democracies'] do," he said. "Today our collective security—and the U.S.-Japanese relationship—continue to be essential for global stability." These same Japanese sensitivities have prevented the Trilateral Commission from undertaking any work focused directly on security: the Commission's work proceeds on the basis of consensus statements, and on security issues trilateral consensus would be too difficult to obtain.

No similar awkwardness or embarrassment characterizes the security relationship between the United States and Western Europe. In this sphere, by contrast, assessments of threat and of mutual need are more or less in harmony on both sides of the Atlantic. Where differences exist, they pertain to non-military aspects of the relationship between the West and the U.S.S.R. and its allies—the appropriate terms for economic credits, the degree of risk entailed in the transfer of some types of technology, and the like. The United States has also diverged from the European members of NATO over the assessment of mutual interests in the case of threats to international peace originating outside Europe, such as the Middle East. Fear of Arab boycott, not of Soviet military response, led the West Europeans severely to limit American abilities to operate from their territories in support of Israel during the October 1973 War.

V

Differences in perception of security interests between the Americans and, respectively, the Europeans and the Japanese, and the fact that no security linkages of any sort tie the latter pair to each other, ex-

pose one of the most serious shortcomings in the notion of trilateralism—the gap between the vision of rough symmetry contained in the trilateral model and the drastic differences in interests and in roles which in fact exist, and are likely to continue, among the supposed trilateral partners. The United States is a superpower with global interests and military forces capable of supporting them at virtually any point on the globe. At the other end of the spectrum is Japan—a state with worldwide economic interests but one that is scarcely a military power even in the North Asian region. (And even Japan's economic involvements are substantially concentrated in Asia.)

Western Europe, of course, is not really an entity: those West European states which are members of the European Community retain substantial freedom of action even in the economic sphere, not to mention the military and political spheres. None is really more than a regional power. Both the United Kingdom and France possess small but relatively potent nuclear forces. Each retains a few of the vestiges of past empire by virtue of special relationships with some of its former colonies. But each is overshadowed for many purposes by the Federal Republic of Germany, whose economic strength and large conventional forces on the Central Front make it the natural European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. For many reasons, however—not the least of them historical—the Federal Republic cannot, *de facto*, be the European pole of the trilateral design. Thus there is no really effective European pole. The Community's formal functions are too limited. The nearest thing to a common voice for "Europe" on most of the politically sensitive global issues is the semiannual summit meetings of heads of government or the somewhat more frequent meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Because of the need to find a low (if not the lowest) common denominator, however, these meetings rarely move beyond the level of principle. Every month the Directors of Political Affairs of the nine foreign ministries meet informally to consider political issues with important ramifications beyond Europe. Yet, as its composition makes clear, this so-called Davignon Committee (named for its Belgian instigator) is at best a means of sometimes energizing and supplying direction to national bureaucracies.

For security affairs, especially, the real loci for decisions remain the separate national capitals of the nine member-states of the Community. NATO (or its so-called "Euro-group") is the forum in which these national decisions are ratified. On the most important economic issues, "decisions" are the result of a complex interaction among Community institutions, private economic interests, and the nine mem-

ber-governments. But the more highly politicized an issue, such as credits for the U.S.S.R. or dealings with oil-producing states, the more likely it is that the separate national governments will remain central to the decision process. Yet these are issues for which centralization of decision may be highly desirable. And they are among the issues regarding which proponents of trilateralism would seek to present a united front.

There is thus a substantial asymmetry in decision-making ability among the governmental bodies at the three points of the triangle. Washington is not a capital ordinarily praised for either the speed or the coherence of its decisions, but compared to the laborious, consensual "make-no-waves" style which prevails in Tokyo, or the painful, lowest-common-denominator approach characteristic of the Brussels Nine, the U.S. government seems almost Jovian. This asymmetry in decision-making ability further exacerbates the differences in interests and roles which set the United States off from its trilateral partners, and which, indeed, frequently make the notion of partnership scarcely more than an ornament to commencement addresses or campaign speeches.

Such speeches, moreover, are more a staple in the American rhetorical diet than in that of the Europeans or Japanese. Trilateralism as the expression of a set of international relationships is very much an American invention. The Trilateral Commission was born and nurtured in the United States. Although the Commission has enlisted the effective participation in its deliberations of a number of outstanding Europeans and Japanese, the notion of trilateralism is not one which many of them are likely to emphasize except when speaking at clubby international meetings. At home the evocation of nationalism (or, in Europe—sometimes—"Europeanism") still gets the applause. This is not surprising: the more powerful tend more easily to speak of partnership with the less powerful than vice versa. Their ease comes from the fact that the term "partnership" often conveys different meanings. To the small (or the less powerful), partnership implies tying down the big—routinizing their behavior—so the big will dependably meet their needs. To the big, however, solidarity among partners too often means solidarity behind the largest and strongest partner. This is likely to be the case particularly when the largest and strongest also happens to have the easiest time making decisions and framing proposals for what it hopes will become common policies.

Washington's habitual view of effective trilateralism—no matter what the administration or how "good" its intentions—tends to be one of effective support for American positions from the Europeans and

the Japanese. This is not an easy habit to break. That it is not—and the Europeans and Japanese are aware it is not—explains the jaundiced European and Japanese reaction to Secretary of State Kissinger's famous "Year of Europe (and Japan)" speech of April 1973. They had heard such rhetoric before—and had observed the results.

There is another important difference in the evocation of trilateralism by Americans and by Europeans and Japanese. In the United States—among elites, at any rate—trilateralism has become almost the consensus position on foreign policy. Over the past several years, Democrats have made much of the alleged unilateralism and disregard for "the allies" by the diplomacy of the first Nixon Administration. But if there have been such sins in the past, they have been more than expiated by such gestures as President Ford making Japan the locus of his first official trip abroad, or by Secretary Kissinger's pilgrimages to the last several annual OECD ministerial meetings. President Ford's fulsome statements at the Western summits of Rambouillet and San Juan and many of Kissinger's recent speeches could have been lifted from the pages of *Triologue*, the Trilateral Commission's quarterly bulletin. The overt America-first nationalism articulated and acted upon in 1971–72 is a chapter embarrassing to recall. In this respect, the Ford Administration and its Democratic challenger, Governor Carter, are as one.

Even during the dark days (or brave days, depending upon one's viewpoint) of July and August 1971, relations with Western Europe and Japan never became issues of controversy in American domestic politics. What disagreement there was focused upon tactics, not principles. Moreover, the disagreement was among elites. Neither the principles nor the tactics of these relationships are issues which command mass attention in the United States. The public approves (and is generally bored by) the principles, and it scarcely understands the tactics. By contrast, relations with the United States have been an issue of principle—and a controversial issue—in the domestic politics of Japan and of a number of West European states. Typically, the parties of the Center and of the moderate Right have used their American linkages as a rallying point for their own supporters, while those of the Left and sometimes of the far Right have opposed—often vehemently—the notion of concert with Washington (and Wall Street). These domestic political differences have been reflected in the party affiliations of Europeans and Japanese who have accepted membership in the Trilateral Commission. Only in the United Kingdom and in the Federal Republic of Germany have close relations with the United States—more or less continuously, and for all major parties—

been an unquestioned principle of policy. Relations with Japan, of course, have not been an issue in the politics of any European country, just as relations with Western Europe are not an issue in Japanese politics. That leg of the triangle is too unimportant to be divisive. Whether for proponents or opponents, it is the American connection that counts.

VI

Will it "count" a decade from now? Should it? For what purposes? These are questions which governments and prospective governments in Europe and Japan, as well as any administration in Washington, must ponder. And they must also consider what is, or should be, the likely future of trilateralism, as distinguished from U.S.-Europe and U.S.-Japan linkages.

As a start toward suggesting tentative answers to these questions, some general observations about what trilateralism is and is not might be useful. First and most obvious (although not always obvious in trilateral rhetoric), trilateralism is not an end in itself, but an approach and a process—one way of organizing a part of international society to cope with *some* international problems. The reason for wishing to create a genuine partnership linking together the "industrial democracies" is for the goals which thereby might be achieved and the values which thus might be realized, not for the intrinsic satisfactions (although they undoubtedly exist) of transacting business among the more or less like-minded members of a more or less comfortable club. In drawing conclusions about trilateralism, therefore, one must evaluate it both as an arena for problem-solving and as a mode of international organization, and ask what sort of international problems—over the short- and medium-range future—will best be approached from the framework of a North American-West European-Japanese partnership.

It goes without saying that the intense consultation and common political planning envisioned by the trilateralists—the *process* of "trialogue"—would be useful to prevent any one of the poles from doing mischief to either of the others. In such a framework, the "Nixon shocks" of 1971 would have been impossible—indeed, because of prior monetary and trading adjustments, not necessary. The same would be true regarding sudden changes in the European Community's internal regulations designed, in fact, to keep out American farm products or Japanese automobiles. Similarly unnecessary would have been the crisis reactions of late 1973 when each of the three poles of the triangle (and, indeed, separate states within the European pole)

seemed to attempt to alleviate its energy problem at the expense of the others. A common approach to problems that are both common and uniquely (or predominantly) those of the industrialized market-economy states is, of course, an appropriate goal for trilateralism and one which, by definition, will continue to be appropriate. What will change, however, will be the list of problems which are more or less common only to these societies.

Commonality and uniqueness are not, it should be said, limiting criteria. Certainly there are issues scarcely confined to the industrial democracies for which a common trilateral approach—provided it is the *right* approach—would be highly desirable. Energy policy, some aspects of relations with the poorest countries, and some aspects of relations with the industrialized Communist states, are among these issues. Regarding each, the trilateral countries share identifiable common interests. What matters, therefore, is not whether or not they behave as a bloc in negotiating with, say, oil exporters, debtor poor countries, or the Warsaw Pact, but how they use the leverage which comes with bloc cohesion. Trilateralism may be a retreat into semi-isolation (a kind of severing of some existing linkages), a closing of ranks against the oncoming hordes of the poor and the demanding (who may or may not be the same), or an attempt to forge a new kind of collective leadership that will transcend bloc lines but use bloc interests, defined in the longest range terms, as a point of departure. Whether or not trilateralism is a suitable means of moving toward a more desirable world order depends, of course, on which of these or other lines the leaders of the trilateral societies choose to follow.

The question of whether or not trilateral cohesion is desirable, and in what circumstances, may be somewhat beside the point, however. For over the next decade, as the shared characteristics which set the trilateral states off from the other members of the community of nation-states become less distinct, trilateral unity may well grow more difficult to achieve. It is likely, indeed, that every dimension by which the members of the trilateral club are now defined will become blurred, with a corresponding diffusion of interests. For example, the ranks of the industrialized countries will include not merely the democratic, market-economy nations (the trilateral states) on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its East European allies on the other. By the period 1985–90, countries like Mexico, Brazil, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia will probably have joined the “advanced nation club” for a number of the functions of that club—the governance of trade relations, the organization of international monetary affairs, the regulation of foreign direct investment, etc. At the same time, they are not

likely to be representative democracies. Whether or not the next decade will also see the emergence of more sharply demarcated regional economic blocs and regional spheres of influence (another dilution of trilateralism, incidentally), the much greater involvement of these non-trilateral states in the international economic system will erode the qualitative difference, measured both by the intensity and the scope of economic interactions, which is one of the strongest glues of trilateralism.

Not only are these and other new industrial powers not likely to be liberal democracies, but they are likely, at least for rhetorical purposes, to espouse an ideology which emphasizes their differences from the present trilateral countries. Thus the very fact of their presence for many functions within the ranks of the industrialized states will change the nature—by blurring the edges—of the present North-South confrontation. That confrontation might further be altered over the next decade by the Soviet Union and its European allies becoming more identified with “Northern” positions on North-South issues, much as they would choose not to. Presently, despite their relatively small contributions to economic development efforts, the industrialized Communist states for the most part escape the overt wrath of the poor countries because of their outspoken championship of the anti-colonial cause, particularly in regard to the African campaign against the white regimes in Southern Africa, and of the Arabs against Israel. For a variety of reasons (among them the likelihood of substantial movement toward a resolution of these political issues), it seems unlikely that a decade hence such issues will divide East from West in the eyes of the South. With less to gain—as a bloc—in the way of political and military support from Moscow, poor Southern governments are likely to increase their demands for economic concessions from the relatively rich industrialized Communist countries. And the latter may find themselves coordinating their approach to the poor countries with Western governments and Western financial institutions.

Alongside these tendencies which are likely to lead to a blurring of the characteristics which distinguish the trilateral countries, a number of issues are likely to be a source of division among them. Energy, for example, has been a highly divisive issue among the trilateral countries since the Arab boycott of 1973–74 and the consequent efforts by all of the oil-importing states—the United States, despite its avowed disapproval of “bilateral deals,” included—to enter into special arrangements with individual oil exporters that will assure them stability of supply. The International Energy Agency (IEA), formed in the aftermath of the boycott in order to coordinate and channel

Western energy policies and to promote the formation of a united front in relations with OPEC, has yet to be tested by adversity. There are substantial differences in supply position, in domestic energy policy (or its absence), and in relationship to the Arab-Israeli dispute which, particularly in a time of crisis, would all work to separate the United States from its IEA partners.

Oil is undoubtedly the source of most of the present and potential divisions among the trilateral governments over energy, but nuclear policy has—and is likely to continue to have—important divisive effects as well. U.S. relations with Germany and France have recently been strained over whether to accede to the wish of countries buying nuclear reactors also to buy the means of reprocessing or enriching nuclear fuel. The United States has opposed such sales on the grounds that they make easier the acquisition of nuclear weapons; the Germans and the French, on the other hand, seem to believe that only by exporting complete nuclear fuel cycles can they compete with American nuclear salesmanship, and they seem more confident of the ability of the international community to provide safeguards against the diversion of materials for weapons purposes.

This issue is, in a sense, the tip of an iceberg whose base is the whole framework of nuclear energy policy, involving factors such as relative quantities of resources devoted both to nuclear research and to investments in nuclear generating capacity, environmental degradation, potential hazards to health and to life itself, and the like. By the end of a decade, the particular question of the sale of reprocessing or enrichment facilities may no longer be contentious: the nuclear suppliers, whose numbers are likely by then to have grown considerably larger, may have agreed among themselves on restrictive measures, or else the genie of proliferation may be so far out of the bottle as to make the question almost irrelevant in its effects upon the spread of nuclear weapons. But in a climate of greater potential energy scarcity the issue of assured supplies of nuclear fuel may become even more divisive, and may further a process by which the Western states forge close relationships with nations outside the trilateral charmed circle.

Another issue which is likely to continue to be a source of contention among Western governments is their various relationships with the Communist world. The unity of the West when dealing with the Soviet bloc or with China has long been a major American objective. Too often, however, that unity was defined in practice as agreement with U.S. policies and support of U.S. initiatives and programs. Initiatives by others—German Chancellor Willy Brandt's early Ostpolitik, for example, or Canadian policies toward China—

are deplored as "out of step."

No matter how sincere an American Administration may be in its desire to conduct relations with the U.S.S.R. on a basis of close coordination among the Western governments, the nature of the strategic relationship between the two superpowers makes it almost impossible to do so. There are issues of vital importance to the two—the management of the central nuclear balance is the most important, but there are others, such as the competition between them in third areas—where, in practice if not in concept, the bilateral forum inevitably comes to dominate any efforts at intra-alliance consultation.

The same is true of U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China. Coordination with Japan is of course desirable. But in practice there are crosscutting but reinforcing pressures which make coordination very difficult. For Japan, China policy is above all a matter of domestic politics, subject to all the inertia, and, at the same time, short-range opportunism characteristic of those politics. For the United States, on the other hand, China policy is intimately related to policy toward the Soviet Union. Both these factors work against an American China policy conducted in close harmony with Tokyo.

This is not to say that either policy toward the U.S.S.R. or policy toward China need be conducted with as little seeming regard for the sensitivities (if not the actual interests) of allies as that which characterized the Nixon-Kissinger approach of 1970-73. That approach was aimed as much at circumventing the American bureaucracy as at keeping allies at arm's length. Much more effective interallied consultation is clearly possible. But the gap between consultation and true coordination of approaches and policies is most unlikely to close.

That gap—present in virtually every sphere of policy, not merely in policies toward the Soviet Union and China—is ultimately the reason why there is and will continue to be less to trilateralism than meets the ear. Clearly it is worthwhile for the various governments of North America, Western Europe and Japan to have cordial and extensive working relationships with each other, both in order to forestall harmful actions taken in ignorance of the needs and wishes of the others and to promote the kind of cooperation which takes advantage of the complementarity of their social-economic systems and their long-range interests. Among the governments involved, there is no disagreement—at the level of principle—that this should be so. Divergence comes at the level of practice. And the likelihood is that over the next decade the forces which make for a sharper demarcation between the trilateral countries on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other will grow weaker rather than stronger.

Certainly the trilateral nations should not want those forces to grow stronger. For that would mean deeper divisions along the two principal current fault-lines of international politics—West/East and North/South—with all the tension, acerbity, inefficiency, and potential for ultimate disaster that such a deepening division implies. To the degree that this occurs, the First World—as well as the Second and Third—will be worse off. To the extent that this does not occur and the fault lines are blurred rather than emphasized, the notion of “a partnership between North America, Western Europe and Japan” will continue to be largely rhetorical—an acknowledgment of shared values and expectations, rather than of closely coordinated policies.

VII

Yet the importance of shared values should not be underestimated. They are a fragile core which the trilateral countries must strive to preserve. Most of all they include a devotion to human rights. In the industrialized democracies, where basic human economic needs have mostly been met, “human rights” connotes above all civil rights and political liberties such as freedom of speech and of assembly, freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, guarantees of effective political representation, and freedom to criticize one’s own society, its institutions, officials and politicians, without fear of repressive action either by the state or by other citizens. These are rights which in most of the globe’s polities have been subordinated to other values—sometimes the provision of basic economic needs, sometimes merely the maintenance in power of a particular set of elites. Such rights will surely come under attack, as inconvenient or worse, by political parties and even by governments in some of the trilateral countries. Over the next decade or so all the industrialized democracies may experience tensions in their politics which will make it seem expedient to abandon some or all of their present political liberties.

When such attacks occur, persons, parties, and governments in other societies committed to the same values must reinforce one another and speak out. When critical voices in one country are silenced in the name of expedience, authorities in other countries who would similarly abuse political power find it easier to do so. “Speaking out” depends in good measure upon the unimpeded flow of persons back and forth across national frontiers and upon the consequent flow of verified information regarding domestic arrangements within other societies. It also depends on networks of official and private institutions, such as the Council of Europe and its Human Rights Commission, the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and

P.E.N. The first of these institutions focuses, of course, entirely upon Europe; the others look mainly beyond the Western countries because the most serious violations of human rights occur beyond them. That focus would change, however, if the locus of violations were to change. The very existence of such institutions is one guarantee that it will not.

This guarantee might well be strengthened and formalized. Just as it has been proposed that the trilateral countries—and as many others as possible—might enter into binding obligations regarding the punishment or extradition of hijackers and terrorists, so they should also consider entering into formal and binding obligations regarding the preservation of human rights. A framework for such an obligation already exists in the form of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the covenants designed to give it effect. In recent years, however, application of the Declaration has become so highly politicized as to create an Orwellian situation in which some states most flagrant in their disregard of human rights triumphantly proclaim their devotion to it, while some others most earnestly seeking to protect human rights, such as the United States, have refused to ratify its covenants because of the highly selective way in which U.N. organs have interpreted them. In particular, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights is scarcely an effective or impartial monitor of abuses.

It is time, therefore, to consider the creation of a new institution, patterned instead after the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe, working under a charter similar to the European Convention on Human Rights, with guaranteed access and subpoena power and recognized standing in both national and international courts of law, and with the power to recommend sanctions which governments would undertake to enforce against either lesser officials acting on their own, or, collectively, against violator governments. Such an institution would be outside the framework of the United Nations, but its express purpose would be to make effective the basic principles of the Universal Declaration. It would be open to any state willing to incur the rather far-reaching obligations of membership.

Should such a new institution be created, its membership would surely include most—one hopes all—of the trilateral states. For the values it would uphold are their bedrock values. One way to create it would be simply to enlarge the European human rights system and allow others to participate in its Convention, its Commission, and its Court. The European system has been highly effective in a number of instances. Enlargement would make it more so. For example, the effort to restrain abuse of human rights by the Greek military junta would have been far more effective had the United States been a

participating member of the European enforcement system.

Such a new human rights institution would not—and certainly need not—depend for its effectiveness upon collaboration and coordination by its member-states in other spheres of national and international policy. In the years ahead, as we have already noted, such coordination is likely to be no more effective than it is today, probably less so. A frequent assumption within most trilateralist statements is that the mutual protection of the core values held in common by the trilateral societies depends upon their genuine “partnership” in all the other important spheres of international policy. If such a linkage in fact exists, it is only very loose: clearly, a state subjected to physical attack from abroad cannot be expected to place the protection of human rights and political liberties high on its agenda for action. But, short of this limiting case, the mutual protection of these rights and liberties depends not upon policy coordination in other spheres but upon the elaboration and strengthening of the informal and formal networks mentioned above. If the will exists—and it surely does—this can be done regardless of how varied and diverse are the other policy arenas a society chooses to enter for the achievement of other goals.

VIII

In his address to the Foreign Policy Association, Governor Carter spoke of the need for the Western societies to learn from one another in such prosaic spheres as health care, urban planning, mass transportation, and measures to counteract unemployment, rootlessness and alienation. In the short run, such sharing of ideas and techniques may be the most valuable—because they are the most concrete—achievements of trilateralism. In the long run, it may be the effective protection of rights and liberties. The “partnership” about which he also spoke is already an accomplished fact—provided one is prepared to use the rhetoric of trilateralism to connote a complex set of particular relationships that link together the several societies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan in a variety of different ways for a variety of different purposes. Only the triangle, in all its elegant simplicity, is absent. It is unlikely ever to appear.

A CHINA POLICY FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION

By Jerome Alan Cohen



“EVERYBODY talks about it, but nobody does anything about it.” The old saw about the weather might well be applied to America’s China policy. After the dramatic events of 1971–73 which initiated the long overdue process of “normalization” of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, the past three years have witnessed a lull in the relationship. At the start of President Richard Nixon’s second term, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations was expected before the 1976 presidential election. The Sino-American joint communiqué of February 22, 1973, authorizing the parties to open liaison offices in each other’s capital, and the termination of American military operations in Vietnam in early 1973 seemed to clear the path for a serious effort at normalization.

What actually happened thereafter, of course, was rather different. First Watergate, then the collapse of our anti-communist allies in Indochina, and now our presidential election have prevented the Administration from moving forward to complete normalization in accordance with the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972. Sino-American contacts have cooled and may deteriorate unless carefully nurtured.

What will happen after the November election? The media have been filled with analysis, prediction and speculation. Certain politicians and pundits claim the Ford Administration intends to complete the normalization process immediately after the election, whether it wins or loses. Other rumors suggest that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger may do the deed during a pre-election visit to Peking in a daring effort to capture the voters’ imagination. New Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng has said that he does not expect progress on normalization prior to the election, but increasing Chinese pressure for post-election normalization has been felt in recent months. There have even been hints that if the United States does not act soon in fulfilling the terms of the Shanghai Communiqué, Peking cannot rule

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out the possibility of improving its relations with the Soviet Union.

Administration spokesmen reaffirm President Gerald Ford's commitment to complete the normalization process but deny that the United States has any timetable or formula for doing so. The Democratic nominee for the presidency, Governor Jimmy Carter, has announced a similar position, and the Democratic Platform calls only for "early movement toward normalizing diplomatic relations in the context of a peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan."

High Foreign Ministry officials in Peking have told American journalists that improvement in Sino-American relations is unlikely until the United States severs all formal ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan. But public opinion polls show that while most Americans favor establishment of full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic, they oppose doing so at the price of eliminating U.S. diplomatic relations with the Nationalists on Taiwan. Secretary Kissinger has also been reported as believing that, if Washington yields to Chinese Communist demands that it sever formal diplomatic and defense ties to Taiwan, this would actually harm U.S. relations with the People's Republic because Peking would lose confidence in American resolve to live up to U.S. commitments elsewhere in the world. Seeking to square the circle, the Republican Platform calls for retention of these formal ties with the Nationalists while achieving normalization with the Communists. In the meantime, anxiety on the island grows as the election approaches, and rumors circulate that Taipei is making preparations for resurrecting its long defunct relationship with Moscow.

II

Ferment over China policy has not been limited to the question of normalization. That problem, of course, must be viewed in terms of the overall relationship with the People's Republic. This bilateral relationship, in turn, cannot be separated from U.S. global concerns, especially how to meet the expanding worldwide power of the U.S.S.R. in ways that will reduce the risks of conflict and enhance international cooperation on a host of urgent matters.

The essential question for American policymakers is this: What general posture should the United States assume toward the militarily mighty Soviet Union and the militarily modest People's Republic of China? Is it wise to pursue an "evenhanded" policy that seeks to improve relations with each while not siding with one against the other? Or do the realities of world politics suggest that the United States should "lean to one side"—that of Peking? Even if concern for

fostering détente with the U.S.S.R. requires maintaining the principle of balanced treatment in theory, should the United States depart from it in practice in order to shore up China's defenses against the much stronger and more threatening U.S.S.R. and thereby reduce the likelihood of either armed conflict or rapprochement between Moscow and Peking? If so, how, and to what extent, should such a *de facto* tilt be carried out?

Although these questions have thus far not received the same degree of public attention as those pertaining to normalization, events have brought them increasingly into view. Because the record of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger conversations in Peking is so closely held, we do not know whether either the United States or China has officially broached suggestions for forging a tacit entente cordiale among China, the United States and Japan that could block the spread of Soviet influence in Asia. However, such suggestions would follow logically from the Asian policies gradually unveiled by these powers since the start of the 1970s. Moreover, there has been increasing discussion in the press of ideas ranging from the grandiose, such as the formation of a Washington-Peking-Tokyo anti-Soviet Pacific triumvirate, to the concrete, such as sharing of intelligence from satellite cameras, electronic monitors and antisubmarine patrols.

While both the Chinese and the next Administration in Washington may be hesitant openly to discuss the possibilities of Sino-American cooperation on military matters, these issues—raising fundamental policy questions—have been before us for some time and cannot be avoided. The most obvious and sensitive of these concerns is whether the United States should permit trade that facilitates China's military modernization. Since ending the embargo against all economic relations with China, the United States has sought to achieve a balance in its treatment of Moscow and Peking, refusing to allow private American companies to sell military equipment or strategic technology to either. Yet America's allies have not done the same.

In 1975-76, Britain's sale of Rolls Royce engines and technology for use in Chinese jet fighters, West Germany's sale to Peking of helicopters for "refueling offshore oil platforms," France's sale of "civilian model" helicopters and radar plus aircraft and missile tracking equipment, and Japan's reported negotiations to sell China patrol aircraft, illustrate the involvement of major U.S. allies. These developments indicate that, although the current policy of COCOM, the international committee that coordinates control of strategic exports to the communist countries, purportedly continues to embargo all strategic exports to China, the United States has begun to acquiesce in such

sales by its allies, sometimes without even requiring COCOM approval.¹

If the United States has begun to permit allied sales of selected actual and potential military equipment—items that often include American components and technology—will American firms themselves make military sales to the People's Republic? In the year that has elapsed since Michael Pillsbury stimulated public discussion of this sensitive question,² many occurrences have fueled speculation that this may soon take place. For instance, one former Secretary of Defense, Thomas Gates, was appointed chief of the U.S. liaison office in Peking. Another former Secretary, James Schlesinger, was invited to visit China, as were a number of Congressmen whose responsibilities embrace military affairs. And politicians, including Commerce Secretary Elliot Richardson, Senators Mike Mansfield and Robert Taft, Jr., and Governor Ronald Reagan have shown varying degrees of interest in American arms sales to mainland China. Moreover, James Schlesinger and Henry Kissinger have both confirmed that military assistance to China has actually been considered, although only in the context of the contingency of increased Sino-Soviet tension.

Soviet propaganda organs, having long anticipated Sino-American military "collusion" aimed at the U.S.S.R., warned that military aid to China would create a Frankenstein monster endangering peace and threatening Japan and other American allies. Nationalist Chinese Premier Chiang Ching-kuo expressed similar fears that American military aid to Peking would heat up the international arms race and be tantamount to "feeding the tiger so it could later devour the feeders." Chiang also said that "military aid to the Chinese Communist regime which opposes democracy, freedom and humanity would be diametrically opposed to the American national spirit of love for freedom and adherence to democracy."

This raises two additional issues. First, would it be sound for the United States to supply China with military equipment for credit rather than cash or even on a grant basis? This would indeed constitute "military aid." Second, such aid would present the same troublesome questions as have been raised by U.S. military assistance to other regimes that suppress fundamental freedoms, including such Asian nations as South Korea, the Philippines and—of all places—Taiwan itself.

¹ The Consultative Group Coordinating Committee (COCOM) is an informal working group established at the end of 1949. Its members now include Japan and all NATO countries except Iceland.

² Michael Pillsbury, "U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?" *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1975, pp. 50-64.

Actually, according to Ford Administration officials, Peking has thus far shown little interest in acquiring finished weapons from the United States. The direct import of American weapons might seriously raise the temperature of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Moreover, other foreign-made weapons are often better and cheaper. And, until its succession crisis is resolved, the degree to which the People's Republic should welcome foreign cooperation of any sort in the badly needed modernization of its forces will remain a divisive political issue. Nevertheless, *Forbes* magazine, quoting a high-ranking but unidentified U.S. intelligence officer, recently reported that the Chinese have tried to buy American helicopters and have expressed interest in antisubmarine warfare equipment and advanced antitank weapons. And earlier this year, in response to inquiries by visiting Congressmen, Chinese leaders stated that "trade relations include items of a military nature."

What Peking is most interested in acquiring—from the United States as well as from others—is sophisticated technology and machinery capable of either civilian or military application, rather than weapons per se. The extent of China's demand will depend upon the outcome of the internal struggle, the military and economic development strategies of the new leadership, the availability of foreign exchange, and other factors. Although "a top Administration official" has cautioned that "China has its own limits in exposing its need for and increasing its dependence on Western technology," the United States is very likely to have to decide upon many requests for items such as seismic computers, military-related chemicals, communications equipment, electro-optic sensors, and nuclear reactors, that lie in the "gray area" between strictly military and strictly civilian technologies. This will be especially the case if the United States manages to normalize relations and thus becomes more than a residual supplier of China's needs.

In the first flush of euphoria of 1971–73, the Nixon Administration took a rather relaxed stance regarding the export of potentially sensitive technology and equipment, as seen in the sale of earth satellite ground receivers and the inertial navigation systems of Boeing 707 airplanes. But the Ford Administration appears to be tighter fisted. Its officials concede that the "essentially evenhanded" policy for trade with Peking and Moscow tends to preserve Moscow's vast strategic superiority. Moreover, in practice the U.S.S.R. has bought American computers that have been denied China.

Because of the U.S.S.R.'s military and industrial superiority over China, the problems of hewing to an evenhanded policy are complex.

For example, what if Peking seeks to buy certain "passive" equipment, such as radar systems, which Moscow already has and is not interested in purchasing? Evenhanded policy could either dictate a refusal to sell to either side, thereby harming Peking, or conversely a decision to sell to both, thereby helping Peking. On the other hand, what if the United States should sell both Moscow *and* Peking a strategic item, such as an advanced computer? Would such a decision actually favor the U.S.S.R. by precluding China from closing the technology gap, or would it constitute a relative gain for Peking? Moreover, the present evenhanded policy, as "a high State Department official" has conceded, might not be as balanced as is professed, if only because current U.S. export control rules do not permit the sale of items, such as computers, which would give the receiving country a sizable advance over its present technological level, and this plainly favors the Soviet Union.

Indeed, even a version of evenhandedness that eliminates current inequities vis-à-vis China may be insufficient. In certain circumstances the United States might surely see the desirability of denying some items to the Soviet Union while selling them to China in order to reduce China's strategic inferiority. Thus reintroduction into U.S. strategic trade of a "China differential"—this time favoring the People's Republic instead of discriminating against it—may make sense. Plainly, with respect to strategic trade as well as normalization, the next Administration faces some difficult decision-making.

III

Strengthening China's military potential would obviously contribute to the balancing of Soviet power. The problem is how to do so in ways that will not increase tensions with the U.S.S.R., that will not place the United States in the unattractive posture of intimately supporting yet another repressive regime, and that will not increase China's capacity to threaten America or her friends in the uncertain future.

At this stage of U.S. relations with Moscow and Peking it would seem unwise totally to abandon the principle of evenhandedness. Surely there should be no question of a consistent *de facto* alignment or "quasi-alliance" with China. Institutionalized military cooperation such as systematic sharing of intelligence with China (which would, in any case, be hard to keep secret) would seriously upset the Soviet Union and further stimulate the trend toward a return to the cold war. The United States must make it clear to Peking that it will not sacrifice *détente* with the U.S.S.R. Our survival and that of much

of the world depend upon making more, not less, progress in relaxing tensions between the two superpowers. Nevertheless, the United States need not refrain from less inflammatory actions such as the posting of military attachés at the respective liaison offices (or future embassies), exchanges of visits between groups of defense experts including high officials, and installation of a Sino-American "hot line" similar to that established between Washington and Moscow.

Nor need we be insensitive to Chinese desires for plainly defensive military equipment and related high-level technology. Fortunately, as I have noted, even when U.S. military equipment is competitive in price and quality with that of our allies, China may not wish to purchase it, in order to avoid arousing Soviet concern as well as depending unnecessarily on the United States, especially prior to normalization. Thus the current situation, in which America has begun to acquiesce in Chinese purchase of selected military items from our allies, may constitute a convenient, durable and mutually preferable resolution of the problem. The United States should remain free, of course, to hold up allied sales that raise long-run security concerns for itself or for China's neighbors, and so formal COCOM approval should be required for all future sales. Moreover, another aspect of COCOM should be changed, namely the secrecy of its operations, which only precludes legislators, businessmen, and ordinary citizens from scrutinizing allied export controls over technology transfers to communist countries.

The United States should also reserve the option to make direct sales of defensive military items to China if Soviet-American relations or Sino-Soviet relations deteriorate. Initially the United States could do so simply by interpreting the policy of evenhandedness more loosely. For example, as Michael Pillsbury suggests, the United States might offer both China and the U.S.S.R. defensive equipment that the former—but not the latter—badly needs, such as components for over-the-horizon radar and advanced satellite reconnaissance systems. Even without permanently changing the policy of evenhandedness, ad hoc sales to Peking of defensive items not made available to Moscow can serve as useful signals of American displeasure toward the Soviet Union, while meeting intrinsic Chinese needs. But only a major deterioration of Soviet-American relations or the renewal of Sino-Soviet hostilities would warrant reconsideration of the policy itself.

With respect to the sale of sophisticated technology that is capable of being used for both civilian and military purposes, the United States should adhere to the existing practice of examining each request

on a case-by-case basis within the guidelines of an evenhanded policy. But creative use should be made of the ambiguities associated with "gray area" technology, which offer considerable opportunity for a non-mechanical application of this policy by the United States and by other COCOM members. The United States should take a generous view of requests to sell China technology which the Soviet Union will not want to purchase, for this will not require departure from the principle of balanced treatment and will reduce China's strategic and technological inferiority. Export controls should surely be administered in ways that will avoid discrimination against China. If anything, in coping with China's reluctance to give details about the end use of purchased technologies and to permit inspections of actual use, the United States should demonstrate more of the flexibility and ingenuity that marked some of the early transactions with Peking, taking due account of China's historically derived sensitivity to foreign interference and her comparatively limited experience in dealing with the United States.

Above all, the United States should rescind those export control rules that permit sales of technologies to the U.S.S.R. but deny them to China on the ground that, given China's lack of technological sophistication in the area, they would add relatively more to China's military potential than to the U.S.S.R.'s. Rather, the United States should approve such exports to China as a means of reducing the technological gap and concomitant risk of a Soviet attack on China. Otherwise the United States will make the strong stronger in a relative as well as absolute sense, which is precisely what it should not want to do if it hopes to balance Soviet power in Asia.

In the case of technology transfers, as in the case of pure military sales, the United States should hold open the option of departing from the principle of evenhandedness on an ad hoc or generalized basis should great power triangular relations make this desirable. In all cases it needs to bear in mind, however, not only Soviet sensitivities but also those of its Asian friends, who are fully aware that China's military potential can still be used against them. Many Asian statesmen, including Japanese, recall the American blunder of selling scrap iron to an expansionist Japan before World War II.

The question of providing "military aid," in the sense of government credits or grants to facilitate Chinese acquisition of weapons and strategic goods, calls for a negative answer at this time. China is unlikely to ask for it, and the Soviet Union would surely be disturbed by such a quasi-alliance. Moreover, because of widespread public and congressional criticism of U.S. military assistance to re-

pressive regimes and the consequent legislation seeking to restrict it, military aid to China would prove an embarrassment to Sino-American relations except in extreme circumstances. However, should Peking seek nongovernmental financing of those military purchases it is permitted to make, it would presumably be free to obtain this on the same basis as for its ordinary trade.

Obviously the United States must be prepared to review the military aid question should renewal of Sino-Soviet hostilities stimulate a Chinese request. Similarly, a serious deterioration of Soviet relations with the West, resulting from such actions as another Angola-type adventure or Soviet aggression against Yugoslavia, might well overcome the arguments against U.S. military aid to China. In fact, if the U.S.S.R. is made aware that in such circumstances the United States might undertake military aid to China, those circumstances may never materialize. Moscow has been trying hard to foreclose this American option by emphasizing its fear of U.S. military aid to China. The United States should make clear that it will regard the option as a live one whenever things go from bad to worse.

By moving cautiously to facilitate China's military modernization under this suggested policy, the United States will reduce the risk of a Soviet attack upon China not only by contributing to the improvement of China's defenses but also by confirming a clear interest in Chinese security and her role in the balance of power. Although the United States must not meddle in China's internal affairs, it can, by these modest steps, attract favorable interest from China's military leaders and bring them into the Sino-American relationship, just as normalization will extend American contacts with other Chinese bureaucracies. Given the uncertainties of the struggle for power among various factions in Peking, this may be a factor of some significance in developing favorable relations with China after the passing of Chairman Mao and his generation. Yet, by remaining within the bounds of an evenhanded approach as long as relations with the U.S.S.R. do not deteriorate further, this policy minimizes the risk that U.S. help to China will unduly disturb Moscow, and, by limiting that help to defensive or passive equipment and technology, it should create no serious threat either to the United States and its friends, or to the Soviet Union.

IV

Whether one advocates an evenhanded approach to the Sino-Soviet rivalry or explicit leaning to Peking's side, it is important to complete the process of normalization by establishing formal diplo-

matic relations at the ambassadorial level. This is, after all, the way that nations—including the United States and the Soviet Union—ordinarily transact their business. The policy of completing the now lengthy process of normalization does not rest upon any preference for the Communist regime over the Nationalists. The United States should maintain formal diplomatic relations with whatever regime commands the obedience of the approximately 950 million people on the China mainland.

Nothing that has happened during the past five years has invalidated the reasoning that originally led the United States to seek normalization. In fact, China's economic achievements, nuclear capability and political influence have all increased significantly since ping-pong diplomacy captured the world's imagination. Administration spokesmen are correct in reminding us that there can be no stable equilibrium in Asia, and ultimately in the world, without China's constructive participation, and that normalization is a crucial element in preserving this equilibrium. Existing Sino-American contacts have already lessened the danger of conflict in Asia, where Americans have fought three wars since 1941, and the enhanced range of communication following normalization will further reduce the risks of misperception and miscalculation. Both functionally and symbolically, normalization will solidify Sino-American efforts to balance expanding Soviet power at a time when many countries are skeptical about America's capacity and will to do so. It will also improve prospects for cooperative, parallel, or at least compatible actions on many global and regional issues, even while each side competes with and seeks to discredit the other on certain issues. During the decades ahead the United States will need Chinese cooperation in arms control, in trying to remove the sources of conflict in Korea, in stabilizing relations in Southeast and South Asia, in settling Asian territorial disputes, in coping with the energy crisis and the struggle to allocate scarce resources, and in a host of other matters.

Thus it is time to place Sino-American relations on the same formal plane as Soviet-American relations and China's relations with all other important powers. The United States should realize that normalization will put pressure upon Moscow to behave more cautiously, if not more cooperatively, toward the United States. By reassuring China's leaders that the United States can serve as a counterweight to the U.S.S.R., it is also likely to reduce the chances and the extent of a possible Sino-Soviet reconciliation, which would have profoundly adverse implications for the position of the United States and its friends in world politics. Failure to vindicate the

Shanghai Communiqué's promise of normalization would intensify foreign policy debate in Peking and would be exploited by those who advocate a harder line toward the United States and movement toward the Soviet Union. Indeed, this may already be happening: while the issues in the recent political upheavals in Peking are unclear to outside observers, foreign policy disputes seem to be involved, and, since the ouster of Teng Hsiao-ping in April, certain Chinese leaders have shown less flexibility when discussing relations between the United States and China.

Normalization will also stimulate progress in more concrete aspects of U.S. relations with Peking. It will improve bilateral trade, which has dropped sharply as relations have cooled, by making the United States more than China's residual supplier. In addition, it will pave the way for the usual infrastructure of agreements that facilitate economic contacts between nations. It should produce the long-awaited settlement of property claims that the two countries have against each other. It will also eliminate a major obstacle to airline and shipping agreements and to a trade agreement that will confer most-favored-nation treatment on Chinese exports to the United States, provide for the registration of trademarks, open up official U.S. credit sources, establish institutions for the resolution of commercial disputes, and allow other steps to develop trade beyond the present modest level.

Normalization will also improve cultural exchange and travel opportunities to a certain extent, although, given Peking's closed political system, meaningful people-to-people contacts will undoubtedly remain quite limited. At a minimum, American officials and journalists should enjoy somewhat greater access to Chinese life after normalization.

To be sure, normalization in and of itself cannot guarantee success in efforts to cooperate with Peking. But it will remove a barrier and enhance prospects for developing smoother contacts, finally putting an end to the long, unhappy era in which the United States refused to acknowledge Peking's legitimacy and sustained the claims of its rival, despite Peking's control of the overwhelming bulk of China's population and territory.

If nothing else, normalization will restore a sense of momentum to Sino-American reconciliation. International politics is a dynamic process. Nothing stands still for long. If the next Administration does not go forward with Sino-American détente, relations may deteriorate and a new, more dangerous situation may develop, giving the U.S.S.R. greater freedom of action on the world scene and intro-

ducing new elements of instability on China's periphery. We should not underestimate the risks of inaction. Rather, we should think of what the world will look like ten years hence if a China possessing intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of destroying America's cities either renews her Soviet alliance or is hostile to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Dean Rusk's specter of a billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons would then haunt us all.

Thus, the benefits of normalization are likely to be significant, especially in the long run. Will the costs be reasonable? We will never know unless the United States explores Peking's price in a sustained, serious effort. Essentially there are three obstacles to normalization.

First, both Peking and Taipei insist that there is only one state of China and that only one government can represent that state. Each claims to be that government, and neither can tolerate the prospect of other countries simultaneously maintaining formal relations with both it and its rival. Peking has been successful in persuading the overwhelming majority of the world's nation-states to accept its legitimacy and to break with Taipei. No country has succeeded in both normalizing relations with the People's Republic and long maintaining an embassy in Taipei. The People's Republic is not prepared to make an exception for the only major holdout—the United States—even if Taiwan is.

A "two China" solution along the lines of the "two Germanies" model would be splendid from an American viewpoint, and in 1961 or even 1970 this proposal might have had a certain plausibility. But today it is plainly too little and too late.

Peking went as far as it could in being flexible on this point by agreeing to establish a liaison office in Washington and to permit the United States to establish one in Peking, even though the United States failed to withdraw recognition from the Nationalist government. The liaison offices have played a useful role in fostering contacts between the two governments, in promoting trade and in facilitating travel and cultural exchanges. Yet their role has been restricted because of their limited status.

The second obstacle to normalization arises from the fact that U.S. withdrawal of recognition from the Nationalist government will automatically terminate the defense treaty concluded with it in 1954. That treaty has guaranteed the island against a Chinese Communist takeover that would finally end a civil war begun half a century ago. What worries the United States is the impact which termination of this treaty might have on the island, on other allies in Asia, on Moscow and Peking, and on the American people, should it fail to

replace the treaty with some functional substitute that would maintain Taiwan's defense.

It should be pointed out, however, that few expect the People's Republic to attempt a violent conquest of Taiwan after termination of the defense treaty, even if the United States should fail to provide a substitute for the treaty. Peking's resort to force would shatter the network of relationships with the United States, Japan and other Asian countries that it has labored so assiduously to construct, weaken China's defenses on the northern borders, and run the risk of triggering radical action by Taiwan, such as a decision to declare itself an independent state, seek ties with the Soviet Union, or "go nuclear." This may well be why Peking has not yet developed the amphibious and air capability required to launch such an attack. Furthermore, Taiwan presents a formidable defense force, one that can be expected to make the military price of any Communist victory unacceptable to Peking. If Taipei, as is now expected, receives a massive infusion of American military equipment before withdrawal of recognition, and if it can continue to purchase such equipment thereafter, it should be able to defend itself as long as morale on the island remains stable.

Here lies the real challenge to American diplomacy—how to terminate the defense treaty without seriously damaging morale on Taiwan and turning prosperity into panic. Psychological factors, after all, are the most crucial, as the collapse of South Vietnam demonstrated. A sudden American termination of the defense treaty, with no functional substitute guaranteeing Taiwan's security, might expose the island to demoralization, flight of capital and subversion.

Can the United States provide a substitute for the present defense treaty—one that is acceptable to Peking? Here we run into the third obstacle to normalization—the legal status of Taiwan, an issue on which there has been considerable ambiguity in the American position. At Shanghai in 1972 the United States stated that it "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain . . . that Taiwan is part of China." It went on to state that "the United States government does not challenge that position." The meaning of this statement has been widely debated. Many observers believe that it represented a departure from the position the United States maintained from the outbreak of the Korean conflict in mid-1950—that the legal status of Taiwan is undetermined. It was not an explicit return to the position articulated by President Harry Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson in January 1950, which treated Taiwan as Chinese territory; yet the statement seemed to move the United States in that direction. Peking, of course, insists, as it has since 1949, that

"Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland."³

If the United States legally confirms that Taiwan is Chinese territory and couples this with the establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking as the sole legitimate government of China, how will the United States be able to justify some form of continuing American security guaranty for Taiwan once the 1954 defense treaty lapses? For a quarter of a century Peking has refused to bind itself not to use force to settle China's own civil war. Will it now acquiesce in American words or deeds that continue U.S. interference in that civil war under a new label?

V

Thus we see that there are three interrelated difficulties, all concerning Taiwan, that must be dealt with if normalization is to be achieved. Nixon and Kissinger took us a long way but left the hardest problems for their successors. Can these problems be solved? I believe they can, if both Washington and Peking have the will to do so.

The 1972 "Japanese formula" for normalization, which both the People's Republic and Secretary Kissinger seem to accept as a basis for Sino-American negotiations, is actually insufficient to meet the rather different circumstances of the American case. Japan, after all, had no defense treaty with Taiwan and was able to rely on the continuing American guaranty of the island's security. Yet the Japanese case does indicate that Peking may be willing to compromise with Washington, as it has with Tokyo, to win formal recognition of its legitimacy.

Peking itself presumably does not want to risk a destabilization of Taiwan's situation that might produce another Bangladesh, either through a declaration of independence by the authorities on the island or a Taiwanese revolt. Neither does it want to act in ways that would lead Taipei to "go nuclear" in a desperate effort to survive. Nor does it wish to drive the Nationalist government into the arms of the Soviet Union in order to obtain a replacement for the American defense guaranty, or to stimulate additional doubts about U.S. willingness to maintain defense commitments to other countries.

This is a reminder that China's major preoccupation is its struggle against the U.S.S.R. Although eager for the long-awaited normalization with Washington, Peking wants to achieve it without prejudicing China's effort to forge a "united front" capable of resisting the ex-

³ For background on this question, see my article, "Recognizing China," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1971.

panding power of the Soviet Union. A strong American posture toward Moscow and a continuing American presence in Asia are crucial, at least for the time being, to Peking's anti-Soviet strategy.

Thus, despite the inflexible tenor of certain recent Chinese statements, the next Administration may find the People's Republic reasonable about negotiating the terms of normalization. Surely the United States should move forward in good faith to explore this possibility with the new leadership in Peking, as indeed it is committed to do under the Shanghai Communiqué. At the same time it must assure the authorities in Taiwan that the United States is not bent upon normalization at any price, that it will not cut the island adrift but will maintain security by a new type of guaranty, that it will cushion the island against the shock of diplomatic change, and that it will maintain economic, cultural, touristic and other contacts with Taiwan.

It is difficult to anticipate the precise terms of a settlement. Peking's stance will reflect the parameters of a debate we only dimly perceive. A number of formulas are possible. The most challenging problem, of course, will be to agree upon the substance and form of a substitute guaranty of Taiwan's security to be announced at the same time as the joint communiqué establishing full diplomatic relations. Some type of public assurance from Peking that would rule out the use of force against Taiwan, while not indispensable, would be desirable even though that alone will be insufficient to maintain confidence among the people on Taiwan, in neighboring countries, and in the United States. The prospects for obtaining such an assurance are not bright, and it can only be forthcoming if it does not contradict Peking's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Although this severely limits the options, the United States should nevertheless explore the possibilities of eliciting either a unilateral or bilateral assurance. The former, for example, might consist of a statement by the Premier or Foreign Minister that would reiterate Peking's claim to Taiwan and its right to use force to complete China's civil war, but would make clear that it sees no need to use force and has no intention of doing so. The latter might consist of a Sino-American agreement declaring the international waters and airspace between Taiwan and mainland China a bilateral zone of peace and binding the two sides not to resort to force in this international area, but without spelling out the implications of this move for Taiwan.

Whether or not any public assurance from Peking is forthcoming, the United States will want to make clear its continuing concern for Taiwan's security while, at the same time, neither clarifying the

island's legal status nor raising any doubts about prospects for Taiwan's eventual reunification with the rest of China. If a bilateral agreement with the People's Republic cannot be reached, some specific form of unilateral American commitment will be necessary. One prominent possibility would be a statement expressing American determination to maintain security in the western Pacific and re-affirming, as in the Shanghai Communiqué, "interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese themselves." Anything less specific might be too little to maintain confidence on the island and among foreign investors and others whose continuing support will be necessary. Anything more specific might be too objectionable to allow Peking to look the other way as it did when, following Sino-Japanese normalization, Japan made certain unilateral statements preserving her legal position that the status of Taiwan remains undetermined.

Whether the new U.S. commitment will prove effective will depend not only on its substance but also on both its form and the actions taken to confer credibility upon the words selected. A solemn policy declaration by the President will be essential, explaining the reasons for and significance of the action and pointing out that, as in the case of Israel, the depth of the American commitment to the security of an area cannot always be judged by the presence or absence of a formal defense treaty. This presidential commitment might subsequently be bolstered by a congressional resolution authorizing in advance any action in defense of Taiwan that might, at the discretion of the President, prove necessary. Although normalization will probably be accompanied by the withdrawal of the remaining American military personnel from Taiwan, this need not preclude any necessary joint planning for the island's defense. Moreover, arrangements must be made both for continuing sale, under private auspices, of the American military equipment upon which Taiwan places virtually exclusive reliance and for expanding Taiwan's access to other suppliers.

Similarly, measures must be taken to continue the flourishing American trade with and investment in Taiwan. For example, Export-Import Bank credits and Overseas Private Investment Corporation guaranties must not be cut off, and institutions must be created to maintain the sale of nuclear fuel for peaceful uses under appropriate safeguards. Arrangements must also be made to preserve unimpeded airline, shipping and other communications, as well as touristic and cultural contacts. And questions of protecting property rights in the United States and Taiwan will have to be dealt with.

These arrangements with an unrecognized government will require

complex legislative and administrative innovations, even more challenging to legal ingenuity than those which the United States has made to initiate much more limited contacts with the People's Republic. The extent of the challenge will depend in part upon the kind of political representation maintained by the United States and Taiwan. Peking's refusal to exchange ambassadors so long as Great Britain retained a consulate on Taiwan suggests that American consular representation on the island may be impossible; nor will Peking want a Taiwan consulate in Washington. Establishment of diplomatic liaison offices similar to those now used by the United States and the People's Republic would be an optimal arrangement for Washington and Taipei, but Secretary Kissinger seems to have given up hope for so official a representation. Here the Japanese formula is likely to be applied, providing for the exchange of supposedly unofficial trade offices which would actually be staffed by diplomats and other officials. This would offer the maximum challenge to the legal ingenuity and energy of bureaucrats and legislators but would present no insuperable difficulties to retaining contacts.

Plainly, close attention must be devoted to the sequence and timing of the elements of this compromise. Although the negotiations with Peking must be kept confidential, the Administration should take pains to discuss the broad outlines of the U.S. approach in advance with congressional leaders, Asian allies and even Taiwan, and to do its best to take account of their concerns. Whatever formula may eventually emerge from the negotiations should not be announced until the executive branch is prepared to promulgate the program of necessary adjustments in U.S. diplomatic and administrative arrangements, to propose to Congress the detailed legislative changes required, and, preferably, to make known the first fruits of normalization, such as a settlement of U.S.-Chinese property claims and a scheduled visit to Washington of China's leaders. Efficient cooperation with Congress, the authorities on Taiwan, and American business will then be essential in order to maintain public confidence in the island's future. The United States will also have to obtain Peking's advance understanding of, and tacit acquiescence in, the various steps planned so that no surprise or discordance mars the transition. The aim of the exercise, after all, is to improve Sino-American relations, and the United States must not allow implementation of the arrangement to produce mistrust, as has happened in the past.

The approach suggested here does not dispose of Taiwan's fate. It does not rule out any of a number of possible outcomes, such as reunification, autonomy or independence. It recognizes, as the late

Premier Chou En-lai was fond of saying, that decades may be necessary to resolve Taiwan's status. And it reflects the American position, adopted in the Shanghai Communiqué, that the United States is prepared to accommodate to whatever outcome can be peacefully arrived at "by the Chinese themselves" on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This approach seeks a compromise—one that grants the People's Republic the legitimate treatment it has long deserved, but that does not lead to forcible integration of Taiwan with the mainland.

Of course, the new leadership in Peking may prove to be unwilling or unable to strike what the United States would regard as a reasonable compromise concerning Taiwan. If so, Washington will have no choice but to be patient and attempt to improve other aspects of its relationship with the People's Republic while awaiting a more flexible position on normalization. In these circumstances every effort should continue to be made to persuade Peking that it is in its interest as well to achieve normalization without destabilizing Taiwan and that this can be done without undermining Peking's long-standing principles.

Implementation of the policy suggested above is not likely to undermine Taiwan, discredit the United States, harm U.S. security or divide opinion at home, as some critics fear. Such a policy surely does not constitute an "abandonment of Taiwan" or "selling Taiwan into Communist subjugation." Nor can it be characterized as "a heedless rush to recognition," 27 years after the founding of the People's Republic. And if Peking does not accept the offer at this time, the Administration will at least have demonstrated good faith in trying to fulfill the expectations generated by the Shanghai Communiqué.

Whether Washington will be able to establish diplomatic relations with Peking and negotiate satisfactory arrangements concerning Taiwan will depend, of course, on a number of factors besides those relating to the island. The United States should continue to offer strong support to NATO, Japan and other nations that wish to avoid Soviet pressures, and demonstrate that it will not be naïvely taken in by Soviet stratagems in bilateral relations with the U.S.S.R. and that it will cooperate in strengthening China by a variety of direct and indirect means, including certain forms of strategic trade.

If the next Administration thus normalizes relations with Peking, accompanying this with a policy of flexible evenhandedness in strategic trade with China and the Soviet Union, it will have engaged in statesmanship of a high order and fostered the Sino-American reconciliation to which so many toasts have been offered.

ISRAEL: THE CASE FOR DEFENSIBLE BORDERS

By Yigal Allon



IT is impossible to plumb the depths of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not to speak of formulating proposals for its solution, if no true understanding exists of the full significance of its cardinal characteristic—the extreme asymmetry of its two sides. This asymmetry is manifest not merely in one or two, but in all, of its aspects. It is obvious in such objective data as the comparison between Arab and Israeli territories (of the Arab League states 8,500,000 square miles; of Israel, including presently administered areas, about 28,500); or of the relative population statistics (of the Arab League states 134,000,000; of Israel 3,500,000 citizens); not to mention their contrasting actual and potential wealth.

But of primary importance are the subjective asymmetric factors affecting relations between the two sides. In this respect, there is absolute polarization. Whereas the Arab states seek to isolate, strangle and erase Israel from the world's map, Israel's aim is simply to live in peace and good relations with all its neighbors.

These diverse objectives have determined the war aims of both sides. It is within this context that we should mention the chain of terrorist acts that was designed not merely to sow death and destruction in Israel but also to extend the conflict, and thus embroil the Arab states in full-scale wars. It is almost superfluous, and certainly tiresome, to quote the legion of statements of Arab leaders that represent this aim, ranging from the "Palestine Covenant" to current governmental declarations.

As opposed to this total Arab goal, Israel's war aims have been confined to repelling the offensives of the Arab armies as determined by strategic and political circumstances, whether by reactive counter-offensives such as those of 1948 and 1973 or by preemptive counter-offensives as those of 1956 and 1967. Military defeats, indeed, cost the Arab states losses in lives, destruction of equipment, political setbacks,

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and damage to national prestige—and perhaps even danger to their regimes. However, such defeats have never been, nor ever will be, a threat to their very existence as sovereign states or to the lives of their civilian populations. In contrast, a military defeat of Israel would mean the physical extinction of a large part of its population and the political elimination of the Jewish state. In highly realistic and clear terms, therefore, the Arab states can permit themselves a series of military defeats while Israel cannot afford to lose a single war. Nor does this reflect a historical trauma in any sense. To lose a single war is to lose everything, and this is a most real and stark fact.

As a consequence, as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict is not fully resolved, Israel must exploit to the utmost its military potential in all of its components and on a level that serves two objectives—to deter its enemies from waging war and, failing this, to be sufficient to repel the attackers and defeat them with the least cost in casualties for Israel. In essence, that Israel today still exists is due only to its success in maintaining such defensive strength. Without it, Israel would never have seen the light of day or would already have been eliminated in the first years of its existence. Such were the Arab intentions, and it was fortunate that the Arab states had not the strength to realize them.

Certainly not all the Arab states are cut from the same cloth; nor are their approaches to Israel identical. In the Arab camp there are more extreme elements that openly express their intention of destroying Israel. And there are other elements and people in the Arab world who, in the last two or three years, have expressed themselves toward Israel in less aggressive, and more realistic, terms than in the none too distant past, particularly when their declarations have been directed to the world at large. All things considered, it is in strengthening these latter elements to the extent that they become decisive in the Arab world that the best chance lies to achieve compromise and reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states—in short, to achieve a full settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the meantime that day, whenever it comes, is still far distant. The antagonisms toward Israel, the desire to see its disappearance, are deeply rooted in the Arab world, and these are fed by the authorities, not merely in speeches and articles but also in school textbooks. In fact the subject of Israel is the only one that unites the Arab states today, for they are deeply riven by splits and conflicts. The elements of realism and peace are represented by a small minority of voices in the discordant Arab chorus against Israel. And even these voices are inhibited by negative preconditions.

It was primarily in order to encourage and strengthen these voices and to convert them into a process with momentum that Israel—with all the considered and inherent dangers—entered into the two Disengagement Agreements with Egypt and Syria in 1974, and the subsequent Interim Agreement with Egypt in September 1975. Because these agreements are double-edged, they may not only be a milestone on the road to a settlement and peace, but also part of a strategy designed to push Israel to the brink, to weaken it in stages, in preparation for the steps to erase it from the map. Israel hopes that the positive side of these agreements will be the valid one, but cannot ignore the possibility of the negative.

II

The polarized asymmetry between the size and intentions of the Arab states and those of Israel, and the extreme contrast in the anticipated fate of each side in the event of military defeat, obliges Israel to maintain constantly that measure of strength enabling it to defend itself in every regional conflict and against any regional combination of strength confronting it, without the help of any foreign army. To our deep regret, this is the first imperative facing us, the imperative to survive. And I would venture to say every other state in our place would behave exactly as we do.

There are, of course, many elements constituting the essential strength that Israel must maintain, ranging from its social, scientific and economic standards, as well as its idealistic motivation, to the quality and quantity of its armaments. A discussion of all of these elements is not within the compass of this article; my concern here is with one of them—but one essential to them all and without which Israel might well lack the strength to defend itself. I am referring to the territorial element; to what can be defined as defensible borders that Israel must establish in any settlement, as an essential part of any effective mutual security arrangements and without any desire for territorial expansion per se.

The most cursory glance at the map is sufficient to ascertain how little the armistice lines of 1949—lines which were never in the first place recognized as final—could be considered defensible borders. And even the most superficial fingering of the pages of history should be enough to demonstrate how attractive these lines have been to the Arab states as an encouragement to try their strength again against us. The truth of the matter is that Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council has already recognized, in its original English text, the need to provide Israel with secure and recognized boundaries

—in other words, that changes must be introduced in the old lines of the armistice agreements.

It is no coincidence that this resolution does not speak about Israel's withdrawal from *all* the territories that came under its control in the war that was forced upon Israel in June 1967, nor even from *the* territories. In the original text (which was the outcome of long and exhaustive negotiation), Resolution 242 speaks only of withdrawal from territories. That the meaning was clear was demonstrated by the statement of the United States at the time, made by its U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg on November 15, 1967, in the Security Council discussions that preceded the passage of Resolution 242. He stated: "Historically, there never have been secure or recognized boundaries in the area. Neither the Armistice Lines of 1949, nor the Cease-Fire Lines of 1967, have answered that description."

As is known, Israel expressed more than once its willingness to withdraw from the cease-fire lines of 1967, within the framework of a peace agreement. On the other hand, it is clear—even according to the Security Council decision—that Israel is not obliged to withdraw to the armistice lines of 1949 that preceded the 1967 war, but to revised lines. The question is what borders will provide Israel with that essential minimum of security? And without such security it is difficult to expect to pacify the area and provide a lasting solution to the conflict within it.

If the sole consideration were the purely strategic-military one, then possibly the most convenient security borders would have been those Israel maintained following the Six-Day War, or perhaps those which it maintains today. There is even a basis for the claim that the 1973 Yom Kippur War—begun as a surprise attack in concert by the armies of Egypt and Syria—proves that these lines were ideally the best. Had the Yom Kippur War commenced on the 1949 armistice lines, for example, there can be little doubt that the price Israel would have had to pay in repelling the aggressors would have been unimaginably higher than that paid so painfully in October 1973. But we are not merely talking about purely military-strategic matters, to the extent that they ever exist in isolation. Nor are we discussing the maximum security that borderlines can provide Israel. As stated, our preoccupation is only with the essential minimum.

One does not have to be a military expert to easily identify the critical defects of the armistice lines that existed until June 4, 1967. A considerable part of these lines is without any topographical security value; and, of no less importance, the lines fail to provide Israel with the essential minimum of strategic depth. The gravest problem is

on the eastern boundary, where the entire width of the coastal plain varies between 10 and 15 miles, where the main centers of Israel's population, including Tel Aviv and its suburbs, are situated, and where the situation of Jerusalem is especially perilous. Within these lines a single successful first strike by the Arab armies would be sufficient to dissect Israel at more than one point, to sever its essential living arteries, and to confront it with dangers that no other state would be prepared to face. The purpose of defensible borders is thus to correct this weakness, to provide Israel with the requisite minimal strategic depth, as well as lines which have topographical strategic significance.

Of course I do not wish to overlook the fact that there are some who would claim that in an era of modern technological development such factors are valueless. In a nutshell, their claim is that the appearance of ground-to-ground missiles, supersonic fighter-bombers, and other sophisticated instruments of modern warfare has canceled out the importance of strategic depth and topographical barriers. Personally, I do not know of a single state which is willing and ready to give up a convenient borderline for this reason. At any rate, this argument is certainly invalid regarding Israel, and within the context of the Middle East conflict, where the opposite is true. Precisely because of dramatic developments in conventional weaponry the significance of territorial barriers and strategic depth has increased.

With all the heavy damage that warheads and bombs can inflict, they alone cannot be decisive in war, as long as the other side is resolved to fight back. Recent military history demonstrates this only too clearly. The German air "blitz" did not knock England out of World War II, nor did the heavy allied air bombardments bring Germany to its knees. This happened only when the last bunker in Berlin fell. Even the massive American air bombardments did not defeat North Vietnam which, in the final analysis, proved to be the victor in the war. At least as far as conventional wars are concerned, the following basic truth remains: without an attack by ground forces that physically overrun the country involved, no war can be decisive. This is all the more so in the Middle East where the Arab side is no less vulnerable to rocket and aerial bombardment than Israel, a factor that can greatly minimize the use of this kind of weaponry, and will leave to the ground forces the role of really deciding the issue.

Since decisive attack still depends on the land forces, the innovations and sophistication in weaponry and organization of ground forces that have taken place, therefore, not only fail to weaken the

value of strategic depth and natural barriers but in fact enhance their importance. This is even more true given Israel's difficult geographic position. Moreover, masses of swift and modern armor, mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery, modern engineering corps, marine and airborne commando units—when assisted by tactical airpower—provide ground forces with immense firepower, great mobility, and hence increased breakthrough potential. Since the Arab armies are busily equipping themselves with all of these means to a degree that Israel cannot match, the importance of strategic depth becomes still more apparent.

The danger threatening Israel, therefore, is that such reinforcement of the Arab ground troops with modern weaponry may well tempt the Arab states to act so swiftly on the ground that it will be difficult for Israel to inhibit their forces in the first stage, or to regain territory in a counterattack. In other words, the Arab states may be tempted to hit Israel with a first strike, preventing the latter from hitting back effectively. With such lines as those existing prior to the 1967 war, this would be a concrete and intolerable threat.

Another argument presented to counter Israel's claim to defensible borders is that Israel should be satisfied with guaranties from a single power or a number of powers to ensure its existence. Without detracting from the value of such guaranties, I would not suggest that any country make its very existence dependent upon guaranties of any kind in this changing world. If the reference is to diplomatic guaranties only, these are devoid of any real deterrent value; they are lacking in teeth. And should Israel's enemies be tempted to attack it anew, such guaranties would be of little value in their considerations. Military guaranties, however, can be of some value, but to rely exclusively upon them would be a critical error. Not only might the effectiveness of such a military guaranty prove to be short-lived, but the guaranty itself might hand over almost totally to the guarantor the recipient's power of independent action.

There is scarcely the need to recall the fate of Czechoslovakia after Munich; it is only too easy to draw up a long list of situations in which differences can evolve between the guarantor and the recipient that, in effect, would cancel out the guaranty's inherent value—even such elementary situations as disagreements over evaluation of intelligence information or changes in public opinion within the guarantor state or the position of its government at that time. Were Israel, therefore, to rely on outside guaranties, rather than to maintain a complete ability to defend itself, it would become almost totally dependent upon the guarantor. In effect, it would pass the

most critical decisions concerning its fate into the hands of foreigners who, even as the most loyal friends, would always be foreigners, and who, in the last analysis, could be expected to act in accordance with their own changing interests and concerns.

In such a situation, Israel might well be perceived as a burden rather than an asset to those seeking stability and a settlement in the Middle East. While credible military guaranties or pacts can fulfill a positive function in a settlement of the Middle East conflict—and I do not underestimate this function when, and if, the time comes—it will have to be a supplementary function to Israel's own strength, to its defensible borders, and in no way a substitute for them!


III

Fortunately, the geostrategic conditions that have existed in the Middle East over the past nine years permit a solution based upon a fair political compromise. This could provide Israel with the minimal defensible borders that are indispensable without impairing, to any meaningful extent, the basic interests of the other side, including those of the Palestinian community. As with every other compromise, so, too, is this one likely to be painful in the short term to both sides. But this compromise will, in the long run, grant advantages that both sides do not currently possess nor, without it, ever would in the future.

According to the compromise formula I personally advocate, Israel—within the context of a peace settlement—would give up the large majority of the areas which fell into its hands in the 1967 war. Israel would do so not because of any lack of historical affinity between the Jewish people and many of these areas. With regard to Judea and Samaria, for example, historical Jewish affinity is as great as that for the coastal plain or Galilee. Nonetheless, in order to attain a no less historically exalted goal, namely that of peace, such a deliberate territorial compromise can be made.

For its part, the Arab side would have to concede its claim to those strategic security zones which, together with a number of effective arrangements to be discussed below, will provide Israel with that vital element so lacking in the pre-1967 war lines: a defense posture which would enable the small standing army units of Israel's defense force to hold back the invading Arab armies until most of the country's reserve citizens army could be mobilized. These security zones would thus guarantee enough time to organize and launch the counteroffensive needed to defeat any such aggression.

As can be observed from the accompanying map, the armistice lines of 1949 ("the green line") extend along the foothills of the



Judean and Samarian mountains and along the Mediterranean coastal plain—that is, flat territory without any topographical barriers. This leaves central Israel with a narrow area that comprises the Achilles heel of the lines prior to June 4, 1967. It serves as a constant temptation to a hostile army in possession of hilly Judea and Samaria to attempt to inflict a fatal blow against Israel by severing it in two in one fell swoop. Moreover, this weakness would permit such an army not only to strike at Israel's densest population and industrial centers, but also in effect to paralyze almost all of Israel's airspace with surface-to-air missiles with which the Arab armies are so abundantly equipped.

According to the 1949 lines, Jerusalem was pierced through its heart—the university and the principal hospital on Mount Scopus were cut off, while access from the coastal plain to Jerusalem was restricted to a narrow corridor, threatened on both sides by a pincer attack.

In the northeastern sector, the 1949 line left Syria on the dominating Golan Heights, controlling the Huleh Valley and the Galilee Basin at their foothills, and including the sources of the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee from which Israel draws a vital part of its water supply. Moreover, after 1949 Syria not only repeatedly shelled the Israeli villages located at the Golan foothills but also attempted to divert the sources of the Jordan and thereby deprive Israel of a vital source of water. Even more important, the Golan Heights served in past wars as the most convenient base for the Syrian army to make swift and major attacks upon Galilee, ultimately aimed at the conquest of the entire northern part of our country.

According to the 1949 armistice agreements, signed by Israel in the naïve belief that they would lead swiftly to peace, Egypt was given control of the Gaza Strip. This was a dangerous and needless anomaly. Bordering the unpopulated Sinai desert and without any affinity to Egypt proper, this zone came to serve as a base for large-scale terrorist raids launched at southern Israel. Should the strip be returned to Egyptian control it might easily resume its destructive function. Even worse, it might serve Egypt as a bridgehead for an offensive northward and eastward toward the very heart of Israel, following the historic invasion route from south to north. Another serious defect in the armistice agreements was that it left Israel's southern port entrance at Elath on a tiny strip of shoreline only six miles long from its border with Egypt to that of Jordan. Moreover, Israel's maritime route to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean passes through the Straits of Tiran at Sharm-el-Sheikh, and the Egyptian

blockade there against Israeli ships and cargoes constituted a *casus belli* in both 1956 and 1967.

A reasonable compromise solution can be found for all these weaknesses in the current geostrategic and demographic situation existing in the Middle East. Without going into details or drawing precise maps, an activity that must await direct negotiations between the parties themselves, in my opinion the solution in principle ought to be along the following general lines.

Both to preserve its Jewish character and to contribute toward a solution of the Palestinian issue, Israel should not annex an additional and significant Arab population. Therefore the strategic depth and topographical barriers in the central sector, so totally absent in the lines preceding the 1967 war, cannot be based on moving these lines eastward in a schematic manner, even though this would be logical from a purely strategic point of view. Rather, apart from some minor tactical border alterations along the western section of "the green line," this same goal can be achieved through absolute Israeli control over the strategic zone to the east of the dense Arab population, concentrated as it is on the crest of the hills and westward. I am referring to the arid zone that lies between the Jordan River to the east, and the eastern chain of the Samarian and Judean mountains to the west—from Mt. Gilboa in the north through the Judean desert, until it joins the Negev desert. The area of this desert zone is only about 700 square miles and it is almost devoid of population. Thus this type of solution would leave almost all of the Palestinian Arab population of the West Bank under Arab rule.

Cutting through this zone, which continues from north to south, it would be possible to delineate a corridor from west to east under Arab sovereignty. This would permit uninterrupted communication along the Jericho-Ramallah axis, between the Arab populated areas of the West and East banks of the river. In this manner the only realistic solution becomes possible—one that also helps resolve the problem of Palestinian identity that could then find its expression in a single Jordanian-Palestinian state. (After all, the population of both banks, East and West, are Palestinian Arabs. The fact is that the great majority of Palestinians carry Jordanian passports while almost all of Jordan's inhabitants are Palestinians.)

Jerusalem, Israel's capital, which was never the capital of any Arab or Muslim state, but was always the capital and center of the Jewish people, cannot return to the absurd situation of being partitioned. The Holy City and adjacent areas essential for its protection and communications must remain a single, undivided unit under

Israel's sovereignty. Because of its universal status, however, in that it is holy to three great religions, as well as the mixed nature of its inhabitants¹, a solution for the religious interests connected with it can be found, a *religious* and not a political solution. For example, special status could be granted to the representatives of the various faiths in the places holy to them, just as it might be possible to base the municipal structure of the city upon subdistricts that take ethnic and religious criteria into account.

While the strategic zone in the central sector is crucial to Israel's security, so, too, is a zone on the Golan Heights. As past experience has demonstrated, a border not encompassing the Golan Heights would again invite the easy shelling of the villages below in the Huleh Valley, the Galilee Basin and eastern Galilee. More important than the danger of renewed Syrian shelling and sniping at Israeli villagers and fishermen below, which is basically a *tactical* question, is that Israel needs an effective defense line on the Golan Heights for two cardinal *strategic* reasons: first, to preclude any new Syrian attempts to deny Israel its essential water resources and, second, to prevent a massive Syrian attack on the whole of Galilee, either independently or in coordination with other Arab armies on Israel's other frontiers.

In my view the city of Gaza and its environs, which is heavily populated by Palestinian Arabs, could comprise a part of the Jordanian-Palestinian unit which would arise to the east of Israel, and serve as that state's Mediterranean port. In this case, it would be necessary to place at the disposal of traffic between Gaza and the Jordanian-Palestinian state the use of a land route (as distinct from a land corridor) similar to that, for example, connecting the United States with Alaska. But Israel must continue to control fully the strategic desert zone from the southern part of the Gaza Strip to the dunes on the eastern approaches of the town of El Arish, which itself would be returned to Egypt. This strategic zone, almost empty of population, would block the historic invasion route along the sea coast which many conquerors have taken over the generations to invade the land of Israel, and further north.

A number of border adjustments will also be essential to ensure security along sensitive areas of the 1949 Armistice line between Israel and Egypt. These must be made in such a manner as to permit full Israeli control in a number of sectors of crucial importance to its defense and which lack any value for the security of Egypt. I am refer-

¹ From the middle of the nineteenth century Jerusalem has had a Jewish majority. Today, the population consists of 260,000 Jews, 84,000 Muslims and 12,000 Christians.

ring to such areas as those surrounding Abu Aweigila, Kusseima and Kuntilla, which comprise the principal strategic crossroads on the main routes from the desert to Beersheba, and to the Elath shore line which is the gateway to Israel's maritime routes to the Indian Ocean and the Far East.

An especially sensitive point is that of the area of Sharm-el-Sheikh at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. Although, from this vantage point, there is no danger of a massive surprise attack on Israel proper, a very concrete threat to Israeli freedom of navigation does exist. It should be repeated that Egypt has twice imposed blockades against Israeli ships and cargoes seeking passage through the Straits of Tiran. And, in both instances, Israel was compelled to break this blockade mounted from Sharm-el-Sheikh by capturing the place. In one way or another, unquestionable Israeli control over this corner of the Sinai—and over a land route reaching it—is not only critical to Israeli defense, but also serves to neutralize a focal point that is liable to set the area on fire once again. Moreover, because of the threat of blockade to Israeli-bound traffic through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean, full Israeli control over Sharm-el-Sheikh might serve as a countervailing deterrent against such blockade attempts.

To sum up, there were numerous bitterly deficient points in the pre-1967 lines, and these proposals encompass minimal corrections to them required for an overall peace settlement. The necessity for these corrections is all the more apparent when it is realized that Israel not only faces the military strength of its contiguous neighbors, but may also have to face the combined strength of many other Arab countries. This has already happened to no small extent in the 1973 war, when contingents from Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan and other Arab countries participated in the fighting, together with the armies of Egypt and Syria. Thus, in a very practical sense, solid defense lines are indispensable to Israel in order to withstand the attacks of the entire Arab world. In addition, these may well be supported by contingents of so-called volunteers who can be sent from certain countries from outside the area that are hostile to Israel.

Let me stress again that defensible borders are vital to Israel not out of any desire to annex territories per se, not out of a desire for territorial expansion, and not out of any historical and ideological motivation. Israel can compromise on territory but it cannot afford to do so on security. The entire rationale of defensible borders is strategic. This is also the only rationale for the selective settlement policy that

Israel is pursuing, as an integral part of its unique defense system, in those strategic zones so vital to its security.

Of course, when the peace for which we strive is achieved, the borders will not divide the two peoples but be freely open to them. In short, good fences make good neighbors.

IV

As I have pointed out, border adjustments essential for Israel's security, and hence for the long-term stability of the entire area, must also be linked with mutually effective security arrangements designed to prevent surprise attacks by one side on the other, or at least to reduce to a minimum the danger of such attacks. In the geostrategic circumstances of the Middle East, to reduce the possibility of surprise offensives is, in fact, to reduce the danger of all offensives. I am referring to such arrangements as the delineation of both totally and partially demilitarized zones under joint Arab-Israeli control, with or without the participation of a credible international factor; or such arrangements as the delineation of parallel early-warning systems like those functioning in the Sinai according to the terms of the 1975 Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt.

I will not enter here into the technical details of such arrangements, their nature, placement and scope. Not that they are unimportant or nonessential; on the contrary, without them, Israel could not permit itself to make the far-reaching territorial compromises which, in my opinion, it should be prepared to make within the context of peace agreements with its neighbors. Let me give one example, albeit the most important, in order to illustrate this point. According to the principles I have already outlined, if Israel were to forfeit the densely populated heartland of Judea and Samaria, it would not be able to forego—under any circumstances—the effective demilitarization of these areas. Apart from civilian police to guarantee internal order, these areas would have to be devoid of offensive forces and heavy arms. In the same way as any other country, Israel would be unable to abandon areas so close to its heartland if they were liable once again to become staging areas for full-scale, limited or guerilla attacks upon its most vital areas.

In short, Israel cannot permit itself to withdraw from a large part of the West Bank unless the area from which it withdraws is shorn of all aggressive potential. For this purpose, absolute Israeli control, as proposed above, of a strategic security zone along the Jordan Basin will not be adequate. Effective demilitarization of the areas from which the Israel Defense Forces withdraw will also be essen-

tial. Here as elsewhere, the two elements are interwoven: without a security zone, Israel cannot be satisfied with demilitarization alone; without effective demilitarization, Israel cannot be satisfied with just the security zone.

It should be clear from what I have said, that Israel does not hold most of the territories that fell into its hands in the war, which was imposed on it in 1967, as an end in itself. Despite the paucity of its territory compared with the vast areas of the Arab countries, and despite the historical, strategic and economic importance of these areas, Israel would be prepared to concede all that is not absolutely essential to its security within the context of an overall peace settlement. It is holding most of these territories now only as a means to achieve its foremost goal—peace with all its neighbors.

Peace is not only a Jewish and Zionist value and goal, but an imperative national interest for Israel, coinciding with the desires of all peoples and all peace-seeking forces in the world. Because of this, particular care must be taken regarding the nature of the settlement to be reached: whether it is to be fragile, provisional, and containing the seeds of a future war; or whether it is to be stable and enduring, cutting the ground out, to the greatest possible degree, from anyone intent upon war. But just as peace itself is one of the prime elements of national security, so, too, is the ability to defend oneself a prime guaranty for the maintenance of peace. In view of the marked asymmetry existing between the war aims of those participating in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in light of the unstable internal and regional relations among the Arab states, one should be especially careful to uphold these principles here; this applies even more so to the case of Israel, for whom the threat of total obliteration is always present.

The strategic security principles outlined here are designed to achieve such a peace based on compromise—one that will satisfy the interests of both sides not merely for so limited a period as three, four, or even ten years, but for our children and the children of their children, and beyond. A conflict as complex and prolonged as that between the Arab states and Israel can only be solved through such a far-sighted approach; any other settlement will only lead to further hostilities, with all the concomitant repercussions for the entire world.

V

Is this not only desirable but also possible? My answer is yes, it is possible, maybe not today, or tomorrow, or at one time. Of course, if it were possible to achieve this in one fell swoop by an overall agreement that would solve the conflict, this would be splendid. And as

far as Israel is concerned, it desires and is ready for such a settlement as soon as possible. It may be very difficult to leap from the hostility and hatred which the Arab states bear toward Israel to an era of reconciliation and friendship. But this transition—a process if not a solitary act—is possible. It is a process that can lead from the cease-fire situation to an end of hostilities—from violence to nonviolence, from nonacceptance to acceptance, and from there to real peace. The three agreements signed since the 1973 war (two with Egypt and one with Syria) may mark the beginning of the beginning of this process.

All this of course is possible under the appropriate circumstances and requisite conditions. The central two are: first, that the realistic trend become dominant in the Arab camp, i.e., that the Arabs recognize that Israel is a reality which cannot be obliterated by further rounds of war, and that they reconcile themselves to Israel's existence by reaching a compromise agreement with it. To this end, Israel must have sufficient potential for self-defense to deter the Arab states from any additional military adventure; and should they nonetheless be so drawn to such an adventure, Israel's strength must be adequate to repel them with the minimum of damage to itself. Second, that the international community not foster the delusion among the Arab leaders that it is possible—whether by military means or political pressure—to force Israel to give up what is essential to its minimum security needs. Israel will never yield to such pressure nor will it accept any attempt to impose a solution. Its readiness to compromise is not a function of pressure or war but of its desire for peace and of Arab readiness to start moving toward that goal.

The various proposals or plans raised by third parties to the conflict only serve the opposite purpose, including that unfortunate American plan that entered history under the name of the "Rogers plan" of 1969, which erred on two main counts: first, by the very fact of its presentation to the parties instead of leaving it to them to negotiate their differences without prior conditions; second, by its total lack of any consideration for Israel's security needs. The presentation of this plan gave rise to expectation in the Arab States that Washington was about to impose on Israel a scheme favorable to the Arabs and thereby dealt a damaging blow to the hopes for evolution of realistic policies in the capitals of the Middle East. It is doubtful if any positive movement would have been achieved in the Middle East if this plan had not been shelved in 1970. French policy has played a conspicuously negative role since the Six-Day War of 1967 by its openly pro-Arab bias during the hostilities and by the unfounded interpretation given by France to Resolution 242 in flat contradiction to the

expressed intentions of its sponsors. There is no doubt that this French attitude has encouraged even the least extremist of the Arab States to adopt rigid and uncompromising positions. Outside powers and international organs should strictly refrain from making their own proposals for the solution of the conflict. And if one cannot hope for such "monasticism" in the coming period on the part of those powers hostile to Israel, such as the U.S.S.R.—which is interested in perpetuating the conflict in the region at the expense of the welfare of all the peoples living there—one would hope for such behavior on the part of such friendly powers as the United States, that insist upon the region's peace for the benefit of all. If we had not had to deal with such proposals in the past, we would now be nearer to a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The actual conditions and details of a peace settlement between Israel and the Arab states, and even the next stage toward it, should such a transitional stage prove necessary, must be left in the hands of the parties themselves. Should the Arab states sit at the negotiating table without any preconditions, with full acceptance of Israel's legitimate existence and readiness to make a balanced compromise peace with it, I believe it will be possible to solve all the basic points of conflict, including a constructive solution of the problem of Palestinian identity.

I have no doubt that Israel would be ready and willing, on the basis of such a realistic approach, to negotiate a peace settlement with each of its neighbors, at any time and at any place, within the framework of the Geneva Conference or outside it. If these conditions are achieved, peace in the Middle East becomes not only a desirable goal but a possible one. I will not prophesy when such a turning point will be reached. Very much depends on international circumstances, and on the way these are interpreted by the Arab states. However, it is my firm belief that this stage is bound to come because there is no realistic alternative for the peoples and countries of the region.

THE ANTI-ZIONIST RESOLUTION

By Bernard Lewis



ON NOVEMBER 10, 1976, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Resolution declaring that "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination." Seventy-two votes were recorded in favor of the Resolution, and 35 against. There were 32 abstentions, and three countries—Romania, South Africa and Spain—for different reasons, were recorded as absent.

The Resolution attracted a great deal of attention, and has been much used to attack both Zionism and the United Nations. In the Soviet and Arab camps the Resolution was regarded as constituting formal condemnation, before the tribunal of mankind, of Zionism and of the state which it established. In other quarters it was regarded as evidence of the decline and fall of the United Nations.

The Resolution was not an isolated phenomenon, but part of a continuing process. The campaign to secure a U.N. condemnation of Zionism¹ was launched at the World Conference of the International Women's Year held in Mexico City in late June and early July 1975; the "Declaration on the Equality of Women" issued on that occasion repeatedly stresses the share of women in the struggle against neocolonialism, foreign occupation, Zionism, racism, racial discrimination and apartheid.² On October 17 the Third Committee of the General Assembly—concerned with social, humanitarian and cultural affairs—agreed by a substantial majority that Zionism was a form of racism and called upon the General Assembly to do likewise. This was duly done, and the Resolution made the basis for a series of further condemnations in different agencies and at various meetings of the United Nations, most recently at the Habitat conference in Canada.

¹ A General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1973, condemning, *inter alia*, "the unholy alliance between South African racism and Zionism" had no immediate effect.

² It is striking that while the Declaration condemns Zionism four times, it calls just once for the elimination of "rape, prostitution, physical assault . . . child marriage, forced marriage or marriage as a commercial transaction," and makes no reference to polygamy or concubinage.

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II

An inquiry into the Resolution, its genesis and its consequences, might begin with the double question: How much truth is there in the charge that Zionism is a form of racism? How much truth is there in the countercharge leveled by some Zionists and some of their friends that the Resolution is a thinly disguised form of anti-Semitism and is itself a return to the racial politics of Nazi Germany and its allies in the 1930s?

Zionism is basically not a racial movement but a form of nationalism or, to use the current nomenclature, a national liberation movement. Like other such movements, it combines various currents, some springing from tradition and necessity, others carried on the winds of international change and fashion. Most important among the former is the Jewish religion itself, with its recurring stress on Zion, Jerusalem and the Holy Land, and with the interwoven and recurring themes of bondage and liberation, of exile and return. The messianism and movements of religious revival which arose among Jews from the seventeenth century also made an important contribution to the genesis of this movement. The persecutions to which Jews were subject, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, gave an enormous impetus to its development.

In its political form, Zionism is quite clearly a nationalist movement of the type which was common in parts of Europe in the nineteenth century and which spread to much of Asia and Africa in the twentieth century. It is no more racial and no more discriminatory than other movements of this type—indeed less than most, since it is based on an entity defined primarily in religious rather than ethnic terms. The definition of a Jew according to rabbinical law is one who is born of a Jewish mother irrespective of the religious or racial origin of the father, or one who is duly converted to Judaism. This is not a racial definition; for the racist, fathers are at least as relevant as mothers, and identity cannot be changed at will. Zionism has always accepted this definition of the Jew, and the laws of the modern state of Israel recognize a convert to Judaism as a Jew and a convert from Judaism as a non-Jew. Zionism is certainly a form of nationalism, and the state of Israel may therefore practice some forms of discrimination, but these are not racial, insofar as this word retains any precise meaning at the present time.

The contrary accusation, that anti-Zionism is a form of anti-Judaism, is also false. Zionism is a political ideology, which Jews and others may accept or reject at will. There are good and faithful Jews

who are non-Zionists or even anti-Zionists, and an anti-Zionist posture does not *necessarily* mean that its holder is an anti-Semite.

In any case, the Jews are not a race as that word is used at the present time. It was only in the pseudoscience of the Nazis and those who were duped by them that the Jews were regarded as such. Zionism is concerned with the claims of what it asserts to be a nation, and has both the merits and the defects common to nationalist movements. If Zionism is racist, then so too are the various nationalisms of Asia, Africa and elsewhere.

In examining any accusation, the question may be asked whether the accusers come with clean hands. Are they themselves racists? Do they themselves practice racial or other discrimination? And are they honest in their claim that their hostility is political, against Zionism, and not ethnic or religious, against Jews?

Some form of discrimination against groups other than the dominant group—whether defined by religion, race, culture, language, social origin or sex—exists in virtually every member-state of the United Nations, in some more actively and perniciously than in others. The inquiring reader may find it instructive to look through the lists of supporters, opponents, and abstainers with this in mind. The Arab countries of the Middle East are on the whole not racist, though other forms of discrimination flourish there no less than elsewhere. One may be less sure of the attitudes and policies of the Soviet Union and its satellites.

The claim put forward that the non-communist accusers attack Zionism but have reverence for Judaism as a divine religion is open to doubt. There is a vast literature of denigration and denunciation of the Jews published in Arabic, ranging over the whole of Jewish history from remote antiquity to the present day and including all kinds of accusations culled, in the main, from European anti-Semitic literature. Paradoxically, Arab authors appear to show more respect for Israel and Zionism than for Jewish religion and history. Discussions of the former are occasionally serious and factual; on the latter they rarely rise above the level of uninformed polemic and abuse, drawn partly from local stereotypes but relying very largely on such typical products of Christian anti-Semitism as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. This well-known anti-Semitic fabrication now has more editions in Arabic than in any other language. It is universally cited in Arabic literature on Jewish matters, has been endorsed by heads of state and other prominent personages, and is taught as a basic Jewish text in some Arab university courses in comparative religion. To my knowledge, its authenticity has never been refuted or even called into

question by any Arab writer.³ More practical attitudes are illustrated by the fate of the Jewish communities in Arab countries, and by such noteworthy cases as the refusal by Saudi Arabia a few years ago to grant an *agrément* to a distinguished British diplomat, appointed as Ambassador, when it became known that he was of Jewish origin.

III

Who were the sponsors of the Resolution and what were their aims? In part, the Resolution was a stepping stone for the Arab states toward their next objective, Israel's expulsion from the United Nations. No doubt they will return to this goal; meanwhile the Resolution serves a useful propaganda purpose. In part it was probably intended as a maneuver against Egypt—to embarrass the Egyptian government by forcing it to join in this exercise and to sabotage independent Egyptian moves toward peace. In this, the sponsors of the Resolution achieved some initial success, notably when President Sadat was provoked into making remarks about Jewish predominance in the Egyptian economy which were reminiscent of banal street-corner anti-Semitism. The unwonted clumsiness with which President Sadat handled this matter suggests that, for the Egyptians at least, it came as something of a surprise.

In part again it was an attempt, by no means without effect, to win wider support for the Arab view of Zionism. It had little success with the liberal and open societies of Northern and Western Europe and North America which lined up with impressive unanimity (this time including even France) in rejecting it. It was more successful with the countries of the Third World, for whom the issue is abstract and remote, and who have little knowledge of Jews or of Zionism. They are, however, much concerned with racism and with the particular manifestation of it in Southern Africa, and the Resolution was, among other things, designed as a bid for their support.

The co-sponsors of the Resolution were the Arabs and the Russians, and their attitudes to the problems of both Zionism and racism are significantly different, not only from each other but also from the

³ A Marxist author (Jalāl Sādiq al-'Azm, *Al-Naqd al-Dhālī ba'd al-hazīma*, Beirut, 1972, pp. 53 ff.) pours ridicule on personal and conspiratorial explanations of history, such as those relying on the Protocols, but without in any way indicating they are a fabrication. On the Protocols and other anti-Semitic literature in Arabic, see Y. Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel*, trans. Misha Louvish, Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972, especially pp. 229 ff.; Norman A. Stillman, "New Attitudes toward the Jew in the Arab World," in *Jewish Social Studies*, 37, 3-4:197-204 (1975); X, "The 'Protocols' among Arabs," in *Patterns of Prejudice*, 9, 4:17-19 (1975). In 1969 a UNESCO expert commission with American, French and Turkish members reported on its investigation of an Israeli complaint about anti-Semitic material in Arabic school textbooks used in UNRWA camps. Out of 127 books examined for this purpose, the commission recommended that 48 be retained, 65 modified before further use, and 14 withdrawn entirely.

Afro-Asian and other countries whom they persuaded to join them.

For the Arabs, the conflict over the Palestine question long antedates any interest on their part in Zionism. Indeed, the quite extensive literature produced in Arabic from the late nineteenth century until the period following the Second World War shows a remarkable lack of concern with Zionist theory and doctrine. On the whole, the Arabs saw the conflict—rightly one may say—as one between two groups of people both desiring the same territory. Such abstract questions as the varying nationalist theories of the one side or the other were of limited interest, and the Arabic literature on Zionism until after the Second World War is meager and very largely derivative. In the main it seems to rely either on accounts written by Zionists themselves, some of which were translated or adapted from English into Arabic, or, increasingly from the mid-1930s, on accounts of Fascist or Nazi provenance, depicting Zionism as a dangerous form of left-wing radicalism. At that time, anti-Zionist propaganda described Zionism as a revolutionary and pro-Bolshevik or socialistic movement which was introducing radical social ideas and practices into the Middle East and should therefore be opposed. This was the main burden of propaganda for a long time, and was used even by Nasser in his early years, until his change of ideology and alignment made “radical” and “socialistic” compliments instead of insults, and therefore no longer appropriate labels for Zionism. The late King Faisal preferred the old line to the new one and went on using it until his death. Others were more sophisticated, and from the 1960s, Arab attacks on the Zionist enterprise and on Zionist theory began to make extensive use of such terms as *racist*, and to seek resemblances between Israel and South Africa, and, even more remarkably, between Zionists and Nazis.⁴

The German Nazis were of course the arch racists of our time, and it is instructive to review the evolution of Arab attitudes toward them. During the lifetime of the Third Reich and for some time after, the word *Nazi* in the Arab world was in general not an insult, and an association with Hitler and his regime was a matter of pride rather than of shame. Many of the leaders of Arab nationalism, including some in power at the present time, were closely associated with the Nazis, and speak proudly of their efforts in memoirs and elsewhere. In the early years of the Nasser regime, Egypt came to share with some Latin American countries the dubious honor of being a haven

⁴ A macabre example is the claim sometimes put forward by PLO spokesmen that while the Israelis are the heirs of Hitler, they themselves are the heirs of the heroes of the Warsaw ghetto. Who, one wonders, are the heirs of Hitler's faithful coadjutor, the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husayni?

for Nazi and other Axis war criminals, and the influence of Nazi experts could be seen in the techniques of both repression and propaganda. Some Arab authors, even including leftists, found it hard to condemn the Nazi crimes against the Jews, and felt impelled to justify, extenuate, diminish, or even deny them.

Only with the rise of Soviet influence in the Arab countries from the mid-1950s onward did this begin to change. *Nazi* appears to have been used for the first time as a term of abuse in the Arabic political vocabulary by Qasim of Iraq criticizing Nasser of Egypt, and this use of the term, at the time, was a danger signal of the growth of Soviet influence in Baghdad. Times have changed, and the term *Nazi* is now generally used as a synonym for the commoner term *Fascist* to denote reactionary movements condemned by the current radical regimes. The racial aspect of Nazism was less important in Arab political discussion. In modern times, race has on the whole not been an issue in Arab politics, and even such major conflicts as those between Arabs and Kurds, Arabs and Persians, and above all Arabs and Jews have not been seen in racial terms. Thus, the preamble to the Syrian Constitution of 1969, amended in 1971, lists the enemies against which the Arab masses are struggling as "colonialism, Zionism and exploitation"—not racism. But the new theme has been slowly emerging. In Article 19 of the Palestine National Covenant of 1964,⁵ *racist* is added to the list of pejorative adjectives applied to Zionism, while in 1965 a publication of the PLO, significantly in English, classifies Zionism as a form of racism.⁶ Before long, Jewish racism was traced back to antiquity, and its sources found in the Bible and the Talmud. The reasons for this change are obvious enough. For one thing, racism can be identified with imperialism, with alien domination. For another, the fashionable enemy in the West in our day is the racist, just as a few years back he was the communist.

But what does the word *racist* actually mean? It is a fairly recent innovation in American English, and even more so in British English. Both this word, and the earlier British term *racialist*, were at first principally applied to the doctrines of the Nazis, including their precursors and their disciples; the Nazis used the words *racist* and *racism* of themselves and their beliefs, and thus brought them into general circulation.

But all that is past and, except among the surviving victims and some readers of history, forgotten. For a long time now the word has

⁵ Article 22 of the amended version adopted in 1968.

⁶ Hasan Sa'ab, *Zionism and Racism*, Palestine Essays No. 2, Research Centre, PLO, Beirut, December 1965.

been used and understood mainly in its American adaptation—i.e., as referring to the relations between whites and non-whites. By choosing the racist as enemy and defining him in these terms, the international community, in this as in so many other respects, is taking its cue from the United States—the most important open society in existence, the forum where the issues in the world's debates are formulated and argued, the theater where the U.N. General Assembly enacts its dramas. If, as is not impossible, the racist is at some future time replaced by some other fashionable enemy, then no doubt the denunciation of Zionism will be adjusted accordingly. For the moment, however, the racist retains his primacy as enemy number one, and is commonly defined in terms of color; this accords well with the experience of many Asian and African countries—of white supremacy and imperial domination—and is so understood in most parts of the world.

In most, but not all. In Israel, color was never much of an issue, and the problem of race, as understood in America and Africa is irrelevant and meaningless; among a people whose dominant memory is of the Holocaust, racism still connotes Nazism and anti-Semitism, and the accusation was thus received with a special kind of outrage.

IV

But it is not only for Israelis that the word *racist* still evokes the Nazi meaning, with all its appalling associations. The Russians, too, use it largely in that sense. In Eastern Europe, in general, the problem of color is of minor importance, the colonial experience of an entirely different character, and the memory of the Nazis and their enormities still vivid. This memory, and the fear and revulsion it arouses, has been much used in Russia, where the word *racist* has undergone another process of semantic development, related on the one hand to the Nazi past, and on the other to the internal problems of the Soviet Union. Specifically, in the technical vocabulary of Soviet vituperation, the term *racist* is applied to nationalist movements linking the non-Slavic peoples of the Union with their kin elsewhere.

In Soviet Russia only Soviet patriotism is approved and this, in fact, though not in theory, now embraces Great Russian nationalism. The nationalisms of other peoples within the Union are suspect and are variously described by such epithets as feudal, bourgeois, reactionary and clericalist. The term *racist* is used more particularly of those movements which have an actual or potential focus outside the Soviet Union. Many of the peoples in the Asian Republics of the U.S.S.R. speak a Turkish or an Iranian language, and pan-Turkism and pan-Iranism—linking divided peoples and, potentially, looking

toward Ankara and Tehran—thus represent a danger to Soviet unity. Condemnation of these movements, and of pan-Islamism as well, is therefore fierce and unrelenting, and is a feature of Soviet polemic literature, both political and academic. The charge of racism is often brought against such movements, and its extension to Zionism—a kind of pan-Judaism, with a focus in Israel—is a development of its use against pan-Turkism and pan-Iranism. The offense is the same: a group or groups of Soviet subjects identify themselves with others of the same religion, culture or origin outside the Soviet Union, and therefore constitute a possibly disruptive element.⁷

A new major Soviet attack on pan-Turkism, pan-Iranism and pan-Islamism was launched in the years following World War II. Charges of racism figured prominently in the campaign and were given some color of plausibility by the collaboration of elements among the peoples concerned with the German invaders. (The collaboration of large numbers of Russians and other Slavs gave rise to no such inferences.) By labeling even cultural movements among the subject peoples as “racist,” the Soviets sought to link them with the Nazis, and thus hold them up to universal execration.

The Jews, as so often, are a special case. Unlike the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and other “nationalities,” they have no regional homeland within the U.S.S.R.; Soviet attempts to create a Jewish district in Birobidjan, in the Far East, have so far been desultory and ineffective. Neither have the Jews, to any extent, retained a separate and distinctive culture; Soviet restrictions on religious practice and on Jewish cultural activity have seen to that. Instead, Jews in Russia, as in the West, are increasingly becoming an assimilated minority, indistinguishable in language and culture from those among whom they live. There is however one significant difference from the West. We speak of American Jews, French Jews, Dutch Jews, and by extension of Russian Jews—but in the Soviet context this expression is a contradiction in terms. One is either a Russian or a Jew, but one cannot be both, since “Russian” and “Jew” in Soviet law are both “nationalities” (*natsionalnost*), within the common Soviet citizenship, and are, therefore mutually exclusive categories. The Soviets do not recognize religion as a form of identity, but maintain Jewish separateness through the principle of a Jewish *natsionalnost*. The word *Jew* is inscribed on every Soviet Jew’s identity documents, and in many ways affects the treatment he receives. The Jew, like the Uzbek or the Ar-

⁷ See Vincent Monteil, “Essai sur l’Islam en U.R.S.S.” in *Revue des Études Islamiques*, pp. 107–125, (1952); Alexandre A. Bennigsen, “The Crisis of the Turkic National Epics 1951–1952: Local Nationalism or Internationalism?” in *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 17, 2–3:453–74 (1975).

menian, belongs in Soviet law to a national minority; unlike them, he has no territorial base or political institutions, and little opportunity to develop and express a distinctive cultural identity. Soviet practice allows him neither to remain a Jew nor to become a Russian, and thus places him in an agonizing dilemma, which is worsened by widespread and deep-rooted hostility. Emigration, when permitted, is one answer. Zionism, which in a sense arose as a Jewish response to this kind of situation, has been outlawed in the U.S.S.R. almost from the beginning, and subjected to both repression and propaganda attacks. In recent years these have assumed a familiar demonological aspect, and the Zionist has become the root of all evil, both at home and abroad.

The charge of Nazi collaboration was not of course brought against the Jews or the Zionists in the years 1939-40, the period between the Soviet-German pact and the German invasion of Russia. Even during the war, the Soviets seem to have made considerable efforts to blur the fact that the Nazis persecuted Jews. To stress it could have had untoward effects—either by arousing sympathy for the Nazis, or by arousing sympathy for the Jews, both undesirable in Soviet eyes.

Until the Israeli victory of 1967, however, the problem of Zionism in the U.S.S.R. was manageable, and individual suppression sufficed. The Israeli victory in the Six-Day War generated enormous enthusiasm among Soviet Jews and a certain amount of sympathy even among Soviet non-Jews; for the first time, Zionism was seen as a serious problem, comparable with other nationalist movements which had plagued the colonial administrators of Tsarist Russia and their Soviet successors. The results were immediately visible in a vehement campaign of abuse, particularly in the attempt to equate the Israelis with the Nazis as aggressors, invaders, occupiers, racists, oppressors and murderers. Some of the literature produced at the time in the Soviet Union and its satellites was anti-Semitic and not merely anti-Zionist, sometimes even resorting to such classical themes as the world Jewish conspiracy and the use of Gentile blood for religious purposes.⁸

Some Jews, alarmed by such propaganda and its effects on Jews in communist countries, have seen in the Soviet Union a new danger to Jews and Judaism comparable with that of Nazi Germany. Certainly there are resemblances—in the totalitarian character of the two societies, and in the ruthless use of chauvinism and prejudice where appropriate and helpful to the purposes of the state. A further resemblance is that the Russian Communists have learned the value of anti-Jewish

⁸ See William Korey, *The Soviet Cage: Anti-Semitism in Russia*, New York: The Viking Press, 1973; Baruch A. Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda, a Case Study of the Middle East Conflict*, Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1976.

propaganda as a divisive force among their foreign clients or adversaries. The Nazis, by fostering anti-Semitic feeling in the West, tried to weaken and divide their opponents, sometimes achieving a measure of success that helped their conquests in Europe; the Russians are playing intensively on the anti-Zionist theme, and trying to persuade the non-Jewish majorities in both East European and Western countries that resistance to Soviet demands means pandering to Zionist (i.e., Jewish) interests, and that their Jewish compatriots are disaffected and dangerous. "Zionist" conspirators were blamed for dissident trends in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other Soviet allies, and great stress was laid on the Jewish background, sometimes real and sometimes invented, of some of the protagonists. A favorite theme is the presumed disloyalty of Western Jews. Thus, even Mr. Kissinger has been called a "Zionist agent,"⁹ and Jewish members of the U.S. Congress are alleged to place loyalty to Tel Aviv above loyalty to their country. (The loyalty of American citizens is of course a prime concern of the Soviet government.)

There is another respect in which the Anti-Zionist Resolution may be important, especially for the Soviets. In bygone days Jews were persecuted on religious grounds. In the twentieth century, religious oppression was no longer acceptable or even believable; when the Nazis sought to eliminate Jews from German life, they did not appeal to outdated religious doctrines and prejudices, but instead took their stand on the "scientific" grounds of race. Jews were different and had to be dealt with, not because they followed a false doctrine but because they belonged to an alien and inferior race. Today, a new rationale is needed, to replace race as race replaced religion—and Zionism provides the answer. In the Soviet Union, where religion and race are both equally taboo in official doctrine, only ideology provides a possible basis in law and public statement for separation, discrimination and repression. Zionism is therefore condemned as an ideological transgression, and those who support it or can be alleged to support it (this last is an important point) may be punished without any danger of a charge of religious or racial discrimination or prejudice. The case is strengthened if it can be shown that this transgression has been condemned by the "forum of mankind," the General Assembly of the United Nations. The speed with which the passage of the Resolution was announced by the Soviet information media, in contrast to their usual slowness, is instructive. Anti-Zionism thus serves a double purpose for the Soviet Union. At home it provides the necessary ideological instrument for the containment of what is seen as a

⁹ Hazan, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

danger to the political loyalties of an important group of Soviet subjects and a potential disruptive force extending to other national liberation movements among the subject peoples of the Soviet Union and of the larger Soviet Empire. Abroad it helps to create suspicion and disunity and thus weaken resistance to Soviet purposes.

It has been said before that anti-Zionism is not the same as anti-Semitism and that many anti-Zionists hold such views with the best intentions unrelated to any form of prejudice. The disagreeable fact remains that anti-Zionism is very often a cloak for vulgar anti-Semitism, for which it provides possibilities of expression and action previously lacking. Particularly in the English-speaking world, anti-Semitism has never acquired the degree of intellectual or political respectability which, at various times, it achieved in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in France, and no one with political ambitions or intellectual pretensions can openly avow it. It is an ironic achievement of Zionism to have lent it a veil of respectability.

V

The coalition that passed the anti-Zionist Resolution was made up of disparate elements: the innocent majority, beguiled by semantic sleight of hand and irrelevant slogans and diverted from their own needs and interests; the trimmers, daunted by the power or tempted by the wealth of one or other of the sponsors, offering private apologies for their public actions; the Arabs and their associates, obsessed with one danger, oblivious of others; the Russians, as always carefully pursuing their special purposes, and convoking the grand alliance of all who oppose the West, its institutions, its way of life, its friends.

Between the Arab and Russian co-sponsors of the Resolution there is some convergence, but greater divergence of purpose. For the Arabs, the aim is to delegitimize the state of Israel. The condemnation of its ideological basis, for whatever reason, is an important step toward that end and, together with excluding Israel from UNESCO, the ILO, and other U.N. bodies, forms a kind of incantatory prefigurement of the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations and the ultimate dismantling of the "Zionist state." For the Russians, the purpose is to delegitimize, not just the state of Israel, but the Jewish people, or at least Jewish peoplehood, and to obtain for their actions toward this end a seal of international approval. It is a somber prospect.

All this has nothing whatever to do with the rights and wrongs of the Arab-Israel conflict which, despite its bitterness and complexity, is basically not a racial one. It is no service to the cause of peace or of either protagonist to inject the poison of race into the conflict now.

ENERGY STRATEGY: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN?

By Amory B. Lovins

Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.

—Robert Frost



WHERE are America's formal or de facto energy policies leading us? Where might we choose to go instead? How can we find out?

Addressing these questions can reveal deeper questions—and a few answers—that are easy to grasp, yet rich in insight and in international relevance. This paper will seek to explore such basic concepts in energy strategy by outlining and contrasting two energy paths that the United States might follow over the next 50 years—long enough for the full implications of change to start to emerge. The first path resembles present federal policy and is essentially an extrapolation of the recent past. It relies on rapid expansion of centralized high technologies to increase supplies of energy, especially in the form of electricity. The second path combines a prompt and serious commitment to efficient use of energy, rapid development of renewable energy sources matched in scale and in energy quality to end-use needs, and special transitional fossil-fuel technologies. This path, a whole greater than the sum of its parts, diverges radically from incremental past practices to pursue long-term goals.

Both paths, as will be argued, present difficult—but very different—problems. The first path is convincingly familiar, but the economic and sociopolitical problems lying ahead loom large, and eventually, perhaps, insuperable. The second path, though it represents a shift in direction, offers many social, economic and geopolitical advantages, including virtual elimination of nuclear proliferation from the world. It is important to recognize that the two paths are mutually exclusive. Because commitments to the first may foreclose the second,

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we must soon choose one or the other—before failure to stop nuclear proliferation has foreclosed both.¹

II

Most official proposals for future U.S. energy policy embody the twin goals of sustaining growth in energy consumption (assumed to be closely and causally linked to GNP and to social welfare) and of minimizing oil imports. The usual proposed solution is rapid expansion of three sectors: coal (mainly strip-mined, then made into electricity and synthetic fluid fuels); oil and gas (increasingly from Arctic and offshore wells); and nuclear fission (eventually in fast breeder reactors). All domestic resources, even naval oil reserves, are squeezed hard—in a policy which David Brower calls “Strength Through Exhaustion.” Conservation, usually induced by price rather than by policy, is conceded to be necessary but it is given a priority more rhetorical than real. “Unconventional” energy supply is relegated to a minor role, its significant contribution postponed until past 2000. Emphasis is overwhelmingly on the short term. Long-term sustainability is vaguely assumed to be ensured by some eventual combination of fission breeders, fusion breeders, and solar electricity. Meanwhile, aggressive subsidies and regulations are used to hold down energy prices well below economic and prevailing international levels so that growth will not be seriously constrained.

Even over the next ten years (1976–85), the supply enterprise typically proposed in such projections is impressive. Oil and gas extraction shift dramatically to offshore and Alaskan sources, with nearly 900 new oil wells offshore of the contiguous 48 states alone. Some 170 new coal mines open, extracting about 200 million tons per year each from eastern underground and strip mines, plus 120 million from western stripping. The nuclear fuel cycle requires over 100 new uranium mines, a new enrichment plant, some 40 fuel fabrication plants, three fuel reprocessing plants. The electrical supply system, more than doubling, draws on some 180 new 800-megawatt coal-

¹ In this essay the proportions assigned to the components of the two paths are only indicative and illustrative. More exact computations, now being done by several groups in the United States and abroad (notably the interim [autumn 1976] and forthcoming final [1976–1977] reports of the energy study of the Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, Mass.), involve a level of technical detail which, though an essential next step, may deflect attention from fundamental concepts. This article will accordingly seek technical realism without rigorous precision or completeness. Its aim is to try to bring some modest synthesis to the enormous flux and ferment of current energy thinking around the world. Much of the credit (though none of the final responsibility) must go to the many energy strategists whose insight and excitement they have generously shared and whose ideas I have shamelessly recycled without explicit citation. Only the limitations of space keep me from acknowledging by name the 70-odd contributors, in many countries, who come especially to mind.

fired stations, over one hundred and forty 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactors, 60 conventional and over 100 pumped-storage hydroelectric plants, and over 350 gas turbines. Work begins on new industries to make synthetic fuels from coal and oil shale. At peak, just building (not operating) all these new facilities directly requires nearly 100,000 engineers, over 420,000 craftspeople, and over 140,000 laborers. Total indirect labor requirements are twice as great.²

This ten-year spurt is only the beginning. The year 2000 finds us with 450 to 800 reactors (including perhaps 80 fast breeders, each loaded with 2.5 metric tons of plutonium), 500 to 800 huge coal-fired power stations, 1,000 to 1,600 new coal mines and some 15 million electric automobiles. Massive electrification—which, according to one expert, is “the most important attempt to modify the infrastructure of industrial society since the railroad”³—is largely responsible for the release of waste heat sufficient to warm the entire freshwater runoff of the contiguous 48 states by 34–49°F.⁴ Mining coal and uranium, increasingly in the arid West, entails inverting thousands of communities and millions of acres, often with little hope of effective restoration. The commitment to a long-term coal economy many times the scale of today’s makes the doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration early in the next century virtually unavoidable, with the prospect then or soon thereafter of substantial and perhaps irreversible changes in global climate.⁵ Only the exact date of such changes is in question.

The main ingredients of such an energy future are roughly sketched in Figure 1. For the period up to 2000, this sketch is a composite of recent projections published by the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), Federal Energy Administration (FEA), Department of the Interior, Exxon, and Edison Electric Institute. Minor and relatively constant sources, such as hydroelectricity, are omitted; the nuclear component represents nuclear


² The foregoing data are from M. Carasso *et al.*, *The Energy Supply Planning Model*, PB-245 382 and PB-245 383, National Technical Information Service (Springfield, Va.), Bechtel Corp. report to the National Science Foundation (NSF), August 1975. The figures assume the production goals of the 1975 State of the Union Message. Indirect labor requirements are calculated by C. W. Bullard and D. A. Pilati, CAC Document 178 (September 1975), Center for Advanced Computation, Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

³ I. C. Bupp and R. Treitel, “The Economics of Nuclear Power: De Omnibus Dubitandum,” 1976 (available from Professor Bupp, Harvard Business School).

⁴ Computation concerning waste heat and projections to 2000 are based on data in the 1975 Energy Research and Development Administration Plan (ERDA-48).

⁵ B. Bolin, “Energy and Climate,” Secretariat for Future Studies (Fack, S-103 10 Stockholm); S. H. Schneider and R. D. Dennett, *Ambio* 4, 2:65–74 (1975); S. H. Schneider, *The Genesis Strategy*, New York: Plenum, 1976; W. W. Kellogg and S. H. Schneider, *Science* 186:1163–72 (1974).

FIGURE 1



heat, which is roughly three times the resulting nuclear electric output; fuel imports are aggregated with domestic production. Beyond 2000, the usual cutoff date of present projections, the picture has been extrapolated to the year 2025—exactly how is not important here—in order to show its long-term implications more clearly.⁶

III

The flaws in this type of energy policy have been pointed out by critics in and out of government. For example, despite the intensive electrification—consuming more than half the total fuel input in 2000 and more thereafter—we are still short of gaseous and liquid fuels, acutely so from the 1980s on, because of slow and incomplete substitution of electricity for the two-thirds of fuel use that is now direct. Despite enhanced recovery of resources in the ground, shortages steadily deepen in natural gas—on which plastics and nitrogen fertilizers depend—and, later, in fuel for the transport sector (half our oil now runs cars). Worse, at least half the energy growth never reaches the consumer because it is lost earlier in elaborate conversions in an increasingly inefficient fuel chain dominated by electricity generation (which wastes about two-thirds of the fuel) and coal con-

⁶ Figure 1 shows only *nonagricultural* energy. Yet the sunlight participating in photosynthesis in our harvested crops is comparable to our total use of nonagricultural energy, while the sunlight falling on *all* U.S. croplands and grazing lands is about 25 times the nonagricultural energy. By any measure, sunlight is the largest single energy input to the U.S. economy today.

version (which wastes about one-third). Thus in Britain since 1900, primary energy—the input to the fuel chain—has doubled while energy at the point of end use—the car, furnace or machine whose function it fuels—has increased by only a half, or by a third per capita; the other half of the growth went to fuel the fuel industries, which are the largest energy consumers.

Among the most intractable barriers to implementing Figure 1 is its capital cost. In the 1960s, the total investment to increase a consumer's delivered energy supplies by the equivalent of one barrel of oil per day (about 67 kilowatts of heat) was a few thousand of today's dollars—of which, in an oil system, the wellhead investment in the Persian Gulf was and still is only a few hundred dollars. (The rest is transport, refining, marketing and distribution.) The capital intensity of much new coal supply is still in this range. But such cheaply won resources can no longer stretch our domestic production of fluid fuels or electricity; and Figure 1 relies mainly on these, not on coal burned directly, so it must bear the full burden of increased capital intensity.

That burden is formidable. For the North Sea oilfields coming into production soon, the investment in the whole system is roughly \$10,000 to deliver an extra barrel per day (constant 1976 dollars throughout); for U.S. frontier (Arctic and offshore) oil and gas in the 1980s it will be generally in the range from \$10,000 to \$25,000; for synthetic gaseous and liquid fuels made from coal, from \$20,000 to \$50,000 per daily barrel.

The scale of these capital costs is generally recognized in the industries concerned. What is less widely appreciated—partly because capital costs of electrical capacity are normally calculated per installed (not delivered) kilowatt and partly because whole-system costs are rarely computed—is that capital cost is many times greater for new systems that make electricity than for those that burn fuels directly. For coal-electric capacity ordered today, a reasonable estimate would be about \$150,000 for the delivered equivalent of one barrel of oil per day; for nuclear-electric capacity ordered today, about \$200,000–\$300,000. Thus, the capital cost per delivered kilowatt of electrical energy emerges as roughly 100 times that of the traditional direct-fuel technologies on which our society has been built.⁷

⁷ The capital costs for frontier fluids and for electrical systems can be readily calculated from the data base of the Bechtel model (footnote 2 above). The electrical examples are worked out in my "Scale, Centralization and Electrification in Energy Systems," *Future Strategies of Energy Development* symposium, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, October 20–21, 1976.

The capital intensity of coal conversion and, even more, of large electrical stations and distribution networks is so great that many analysts, such as the strategic planners of the Shell Group in London, have concluded that no major country outside the Persian Gulf can afford these centralized high technologies on a truly large scale, large enough to run a country. They are looking, in Monte Canfield's phrase, like future technologies whose time has passed.

Relying heavily on such technologies, President Ford's 1976-85 energy program turns out to cost over \$1 trillion (in 1976 dollars) in initial investment, of which about 70 to 80 percent would be for new rather than replacement plants.⁸ The latter figure corresponds to about three-fourths of cumulative net private domestic investment (NPDI) over the decade (assuming that NPDI remains 7 percent of gross national product and that GNP achieves real growth of 3.5 percent per year despite the adverse effects of the energy program on other investments). In contrast, the energy sector has recently required only one-fourth of NPDI. Diverting to the energy sector not only this hefty share of discretionary investment but also about two-thirds of all the rest would deprive other sectors which have their own cost-escalation problems and their own vocal constituencies. A powerful political response could be expected. And this capital burden is not temporary; further up the curves of Figure 1 it tends to increase, and much of what might have been thought to be increased national wealth must be plowed back into the care and feeding of the energy system. Such long-lead-time, long-payback-time investments might also be highly inflationary.

Of the \$1 trillion-plus just cited, three-fourths would be for electrification. About 18 percent of the total investment could be saved just by reducing the assumed average 1976-85 electrical growth rate from 6.5 to 5.5 percent per year.⁹ Not surprisingly, the combination of disproportionate and rapidly increasing capital intensity, long lead times, and economic responses is already proving awkward to the electric utility industry, despite the protection of a 20 percent taxpayer subsidy on new power stations.¹⁰ "Probably no industry," observes Bankers Trust Company, "has come closer to the edge of

⁸ The Bechtel model, using 1974 dollars and assuming ordering in early 1974, estimates direct construction costs totaling \$559 billion, including work that is in progress but not yet commissioned in 1985. Interest, design and administration—but not land, nor escalation beyond the GNP inflation rate—bring the total to \$743 billion. Including the cost of land, and correcting to a 1976 ordering date and 1976 dollars, is estimated by M. Carasso to yield over \$1 trillion.

⁹ M. Carasso *et al.*, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ E. Kahn *et al.*, "Investment Planning in the Energy Sector," LBL-4479, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, Calif., March 1, 1976.

financial disaster." Both here and abroad an effective feedback loop is observable: large capital programs → poor cash flow → higher electricity prices → reduced demand growth → worse cash flow → increased bond flotation → increased debt-to-equity ratio, worse coverage, and less attractive bonds → poor bond sales → worse cash flow → higher electricity prices → reduced (even negative) demand growth and political pressure on utility regulators → overcapacity, credit pressure, and higher cost of money → worse cash flow, etc. This "spiral of impossibility," as Mason Willrich has called it, is exacerbated by most utilities' failure to base historic prices on the long-run cost of new supply: thus some must now tell their customers that the current-dollar cost of a kilowatt-hour will treble by 1985, and that two-thirds of that increase will be capital charges for new plants. Moreover, experience abroad suggests that even a national treasury cannot long afford electrification: a New York State-like position is quickly reached, or too little money is left over to finance the energy *uses*, or both.

IV

Summarizing a similar situation in Britain, Walter Patterson concludes: "Official statements identify an anticipated 'energy gap' which can be filled only with nuclear electricity; the data do not support any such conclusion, either as regards the 'gap' or as regards the capability of filling it with nuclear electricity." We have sketched one form of the latter argument; let us now consider the former.

Despite the steeply rising capital intensity of new energy supply, forecasts of energy demand made as recently as 1972 by such bodies as the Federal Power Commission and the Department of the Interior wholly ignored both price elasticity of demand and energy conservation. The Chase Manhattan Bank in 1973 saw virtually no scope for conservation save by minor curtailments: the efficiency with which energy produced economic outputs was assumed to be optimal already. In 1976, some analysts still predict economic calamity if the United States does not continue to consume twice the combined energy total for Africa, the rest of North and South America, and Asia except Japan. But what have more careful studies taught us about the scope for doing better with the energy we have? Since we can't keep the bathtub filled because the hot water keeps running out, do we really (as Malcolm MacEwen asks) need a bigger water heater, or could we do better with a cheap, low-technology plug?

There are two ways, divided by a somewhat fuzzy line, to do more

with less energy. First, we can plug leaks and use thriftier technologies to produce exactly the same output of goods and services—and bads and nuisances—as before, substituting other resources (capital, design, management, care, etc.) for some of the energy we formerly used. When measures of this type use today's technologies, are advantageous today by conventional economic criteria, and have no significant effect on life-styles, they are called "technical fixes."

In addition, or instead, we can make and use a smaller quantity or a different mix of the outputs themselves, thus to some degree changing (or reflecting ulterior changes in) our life-styles. We might do this because of changes in personal values, rationing by price or otherwise, mandatory curtailments, or gentler inducements. Such "social changes" include car-pooling, smaller cars, mass transit, bicycles, walking, opening windows, dressing to suit the weather, and extensively recycling materials. Technical fixes, on the other hand, include thermal insulation, heat-pumps (devices like air conditioners which move heat around—often in either direction—rather than making it from scratch), more efficient furnaces and car engines, less overlighting and overventilation in commercial buildings, and recuperators for waste heat in industrial processes. Hundreds of technical and semi-technical analyses of both kinds of conservation have been done; in the last two years especially, much analytic progress has been made.

Theoretical analysis suggests that in the long term, technical fixes *alone* in the United States could probably improve energy efficiency by a factor of at least three or four.¹¹ A recent review of specific practical measures cogently argues that with only those technical fixes that could be implemented by about the turn of the century, we could nearly double the efficiency with which we use energy.¹² If that is correct, we could have steadily increasing economic activity with approximately constant primary energy use for the next few decades, thus stretching our present energy supplies rather than having to add massively to them. One careful comparison shows that *after* correcting for differences of climate, hydroelectric capacity, etc., Americans would still use about a third less energy than they do now if they were as efficient as the Swedes (who see much room for improvement in their own efficiency).¹³ U.S. per capita energy

¹¹ American Institute of Physics Conference Proceedings No. 25, *Efficient Use of Energy*, New York: AIP, 1975; summarized in *Physics Today*, August 1975.

¹² M. Ross and R. H. Williams, "Assessing the Potential for Fuel Conservation," forthcoming in *Technology Review*; see also L. Schipper, *Annual Review of Energy* 1: 455-518 (1976).

¹³ L. Schipper and A. J. Lichtenberg, "Efficient Energy Use and Well-Being: The Swedish Example," LBL-4430 and ERG-76-09, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, April 1976.

intensity, too, is about twice that of West Germany in space heating, four times in transport.¹⁴ Much of the difference is attributable to technical fixes.

Some technical fixes are already under way in the United States. Many factories have cut tens of percent off their fuel cost per unit output, often with practically no capital investment. New 1976 cars average 27 percent better mileage than 1974 models. And there is overwhelming evidence that technical fixes are generally much cheaper than increasing energy supply, quicker, safer, of more lasting benefit. They are also better for secure, broadly based employment using existing skills. Most energy conservation measures and the shifts of consumption which they occasion are relatively labor-intensive. Even making more energy-efficient home appliances is about twice as good for jobs as is building power stations: the latter is practically the least labor-intensive major investment in the whole economy.

The capital savings of conservation are particularly impressive. In the terms used above, the investments needed to *save* the equivalent of an extra barrel of oil per day are often zero to \$3,500, generally under \$8,000, and at most about \$25,000—far less than the amounts needed to increase most kinds of energy supply. Indeed, to use energy efficiently in new buildings, especially commercial ones, the additional capital cost is often *negative*: savings on heating and cooling equipment more than pay for the other modifications.

To take one major area of potential saving, technical fixes in new buildings can save 50 percent or more in office buildings and 80 percent or more in some new houses.¹⁵ A recent American Institute of Architects study concludes that, by 1990, improved design of new buildings and modification of old ones could save a third of our current *total* national energy use—and save money too. The payback time would be only half that of the alternative investment in increased energy supply, so the same capital could be used twice over.

A second major area lies in “cogeneration,” or the generating of electricity as a by-product of the process steam normally produced in many industries. A Dow study chaired by Paul McCracken reports that by 1985 U.S. industry could meet approximately half its own

¹⁴ R. L. Goen and R. K. White, “Comparison of Energy Consumption Between West Germany and the United States,” Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, Calif., June 1975.

¹⁵ A. D. Little, Inc., “An Impact Assessment of ASHRAE Standard 90-75,” report to FEA, C-78309, December 1975; J. E. Snell *et al.* (National Bureau of Standards), “Energy Conservation in Office Buildings: Some United States Examples,” International CIB Symposium on Energy Conservation in the Built Environment (Building Research Establishment, Garston, Watford, England), April 1976; Owens-Corning-Fiberglas, “The Arkansas Story,” 1975.

electricity needs (compared to about a seventh today) by this means. Such cogeneration would save \$20–50 billion in investment, save fuel equivalent to 2–3 million barrels of oil per day, obviate the need for more than 50 large reactors, and (with flattened utility rates) yield at least 20 percent pretax return on marginal investment while reducing the price of electricity to consumers.¹⁶ Another measure of the potential is that cogeneration provides about 4 percent of electricity today in the United States but about 29 percent in West Germany. Cogeneration and more efficient use of electricity could together reduce our use of electricity by a third and our central-station generation by 60 percent.¹⁷ Like district heating (distribution of waste heat as hot water via insulated pipes to heat buildings), U.S. cogeneration is held back only by institutional barriers. Yet these are smaller than those that were overcome when the present utility industry was established.

So great is the scope for technical fixes now that we could spend several hundred billion dollars on them initially plus several hundred million dollars per day—and still save money compared with increasing the supply! And we would still have the fuel (without the environmental and geopolitical problems of getting and using it). The barriers to far more efficient use of energy are not technical, nor in any fundamental sense economic. So why do we stand here confronted, as Pogo said, by insurmountable opportunities?

The answer—apart from poor information and ideological antipathy and rigidity—is a wide array of institutional barriers, including more than 3,000 conflicting and often obsolete building codes, an innovation-resistant building industry, lack of mechanisms to ease the transition from kinds of work that we no longer need to kinds we do need, opposition by strong unions to schemes that would transfer jobs from their members to larger numbers of less “skilled” workers, promotional utility rate structures, fee structures giving building engineers a fixed percentage of prices of heating and cooling equipment they install, inappropriate tax and mortgage policies, conflicting signals to consumers, misallocation of conservation’s costs and benefits (builders vs. buyers, landlords vs. tenants, etc.), imperfect access to capital markets, fragmentation of government responsibility, etc.

Though economic answers are not always right answers, properly

¹⁶ P. W. McCracken *et al.*, *Industrial Energy Center Study*, Dow Chemical Co. *et al.*, report to NSF, PB-243 824, National Technical Information Service (Springfield, Va.), June 1975. Extensive cogeneration studies for FEA are in progress at Thermo-Electron Corp., Waltham, Mass. A pathfinding June 1976 study by R. H. Williams (Center for Environmental Studies, Princeton University) for the N.J. Cabinet Energy Committee argues that the Dow report substantially underestimates cogeneration potential.

¹⁷ Ross and Williams, *op. cit.*

using the markets we have may be the greatest single step we could take toward a sustainable, humane energy future. The sound economic principles we need to apply include flat (even inverted) utility rate structures rather than discounts for large users, pricing energy according to what extra supplies will cost in the long run ("long-run marginal-cost pricing"), removing subsidies, assessing the total costs of energy-using purchases over their whole operating lifetimes ("life-cycle costing"), counting the costs of complete energy systems including all support and distribution systems, properly assessing and charging environmental costs, valuing assets by what it would cost to replace them, discounting appropriately, and encouraging competition through antitrust enforcement (including at least horizontal divestiture of giant energy corporations).

Such practicing of the market principles we preach could go very far to help us use energy efficiently and get it from sustainable sources. But just as clearly, there are things the market cannot do, like reforming building codes or utility practices. And whatever our means, there is room for differences of opinion about how far we can achieve the great theoretical potential for technical fixes. How far might we instead choose, or be driven to, some of the "social changes" mentioned earlier?

There is no definitive answer to this question—though it is arguable that if we are not clever enough to overcome the institutional barriers to implementing technical fixes, we shall certainly not be clever enough to overcome the more familiar but more formidable barriers to increasing energy supplies. My own view of the evidence is, first, that we are adaptable enough to use technical fixes *alone* to double, in the next few decades, the amount of social benefit we wring from each unit of end-use energy; and second, that value changes which could either replace or supplement those technical changes are also occurring rapidly. If either of these views is right, or if both are partly right, we should be able to double end-use efficiency by the turn of the century or shortly thereafter, with minor or no changes in life-styles or values save increasing comfort for modestly increasing numbers. Then over the period 2010–40, we should be able to shrink per capita primary energy use to perhaps a third or a quarter of today's.¹⁸ (The former would put us at the per capita level of the

¹⁸ A calculation for Canada supports this view: A. B. Lovins, *Conserving Society Notes* (Science Council of Canada, Ottawa), May/June 1976, pp. 3–16. Technical fixes already approved in principle by the Canadian Cabinet should hold approximately constant until 1990 the energy required for the transport, commercial and house-heating sectors; sustaining similar measures to 2025 is estimated to shrink per capita primary energy to about half today's level. Plausible social changes are estimated to yield a further halving. The Canadian and U.S. energy systems have rather similar structures.

wasteful, but hardly troglodytic, French.) Even in the case of four-fold shrinkage, the resulting society could be instantly recognizable to a visitor from the 1960s and need in no sense be a pastoralist's utopia—though that option would remain open to those who may desire it.


The long-term mix of technical fixes with structural and value changes in work, leisure, agriculture and industry will require much trial and error. It will take many years to make up our diverse minds about. It will not be easy—merely easier than not doing it. Meanwhile it is easy only to see what not to do.

If one assumes that by resolute technical fixes and modest social innovation we can double our end-use efficiency by shortly after 2000, then we could be twice as affluent as now with today's level of energy use, or as affluent as now while using only half the end-use energy we use today. Or we might be somewhere in between—significantly more affluent (and equitable) than today but with less end-use energy.

Many analysts now regard modest, zero or negative growth in our rate of energy use as a realistic long-term goal. Present annual U.S. primary energy demand is about 75 quadrillion BTU ("quads"), and most official projections for 2000 envisage growth to 130–170 quads. However, recent work at the Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge, under the direction of Dr. Alvin Weinberg, suggests that standard projections of energy demand are far too high because they do not take account of changes in demographic and economic trends. In June 1976 the Institute considered that with a conservation program far more modest than that contemplated in this article, the likely range of U.S. primary energy demand in the year 2000 would be about 101–126 quads, with the lower end of the range more probable and end-use energy being about 60–65 quads. And, at the further end of the spectrum, projections for 2000 being considered by the "Demand Panel" of a major U.S. National Research Council study, as of mid-1976, ranged as low as about 54 quads of fuels (plus 16 of solar energy).

As the basis for a coherent alternative to the path shown in Figure 1 earlier, a primary energy demand of about 95 quads for 2000 is sketched in Figure 2. Total energy demand would gradually decline thereafter as inefficient buildings, machines, cars and energy systems are slowly modified or replaced. Let us now explore the other ingredients of such a path—starting with the "soft" supply technologies which, spurned in Figure 1 as insignificant, now assume great importance.

FIGURE 2



V

There exists today a body of energy technologies that have certain specific features in common and that offer great technical, economic and political attractions, yet for which there is no generic term. For lack of a more satisfactory term, I shall call them "soft" technologies: a textural description, intended to mean not vague, mushy, speculative or ephemeral, but rather flexible, resilient, sustainable and benign. Energy paths dependent on soft technologies, illustrated in Figure 2, will be called "soft" energy paths, as the "hard" technologies sketched in Section II constitute a "hard" path (in both senses). The distinction between hard and soft energy paths rests not on how much energy is used, but on the technical and sociopolitical *structure* of the energy system, thus focusing our attention on consequent and crucial political differences.

In Figure 2, then, the social structure is significantly shaped by the rapid deployment of soft technologies. These are defined by five characteristics:

- They rely on renewable energy flows that are always there whether we use them or not, such as sun and wind and vegetation: on energy income, not on depletable energy capital.
- They are diverse, so that energy supply is an aggregate of very many individually modest contributions, each designed for maximum effectiveness in particular circumstances.

- They are flexible and relatively low-technology—which does not mean unsophisticated, but rather, easy to understand and use without esoteric skills, accessible rather than arcane.
- They are matched in *scale* and in geographic distribution to end-use needs, taking advantage of the free distribution of most natural energy flows.
- They are matched in *energy quality* to end-use needs: a key feature that deserves immediate explanation.

People do not want electricity or oil, nor such economic abstractions as “residential services,” but rather comfortable rooms, light, vehicular motion, food, tables, and other real things. Such end-use needs can be classified by the physical nature of the task to be done. In the United States today, about 58 percent of all energy at the point of end use is required as heat, split roughly equally between temperatures above and below the boiling point of water. (In Western Europe the low-temperature heat alone is often a half of all end-use energy.) Another 38 percent of all U.S. end-use energy provides mechanical motion: 31 percent in vehicles, 3 percent in pipelines, 4 percent in industrial electric motors. The rest, a mere 4 percent of delivered energy, represents *all* lighting, electronics, telecommunications, electrometallurgy, electrochemistry, arc-welding, electric motors in home appliances and in railways, and similar end uses which now *require* electricity.

Some 8 percent of all our energy end use, then, requires electricity for purposes other than low-temperature heating and cooling. Yet, since we actually use electricity for many such low-grade purposes, it now meets 13 percent of our end-use needs—and its generation consumes 29 percent of our fossil fuels. A hard energy path would increase this 13 percent figure to 20–40 percent (depending on assumptions) by the year 2000, and far more thereafter. But this is wasteful because the laws of physics require, broadly speaking, that a power station change three units of fuel into two units of almost useless waste heat plus one unit of electricity. This electricity can do more difficult kinds of work than can the original fuel, but unless this extra quality and versatility are used to advantage, the costly process of upgrading the fuel—and losing two-thirds of it—is all for naught.

Plainly we are using premium fuels and electricity for many tasks for which their high energy quality is superfluous, wasteful and expensive, and a hard path would make this inelegant practice even more common. Where we want only to create temperature differences of tens of degrees, we should meet the need with sources whose po-

tential is tens or hundreds of degrees, not with a flame temperature of thousands or a nuclear temperature of millions—like cutting butter with a chainsaw.

For some applications, electricity is appropriate and indispensable: electronics, smelting, subways, most lighting, some kinds of mechanical work, and a few more. But these uses are already oversupplied, and for the other, dominant uses remaining in our energy economy this special form of energy cannot give us our money's worth (in many parts of the United States today it already costs \$50–120 per barrel-equivalent). Indeed, in probably no industrial country today can additional supplies of electricity be used to thermodynamic advantage which would justify their high cost in money and fuels.

So limited are the U.S. end uses that really require electricity that by applying careful technical fixes to them we could reduce their 8 percent total to about 5 percent (mainly by reducing commercial overlighting), whereupon we could probably cover all those needs with present U.S. hydroelectric capacity plus the cogeneration capacity available in the mid-to-late 1980s.¹⁹ Thus an affluent industrial economy could advantageously operate with no central power stations at all! In practice we would not necessarily want to go that far, at least not for a long time; but the possibility illustrates how far we are from supplying energy only in the quality needed for the task at hand.

A feature of soft technologies as essential as their fitting end-use needs (for a different reason) is their appropriate scale, which can achieve important types of economies not available to larger, more centralized systems. This is done in five ways, of which the first is reducing and sharing overheads. Roughly half your electricity bill is fixed distribution costs to pay the overheads of a sprawling energy system: transmission lines, transformers, cables, meters and people to read them, planners, headquarters, billing computers, interoffice memos, advertising agencies. For electrical and some fossil-fuel systems, distribution accounts for more than half of total capital cost, and administration for a significant fraction of total operating cost. Local or domestic energy systems can reduce or even eliminate these infrastructure costs. The resulting savings can far outweigh the extra costs of the dispersed maintenance infrastructure that the small systems require, particularly where that infrastructure already exists or can be shared (e.g., plumbers fixing solar heaters as well as sinks).

Small scale brings further savings by virtually eliminating distribution losses, which are cumulative and pervasive in centralized

¹⁹ The scale of potential conservation in this area is given in Ross and Williams, *op. cit.*; the scale of potential cogeneration capacity is from McCracken *et al.*, *op. cit.*

energy systems (particularly those using high-quality energy). Small systems also avoid direct diseconomies of scale, such as the frequent unreliability of large units and the related need to provide instant "spinning reserve" capacity on electrical grids to replace large stations that suddenly fail. Small systems with short lead times greatly reduce exposure to interest, escalation and mistimed demand forecasts—major indirect diseconomies of large scale.

The fifth type of economy available to small systems arises from mass production. Consider, as Henrik Harboe suggests, the 100-odd million cars in this country. In round numbers, each car probably has an average cost of less than \$4,000 and a shaft power over 100 kilowatts (134 horsepower). Presumably a good engineer could build a generator and upgrade an automobile engine to a reliable, 35-percent-efficient diesel at no greater total cost, yielding a mass-produced diesel generator unit costing less than \$40 per kW. In contrast, the motive capacity in our central power stations—currently totaling about 1/40 as much as in our cars—costs perhaps ten times more per kW, partly because it is not mass-produced. It is not surprising that at least one foreign car maker hopes to go into the wind-machine and heat-pump business. Such a market can be entered incrementally, without the billions of dollars' investment required for, say, liquefying natural gas or gasifying coal. It may require a production philosophy oriented toward technical simplicity, low replacement cost, slow obsolescence, high reliability, high volume and low markup; but these are familiar concepts in mass production. Industrial resistance would presumably melt when—as with pollution-abatement equipment—the scope for profit was perceived.

This is not to say that all energy systems need be at domestic scale. For example, the medium scale of urban neighborhoods and rural villages offers fine prospects for solar collectors—especially for adding collectors to existing buildings of which some (perhaps with large flat roofs) can take excess collector area while others cannot take any. They could be joined via communal heat storage systems, saving on labor cost and on heat losses. The costly craftwork of remodeling existing systems—"backfitting" idiosyncratic houses with individual collectors—could thereby be greatly reduced. Despite these advantages, medium-scale solar technologies are currently receiving little attention apart from a condominium-village project in Vermont sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the 100-dwelling-unit Mejjannes-le-Clap project in France.

The schemes that dominate ERDA's solar research budget—such as making electricity from huge collectors in the desert, or from tem-

perature differences in the oceans, or from Brooklyn Bridge-like satellites in outer space—do not satisfy our criteria, for they are ingenious high-technology ways to supply energy in a form and at a scale inappropriate to most end-use needs. Not all solar technologies are soft. Nor, for the same reason, is nuclear fusion a soft technology.²⁰ But many genuine soft technologies are now available and are now economic. What are some of them?

Solar heating and, imminently, cooling head the list. They are incrementally cheaper than electric heating, and far more inflation-proof, practically anywhere in the world.²¹ In the United States (with fairly high average sunlight levels), they are cheaper than present electric heating virtually anywhere, cheaper than oil heat in many parts, and cheaper than gas and coal in some. Even in the least favorable parts of the continental United States, far more sunlight falls on a typical building than is required to heat and cool it without supplement; whether this is considered economic depends on how the accounts are done.²² The difference in solar input between the most and least favorable parts of the lower 49 states is generally less than two-fold, and in cold regions, the long heating season can improve solar economics.

Ingenious ways of backfitting existing urban and rural buildings (even large commercial ones) or their neighborhoods with efficient and exceedingly reliable solar collectors are being rapidly developed in both the private and public sectors. In some recent projects, the lead time from ordering to operation has been only a few months. Good solar hardware, often modular, is going into pilot or full-scale produc-

²⁰ Assuming (which is still not certain) that controlled nuclear fusion works, it will almost certainly be more difficult, complex and costly—though safer and perhaps more permanently fueled—than fast breeder reactors. See W. D. Metz, *Science* 192:1320–23 (1976), 193:38–40, 76 (1976), and 193:307–309 (1976). But for three reasons we ought not to pursue fusion. First, it generally produces copious fast neutrons that can and probably would be used to make bomb materials. Second, if it turns out to be rather “dirty,” as most fusion experts expect, we shall probably use it anyway, whereas if it is clean, we shall so overuse it that the resulting heat release will alter global climate: we should prefer energy sources that give us enough for our needs while denying us the excesses of concentrated energy with which we might do mischief to the earth or to each other. Third, fusion is a clever way to do something we don’t really want to do, namely to find *yet another* complex, costly, large-scale, centralized, high-technology way to make electricity—all of which goes in the wrong direction.

²¹ Partly or wholly solar heating is attractive and is being demonstrated even in cloudy countries approaching the latitude of Anchorage, such as Denmark and the Netherlands (International CIB Symposium, *op. cit.*) and Britain (*Solar Energy: A U.K. Assessment*, International Solar Energy Society, London, May 1976).

²² Solar heating cost is traditionally computed microeconomically for a consumer whose alternative fuels are not priced at long-run marginal cost. Another method would be to compare the total cost (capital and life-cycle) of the solar system with the total cost of the other complete systems that would otherwise have to be used in the long run to heat the same space. On that basis, 100 percent solar heating, even with twice the capital cost of two-thirds or three-fourths solar heating, is almost always advantageous.

tion over the next few years, and will increasingly be integrated into buildings as a multipurpose structural element, thereby sharing costs. Such firms as Philips, Honeywell, Revere, Pittsburgh Plate Glass, and Owens-Illinois, plus many dozens of smaller firms, are applying their talents, with rapid and accelerating effect, to reducing unit costs and improving performance. Some novel types of very simple collectors with far lower costs also show promise in current experiments. Indeed, solar hardware per se is necessary only for backfitting existing buildings. If we build new buildings properly in the first place, they can use "passive" solar collectors—large south windows or glass-covered black south walls—rather than special collectors. If we did this to all new houses in the next 12 years, we would save about as much energy as we expect to recover from the Alaskan North Slope.²³

Secondly, exciting developments in the conversion of agricultural, forestry and urban wastes to methanol and other liquid and gaseous fuels now offer practical, economically interesting technologies sufficient to run an efficient U.S. transport sector.²⁴ Some bacterial and enzymatic routes under study look even more promising, but presently proved processes already offer sizable contributions without the inevitable climatic constraints of fossil-fuel combustion. Organic conversion technologies must be sensitively integrated with agriculture and forestry so as not to deplete the soil; most current methods seem suitable in this respect, though they may change the farmer's priorities by making his whole yield of biomass (vegetable matter) salable.

The required scale of organic conversion can be estimated. Each year the U.S. beer and wine industry, for example, microbiologically produces 5 percent as many gallons (not all alcohol, of course) as the U.S. oil industry produces gasoline. Gasoline has 1.5–2 times the fuel value of alcohol per gallon. Thus a conversion industry roughly 10 to 14 times the scale (in gallons of fluid output per year) of our cellars and breweries would produce roughly one-third of the present gasoline requirements of the United States; if one assumes a transport sector with three times today's average efficiency—a reasonable estimate for early in the next century—then the whole of the transport needs could be met by organic conversion. The scale of effort required does not seem unreasonable, since it would replace in function half our refinery capacity.

Additional soft technologies include wind-hydraulic systems (especially those with a vertical axis), which already seem likely in many design studies to compete with nuclear power in much of North

²³ R. W. Bliss, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1976, pp. 32–40.

²⁴ A. D. Poole and R. H. Williams, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May 1976, pp. 48–58.

America and Western Europe. But wind is not restricted to making electricity: it can heat, pump, heat-pump, or compress air. Solar process heat, too, is coming along rapidly as we learn to use the $5,800^{\circ}\text{C}$. potential of sunlight (much hotter than a boiler). Finally, high- and low-temperature solar collectors, organic converters, and wind machines can form symbiotic hybrid combinations more attractive than the separate components.

Energy storage is often said to be a major problem of energy-income technologies. But this "problem" is largely an artifact of trying to recentralize, upgrade and redistribute inherently diffuse energy flows. Directly storing sunlight or wind—or, for that matter, electricity from any source—is indeed difficult on a large scale. But it is easy if done on a scale and in an energy quality matched to most end-use needs. Daily, even seasonal, storage of low- and medium-temperature heat at the point of use is straightforward with water tanks, rock beds, or perhaps fusible salts. Neighborhood heat storage is even cheaper. In industry, wind-generated compressed air can easily (and, with due care, safely) be stored to operate machinery: the technology is simple, cheap, reliable and highly developed. (Some cities even used to supply compressed air as a standard utility.) Installing pipes to distribute hot water (or compressed air) tends to be considerably cheaper than installing equivalent electric distribution capacity. Hydroelectricity is stored behind dams, and organic conversion yields readily stored liquid and gaseous fuels. On the whole, therefore, energy storage is much less of a problem in a soft energy economy than in a hard one.

Recent research suggests that a largely or wholly solar economy can be constructed in the United States with straightforward soft technologies that are now demonstrated and now economic or nearly economic.²⁵ Such a conceptual exercise does not require "exotic" methods such as sea-thermal, hot-dry-rock geothermal, cheap (perhaps organic) photovoltaic, or solar-thermal electric systems. If developed, as some probably will be, these technologies could be convenient, but they are in no way essential for an industrial society operating solely on energy income.

Figure 2 shows a plausible and realistic growth pattern, based on several detailed assessments, for soft technologies given aggressive support. The useful output from these technologies would overtake, starting in the 1990s, the output of nuclear electricity shown in even the most sanguine federal estimates. For illustration, Figure 2 shows soft

²⁵ For examples, see the Canadian computations in A. B. Lovins, *Conserver Society Notes*, *op. cit.*; Bent Sørensen's Danish estimates in *Science* 180:225-60 (1975); and the estimates by the Union of Concerned Scientists, footnote 1 above.

technologies meeting virtually all energy needs in 2025, reflecting a judgment that a completely soft supply mix is practicable in the long run with or without the 2000–25 energy shrinkage shown. Though most technologists who have thought seriously about the matter will concede it conceptually, some may be uneasy about the details. Obviously the sketched curve is not definitive, for although the general direction of the soft path must be shaped soon, the details of the energy economy in 2025 would not be committed in this century. To a large extent, therefore, it is enough to ask yourself whether Figure 1 or 2 seems preferable in the 1975–2000 period.

A simple comparison may help. Roughly half, perhaps more, of the gross primary energy being produced in the hard path in 2025 is lost in conversions. A further appreciable fraction is lost in distribution. Delivered end-use energy is thus not vastly greater than in the soft path, where conversion and distribution losses have been all but eliminated. (What is lost can often be used locally for heating, and is renewable, not depletable.) But the soft path makes each unit of end-use energy perform several times as much social function as it would have done in the hard path; so in a conventional sense, social welfare in the soft path in 2025 is substantially greater than in the hard path at the same date.

VI

To fuse into a coherent strategy the benefits of energy efficiency and of soft technologies, we need one further ingredient: transitional technologies that use fossil fuels briefly and sparingly to build a bridge to the energy-income economy of 2025, conserving those fuels—especially oil and gas—for petrochemicals (ammonia, plastics, etc.) and leaving as much as possible in the ground for emergency use only.

Some transitional technologies have already been mentioned under the heading of conservation—specifically, cogenerating electricity from existing industrial steam and using existing waste heat for district heating. Given such measures, increased end-use efficiency, and the rapid development of biomass alcohol as a portable liquid fuel, the principal short- and medium-term problem becomes, not a shortage of electricity or of portable liquid fuels, but a shortage of clean sources of heat. It is above all the sophisticated use of coal, chiefly at modest scale, that needs development. Technical measures to permit the highly efficient use of this widely available fuel would be the most valuable transitional technologies.

Neglected for so many years, coal technology is now experiencing a virtual revolution. We are developing supercritical gas extraction,

flash hydrogenation, flash pyrolysis, panel-bed filters and similar ways to use coal cleanly at essentially any scale and to cream off valuable liquids and gases as premium fuels before burning the rest. These methods largely avoid the costs, complexity, inflexibility, technical risks, long lead times, large scale, and tar formation of the traditional processes that now dominate our research.

Perhaps the most exciting current development is the so-called fluidized-bed system for burning coal (or virtually any other combustible material). Fluidized beds are simple, versatile devices that add the fuel a little at a time to a much larger mass of small, inert, red-hot particles—sand or ceramic pellets—kept suspended as an agitated fluid by a stream of air continuously blown up through it from below. The efficiency of combustion, of other chemical reactions (such as sulfur removal), and of heat transfer is remarkably high because of the turbulent mixing and large surface area of the particles. Fluidized beds have long been used as chemical reactors and for burning trash, but are now ready to be commercially applied to raising steam and operating turbines. In one system currently available from Stal-Laval Turbin AB of Sweden, eight off-the-shelf 70-megawatt gas turbines powered by fluidized-bed combusters, together with district-heating networks and heat pumps, would heat as many houses as a \$1 billion-plus coal gasification plant, but would use only two-fifths as much coal, cost a half to two-thirds as much to build, and burn more cleanly than a normal power station with the best modern scrubbers.²⁶

Fluidized-bed boilers and turbines can power giant industrial complexes, especially for cogeneration, and are relatively easy to backfit into old municipal power stations. Scaled down, a fluidized bed can be a tiny household device—clean, strikingly simple and flexible—that can replace an ordinary furnace or grate and can recover combustion heat with an efficiency over 80 percent.²⁷ At medium scale, such technologies offer versatile boiler backfits and improve heat recovery in flues. With only minor modifications they can burn practically any fuel. It is essential to commercialize all these systems now—not to waste a decade on highly instrumented but noncommercial

²⁶ The system and its conceptual framework are described in several papers by H. Harboe, Managing Director, Stal-Laval (G.B.) Ltd., London: "District Heating and Power Generation," November 14, 1975; "Advances in Coal Combustion and Its Applications," February 20, 1976; "Pressurized Fluidized Bed Combustion with Special Reference to Open Gas Turbines" (with C. W. Maude), May 1976. See also K. D. Kiang *et al.*, "Fluidized-Bed Combustion of Coals," GFERC/IC-75/2 (CONF-750586), ERDA, May 1975.

²⁷ Small devices were pioneered by the late Professor Douglas Elliott. His associated firm, Fluidfire Development, Ltd. (Netherton, Dudley, W. Midlands, England), has sold many dozens of units for industrial heat treatment or heat recuperation. Field tests of domestic packaged fluidized-bed boilers are in progress in the Netherlands and planned in Montana.

pilot plants constrained to a narrow, even obsolete design philosophy.²⁸

Transitional technologies can be built at appropriate scale so that soft technologies can be plugged into the system later. For example, if district heating uses hot water tanks on a neighborhood scale, those tanks can in the long run be heated by neighborhood solar collectors, wind-driven heat pumps, a factory, a pyrolyzer, a geothermal well, or whatever else becomes locally available—offering flexibility that is not possible at today's excessive scale.

Both transitional and soft technologies are worthwhile industrial investments that can recycle moribund capacity and underused skills, stimulate exports, and give engaging problems to innovative technologists. Though neither glamorous nor militarily useful, these technologies are socially effective—especially in poor countries that need such scale, versatility and simplicity even more than we do.

Properly used, coal, conservation, and soft technologies together can squeeze the “oil and gas” wedge in Figure 2 from both sides—so far that most of the frontier extraction and medium-term imports of oil and gas become unnecessary and our conventional resources are greatly stretched. Coal can fill the real gaps in our fuel economy with only a temporary and modest (less than twofold at peak) expansion of mining, not requiring the enormous infrastructure and social impacts implied by the scale of coal use in Figure 1.

In sum, Figure 2 outlines a prompt redirection of effort at the margin that lets us use fossil fuels intelligently to buy the time we need to change over to living on our energy income. The innovations required, both technical and social, compete directly and immediately with the incremental actions that constitute a hard energy path: fluidized beds vs. large coal gasification plants and coal-electric stations, efficient cars vs. offshore oil, roof insulation vs. Arctic gas, cogeneration vs. nuclear power. These two directions of development are mutually exclusive: the pattern of commitments of resources and time required for the hard energy path and the pervasive infrastructure which it accretes gradually make the soft path less and less attainable. That is, our two sets of choices compete not only in what they accomplish, but also in what they allow us to contemplate later. Figure 1 obscures this constriction of options, for it peers myopically forward, one power station at a time, extrapolating trend into destiny by self-fulfilling prophecy with no end clearly in sight. Figure 2, in contrast, works backward from a strategic goal, asks what we must do when in order

²⁸ Already Linköping, Sweden, is evaluating bids from several confident vendors for a 15-megawatt fluidized-bed boiler to add to its district heating system. New reviews at the Institute for Energy Analysis and elsewhere confirm fluidized beds' promise of rapid benefits without massive research programs.

to get there, and thus reveals the potential for a radically different path that would be invisible to anyone working forward in time by incremental ad-hocracy.

VII

Both the soft and the hard paths bring us, each in its own way and at broadly similar rates, to the era beyond oil and gas. But the rates of internal adaptation meanwhile are different. As we have seen, the soft path relies on smaller, far simpler supply systems entailing vastly shorter development and construction time, and on smaller, less sophisticated management systems. Even converting the urban clusters of a whole country to district heating should take only 30–40 years. Furthermore, the soft path relies mainly on small, standard, easy-to-make components and on technical resources dispersed in many organizations of diverse sizes and habits; thus everyone can get into the act, unimpeded by centralized bureaucracies, and can compete for a market share through ingenuity and local adaptation. Besides having much lower and more stable operating costs than the hard path, the soft path appears to have lower initial cost because of its technical simplicity, small unit size, very low overheads, scope for mass production, virtual elimination of distribution losses and of interfuel conversion losses, low exposure to escalation and interest, and prompt incremental construction (so that new capacity is built only when and where it is needed).²⁹

The actual costs of whole systems, however, are not the same as perceived costs: solar investments are borne by the householder, electric investments by a utility that can float low-interest bonds and amortize over 30 years. During the transitional era, we should therefore consider ways to broaden householders' access to capital markets. For example, the utility could finance the solar investment (leaving its execution to the householder's discretion), then be repaid in installments corresponding to the householder's saving. The householder

²⁹ Estimates of the total capital cost of "soft" systems are necessarily less well developed than those for the "hard" systems. For 100-percent solar space heating, one of the high-priority soft technologies, mid-1980s estimates are about \$50,000–\$60,000 (1976 dollars) of investment per daily oil-barrel-equivalent in the United States, \$100,000 in Scandinavia. All solar cost estimates, however, depend sensitively on collector and building design, both under rapid development. In most new buildings, passive solar systems with negligible or negative marginal capital costs should suffice. For biomass conversion, the 1974 FEA Solar Task Force estimated capital costs of \$10,000–\$30,000 per daily barrel equivalent—toward the lower part of this range for most agricultural projects. Currently available wind-electric systems require total-system investment as high as about \$200,000 per delivered daily barrel, with much improvement in store. As for transitional technologies, the Stal-Laval fluidized-bed gas-turbine system, complete with district-heating network and heat-pumps (coefficient of performance = 2), would cost about \$30,000 per delivered daily barrel equivalent. See Lovins, *op. cit.*, footnote 7.

would thus minimize his own—and society's—long-term costs. The utility would have to raise several times less capital than it would without such a scheme—for otherwise it would have to build new electric or synthetic-gas capacity at even higher cost—and would turn over its money at least twice as quickly, thus retaining an attractive rate of return on capital. The utility would also avoid social obsolescence and use its existing infrastructure. Such incentives have already led several U.S. gas utilities to use such a capital-transfer scheme to finance roof insulation.

Next, the two paths differ even more in risks than in costs. The hard path entails serious environmental risks, many of which are poorly understood and some of which have probably not yet been thought of. Perhaps the most awkward risk is that late in this century, when it is too late to do much about it, we may well find climatic constraints on coal combustion about to become acute in a few more decades; for it now takes us only that long, not centuries or millennia, to approach such outer limits. The soft path, by minimizing all fossil-fuel combustion, hedges our bets. Its environmental impacts are relatively small, tractable and reversible.³⁰

The hard path, further, relies on a very few high technologies whose success is by no means assured. The soft path distributes the technical risk among very many diverse low technologies, most of which are already known to work well. They do need sound engineering—a solar collector or heat pump can be worthless if badly designed—but the engineering is of an altogether different and more forgiving order than the hard path requires, and the cost of failure is much lower both in potential consequences and in number of people affected. The soft path also minimizes the economic risks to capital in case of error, accident or sabotage; the hard path effectively maximizes those risks by relying on vulnerable high-technology devices each costing more than the endowment of Harvard University. Finally, the soft path appears generally more flexible—and thus robust. Its technical diversity, adaptability, and geographic dispersion make it resilient and offer a good prospect of stability under a wide range of conditions, foreseen or not. The hard path, however, is brittle; it must fail, with widespread and serious disruption, if any of its exacting technical and social conditions is not satisfied continuously and indefinitely.

³⁰ See A. B. Lovins, "Long-Term Constraints on Human Activity," *Environmental Conservation* 3, 1:3-14 (1976) (Geneva); "Some Limits to Energy Conversion," *Limits to Growth 1975 Conference* (The Woodlands, Texas), October 20, 1975 (to be published in conference papers). The environmental and social impacts of solar technologies are being assessed in a study coordinated by J. W. Benson (ERDA Solar Division), to be completed autumn 1976.

VIII

The soft path has novel and important international implications. Just as improvements in end-use efficiency can be used at home (via innovative financing and neighborhood self-help schemes) to lessen first the disproportionate burden of energy waste on the poor, so can soft technologies and reduced pressure on oil markets especially benefit the poor abroad. Soft technologies are ideally suited for rural villagers and urban poor alike, directly helping the more than two billion people who have no electric outlet nor anything to plug into it but who need ways to heat, cook, light and pump. Soft technologies do not carry with them inappropriate cultural patterns or values; they capitalize on poor countries' most abundant resources (including such protein-poor plants as cassava, eminently suited to making fuel alcohols), helping to redress the severe energy imbalance between temperate and tropical regions; they can often be made locally from local materials and do not require a technical elite to maintain them; they resist technological dependence and commercial monopoly; they conform to modern concepts of agriculturally based eco-development from the bottom up, particularly in the rural villages.

Even more crucial, unilateral adoption of a soft energy path by the United States can go a long way to control nuclear proliferation—perhaps to eliminate it entirely. Many nuclear advocates have missed this point: believing that there is no alternative to nuclear power, they say that if the United States does not export nuclear technology, others will, so we might as well get the business and try to use it as a lever to slow the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons to nations and sub-national groups in other regions. Yet the genie is not wholly out of the bottle yet—thousands of reactors are planned for a few decades hence, tens of thousands thereafter—and the cork sits unnoticed in our hands.

Perhaps the most important opportunity available to us stems from the fact that for at least the next five or ten years, while nuclear dependence and commitments are still reversible, all countries will continue to rely on the United States for the technical, the economic, and especially the *political* support they need to justify their own nuclear programs. Technical and economic dependence is intricate and pervasive; political dependence is far more important but has been almost ignored, so we do not yet realize the power of the American example in an essentially imitative world where public and private divisions over nuclear policy are already deep and grow deeper daily.

The fact is that in almost all countries the domestic political base to support nuclear power is not solid but shaky. However great their

nuclear ambitions, other countries must still borrow that political support from the United States. Few are succeeding. Nuclear expansion is all but halted by grass-roots opposition in Japan and the Netherlands; has been severely impeded in West Germany, France, Switzerland, Italy and Austria; has been slowed and may soon be stopped in Sweden; has been rejected in Norway and (so far) Australia and New Zealand, as well as in two Canadian Provinces; faces an uncertain prospect in Denmark and many American states; has been widely questioned in Britain, Canada and the U.S.S.R.³¹; and has been opposed in Spain, Brazil, India, Thailand and elsewhere.

Consider the impact of three prompt, clear U.S. statements:

- The United States will phase out its nuclear power program³² and its support of others' nuclear power programs.
- The United States will redirect those resources into the tasks of a soft energy path and will freely help any other interested countries to do the same, seeking to adapt the same broad principles to others' needs and to learn from shared experience.
- The United States will start to treat nonproliferation, control of civilian fission technology, and strategic arms reduction as inter-related parts of the same problem with intertwined solutions.

I believe that such a universal, nondiscriminatory package of policies would be politically irresistible to North and South, East and West alike. It would offer perhaps our best chance of transcending the hypocrisy that has stalled arms control: by no longer artificially divorcing civilian from military nuclear technology, we would recognize officially the real driving forces behind proliferation; and we would no longer exhort others not to acquire bombs while claiming that we ourselves feel more secure with bombs than without them.

Nobody can be certain that such a package of policies, going far beyond a mere moratorium, would work. The question has received far too little thought, and political judgments differ. My own, based on the past nine years' residence in the midst of the European nuclear debate, is that nuclear power could not flourish there if the United States did not want it to.³³ In giving up the export market that our

³¹ Recent private reports indicate the Soviet scientific community is deeply split over the wisdom of nuclear expansion. See also *Nucleonics Week*, May 13, 1976, pp. 12-13.

³² Current overcapacity, capacity under construction, and the potential for rapid conservation and cogeneration make this a relatively painless course, whether nuclear generation is merely frozen or phased out altogether. For an illustration (the case of California), see R. Doctor *et al.*, *Sierra Club Bulletin*, May 1976, pp. 4ff. I believe the same is true abroad. See Introduction to *Non-Nuclear Futures* by A. B. Lovins and J. H. Price, Cambridge, Mass.: FOE/Ballinger, 1975.

³³ See *Nucleonics Week*, May 6, 1976, p. 7, and I. C. Bupp and J.-C. Derian, "Nuclear Reactor Safety: The Twilight of Probability," December 1975. Bupp, after a detailed study of European nuclear politics, shares this assessment.

own reactor designs have dominated, we would be demonstrating a desire for peace, not profit, thus allaying legitimate European commercial suspicions. Those who believe such a move would be seized upon gleefully by, say, French exporters are seriously misjudging French nuclear politics. Skeptics, too, have yet to present a more promising alternative—a credible set of technical and political measures for meticulously restricting to peaceful purposes extremely large amounts of bomb materials which, once generated, will persist for the foreseeable lifetime of our species.

I am confident that the United States can still turn off the technology that it originated and deployed. By rebottling that genie we could move to energy and foreign policies that our grandchildren can live with. No more important step could be taken toward revitalizing the American dream.

IX

Perhaps the most profound difference between the soft and hard paths is their domestic sociopolitical impact. Both paths, like any 50-year energy path, entail significant social change. But the kinds of social change needed for a hard path are apt to be much less pleasant, less plausible, less compatible with social diversity and personal freedom of choice, and less consistent with traditional values than are the social changes that could make a soft path work.

It is often said that, on the contrary, a soft path must be repressive; and coercive paths to energy conservation and soft technologies can indeed be imagined. But coercion is not necessary and its use would signal a major failure of imagination, given the many policy instruments available to achieve a given technical end. Why use penal legislation to encourage roof insulation when tax incentives and education (leading to the sophisticated public understanding now being achieved in Canada and parts of Europe) will do? Policy tools need not harm life-styles or liberties if chosen with reasonable sensitivity.

In contrast to the soft path's dependence on pluralistic consumer choice in deploying a myriad of small devices and refinements, the hard path depends on difficult, large-scale projects requiring a major social commitment under centralized management. We have noted in Section II the extraordinary capital intensity of centralized, electrified high technologies. Their similarly heavy demands on other scarce resources—skills, labor, materials, special sites—likewise cannot be met by market allocation, but require compulsory diversion from whatever priorities are backed by the weakest constituencies. Quasi-warpowers legislation to this end has already been seriously

proposed. The hard path, sometimes portrayed as the bastion of free enterprise and free markets, would instead be a world of subsidies, \$100-billion bailouts, oligopolies, regulations, nationalization, eminent domain, corporate statism.

Such dirigiste autarchy is the first of many distortions of the political fabric. While soft technologies can match any settlement pattern, their diversity reflecting our own pluralism, centralized energy sources encourage industrial clustering and urbanization. While soft technologies give everyone the costs and benefits of the energy system he chooses, centralized systems allocate benefits to suburbanites and social costs to politically weaker rural agrarians. Siting big energy systems pits central authority against local autonomy in an increasingly divisive and wasteful form of centrifugal politics that is already proving one of the most potent constraints on expansion.

In an electrical world, your lifeline comes not from an understandable neighborhood technology run by people you know who are at your own social level, but rather from an alien, remote, and perhaps humiliatingly uncontrollable technology run by a faraway, bureaucratized, technical elite who have probably never heard of you. Decisions about who shall have how much energy at what price also become centralized—a politically dangerous trend because it divides those who use energy from those who supply and regulate it.

The scale and complexity of centralized grids not only make them politically inaccessible to the poor and weak, but also increase the likelihood and size of malfunctions, mistakes and deliberate disruptions. A small fault or a few discontented people become able to turn off a country. Even a single rifleman can probably black out a typical city instantaneously. Societies may therefore be tempted to discourage disruption through stringent controls akin to a garrison state. In times of social stress, when grids become a likely target for dissidents, the sector may be paramilitarized and further isolated from grass-roots politics.

If the technology used, like nuclear power, is subject to technical surprises and unique psychological handicaps, prudence or public clamor may require generic shutdowns in case of an unexpected type of malfunction: one may have to choose between turning off a country and persisting in potentially unsafe operation. Indeed, though many in the \$100-billion quasi-civilian nuclear industry agree that it could be politically destroyed if a major accident occurred soon, few have considered the economic or political implications of putting at risk such a large fraction of societal capital. How far would governments go to protect against a threat—even a purely political threat—a basket

full of such delicate, costly and essential eggs? Already in individual nuclear plants, the cost of a shutdown—often many dollars a second—weighs heavily, perhaps too heavily, in operating and safety decisions.

Any demanding high technology tends to develop influential and dedicated constituencies of those who link its commercial success with both the public welfare and their own. Such sincerely held beliefs, peer pressures, and the harsh demands that the work itself places on time and energy all tend to discourage such people from acquiring a similarly thorough knowledge of alternative policies and the need to discuss them. Moreover, the money and talent invested in an electrical program tend to give it disproportionate influence in the counsels of government, often directly through staff-swapping between policy- and mission-oriented agencies. This incestuous position, now well developed in most industrial countries, distorts both social and energy priorities in a lasting way that resists political remedy.

For all these reasons, if nuclear power were clean, safe, economic, assured of ample fuel, and socially benign per se, it would still be unattractive because of the political implications of the kind of energy economy it would lock us into. But fission technology also has unique sociopolitical side-effects arising from the impact of human fallibility and malice on the persistently toxic and explosive materials in the fuel cycle. For example, discouraging nuclear violence and coercion requires some abrogation of civil liberties³⁴; guarding long-lived wastes against geological or social contingencies implies some form of hierarchical social rigidity or homogeneity to insulate the technological priesthood from social turbulence; and making political decisions about nuclear hazards which are compulsory, remote from social experience, disputed, unknown, or unknowable, may tempt governments to bypass democratic decision in favor of elitist technocracy.³⁵

Even now, the inability of our political institutions to cope with nuclear hazard is straining both their competence and their perceived legitimacy. There is no scientific basis for calculating the likelihood or the maximum long-term effects of nuclear mishaps, or for guaranteeing that those effects will not exceed a particular level; we know only that all precautions are, for fundamental reasons, inherently imperfect in essentially unknown degree. Reducing that imperfection would require much social engineering whose success would be speculative. Technical success in reducing the hazards would not reduce, and might enhance, the need for such social engineering. The most

³⁴ R. Ayres, 10 *Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review*, Spring 1975, pp. 369-443; J. H. Barton, "Intensified Nuclear Safeguards and Civil Liberties," report to USNRC, Stanford Law School, October 21, 1975.

³⁵ H. P. Green, 43 *George Washington Law Review*, March 1975, pp. 791-807.

attractive political feature of soft technologies and conservation—the alternatives that will let us avoid these decisions and their high political costs—may be that, like motherhood, everyone is in favor of them.

X

Civilization in this country, according to some, would be inconceivable if we used only, say, half as much electricity as now. But that is what we did use in 1963, when we were at least half as civilized as now. What would life be like at the per capita levels of primary energy that we had in 1910 (about the present British level) but with doubled efficiency of energy use and with the important but not very energy-intensive amenities we lacked in 1910, such as telecommunications and modern medicine? Could it not be at least as agreeable as life today? Since the energy needed today to produce a unit of GNP varies more than 100-fold depending on what good or service is being produced, and since GNP in turn hardly measures social welfare, why must energy and welfare march forever in lockstep? Such questions today can be neither answered nor ignored.

Underlying energy choices are real but tacit choices of personal values. Those that make a high-energy society work are all too apparent. Those that could sustain life-styles of elegant frugality are not new; they are in the attic and could be dusted off and recycled. Such values as thrift, simplicity, diversity, neighborliness, humility and craftsmanship—perhaps most closely preserved in politically conservative communities—are already, as we see from the ballot box and the census, embodied in a substantial social movement, camouflaged by its very pervasiveness. Offered the choice freely and equitably, many people would choose, as Herman Daly puts it, “growth in things that really count rather than in things that are merely countable”: choose not to transform, in Duane Elgin’s phrase, “a rational concern for material well-being into an obsessive concern for unconscionable levels of material consumption.”

Indeed, we are learning that many of the things we had taken to be the benefits of affluence are really remedial costs, incurred in the pursuit of benefits that might be obtainable in other ways without those costs. Thus much of our prized personal mobility is really involuntary traffic made necessary by the settlement patterns which cars create. Is that traffic a cost or a benefit?

Pricked by such doubts, our inflated craving for consumer ephemerals is giving way to a search for both personal and public purpose, to reexamination of the legitimacy of the industrial ethic. In the new age of scarcity, our ingenious strivings to substitute abstract (therefore

limitless) wants for concrete (therefore reasonably bounded) needs no longer seem so virtuous. But where we used to accept unquestioningly the facile (and often self-serving) argument that traditional economic growth and distributional equity are inseparable, new moral and humane stirrings now are nudging us. We can now ask whether we are not already so wealthy that further growth, far from being essential to addressing our equity problems, is instead an excuse not to mobilize the compassion and commitment that could solve the same problems with or without the growth.

Finally, as national purpose and trust in institutions diminish, governments, striving to halt the drift, seek ever more outward control. We are becoming more uneasily aware of the nascent risk of what a Stanford Research Institute group has called "... 'friendly fascism'—a managed society which rules by a faceless and widely dispersed complex of warfare-welfare-industrial-communications-police bureaucracies with a technocratic ideology." In the sphere of politics as of personal values, could many strands of observable social change be converging on a profound cultural transformation whose implications we can only vaguely sense: one in which energy policy, as an integrating principle, could be catalytic?³⁶

It is not my purpose here to resolve such questions—only to stress their relevance. Though fuzzy and unscientific, they are the beginning and end of any energy policy. Making values explicit is essential to preserving a society in which diversity of values can flourish.

Some people suppose that a soft energy path entails mainly social problems, a hard path mainly technical problems, so that since in the past we have been better at solving the technical problems, that is the kind we should prefer to incur now. But the hard path, too, involves difficult social problems. We can no longer escape them; we must choose which kinds of social problems we want. The most important, difficult, and neglected questions of energy strategy are not mainly technical or economic but rather social and ethical. They will pose a supreme challenge to the adaptability of democratic institutions and to the vitality of our spiritual life.

XI

These choices may seem abstract, but they are sharp, imminent and practical. We stand at a crossroads: without decisive action our options will slip away. Delay in energy conservation lets wasteful use run on so far that the logistical problems of catching up become in-

³⁶ W. W. Harman, *An Incomplete Guide to the Future*, Stanford Alumni Association, 1976.

superable. Delay in widely deploying diverse soft technologies pushes them so far into the future that there is no longer a credible fossil-fuel bridge to them: they must be well under way before the worst part of the oil-and-gas decline. Delay in building the fossil-fuel bridge makes it too tenuous: what the sophisticated coal technologies can give us, in particular, will no longer mesh with our pattern of transitional needs as oil and gas dwindle.

Yet these kinds of delay are exactly what we can expect if we continue to devote so much money, time, skill, fuel and political will to the hard technologies that are so demanding of them. Enterprises like nuclear power are not only unnecessary but a positive encumbrance for they prevent us, through logistical competition and cultural incompatibility, from pursuing the tasks of a soft path at a high enough priority to make them work together properly. A hard path can make the attainment of a soft path prohibitively difficult, both by starving its components into garbled and incoherent fragments and by changing social structures and values in a way that makes the innovations of a soft path more painful to envisage and to achieve. As a nation, therefore, we must choose one path before they diverge much further. Indeed, one of the infinite variations on a soft path seems inevitable, either smoothly by choice now or disruptively by necessity later; and I fear that if we do not soon make the choice, growing tensions between rich and poor countries may destroy the conditions that now make smooth attainment of a soft path possible.

These conditions will not be repeated. Some people think we can use oil and gas to bridge to a coal and fission economy, then use that later, if we wish, to bridge to similarly costly technologies in the hazy future. But what if the bridge we are now on is the last one? Our past major transitions in energy supply were smooth because we subsidized them with cheap fossil fuels. Now our new energy supplies are ten or a hundred times more capital-intensive and will stay that way. If our future capital is generated by economic activity fueled by synthetic gas at \$25 a barrel-equivalent, nuclear electricity at \$60–120 a barrel-equivalent, and the like, and if the energy sector itself requires much of that capital just to maintain itself, will capital still be as cheap and plentiful as it is now, or will we have fallen into a “capital trap”? Wherever we make our present transition to, once we arrive we may be stuck there for a long time. Thus if neither the soft nor the hard path were preferable on cost or other grounds, we would still be wise to use our remaining cheap fossil fuels—sparingly—to finance a transition as nearly as possible straight to our ultimate energy-income sources. We shall not have another chance to get there.

CANADA: THE NEW NATIONALISM

By Abraham Rotstein



FOR as long as most people can remember, a glance out of the corner of one's eye to the upper half of North America would bring warm reassurance that things were moving quietly and gracefully *somewhere* in the world. Alphonse and Gaston could invariably be heard out there bowing and scraping, and toasting their long undefended border. Today, official devotees of this stately two-step are still meeting and greeting, but few take the old shuffle at face value. In-

stead, private conversations in directors' board rooms, in expensive lunch clubs, in government cafeterias and in faculty lounges have a distinctly worried and wary undertone.

These are not merely the nervous Nellies (American-style), or the bleeding hearts (Canadian-style). Bad consciences do exist about this overdeveloped and one-sided intimacy that has grown up between the two countries, but that, as everyone knows, is not the stuff of politics. It is not conscience and sentiment which are beginning to interfere with the work-a-day world of gas and oil and the purchase and sale of branch plants, but a new and distinct phase of Canadian nationalism.

Despite recent appearances, this nationalism is still frail and, considering the circumstances, a belated arrival on the political scene. The editor of an eminent American publication put the crucial question in a recent visit. "Why," he wanted to know, "is there so *little* nationalism in Canada?" It was clear that he knew the background very well. On the economic side, 58 percent of the manufacturing sector is in foreign hands as are 61 of the largest 102 corporations in the manufacturing, resources and utility fields. Seventy-five percent of the capital employed in our oil and natural gas industry is foreign controlled and 52 percent of the trade union movement takes orders of one sort or another from American head offices.

On the cultural side the situation is no better. About half of the university professors in the humanities and social sciences are non-Canadian. Foreign magazines account for 85 percent of the total magazine circulation; Canada still does not have its own national news weekly; foreign books (those not authored by Canadians) form 83

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percent of book sales, and 71 percent of the publishing industry is foreign-controlled; 96 percent of the films in Canadian cinemas are foreign, as are much of television, plays, art—and on and on it goes. In Canada, we may still own the cupboard, but little of the contents.

“Foreign,” of course, means mainly American (about four-fifths) in every case. What one Canadian economist, Bruce Wilkinson, stated about Canada’s intense trade concentration with the United States, can be applied to the economic and cultural situation as a whole: “Canada’s position resembles more closely that of a less-developed nation than that of other developed countries.”

But statistics alone do not tell the story about the quality of everyday life. It would be a mistake to evoke the image of Canada as a seething colony struggling to break loose. Canada bears rather the signs of a successful lobotomy to which it has voluntarily assented. The routine of daily existence is comfortable, decent and sane. There is only the occasional disorientation of not really knowing what country you are living in. Saunter into a drugstore and there is hardly a Canadian paperback to be found anywhere, although an enormous number have been published. The 10,000 mass paperback outlets in Canada provide the American books read by the great majority of the population, while Canadian books have their home in the 400 proper bookstores. Stroll down the main street of your average city, the marquees alight with the titles and stars of the latest films, and hardly a Canadian film is available anywhere, although several hundred have been made in recent years. Turn on your TV set and the chances are two out of three that it will be an American network show on your television screen. Silent qualms surface now and then, but soon one is lulled into passive acceptance, with a fading sense of loss. Increasingly Americanized tastes in Canada acquire a priority of their own, while the very capacity to create and relay our own sense of self rapidly atrophies.

Occasionally there are surrealistic moments that break the numbness—untypical events that throw the “normal” situation into high relief. In the tangled skein of oil and gas negotiations between Canada and the United States, one of the landmark events occurred on September 29, 1970, when then Energy Minister Joe Greene announced that the Federal Cabinet had approved the largest gas export license in Canadian history—6.3 trillion cubic feet, to be exported over a 15-to-20-year period. The National Energy Board had urged the Cabinet to approve the massive gas export to the United States on the basis of a set of reserve figures supplied by the Canadian Petroleum Association. (Despite its name, the Association consists largely

of the major American oil companies which do over 90 percent of the production and refining.) On June 2, 1971, these reserve figures were made public by the Energy Minister when he stated: "At 1970 rates of production, these reserves represent 923 years supply for oil and 392 years for gas."

The rest is history. In April 1975, the same National Energy Board reported that Canada would have a natural gas shortage *within this decade* and oil production would decline to the point where Canada would become a net importer of oil. Canada is already in that position. Yet the American oil companies remain undaunted and are now pressing (with Canadian government support) for the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline to carry both the Delta and Alaska gas, *because* of the urgent and imminent gas shortage.

Data on energy reserves expand and contract like an accordion but even Canadian numbness and gullibility have their limits. The rising tide of popular skepticism begins to question all the oil companies' arguments, certainly questions the basis of all our oil and gas export agreements, and even begins to wonder wistfully why oil and gas production should not be in Canadian hands.

One further touch of the surreal in Canada will suffice to throw some light on the quality of everyday existence. In recent years we have had a national university commission investigating the role (actually the absence) of Canadian courses in our universities. Its recent report, *To Know Ourselves*, recounts the testimony from some American sociologists who now predominate on the staff of Canadian universities. The report states that these sociologists "were even forthright enough to tell the commission that they would not hire Canadians for 'their' departments because 'once one hires a few then they will be pushing for more and more.'"

However bizarre these episodes, the American sociologists as well as the American oil companies are, in their own way, "right." Once the game warden has declared open season, everyone is quite entitled to look to his own catch.

As a nationalist and a dispirited critic of Canadian government policy, I had no immediate answer to the question: why indeed is there so little nationalism, so little concern with serious countermeasures that are crucial to hold the American tide in check and to sustain whatever is still possible of an autonomous national existence?

For the more articulate segments of the community, the press, the political commentators, the academics and so on, it required a sophisticated myopia to fail to notice the self-immolation of Canadian independence in the postwar period. Indeed, the great American takeover

has been aided and encouraged by internal forces, what one author called in a summary theme, Canada's "silent surrender." These forces are as prevalent in government as in business. They exist in the trade unions as much as in the groves of academe. The transition to institutionalized dependence occurred with the greatest impetus in the last two decades at precisely the time when, in the rest of the world, the trend was in the opposite direction.

In a belated fashion, Canada is beginning to come awake, and beginning to explore and even to implement new policies. But the penetration of American society in Canada is now so great that there is no practical way to distinguish domestic and foreign policy. New domestic policies inevitably touch the huge American sector closely. Official Canadian foreign policy declarations, such as the "third option" (the move to somewhat lesser dependence on the United States), are little more than changing domestic policy seen in the rearview mirror. They are an effective guide to the past.

Thus, the future of the Canadian-American relationship must be sought on the domestic scene but not necessarily within the federal government. Its recent initiatives have, on the whole, been weak. The Foreign Investment Review Agency aims to achieve better terms for Canada on U.S. takeovers of Canadian business and on new ventures. But even the U.S. financial journal *Barron's* admitted: "It is difficult to imagine a legitimate business venture which would be impeded by the Foreign Investment Review Act . . . the only U.S. business which wouldn't be cordially welcomed to Canada is Murder, Inc."

As far as energy is concerned, the closing of the door on oil exports to the United States in 1982 will occur after the horse has gone. By 1985, net imports of oil to Canada will amount to 50 percent of Canadian requirements.

On the cultural front, the Canadian edition of *Time* has, after a 15-year debate, been declared non grata because of the ease with which dumped U.S. copy would siphon off Canadian advertising dollars. Some additional cultural initiatives are pending.

Reassurances to Washington from the Department of External Affairs continue, but the rhetoric of officialdom in a federal state is belied by unexpected eruptions at the periphery, somewhere in the disparate collection of regional loyalties and semi-autonomous institutional structures which constitute the kingdoms (in the plural) of Canada.

With little warning, gas export prices in British Columbia are hiked several times over; the province of Saskatchewan proposes to reclaim half of its potash industry now largely in American hands.

Seemingly unfriendly gestures are being made by the autonomous Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission to strip the cable TV commercials coming into Canada from U.S. border stations in order to provide a financial base for Canadian programming. The membership of "Canadian unions" is becoming much more restless under American control, and rapid moves toward autonomy are taking place among the teamsters, construction workers, railway workers and chemical workers.

Some other faint thunder is heard here and there in different parts of Canada, but does that really mean lightning is about to follow? Is the age of Canadian immobilism and benign somnolence coming to an end? Canadian nationalists might indeed wish this were so, but their aspirations are as premature as the darker American suspicions.

Everyone was looking for a toehold on the problem, including my visiting American, but none was immediately apparent. I told him that perhaps the answer to his question lay somewhere in the deeper recesses of the elusive Canadian psyche. Some sort of shifting internal deadlock in Canada suggested itself, but how could it ever be uncovered? It may take an unconventional imagination to probe the dynamics of Canadian-American relations at present. As with the ice floes of the Canadian north, the greater preponderance lies beneath the surface. My aim here is not to explore the merits of the immediate issues, nor to air the grievances on either side, but to probe the difficult substratum where the problems have their source. What is developing now is rooted in those antecedent dramas of history and those formative casts of mind that push periodically to center stage. To quote one of our better known Canadian poets and balladeers, Leonard Cohen, "let us compare mythologies."

II

In the year of the American Bicentennial, retrospective reflections are the order of the day. Among the most compelling is the work of the American historian Louis Hartz who, in *The Founding of New Societies*, explained how countries of the New World grew and developed within the matrix of that set of beliefs that existed at the moment of their birth. The "fragment" of the Old World that was planted in new soil was a seed carrying John Locke's philosophy of liberalism and freedom. "Born free," Americans must be allowed to become equal. The inner drive has a compelling hold, and, Hartz suggests, "cannot tolerate an accommodation of degree."

Much that was later to emerge as the ideology of American bourgeois society had its roots in that *forma mentis* or the pristine cast of

mind of this liberalism. As U.S. history evolved, through Jacksonian democracy, the New Deal, and the Great Society, Hartz maintains that this ethos became "a moral absolute, a national essence, a veritable way of racial life." This ideological leaven pervaded the search for the solution to ills such as the problem of blacks and poverty.

The very dogma that produced the ferocity of the American Civil War was reiterated in the moral brinkmanship of the cold war. The American liberal ethos, in Hartz' interpretation, proclaims that "the world is really one," and this ideology provides Americans "with a shield against the Saracen [and] the only imaginable moral way of dealing with the man outside the West."

A distinct economic ideology formed an integral part of American liberalism. Free exchange, freely arrived at, always and inherently evenhanded, became the filter through which economic life was viewed. If economic practice did not live up to this prescription, the function of national policy was to restructure the environment to appear to conform to the ideology, from fair trade practices to regulatory agencies and antitrust legislation.

In the 1960s—the coming of age of the multinational corporation—American economic liberalism acquired cosmic wings once more as the economic and moral elements fused. For Roy Ash, the former head of Litton Industries, the world corporation represented a "transcendental unity," for "nothing can stop an idea whose time has come." This global vision pervades the American view of much of what has transpired in Canada. Canadian concerns with the integrity of the nation-state, or the preservation of political and cultural autonomy, receive short shrift against this symphonic resonance of global progress ringing in American ears. Fair dealing, the justice inherent in the marketplace, the sanctity of contracts that have been freely entered into by both parties—these serve as a moral shield against the seemingly outmoded objections that Canadians raise. Such an attitude deeply imbues the outlook of American officialdom as well as American business. The U.S. State Department, while sharing the traditional but limited American skepticism about its own corporations, takes a stand on opposing any Canadian legislation that appears to be either retroactive or discriminatory against American interests.

Thus Americans hold firmly to the implicit premise that all that has transpired to date in Canadian-American relations has, by and large, been evenhanded and mutually beneficial. There have, admittedly, been marginal problems in this vast web of interconnections, but a strong tradition of open lines of communication and administrative flexibility has been, and will be able, to resolve the difficulties.

The cumulative political effect with which we now have to contend in Canada appears as the result of unintended and unforeseen consequences; blind spots were at least as operative on the Canadian as on the American side. But the liberal ethos now provides the moral basis for downgrading and tuning out the difficult, unwieldy, and ultimately dangerous problem of the vast American presence. Those who uphold the code of square dealing and who expect their partners to do the same find that the frail Canadian nationalist rhetoric seems to saddle them with a bad conscience. But they tend to reassure themselves that they have played by the rules of the game and the rules carry no particular compensatory provisions for losers ("handicaps," in rare cases, must be specified at the outset). How, in any case, can there be "losers" in a game whose rules are always "even-steven"? When some understanding is forthcoming, it tends at the same time to echo Lyndon Johnson's first public reference to the Canadian-American relationship: "Canada is such a close neighbor and such a good neighbor that we always have plenty of problems there. They are kind of like problems in the hometown."

The latest expressions of American policy bear clearer marks of recognition of the Canadian situation, but are still not easily budged from the traditional stance. Richard Vine, a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the U.S. State Department, went over the ground recently before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs. While sympathizing with the "Canadian effort to promote expanded economic and cultural autonomy," he recognized the problems involved:

National controls can rarely be expanded without some impact, usually adverse, on established interests in the area of control. . . . The U.S. government has a responsibility to protect the American interests affected to the extent possible and appropriate.

Friendly personal relations, extensive consultation and administrative flexibility are desirable in themselves, but serve to disguise, even from Americans, the hidden rigidity of American policy. The friendly tone still continues with talk of "interdependence" and "mutual benefits" but it is entirely geared to the dubious objective of the preservation of the status quo. For Americans to insist on nondiscrimination in Canadian policies is tantamount to suggesting that we continue to play blindman's buff with the overwhelming American presence. For Americans to continue to insist on nonretroactive policies only is to abort from the outset any possibility of fundamental change. Together, the two pillars of U.S. State Department policy

seem to some Canadians merely a license for cosmetic changes, a variant of Henry Ford's aphorism about black cars.

But on the other side, the unpreparedness is just as great. Many Canadians greeted Nixon's declaration of the end of "the special relationship" with an inaudible but vast sigh of relief. But they were nevertheless still hard put to answer concretely and in some detail the increasingly truculent question, "What do Canadians want?"

III

I'm struck by the clarity of the American sense of history: in the beginning, the Americans created America. And ever since, they've been consulting their beginning, the way fundamentalists consult the book of Genesis Canadians don't have such a clear sense of when things began and ended.—*Northrop Frye*

What appears to many as the paralyzing deadlock of Canadian policy toward the United States, the substantial acquiescence by Canadians in their own takeover, stems from the effects of two different systems of belief that remain out of phase: Canadian liberalism, the credo of the dominant elite culture in Canada, and Canadian populism that grows out of a "homestead mentality." While elements of both systems may be present in the same individuals and in the same political parties and while we must ride roughshod over the fine points and exceptions, these two casts of mind are, so to speak, the two psychic horns of the English-speaking Canadian dilemma.

Canadian liberalism is a close cousin of the American variety. Their origins are common but the cadences and mode of development in Canada differ. The ingesting of nineteenth-century British liberalism was the inevitable consequence of the pride Canadians initially took in their colonial status. Philosophy, economics, politics and law had Oxbridge and Westminster as their respective models. Rhodes scholars and other cadres of the able and affluent went to England for many generations to pay homage to civilization at its apogee. They returned to slip into the waiting positions in business, finance, the universities and the civil service. The global perspectives of nineteenth-century England became the official Canadian credo. Free trade (at least in theory if not in practice) and free markets, civil liberties and parliamentary government, would bring the latter-day millennium of the Enlightenment—English style. Oxford accents sometimes sat uneasily atop Canadian French and barely masked a native Ottawa Valley shrewdness, but the prerogatives of shouldering manfully the delegated responsibilities of the Empire were the order of the day.

The loosening of ties with Britain in the interwar period had no more dramatic consequences for national self-consciousness than that

of a dutiful and dependent adolescent reluctantly leaving home at last. The country's self-image never rose in stature above Mackenzie King's truculent ambivalence toward Britain and his seemingly cunning flirtation with the United States. Mackenzie King stated to the American Minister in Ottawa in 1935 that Canada was prepared to loosen its British ties and take "the American road," if a good trade agreement with the United States could be arranged.

The trade agreements were eventually forthcoming for reasons of their own, and the Second World War, in turn, brought a more substantial entente and integration between the two countries under King's direction. King became a good deal more suspicious of "the American road" toward the end of his life, but he had set a pattern followed in broad outline by successive Canadian prime ministers.

Lester Pearson's views heralded a transformation in Canadian opinion to "internationalism," leapfrogging the rather suspect and parochial elements of nationalism. This shining aura overlay the close ties being knotted together under the pressures of the cold war, the joint continental defense agreements, and the open-door policy to all things American. Few paused to wonder at the rather limited range of the "internationalism" we were, in fact, practicing.

Among the most important new influences was the rise of mass education in the postwar period and the redirection of large numbers of Canadian university students from graduate study in Great Britain to the United States. The intellectual atmosphere and assumptions of the University of Chicago, MIT, Harvard and Columbia became the norms of expanding Canadian university staffs and of middle-rank and key civil servants.

In the area of economics, the drums began to beat once more for free trade, and by close analogy for free capital movement. When the institutional form of this capital increasingly became the highly visible hand of the multinational corporation, Canadian economists regilded this new phenomenon with the old paint of Adam Smith. Nothing really new was happening, they maintained, and a *carte blanche* welcome was to be the policy of the postwar decades. Whatever second thoughts arose in Ottawa were soon suppressed under the old mercantile wisdom of not looking gift horses in the mouth and genuine fears of unemployment. Political time-horizons were short and long-term consequences would look after themselves.

Among the more euphoric prophets of the liberal ethos, elegiac notions arose of Canada as an "international nation," bypassing all that embarrassing, chauvinistic talk of nationhood, which, as everyone knew, simply led to wars. (Whom would Canada attack?) This

sentimental miasma produced a comprehensive integrated vision that legitimized the American tide—a vision liberal to its core. In brief summary its components were as follows: an international community seemingly without its constituent component—nations; national intellectual “excellence” without the “parochialism” of national traditions, a community of scholars without any special concern for those indigenous boundaries which shape the direction of national inquiry (the inquiry that *produces* knowledge rather than simply living off everyone else’s insights); an economy without specificity—manufactured goods as well as resources are all “commodities,” faceless units of exchange in both the domestic and international economy. As the gold rush developed for Canadian resources, the door was opened wider still by the conventional economic wisdom. It maintained that there can, by definition, be no overdevelopment in any sector, if “comparative advantage” is pursued under the aegis of the “market.”

The Economic Council of Canada, the government’s official advisory body, was under the full sway of this economic wisdom. It never deemed the problem of foreign investment in Canada worthy of a full and proper study, even though hundreds of other topics were closely scrutinized. The debate on foreign investment was launched instead by a tiny subculture of economists and politicians who refused to take liberal rhetoric and neoclassical economic theory at face value. The chief documents to emerge were the Gordon Commission Report (1958), the Watkins Report (1968), the Wahn Report (1970) and the Gray Report (1972).¹ They all tried to deal with the issues of Canadian independence in various ways that straddled economics and politics. A picture began to emerge of the “truncation” of Canadian industry—branch plants devoid of research and development facilities, dependent on marketing and purchasing decisions centralized in U.S. head offices—and an overdeveloped resource sector that provided relatively less employment than equivalent manufacturing activity.

The picture was of course mixed, for foreign capital did provide increased employment, paid taxes, and brought new technological and management techniques into the country. But foreign investment was clearly not foreign aid. The specific balance-of-payments effects of foreign investment were difficult to isolate, but one study may give a very rough indication of the magnitudes involved in the two-way flow. The short-term and long-term inflow of capital to Canada between

¹ The full titles of these government reports are respectively: *The Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects*; *Report of the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry*; *Report (11th) of the Committee Respecting Canada-U.S. Relations*; and *Foreign Direct Investment in Canada*.

1950 and 1974 was around \$20 billion. This was matched by an outflow of slightly over \$40 billion in the same period (\$7 billion in interest payments, \$17 billion in dividends and \$16 billion in "service charges," such as license and management fees).

The Science Council of Canada began to fill in the picture where the Economic Council feared to tread. Its 1972 study, *Innovation and the Structure of Canadian Industry*, by Pierre L. Bourgault, noted:

We are the world's largest producer of nickel, but we are net importers of stainless steel and manufactured nickel products, including "cold climate" nickel-cadmium batteries; we are the world's second largest producer of aluminum, but we import it in its more sophisticated forms. . . . We are the world's largest exporter of pulp and paper, but we import much of our fine paper and virtually all of the highly sophisticated paper, such as backing for photographic film and dielectric papers for use in electronic components; we are one of the world's principal sources of platinum, but it is all exported for refining and processing and reimported in finished forms; we are large exporters of natural gas and petroleum, but we are net importers of petrochemicals; and, although we are the world's foremost exporter of raw asbestos fibres, we are net importers of manufactured asbestos products.

For a country with a higher than average unemployment problem, the low employment content of these resource exports should have meant something. The issue has now been recognized, but the inhibition on effective policy continues despite much talk in recent years about an "industrial strategy" to increase the manufacturing content of our exports.

Nothing was more emblematic of the whole mood of resignation to the incoming tide than the inability of the External Affairs Department to deal with the issue of the extension of American law to American subsidiaries located in Canada. Under the Foreign Assets Control Regulations (the Trading with the Enemy Act), the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the American government retains the primary jurisdiction in deciding which countries its foreign subsidiaries can or cannot trade with, when they might or might not discuss mergers, and so on. The divergence from Canadian policy in these matters was often marked, particularly in regard to the American embargo on trade with China, and up until very recently in regard to trade with Cuba.

The crux of the issue, however, lies neither in the value of potential exports to communist countries which have been foregone, nor in whether American antitrust law has had "good" or "bad" effects on the Canadian industrial structure. There may be legitimate debate about both these points, but the central question is the intrusion of American jurisdiction into a great segment of the Canadian economy through the insistence on the control of U.S. subsidiaries. An elab-

orate administrative apparatus encompassing several U.S. government departments is set up to try to ensure effective compliance with U.S. foreign economic policy and to impose severe penalties in case of violation. There are no "problems," of course, as long as the foreign economic policies of the two countries are congruent.

The records of the Joint Ministerial Committees of the two countries reveal much symbolic table-pounding, but the Canadians never produced a single workable proposal to implement Canadian sovereignty. The Americans, in turn, never budged an inch in principle, although they were prepared to grant case-by-case exemptions under Washington's total discretion.

Arnold Heeney was the top Canadian diplomat of the period and a living embodiment of the liberal vision. Along with the senior American diplomat Livingston Merchant, he produced the 1965 report entitled *Principles of Partnership*, which put forward the proposal that problems between the two countries be settled discreetly in the diplomatic corridors before they erupted as "public positions." But the report did contain the single blanket proposal that American extraterritorial law operating in Canada be unilaterally revoked by the United States. Paragraph 61 stated: "We strongly recommend that the two governments examine promptly the means, through issuance by the United States of a general license or adoption of other appropriate measures, by which this irritant may be removed. . . ."

I was involved in a governmental task force at the time, studying the broad range of issues relating to foreign investment in Canada and was intrigued by the origins and fate of this proposal. In a July 1967 interview with Mr. Heeney, he expressed some belated uneasiness about the onrushing economic integration of Canada and the United States. But he confessed, somewhat shamefacedly, that the one original proposal of the report had come, to his own surprise, from Livingston Merchant, his American counterpart. He had not himself seen at any time how the problem could be solved.

I discovered later that the proposal had been blocked by the U.S. Treasury Department and never got anywhere. But the interview summed up for me the limits of Ottawa's liberal vision: the lurking regret and unwitting day-to-day participation in knotting together and smoothing out the strands of Canadian dependence; the excellence in soft-shoe tactics and the haplessness in strategy. After 1968, when legal proposals began to emerge for the first time from both the Watkins and Wahn Reports that showed how American extraterritorial jurisdiction could be effectively blocked by firm action in Canada, the Canadian government ran true to form by deciding that the

political costs of marring the American relationship in this way were too high. Nothing was done. In retrospect, it appears to have been an era of flatulent rhetoric and faceless floundering best exhibited by the two Ministers of External Affairs, Paul Martin and Mitchell Sharp.

While it may appear dubious to root concrete and massive economic and political dilemmas in Canada in the astigmatism of liberal theory, exactly that cast of mind, I believe, is the key to Canada's "silent surrender." Canadian liberalism was all of a piece: a sentimental internationalism, a pussyfooting "quiet diplomacy," and a procrustean view of multinational corporations as ever-friendly "market" phenomena.

As it happened, liberalism proclaimed, and indeed "celebrated, the nation's nonexistence. Society was reduced by definition to a collection of self-seeking individuals; the state was merely the instrument of the protection of property and the enforcement of contract. The concept of the nation as such entered obtrusively only in awkward and negative ways: in its economic incarnation it was the progenitor of tariffs and other restrictions on the "natural" free flow of trade and capital. Such a natural flow would make, as everyone from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman knew, for grand global harmony.

The absence of a distinct and traumatic moment of self-creation in Canada gave great power and longevity to an imported British liberalism and its subsequent American version, despite the vital threat it posed to Canada's inner integrity as a nation. Missing as always from such colonial projection was the internally rooted sense of a national self, that is, an independent political culture with its accompanying symbols to evoke and protect Canadian nationhood.

What was thereby so effectively blotted out was the problem of power, particularly the locus of economic power. Thus when power began to shift out of the Canadian economy to Chicago, New York and Washington by virtue of the highly visible and active hand of the multinational corporation, and by virtue of our dependence on Washington's legal and economic policies, we were barely conscious that anything of importance had happened. All we could ask was whether the "market" was functioning properly and whether profits (somewhere, anywhere) were being "maximized."

But the nemesis of the twentieth century must come sooner or later to the adherents of nineteenth-century credos. So, too, this era moved to its grand moment of culmination when one event lit up the entire Canadian reality. On December 6, 1971, Prime Minister Trudeau visited President Nixon in Washington on a strange quest. He emerged from this meeting elated and euphoric, for the American

President had granted Canada something quite "fantastic." Nothing less than a Canadian Declaration of Independence had emerged out of Washington. Presumably that is where it now had to be sought. However demeaning to Canadian sensibilities, a high degree of political realism was involved in this backhanded recognition of how far American control had extended. As Trudeau put the matter the following day to the Canadian Parliament: "He [the President] assured me that it was in the clear interests of the United States to have a Canadian neighbour, not only independent both politically and economically but also one which was confident that the decisions and policies in each of these sectors would be taken by Canadians in their own interests, in defence of their own values, and in pursuit of their own goals." *Noblesse oblige*. The event was "fantastic" in more ways than one: for Canadian liberalism, the head office is always elsewhere.

IV

But there is a backstage protagonist that has only sporadically appeared on the stage of Canadian-American relations. That protagonist is not, in the first instance, Canadian nationalism, but a more diffuse, unfocused and potentially very powerful force in Canadian politics—grass-roots populism. Its essential cast of mind is the homestead mentality and its articulation is through the politics of space.

In the inner recesses of the Canadian self-image there remains the indelible imprint of the pioneer struggle with the land—the vanquishing of hostile forest, stubborn rock and parched prairie. There is the lasting trauma of outliving bleak winters into a late spring, of existing on the precarious margin of a short Canadian agricultural season. This is the psychic crucible in which Canadian populism was shaped—in latent anxiety, in wariness and reticence and in a sense of ongoing silent siege.

But turning no-man's-land into one's own homestead carries with it ingrained or natural rights that accrue to the survivor. A political sense of earned jurisdiction over a vanquished space that was, at least in principle, inviolable and sacrosanct, became the nuclear element of political identity that arose in the Canadian psyche. Economic and political jurisdiction on the homestead should be untrammelled, and any trespass or political infringement would be resisted.

In the Canadian consciousness, as in Canadian history, the homestead precedes the establishment of the state. This mental landscape that harks back to the primal (even if recent) origins of the country provides the political footing from which the state itself in its various roles may be either substantially endorsed or roundly opposed. The

specific political characteristics of the homestead mentality were, often enough, vague; without a strong ideological base and essentially anti-establishment in its orientation, it remained tied by a powerful navel cord to the land either in fact or in persistent imagination. The essential political framework was space rather than class.

Canadian populism is not unique but seems more firmly entrenched than American populism and more readily articulated in a federal system, particularly as the distance from Ottawa increases. Among its distinct features is the very high priority given to preserving social order over established territory. The national symbol in Canada is not the cowboy or the covered wagon—those self-reliant symbols of rough justice individually dispensed—but the opposite, the “Mountie,” the lone representative and guarantor of central authority in barely policed areas who “always gets his man.” Canadians are prepared to support a virtually unlimited role of the state in the preservation of social order and in the concomitant assertion of sovereignty over the “homestead writ large,” the “Dominion from sea to sea.” The evidence for such a deep-seated but widely pervasive cast of mind is necessarily impressionistic and scattered, only surfacing occasionally.

The primary concern is with the land. Thus it happened that from the apparently least nationalist part of the country, the Maritime Provinces, there emerged the most stringent legislation barring foreigners from owning land. This has been repeated in Saskatchewan, and has now become an active concern in virtually all provinces, and the federal government is prepared to follow their lead. On September 5, 1975, Prime Minister Trudeau sent a letter to the ten provincial premiers offering to introduce federal legislation granting the provinces the right to restrict foreign ownership of property.

The priority given to land, and the corresponding lethargy regarding industry and technology in the Canadian imagination, were never more dramatically illustrated than in an incident which occurred in 1969. At that time the Humble Oil Company, seeking a Northwest Passage to export Alaskan oil by ship, sent the American vessel *Manhattan* through the Arctic waters. This raised the specter of whether Canadian sovereignty in Arctic waters was being challenged or jeopardized (the legal issues of which we must bypass here). Recall that this was prior to the oil and gas boom in the Canadian north, so that what was at issue was the fate of the ice floes and glaciers in a virtually uninhabited part of the country. Suddenly, Canadian newspapers from coast to coast, most of which had traditionally welcomed the takeover of Canadian businesses, now wrote as many as two or three editorials a day in great alarm. “Fly the Canadian Flag” read the

hysterical headline of the now-defunct Toronto *Telegram*, a newspaper that had viewed with complacency the passing of 70 percent of southern Ontario's industry to American control.

But this same consciousness underlies (quite apart from the economic issues) Canada's perennial concern with fishing zones, and more recently the 200-mile offshore limit, and its substantial initiative at the Conference on the Law of the Sea. It is also the homestead mentality that may account for the otherwise totally inexplicable Canadian preoccupation with water. Canada possesses something on the order of 20 to 50 percent of the world's supply of fresh water, and an enormous amount runs off annually into the sea, perhaps six percent of the world's runoff. (As usual, we have no exact statistics.) Yet one of the silent but absolute premises that unites Canadians from coast to coast is that not a single drop should be exported, no matter how great the surplus supply may be. As the former premier of British Columbia, W. A. C. Bennett, who had never hesitated to sell anything to the highest bidder, once stated: "Even to talk about selling water is ridiculous. Water is our heritage and you don't sell your heritage." This curious attitude was reflected in the Canadian response to the 1973 Point Roberts affair.²

Without wishing in any way here to advocate the export of water, or to minimize the enormous environmental issues involved, it seems clear from the data we do have that the potential export of a fraction of our surplus water might easily exceed in value any single item of Canadian exports. It is now completely wasted. My purpose, however, is to indicate one of the areas where the deep-seated homestead mentality has surfaced in the political arena and has held fast. The issue of water is as "self-evident" to Canadians at large, as it is puzzling to everyone else.

Land and water are the clues to the underlying attitudes in the new phase of Canadian nationalism which centers on resources, particularly energy resources. The important question in Canada is the extent to which the same cast of mind is now beginning to surface on these closely related issues. As the leading Canadian historian, Donald Creighton, a man of conservative bent, explained in 1970:

² In the relatively minor Point Roberts affair in 1973, the issue was the export of a minuscule amount of water from the lower British Columbia mainland to an adjacent five-square-mile resort area which was American territory. The Canadian verdict was a unanimous No. The sophisticated, and certainly non-nationalist Toronto *Globe and Mail*, "Canada's national newspaper," commented editorially that "To supply water to Point Roberts would set a most dangerous precedent" since "we do not have any accurate idea of what our future needs will be. We have many, many questions about water that are yet to be answered, and may have to wait for future generations to answer." And what was the *Globe's* own answer to the affair? Nothing less than "to make Point Roberts Canadian territory" (August 16, 1973, my italics).

Canadians instinctively regard their natural resources in a very special light. . . . These natural resources are not looked upon as ordinary assets—things the Canadians have built or acquired themselves. They are regarded as part of the original endowment of nature, as the birthright of Canada. Many of them are not owned absolutely, as they would be in the United States, by private enterprises. They are properties in which the Crown retains a right, which it has sometimes converted into public ownership, for the beneficial interest of the people of Canada.

It appears that public opinion supports this position. A Gallup Poll of May 16, 1973, asked whether the "Canadian government should nationalize our energy resources, such as oil and gas." Of Canadians across the country 48 percent replied in the affirmative, while 36 percent were opposed. A positive plurality emerged in all three Canadian political parties. A similar Gallup Poll taken in the first week of November 1975 indicated a figure of 51 percent in favor of nationalizing oil and gas and 31 percent opposed.

Thus it would be a mistake to interpret the renewed call for reclaiming our oil and gas, as well as other resources such as potash, as a sudden spread of socialist ideology. The activation of the federal government's corporation, Petro-Canada, as well as similar corporations in provinces such as Alberta, Newfoundland and Saskatchewan reflect an extension of this territorial ethic, not radical in its complexion but essentially conservative. It was a Conservative government that nationalized electricity in Ontario in 1910 and Conservative governments now operate in Alberta and Newfoundland while a social democratic government operates in Saskatchewan.

Thus, populist politics in Canada are indeed the politics of space. Canadian sensitivity to the extraterritorial extension of American law, referred to earlier, has been the chief basis for much unease over American investment. The traditional concern with the integrity of Canadian authority on the "homestead writ large" has far outweighed other considerations such as an unbalanced or truncated economic structure, overdependence on resource development for the U.S. market and a rapidly eroding technological capability.

But the politics of space does not make for a uniform endorsement of state intervention. An indirect legacy of this same cast of mind reinforces the existing struggle of both business and labor against various measures proposed by the federal government. The businessman who struggled to carve out his enterprise "against great odds" will barely tolerate any interference in his prerogative; hence the remarkable campaign mounted by the business community a few years ago against the tax reform proposals of the Carter Commission to fundamentally restructure the business "homestead." Economics was not at issue here (despite much rhetoric about free enterprise)

but rather politics, the claim to untrammelled autonomy and jurisdiction of the institutional homestead.

Union leaders who carved out their "homestead," i.e., their union jurisdiction, in the difficult days of the early 1930s, will not tolerate limits on the collective bargaining process—their rightfully earned area of "total authority." In the debate over the government's anti-inflation program of wage and price controls, Canadian labor unions were militantly opposed as were unions in other countries. But a hidden dimension added a particular acrimony to this debate in Canada. Canadian unions were prepared to sink the whole anti-inflation program because it was an intrusion into their political space.

These are not primary but background features of the domestic political scene, and by no means unique to Canada. But in a federal state such as Canada, populism has held on longer and more forcefully, sheltered by the significant provincial enclaves of power. The implicit political game in Canada is somehow to tap this very powerful and widespread populist undercurrent. If successfully achieved on rare occasions, the political payoff can be enormous. This largely accounts, in my view, for the landslide Conservative victories by John Diefenbaker in 1958–59. Diefenbaker appeared as the living image of old-fashioned prairie populism. It also accounts, for quite different reasons—largely because of an image of popular irreverence and iconoclasm—for the substantial Liberal victory of Pierre Trudeau in 1968: the upper-class man in populist clothing.

Populists feel safest when they can have it both ways. While they retain a healthy skepticism of the liberal establishment—the moneyed, the educated and the bureaucracy—they are not prepared to trust their own leaders to govern except on rare occasions. (This syndrome is not unlike that of the British Labour Party's tendency to select its leaders from the graduates of the public school and from Oxbridge.) Populism is more often successful on the provincial rather than the federal scene where the risks of bungling by those without "class" or "experience" are less. In day-to-day politics, populism stands aside as a suspicious but vigilant monitor of potential state intrusions into the equivalent of the homestead, and as a militant guardian of social order and national sovereignty.

Thus at the time of the OPEC oil embargo, when Americans heard the crisp statements of Canadian intentions not to pool energy shortages with the United States, but instead to cut back on energy exports, they might have discerned several different notes in the chord. First, there was the reaction to the fiasco around the nonexistent reserves centered on the oil companies' misleading figures. Second, the under-

lying populist sentiment in Canada had now begun to come forward as an ongoing and overt political factor around the resources question. Third, the nationalist message itself had begun to penetrate the political process.

The linking of these latter two elements may be decisive and may become the dominant factor in future Canadian-American relations.

V

I have overdrawn somewhat the characteristics of the two major casts of mind in Canada. Their elements are often to be found in some combination within the same individual and within all three major political parties. How do they each relate to the new nationalism?

Modern Canadian nationalism is a relative latecomer to the political scene, barely two decades old. It cannot be understood as a movement, but as a countermovement to the astigmatism of the liberal position. Its aim is to protect the fabric of Canadian society against the autonomous and relentless forces running "free" in the North American market economy.

In their public image in Canada, nationalists stand in some awkward middle position between liberals and populists, somewhat suspect to both sides. Populists tend to regard nationalism as an elite heresy, the inverse image of the liberal ethic in which they have no direct stake, and have therefore largely stood aloof from a full nationalist program. Liberals, in turn, have tended to regard the nationalist position as a retrogressive, inward-looking throwback, vaguely populist, for which there is no clear place in the modern world.

Nevertheless, despite these suspicions, and because of the palpable force of circumstances, a limited form of nationalism has quietly spread to a wide segment of the population and has in its own way outrun the actual membership of nationalist organizations such as the Committee for an Independent Canada.

But there are no optimistic forecasts to be made any more for the recapturing by Canadians of their own economic and cultural autonomy—even though in the modern world, the issue can at best be only a matter of degree. Sometimes it seems to Canadian nationalists, from past experience, that if things can possibly go wrong, they will. Nevertheless, there are solid indications that the major battle in Canada has now begun over the question of resources. Here the populist consciousness may well become fully engaged in the reclaiming of the "homestead" along with nationalists whose concern has traditionally been the wider link between resources and industry. Liberals, in turn, now have cause to see all about them, late in the

day as it is, the consequences of their beneficent sleepwalking and defer in a limited way to moderate nationalist arguments.

But none of this in itself necessarily makes for substantial policy changes in Canada. Change, rather, is being galvanized by economic factors: increases in heating and gasoline bills, the vast capital sums that will be needed for pipelines from the north and their attendant inflationary effects, and the major balance-of-payments problems that Canada may anticipate from mounting oil imports.

The nationalist program on energy exports now begins to make sense to many Canadians for it calls for a substantial further reduction in energy exports to the United States. While there is no unanimity on how much or how quickly, a further cut from the 1976 level of 460,000 barrels of oil a day would seem to be warranted, i.e., a more rapid implementation of existing policy.

In regard to natural gas, the Canadian government is following a standpat position, hoping to fulfill existing contracts with the United States—however fraudulent the information on which the 1970 export decision was based—and to meet the domestic shortage with a vastly expensive pipeline from the far north. Since Canadian discoveries of gas in the north are still inadequate to finance a pipeline (3.5 to 5 trillion cubic feet), the intention is to have the pipeline carry jointly Canadian and Alaskan gas, the latter destined for the United States. Total long-term contracts call for the export of 14 trillion cubic feet of Canadian gas to the United States between 1974 and 1995. It is the commitment to these export contracts and the uncertainty about the rate of new discoveries in Alberta and their deliverability that prompts this pipeline policy. Meanwhile, the most easily accessible, high-pressure gas fields (Waterton B.H.K. and Kaybob South) are now under contract to California by the American-owned Alberta and Southern Gas Co. Approximately one trillion cubic feet of gas is exported annually from western Canada, equal to two-thirds of domestic Canadian consumption.

Most nationalists in Canada would argue for a drastic change in government policy. The Mackenzie Valley pipeline would cost some \$10 billion to build. It would have substantial disruptive effects on northern ecology and on the native peoples, and would produce a serious inflationary impact on the Canadian economy. This could all be averted by a moratorium on the project contingent on a drastic reduction of gas exports to the United States.

Under sections 17(2) and 85 of the National Energy Board Act such reduction or elimination of licensed exports is legally possible if domestic supply conditions warrant it. The diversion of, say, 10

trillion cubic feet of gas, earmarked for export, to domestic use would add seven years to Canada's gas supply at 1975 consumption rates and would postpone the need for this expensive pipeline. While new discoveries were being sought in Alberta, American buyers might be given three year's notice of the rescinding of our export agreements and might then contract for whatever surplus gas they could discover that would begin to fulfill their overly sanguine 1970 reserve estimates.

Not to be neglected are the long-term political problems associated with moving Alaskan gas through a Canadian pipeline to the United States. The claims of native groups and environmentalists have hardly begun to be met and we can anticipate that political opposition in this whole area may be very great. Given the potential strategic importance of such a pipeline to the United States, the interests of the American military and intelligence establishments in the security of such a pipeline may tighten the American embrace on Canada even further, particularly since American financing and American gas would be centrally involved in the project. Canadians are not unmindful of the dangers of creating a land-based "Panama Canal"-type situation in their country. The contemplated pipeline treaty between the two countries may be reassuring, but cannot dissolve the political and strategic issues. Thus the pipeline carries with it substantial economic, ecological and political risks for Canada, risks that are too great, in my view, to warrant fulfillment of our American contracts. It is a precise case in point where Canada must, in its own interest, take action that is retroactive and discriminatory.

The populist response to such a program and to the larger question of a new resource policy is not easily predictable. Populism is more at home as the unofficial opposition in day-to-day politics, and is more of an impulse than a movement. Much will depend on the political image the immediate issue assumes. If it comes up as an issue of social order cum sovereignty, one may expect widespread public support for greater Canadian control of our natural resources and great pressures on whatever government is in power. For example, a popular move would be for the government, through Petro-Canada, to buy out one of the major oil companies such as Imperial Oil.

The attempt to deal more forcefully with the high percentages of American control of the manufacturing industry is not on the immediate political agenda. This will have to await a further development of public consciousness around the issue of a national industrial strategy designed to integrate more directly our resource production and manufacturing activity. All that Canadian nationalists can hope for now is that the few cultural initiatives will be sustained, that the

screening and review process on foreign companies will be expanded and that resource nationalism will become the political base for expanded initiatives by Canadians to become masters in their own house.

VI

Such is the direction of the Canadian political endowment at the moment when the country is gathering its second wind. Hence the new American Ambassador to Canada, Thomas O. Enders, may have been somewhat premature in his maiden speech to the Canadian Club of Ottawa last March when he stated: "We are both conscious that the end of the 'special relationship' frees us both from historical hang-ups in pursuing our interests." In the traditional terms in which the Canadian-American relationship has been conducted, he was perfectly correct.

But a realignment of the old liberal credo, wearing its complementary faces in both countries, may not be the best preparation for what is to come. In Canada, an old set of "historical hang-ups" may just be coming into place. For example, Saskatchewan's intention to acquire half the province's potash capacity (largely American-owned) may be better understood in the light of what we have been discussing. This prospect poses the dilemma that the province would then have control of one-third of the U.S. potash supply. "Although welcome," the Ambassador added, "statements that this power would be used benignly are not adequate reassurance."

The power question in all its new and interlocking dimensions goes to the heart of the matter in Canadian-American relations. The Ambassador did sympathize in his speech with "the assertion of Canadian national purpose" and did not contest the right of Canadians to expropriate "provided it is paid for fully, promptly, and effectively." But this expanded liberalism does not settle the question of power, and such an underlying and often hidden issue as potash may be the forerunner of similar problems yet to arise.

The power question—and there is none more important—is now on the agenda, and it is clear that the fundamental and long-standing lopsidedness of the distribution of power as it affects Canadian interests needs major correction. Canadians may be forgiven for a sense of *déjà vu*. Statements that American power in Canada, at so many different levels, "would be used benignly" have a remarkably familiar ring and are not, as the Ambassador states, "adequate reassurance."

It is on the resolution of this central item on our joint agenda that everything now turns.

THE RACE TO CONTROL NUCLEAR ARMS

By Paul Doty, Albert Carnesale and Michael Nacht

AS the nuclear age lengthens and the opportunity for viewing it in perspective grows, its essential features seem increasingly related to successive eight-year American presidential administrations. Measures to control nuclear weapons have been seriously considered in each of the first four postwar "octades," and there has been an acceleration in the number of agreements reached—most notably in limiting nuclear tests, slowing nuclear proliferation, restraining the quantitative growth of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals, and restricting defenses against nuclear weapons.

Yet, as the nuclear age enters its fifth octade, the race to control strategic arms is being lost. Numerous obstacles have arisen to block further progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), thereby creating the danger of a new escalation in "vertical" arms proliferation. And the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries—"horizontal" proliferation—appears to have been rekindled, attributed by some to the stagnation of SALT. Moreover, new weapons systems likely to be deployed within the next few years are certain to exacerbate the arms control problem, for the already shaky SALT process appears inadequate to the task of bringing them under control. Clearly, a major change in our approach to arms control is necessary—one that addresses more decisively and more urgently the inter-related problems of vertical and horizontal proliferation.

The present commitment to joint Soviet-American negotiations to preserve the nuclear balance at progressively lower numerical levels of armaments is wise and prudent, but it is not the only course. If this approach does not produce meaningful limitations and reductions, and if it means the neglect of the growing threat of horizontal proliferation, then it is possible that a reversion to non-negotiated management of nuclear forces and unilateral initiatives offers more hope of restraint than the deceptive pursuit of "arms control" that does not bring control.

II

Each of the four postwar presidential administrations has left its

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distinctive imprint on the nuclear age. The Roosevelt-Truman years, 1945–1952, the first octade of the nuclear age, comprised the development period of nuclear weaponry, stretching from the first explosion in 1945 to the thousand-fold greater yield of the first thermonuclear device in 1952. At the outset, Secretary of War Henry Stimson saw relations with Russia being “dominated by the atomic bomb” but no agreement was reached on mutual management of the new force. Instead, the cold war became dominant. In 1952, the United Kingdom became the third member of the nuclear club.

The Eisenhower octade, 1953–1960, saw the full flowering of nuclear weapons systems. Both sides developed thermonuclear weapons and built large bomber forces for their delivery. With the United States in the lead, massive retaliation became its official strategic doctrine. Meanwhile, planning shifted to second-strike forces, ballistic missiles were born, and the octade closed with the deployment of the first Polaris submarine. American and Soviet arms control plans became more realistic and showed some convergence, but fell short of agreement. In 1960, France exploded her first atomic bomb.

The Kennedy-Johnson octade, 1961–1968, saw the completion by the United States of a modern nuclear force based on about 2,000 delivery systems consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and bombers (mostly B-52s). The Soviet buildup lagged by nearly a decade, finally producing by 1968 about half as many modern delivery vehicles as the United States. Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems developed to the point where claims for their practicability were taken seriously, generating concern that second-strike effectiveness might be compromised, and that the underlying premise of deterrence—mutual assured destruction—was jeopardized. The growing radioactive contamination from fallout catalyzed the first substantive Soviet-American arms control agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The nuclear club expanded to include China, and the U.S. entrapment in Vietnam showed vividly how impotent nuclear weapons could be. Interest in a worldwide effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weaponry grew and became more focused throughout the 1960s, culminating in the signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in mid-1968. Despite the intensity of the Vietnam War, serious approaches to arms control, stimulated by the pressures of ABM developments and growing assurances on verification promised by reconnaissance satellites, pyramided in the summer of 1968 only to be disassembled in August by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

This brings us to the fourth octade, which is now nearing its end. During this period, nuclear arms control has for the first time become a central focus of Soviet-American relations; yet its progress has been disappointing, its value increasingly questioned, and its future, and the ability of the superpowers to restrain proliferation, in doubt. If this central focus is to be marked by failure, what then is to become of the overall relationship? While the fundamental causes of this condition surely derive from various sectors of the unique Soviet-American experience, it is important to focus on those sources of difficulty inherent in the arms control enterprise itself in order to suggest goals and measures appropriate to the nascent fifth octade.

III

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have served throughout the Nixon-Ford octade as the primary forum for negotiation of limits on American and Soviet strategic weapons systems. As a result of SALT I, the two parties signed in May 1972 and ratified six months later the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms. The ABM Treaty, with its protocol of July 1974, prohibits either party from deploying ABM systems outside of one small area, while the Interim Agreement limits the numbers of launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs. Unlike the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, the Interim Agreement is scheduled to expire in October 1977. Guidelines established at Vladivostok in November 1974 would, if converted into a formal SALT II treaty, take the place of the Interim Agreement. These guidelines call for a limit of 2,400 on the total number of strategic delivery vehicles—ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers—each side could deploy through 1985, as well as a ceiling of 1,320 on the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs which could be equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

Further progress toward limiting the testing of nuclear weapons has also been accomplished. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty signed in July 1974 would limit the yield of underground tests of nuclear weapons to 150 kilotons (KT). (The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prohibited all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, but did not restrict tests underground.) In May 1976, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a companion treaty on underground nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, which would limit to 150 KT the yield of any individual peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) and to 1,500 KT the combined yield of any group of PNEs

detonated in rapid succession. Special verification procedures, including on-site observers, are provided for the group explosions and for some individual explosions over 100 KT. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the treaty on PNEs have not yet been ratified: some opposition is expected on the grounds that the 150 KT limit is too high and that the agreements would "legitimize" the PNE path to nuclear proliferation. (India justified her May 1974 nuclear explosion by calling it a PNE.)

Measured by diplomatic activity, numbers of agreements, and the extent of national armaments affected, the Nixon-Ford era undoubtedly represents a profound shift from the episodic contacts of earlier years to an acceptance by each side that its national interest is served by continuing mutual efforts to limit nuclear weaponry. The issue, however, is not whether serious problems have received serious attention in a sustained and comprehensive manner—they have—but that the rate at which limitations are being imposed, even assuming a successful conclusion to SALT II, falls far short of the rate at which the forces are being improved. The race to control strategic arms is being lost.

The accomplishments of SALT to date, including the Vladivostok guidelines, will leave the Soviet and American strategic forces at extraordinarily high levels through 1985. Paradoxically, the limit of 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles agreed to at Vladivostok is not very different from the total number of delivery vehicles in the U.S. arsenal in the early 1950s, before the age of intercontinental ballistic missiles, when the strategic inventory was comprised solely of propeller-driven bombers! But the number of deliverable warheads has increased dramatically and continues to do so, with both superpowers likely to pass the 10,000 mark by the end of the decade.

What is and is not included in SALT remains a problem. The Chinese, French and British forces are excluded from limitation, and the Soviets, viewing these as potential threats, cite them as justification for a Soviet nuclear force greater than that of the United States. On the other hand, the Americans insist that their forward-based systems, including fighter bombers based in England, on the European continent, and on aircraft carriers are theater forces and should be excluded from consideration in SALT, despite the fact that they can carry out nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union, at least on one-way missions. A recently developed Soviet bomber, known in the West as the Backfire, presents a comparable problem, and hundreds of intermediate range ballistic missiles in the Soviet Union targeted on Western Europe—and now being MIRVed—have been

left totally untouched by negotiations.

The listing here of what is not covered by the SALT agreements and the Vladivostok guidelines suggests that if strategic arms are to be brought under control, the achievements of the Nixon-Ford era can only be considered the essential stage-setting for what must follow.

IV

Considering the comprehensiveness of approach and the continuity of effort one must ask why it took seven years of SALT to reach even this point. Had this been accomplished in half the time there would have been ample opportunity to grapple with the problems of real control—reductions, restraints on improvements and new systems, improved command and control arrangements, and limitations on weapons systems of intermediate range. Of course, the 1973 war in the Middle East and its aftermath, as well as Watergate, were unusually disruptive diversions. But the real impediments to progress in SALT lie deeper. In retrospect, four obstacles stand out.

The first obstacle has been the mismatch in strategic conceptions of the two sides. When one side may see an advantage—even a mutual advantage—in proceeding with some arms control measure, the other side may not, and over time each side may reverse its position and remain out of phase with the other (as occurred in the negotiations leading to the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the ABM Treaty). A coincidence of some perceived interests is a prerequisite for any meaningful agreement. It is a function of diplomacy to see that opportunities are identified and brought to the attention of the other side.

It is likely that each side bases its weapons requirements on two strategic conceptions: that of maintaining secure second-strike forces and that of maintaining a nuclear war-fighting capability. The acceptance of a virtual ban on ABM systems at SALT I implies that both sides accepted the view that the assured destruction of the attacker is the primary deterrent against an attack; however, this stability is threatened if either side perceives that a major portion of its deterrent force may be vulnerable. Hence, the development of high accuracy, reliable, counterforce missiles and their deployment in large numbers are destabilizing. A major requirement of future SALT agreements should be the removal of this threat.

Both sides consider that strategic weapons are also needed for use against fixed targets of military value other than strategic forces. This targeting doctrine justifies the development of high accuracy weapons, but it is precisely this development that can threaten the stability of second-strike forces. Moreover, since target lists can be generated al-

most without limit, the numbers of warheads required can be inflated to very high levels. Thus, the superpowers must find sufficient common ground in their strategic doctrines to justify diminishing requirements for nuclear weapons.

The second obstacle to further progress in SALT is the difference between Soviet and American perceptions of strategic parity. A decade ago it was obvious that the United States had a considerably superior nuclear capability. It was not so obvious that this brought much advantage, because the Soviet forces were capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the United States in a retaliatory attack. In the decade that followed, the Soviets have matched approximately our level of strategic delivery vehicles. Indeed, the buildup has been sufficiently aggressive to indicate that they will not stop at parity unless restrained by SALT agreements.

Nevertheless, that the preservation of parity, or essential equivalence, must be a central aim of SALT is unquestioned. But unfortunately, the virtue of parity preservation as a final goal does not ensure its usefulness at every step in the negotiating process.

How is it to be decided that a certain proposal for limiting the strategic forces of both sides meets the criteria of equality—or rough equality? One approach would be to ascertain whether panels of experts on each side would reach the same consensus that the military capabilities of the two forces were approximately the same. Considering only static indicators of weapons systems performance, such a judgment could be made despite the many asymmetries involved. But would this judgment be meaningful? Probably not, for most informed analysts would argue that it is the ability of the weapons to perform important missions that is decisive, not the numbers, placement and characteristics of the hardware itself.

Yet it would hardly be possible to reach a consensus on what missions are to be chosen, on the criteria by which success is to be measured, and on other elements of the scenarios that are relevant (such as effectiveness of command and control, and likely actions and reactions of the adversary). Thus, the search for a test of parity flounders in the complexities and uncertainties of war-gaming. It would seem more prudent to admit that parity can be claimed to exist only within rather wide bounds and that many changes are possible within the bounded area without upsetting the overall judgment of parity. The important consequence of such an approach is that the asymmetric forces of the two sides can be subjected to symmetric constraints while parity is maintained.

The third obstacle to arms control is the view widely held on both

sides that the effectiveness of nuclear weapons in actual use would be roughly proportional to their megatonnage or numbers. This is surely not the case. In an exchange against urban-industrial complexes, the delivery of a few hundred low-yield weapons would destroy so much of the target areas on both sides that additional weapons would be of little effect. And a credible war-fighting exchange might involve tens, hundreds, or even a few thousand warheads. Because individual warheads in a given missile can now be directed to any of a number of different targets by simple adjustments prior to firing, deliverable warheads in excess of a few thousand are largely superfluous even though the list of possible targets may be much larger. In all cases, then, military utility is not proportional to the number of warheads but reaches a plateau beyond which further increases in the number of warheads provide virtually no increase in military effectiveness. Therefore, experimentation with mutual reductions and restraints involves much less risk than is generally alleged.

The fourth and perhaps most decisive obstacle to bringing strategic weapons under control lies in the profound differences in cultural attitudes and military traditions of the United States and the Soviet Union. In any negotiated schedule of reductions and restraints both sides would naturally attempt to preserve forces considered most vital, maintain certain war-fighting options, retain military postures thought capable of yielding political advantage, and keep open the possibility of introducing new weaponry. However, the culture and tradition of each side strongly influence its patterns of force structure and modernization, making difficult the adoption of common limits and reductions.

Most striking is the contrasting emphasis placed on numbers and new technology by the two powers. Despite much progress the Soviet Union continues to lag technologically and has had its attitudes molded by a long heritage of inferiority in technological innovation. In its wars its survival has been due largely to numbers—numbers of weapons or numbers of men. Because numbers have saved it in the past, it still gives priority to numbers in seeking security and in projecting political power. With few exceptions, the traditions of the United States give priority to technological innovation and quality of weaponry in order to achieve the same ends. It is not surprising, therefore, that even in a state of parity the United States seeks to maintain an image of strength by continuing to innovate and introduce sophisticated weaponry, while the Soviet Union relies on the maximization of numbers and sizes to project its power image.

To cope with this divergence of national outlooks it is, of course,

essential to deal with the two proclivities together: to negotiate reductions in numbers, and perhaps in sizes and ranges, together with restraints that limit the rate of improvement and the rate of introduction of new systems.

v

The approach to overcoming these four obstacles which has been attempted repeatedly in the past seven years is to extend the time allotted to negotiations. Experience demonstrates, however, that this does not work. The dynamics of the arms competition will not be stilled. The rates of improvements of old systems and development of new ones set a pace that negotiations have not been able to match, and that threatens to overwhelm the modest repertoire of verification measures that makes negotiated arms control possible. (Nuclear-armed cruise missiles illustrate this latter point.) Consequently, the ultimate challenge to arms control now confronts the Soviets and the United States. Either ways must be found to cope with the obstacles and negotiate comprehensive agreements within a very few years, a period considerably shorter than the development time of major improvements and new systems, or the whole process seems destined to become obsolete and futile.

New weapons systems already on the horizon will only complicate the arms control problem further. Soviet systems include a new submarine designed to carry 16 missiles of 5,000-mile range; a new missile, the SS-20, that may attain intercontinental range and be fired from mobile launchers; and the Backfire bomber, that may or may not be considered as strategic. Emerging U.S. systems include a new larger missile designed for mobile land and air basing, the MX; a new strategic bomber, the B-1; and a new submarine, the Trident, with 24 missiles, initially of 4,600-mile range. Both sides are developing long-range cruise missiles, and recent developments increase the likelihood that space-based laser weapons may lead to a new generation of strategic weapons.

It is under this pressure of a new generation of weapons systems and the approaching termination of the Interim Agreement in October 1977 that the United States and the Soviet Union must decide whether or not to commit themselves to an accelerated negotiation of arms control agreements. Failure to step up the pace of negotiations, and continuance at the slow rate of the Nixon-Ford era, mean not attaining the rate necessary to experience a turning down in the growth of strategic capabilities. If this is not attained and its benefits tested, the justification for the whole enterprise comes into question.

Moreover, superpower arms control is, of course, linked to the problem of "horizontal" nuclear proliferation—a problem which has been exacerbated by the global rush to nuclear energy following the 1973 oil embargo. The lack of progress at SALT is used as a rationale, sincerely or otherwise, by spokesmen in non-nuclear states who advocate the acquisition of an independent nuclear capability. Nuclear proliferation, if it continues unabated, will produce substantial pressures within the United States and the Soviet Union to modify or abrogate the ABM Treaty and to deploy at least "thin" anti-ballistic missile systems to defend themselves against nuclear attacks by third countries. Thus, progress toward the goal of controlling vertical proliferation reinforces efforts to control horizontal proliferation, and vice versa. Similarly, a lack of progress in one area undermines efforts in the other. Both challenges must be met if either goal is to be achieved.

VI

What then is to be done? Policies to be adopted during the next octade must necessarily support the dual objectives of placing meaningful controls on the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals and minimizing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states.

The most immediate problem lies in converting the Vladivostok Accord into a longer term SALT II treaty. This conversion apparently has been delayed for well over a year by disagreement over the manner in which strategic cruise missiles and the Soviet Backfire bomber are to be treated. Because constraints on the cruise missiles are sought by the U.S.S.R. while constraints on the Backfire are sought by the United States, these weapons systems have become linked in the negotiating process. But there is no logical connection in military terms between the two systems; termination of the stalemate will require a purely political compromise. The October 1977 expiration date of the Interim Agreement heightens the urgency of resolving this deadlock.

From an American perspective, an agreement should inhibit the capability of the Soviet Backfire force to attack the United States. This can be achieved if a SALT II treaty prohibits both the deployment of tanker aircraft for in-flight refueling of the Backfire and the deployment of Backfire at Arctic and other forward bases. Such an agreement would, for all practical purposes, limit the Backfire to its designed role as a theater weapons system, eliminating the need for it to be classified as a strategic weapon in SALT II. Moreover, when SALT turns to negotiating controls on non-central systems, i.e., those

of less than intercontinental range, the Backfire will naturally become a candidate for limitations.

Because older generation cruise missiles of short range already have been deployed, it is unrealistic to expect that a complete ban on cruise missiles can be achieved. But the extraordinary potential flexibility of new cruise missiles to perform strategic and tactical missions, to be launched from a variety of land-, sea- and air-based platforms, and to be deployed in large and unverifiable numbers, is such that only negotiated limitations promise to inhibit their wide-scale deployment. A preferred formula would be (a) to ban the testing and deployment of cruise missiles with ranges greater than 2,500 kilometers, and (b) to prohibit the deployment of cruise missiles with ranges between 600 kilometers and 2,500 kilometers on platforms other than manned strategic bombers, counting against the 1,320 MIRVed launcher limit those strategic bombers on which cruise missiles were deployed. (There would be no limits on the deployment of cruise missiles having ranges less than 600 kilometers.) Because short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) have better payload capabilities than do cruise missiles, it is unlikely that, under such an arrangement, large numbers of cruise missile-equipped strategic bombers would be deployed. Such limitations on the deployment of cruise missiles in the strategic mode would retard their development and inhibit the spread of this technology to other nations, thereby helping to prevent the proliferation of a strategic weapons capability to many other states. While it is true that the verification procedures presently available cannot guarantee that all violations would be detected, a combination of testing and development limitations is sufficient to ensure that any undetected violations could not be great enough to be of military significance.

Following the completion of a SALT II agreement, nuclear arms control should be pursued along five fronts: reductions in strategic delivery vehicles, qualitative constraints, limitations on non-central strategic systems, unilateral initiatives, and nonproliferation measures.

As argued earlier, numerical reductions and limits on qualitative improvements must proceed together. The most attractive approach is that of phased reductions—perhaps as much as ten percent of the remaining number of strategic delivery vehicles each year for ten years, with freedom to mix among systems. This would reduce the permitted number of vehicles from 2,400 initially to 836 at the end of ten years. A similar reduction formula should be imposed on MIRVed vehicles, thus reducing that ceiling from 1,320 to 460. This step, perhaps more than any other, would demonstrate the seriousness of Soviet and American arms control policy and be conducive to

stemming the tide of nuclear proliferation.

Qualitative constraints on new systems and on the improvement of existing systems are also essential if the competition in strategic arms is to be halted. A principal means of decreasing the likelihood of nuclear weapons use, particularly in a first strike, is to reduce the confidence which political leaders and military staffs have in the performance capabilities of the delivery vehicles carrying these weapons. These confidence levels can be reduced by imposing graduated limitations on the flight tests of strategic delivery vehicles. Given the first-strike threat posed by highly accurate land-based ICBMs, a negotiated limitation on the frequency of full-range ICBM flight tests is especially worth achieving. The available verification techniques are sufficient to provide substantial confidence that violations would be detected.

Limiting the rate at which major new strategic weapons systems could be deployed to one every five years, for example, would be an additional qualitative constraint of significant value. Though the problems inherent in negotiating a mutually acceptable definition of "major new systems" would be sizable, they should not be insoluble. If such an agreement were reached, the pace of weapons system modernization could be seriously slowed, and the element of surprise in strategic deployments would be greatly reduced. Qualitative restraints inevitably restrain technological developments, but they do not constrain all technologies. Development of those technologies which promise greater stability or improved verification should be permitted under agreements and should have priority. Under these constraints, the research and development process itself would bear a heavier burden than otherwise, since only a few, rather than many, of the systems developed could be carried through the deployment stage.

Related to this constraint on new systems and applicable to existing systems as well is the matter of deployment schedules. Often it is the uncertainty aroused by the pace of deployment, rather than the qualitative attributes of particular systems being deployed, which is the source of concern. This uncertainty can be alleviated by the establishment of pre-announced deployment schedules, perhaps on a yearly basis, which would map out the rate at which specific kinds of delivery vehicles would enter and leave the strategic forces. These schedules, by adding a highly desirable element of predictability, would help reduce the reliance on "worst case" assumptions in the force planning activities of both nations.

Non-central systems—those nuclear-capable delivery vehicles other than ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers—should be added to the

agenda of nuclear arms control negotiations. Reaching agreement on limitations and reduction in this area will be extraordinarily difficult because of the multiplicity of systems involved (e.g., medium-range and intermediate-range missiles, land- and sea-based tactical aircraft), because of geographical asymmetries between the superpowers, because alliance considerations may require multilateral rather than bilateral negotiations, and because of verification problems. But if both nations are serious about nuclear arms control and seek to block potential channels for redirection of the arms competition, it would be logical and desirable to pursue such negotiations.

Inasmuch as future negotiations will encounter difficulties and delays, it is useful to consider a separate, parallel counterpoise: reciprocal unilateral initiatives. The United States should be prepared to undertake one or several initiatives in restraint for a limited period of time, proposing that they would be continued if matched by comparable Soviet restraints. This posture would demonstrate that nuclear arms limitations are a significant element in American foreign policy, would support the arguments in non-nuclear states against "going nuclear," and would apply pressure on the other nuclear powers, particularly the Soviet Union, to exercise similar restraint. It is time that the strategy of reciprocal unilateral restraint be activated in American arms control policy.

Exercising prudence in the discussion of nuclear weapons policies is one relatively simple unilateral action which can contribute substantially to the goals of arms control. Regardless of the degree of success achieved in halting vertical and horizontal proliferation, it is crucial that the use of nuclear weapons be inhibited and, in the event of their use, that further use be halted as rapidly as possible. To discourage initial use, the firebreak between conventional and nuclear weapons must be preserved and indeed reinforced. This can be achieved in part by adopting a declaratory policy in which the possibility of using nuclear weapons is raised only by the President and is treated invariably with the awe it deserves. A balance should be struck in which allies are reassured of the strength of American security guaranties, including the use of nuclear weapons, without conveying in a cavalier fashion the notion that limited nuclear war is a readily feasible option.

Finally, stemming the tide of nuclear proliferation is a challenge which requires aggressive and imaginative action. For of all the elements that can contribute to a less stable world, that of horizontal nuclear proliferation is perhaps the most threatening, and at the same time, the most diplomatically demanding. In concert with other

nations, the United States could do much to slow proliferation and to make that which does occur less threatening. The first step is to terminate the testing of nuclear weapons worldwide. With the United States and Soviet Union so far in advance of other states, they could best take the initiative by joining in an agreement not to test for at least five years, and by inviting all other nations to join. At the end of five years the agreement would be extended unless continued adherence somehow threatened the vital interests of the parties.

If handled with diplomatic skill, such an agreement would, in time, apply pressure on France, China and India to halt their testing programs. On balance, the contribution to nonproliferation, coupled with the knowledge that testing could be resumed in short order if deemed necessary, far outweigh the often-cited disadvantages of such an agreement (e.g., slowing American development of advanced weapons, reducing the reliability of these weapons, weakening the guard against technological breakthroughs by potential adversaries, and accelerating the flow of highly skilled manpower away from weapons research and development work).

A number of additional measures could also be part of the orchestration of an aggressive stance to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. On a case-by-case basis, the United States should apply unilaterally or, where possible, in concert with other nuclear powers, the wide range of incentives and disincentives at its disposal to prevent threshold countries from exercising their nuclear option. Such actions, of course, should not contravene existing treaties or guaranties of reactor fuel supplies, but renewals of alliance commitments and future guaranties of fuel supplies should be contingent upon adherence to nonproliferation policies.

Security guaranties and pledges to non-nuclear states can also play vital roles. Guaranties provided by the superpowers through alliance systems have undoubtedly served to diminish the incentive for client-states to develop separate nuclear capabilities—while also constraining their ability to do so. The recently demonstrated ability of the United States to dissuade South Korea from purchasing a nuclear fuel-reprocessing plant from France illustrates that political leverage within alliance structures can be an effective tool to inhibit proliferation; the threat to withdraw security guaranties can be as powerful in this context as the guaranties themselves.

But pledges not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states should be viewed with caution. There is a danger that such pledges could undermine the coherence of alliances. For example, the credibility of the NATO alliance structure and American security

guaranties to South Korea rests in large measure on the continued deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe and on the Korean peninsula. These weapons serve an important role in the "tripwire" strategy of nuclear deterrence. Should the United States make a no-use pledge generally or even in a regional context, it would substantially diminish German and South Korean confidence in the credibility of American security guaranties and, ironically, add to the pressures in both of these states for development of independent nuclear capabilities. The kind of no-use pledge that might advance the cause of nonproliferation, while requiring the least modification of existing alliance commitments, is that in which nuclear-weapons states pledge not to use nuclear arms against any non-nuclear-weapon party to the NPT unless the non-nuclear-weapons state is engaged in armed aggression in concert with a nuclear-weapons state. But if the United States must choose between maintaining strong alliance structures and issuing no-use pledges, the former choice is preferable.

These suggested measures to rescue arms control from a marginal role and to direct it toward reducing the strategic nuclear capabilities of the superpowers and decisively slowing the spread of nuclear weapons are complex and demanding. It cannot be otherwise. This contrasts with the much simpler arms control prescriptions of two decades ago, when nuclear weaponry was itself simple, albeit revolutionary. Twenty years of the most intensive technological development the world has ever seen, at a cost of more than half a trillion dollars, have made the difference. To control the products of this effort cannot be simple, elegant, or easy; at best it will be complex, messy, and unbearably difficult. But in a world in which the two superpowers are just learning to control their competitive impulses while their nuclear arsenals continue to grow, and the number of independent fingers on nuclear triggers threatens soon to increase beyond manageable bounds, the alternative to nuclear arms control is simply unacceptable.

THE CRUISE MISSILE: THE END OF ARMS CONTROL?

By Alexander R. Vershbow



THE long-range cruise missile has touched off an arms control debate as controversial as the one seven years ago surrounding the MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle). Although it is by no means a “superweapon” which can give its possessor a credible first-strike threat, the new cruise missile’s revolutionary characteristics—particularly its accuracy, near-undetectable size, and multiplicity of firing ranges and launch platforms—threaten to undermine the basic principles underlying successful U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements to date. Thus, the cruise missile—even more than the MIRV—puts the immediate future of SALT into jeopardy.

Distant prospects are even more bleak. The missile’s capabilities obscure the already hazy distinctions between strategic and tactical missions, as well as between nuclear and conventional weaponry. Thus, looking beyond SALT, the cruise missile will complicate the process of finding a new framework for arms control. If arms control is to remain meaningful in the future, enforceable restraints on qualitative improvement of weapons systems must complement the quantitative restrictions achieved at SALT. While the cruise missile is only one of many weapons in the qualitative arms race, halting its development would be a positive first step toward more comprehensive restrictions in this crucial area.

II

A cruise missile is basically a pilotless jet airplane. Unlike a rocket-driven ballistic missile, which leaves the atmosphere at supersonic speeds and sails to its target in a bullet-like, arched trajectory, a cruise missile is continuously propelled by air-breathing jet engines, and flies at subsonic speeds without leaving the atmosphere.

Cruise missiles are by no means new. They can be traced back to the World War II, German V-1 “buzz-bomb.” Other ancestors were deployed by the U.S. Navy on submarines, but abandoned because of

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their bulky size, short range, poor accuracy, and inability to be fired from underwater. The Soviet Navy still has many similarly primitive, short-range cruise missiles deployed on certain surface ships and submarines for use primarily in tactical anti-shipping roles. Both the U.S. and Soviet Air Forces likewise have some of the older, larger cruise missiles deployed for short-range attack purposes.

Until recently only ballistic missiles could achieve the long ranges generally classified as "strategic" (1,000–2,000 miles or more) and hit targets with a reasonable degree of accuracy while carrying warheads with a heavy payload. But today's advanced cruise missiles, as a result of rapid and simultaneous progress in several areas of technology (guidance, accuracy, engine propulsion-efficiency, fuel power and economy, warhead miniaturization), will be able to equal the performance of ballistic missiles in almost all respects—range, accuracy, kill-probability, penetrability—and at markedly lower unit costs. While slower than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles have the offsetting advantage of being less detectable.

The Air Force's new air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and the Navy's sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) are quite similar in terms of their performance; while they cannot easily be used interchangeably, they can be treated as one for purposes of discussion. Twenty feet long and only 21 inches in diameter, they can be launched from standard submarine torpedo tubes, SRAM (short-range attack missile) launchers on B-52 bombers, or even Lance surface-to-surface missile launchers. To achieve a range of 1,500 nautical miles at 400 m.p.h. speed, the 3,000-pound cruise missile requires a turbofan engine of approximately 250 pounds, and 500 pounds of fuel within its 600-pound airframe—leaving more than 1,000 pounds for the warhead and guidance systems. As presently designed, the guidance package weighs a minimum of 800 pounds so the cruise missile can easily carry a 200-pound warhead which, today, means a maximum yield of 200 kilotons (the equivalent of 15 Hiroshimas, and about the same as that of the warheads on our MIRVed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles).

The cruise missile uses two guidance systems: first, an inertial system which updates the missile's pre-programmed targeting information in flight with altimeter-derived data on the weather conditions and the terrain over which the missile is flying; and second, a terminal guidance system built around a microwave radiometer that identifies the target and brings the missile to an accurate landing. Together the two guidance systems make the missile accurate to within 100 feet at ranges of over 1,500 miles; further technological refinements

promise even greater accuracies. Moreover, since the guidance technology is not dependent on range, future increases in engine and fuel efficiencies will allow longer ranges with similar accuracies.¹

Thus the new cruise missile can deliver substantial explosives with an incredibly high degree of accuracy, at long and short ranges. While presently slow and, once detected, easy to shoot down with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), the cruise missile's tiny size and ability to fly at low altitudes ("skimming the treetops") makes radar detection difficult. Even when the Soviets develop advanced look-down radar, it will be hard for their computers to identify an incoming cruise missile amid the "junk" on the ground. Moreover, imminent technological advances in turbofan engine design are likely to produce higher speeds and greater evasive maneuverability. Finally, the cruise missile will be much cheaper than existing strategic weapons, with estimated unit costs set at \$500,000 per missile during full production.

As is so often the case, the cruise missile's capabilities were developed faster than a strategic purpose could be devised for it. Original rationales included the "assurance of future options" and the "matching of potential Soviet cruise missile capability." One important reason for its development was, in fact, interservice rivalry. The Navy sought a weapon that would equal the Air Force's conventional and nuclear capability in performing tactical and strategic missions, on land as well as at sea.

Even more central in the Navy's thinking was the apparent threat posed to its ballistic missile submarine fleet by the SALT I agreements. SALT I set a ceiling of 710 on submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, meaning that 12 of the Navy's 41 Polaris/Poseidon submarines (each carrying 16 SLBMs) would have to be scrapped when the ten planned Trident submarines (each with 24 SLBMs) were deployed. But since cruise missiles were not limited by SALT I, the Navy saw the SLCM as a means of refitting and perpetuating the strategic role of the Polaris submarines that might otherwise have had to be junked. (This reasoning, of course, became moot when the 1974 Vladivostok agreement set comfortably high ceilings on SLBM launchers.)

The Air Force, for its part, wanted to keep its strategic bomber force from becoming obsolete by obtaining air-launched cruise missiles that would help saturate ever-improving Soviet air defenses, and perhaps give a strategic standoff capability as well. Also, it saw

¹ For a more detailed discussion of the physical characteristics and capabilities of the cruise missile, see Kosta Tsipis, "The Long-Range Cruise Missile," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* April 1975, pp. 15-26.

the ALCM's low cost as freeing funds for other Air Force needs.

These and other bureaucratic imperatives to maintain funding and force levels eclipsed the cruise missile's arms control implications throughout its ten-year development. Although it is a strategic weapon, the cruise missile cannot be controlled within the existing SALT framework. SALT has been grounded upon numerical restrictions of strategic weapons launchers (not missiles or warheads), since these are about the only meaningful and mutually acceptable limitations verifiable by "national technical means" (satellite photo-reconnaissance and electronic eavesdropping). SALT's success to date has rested on a mutually, albeit somewhat arbitrarily, accepted distinction between strategic and tactical weapons, with weapons being classified according to their mission. When SALT began, "national technical means" were sufficient to monitor the existence of all weapons that could be classified as strategic. Bombers, of course, blurred the distinction between strategic and tactical, but the Soviets and the Americans found it possible to agree on the inclusion in SALT only of such heavy, primarily long-range bombers as the B-52. While technically capable of performing strategic missions against the Soviet Union, shorter-range strike aircraft—most importantly our forward-based systems in Western Europe—were omitted from SALT since their primary role is tactical (theater defense of our NATO allies), and the more proper venue for negotiating their restriction is the MBFR (mutual balanced force reductions) talks. In any case, the numbers and location of bombers can be determined by satellite reconnaissance, so that any attempt to circumvent SALT restrictions by increased deployments of bombers would be virtually impossible to conceal.

But the cruise missile thoroughly blurs any strategic-tactical distinction—for the same cruise missile can carry small or large warheads and strike from long or short ranges. Because it is difficult to verify the range of a *deployed* cruise missile without actually taking it apart and measuring the weight of its warhead and fuel load,² all cruise missiles would have to be classified as strategic in determining arms limitation ceilings; but this would inhibit their deployment in conceivably legitimate tactical roles. In any case, the tiny size and concealability of cruise missiles makes verification of numerical ceilings impossible except through the most intrusive sort of on-site inspection. And since the launch platforms for cruise missiles—unlike those for ballistic missiles—can be quickly reloaded, numerical re-

² See Section V below for further discussion of range limitations on cruise missiles and cruise missile tests.

straints on launchers are, in any case, irrelevant.

With the ranges and pinpoint accuracies achievable, a cruise missile armed with a *conventional* warhead can conceivably perform *strategic* strikes such as knocking out a hardened ICBM silo. By the same token, the fact that its high accuracy assures against random, peripheral destruction means that *nuclear* warheads can be used for *tactical* strikes where only conventional warheads have previously been feasible. In other words, the traditionally manageable distinctions between strategic and tactical, nuclear and conventional are completely eroded, making it impossible to isolate "strategic" arms limitation from other areas of arms control.³

The cruise missile may have repercussions beyond SALT, for with its advent the nuclear threshold or "firebreak" becomes less clearly defined. The conventionally armed cruise missile *raises* the nuclear threshold: with conventional weapons capable of performing strategic strikes, nuclear weapons will not so quickly be brought into play. But by the same token, this conventional capability may make the temptation to strike first more irresistible, since one might gamble that an enemy is unlikely to retaliate with nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear counterforce attack. Thus, the net effect of the reduced reliance on nuclear weapons is an increased risk of superpower confrontation. In contrast, the nuclear-armed cruise missile *lowers* the nuclear threshold: with tactical nuclear strikes technically more feasible as unintended collateral damage becomes less likely, the use of nuclear weapons in limited wars—with their attendant risks of escalation—will become more attractive.

It is ironic, in view of the long-range cruise missile's potentially devastating impact on strategic stability, arms control, and conventions of military theory, that the United States originally treated it as a "bargaining chip" in SALT to be discarded in exchange for some Soviet concessions. Yet as its amazing capabilities became apparent, the Pentagon's planners devised many rational tactical and strategic functions for both the air-launched and sea-launched versions. Convinced that the cruise missile is essential to our future defense requirements, they no longer see it as easily negotiable.

III

There are numerous tactical missions in which the new cruise missiles, by virtue of their accuracy, undetectability, and payload-carrying ability, could outperform existing systems. Short-range SLCMs

³ Richard Burt brings out the need to link SALT and MBFR in light of the blurring of traditional distinctions caused by the cruise missile. See "The Cruise Missile and Arms Control," *Survival*, January/February 1976.

would be invaluable anti-shipping weapons; and short-range ALCMs would be highly effective in air interdiction roles, in penetrating air defenses, and as more accurate complements to existing short-range attack missiles in air-to-surface attack missions.⁴

However, since the technical characteristics of the new cruise missile make any tactically intended cruise missile a long-range strategic threat as well, it is impossible to argue for a tactical version and against a strategic one. No matter how pressing the need for short-range cruise missiles, the dangerous arms control implications inherent in their strategic potential make such deployments unjustifiable. Moreover, the need for a strictly long-range cruise missile is rather dubious.

Its supporters argue that a long-range cruise missile—either air- or sea-launched—would be cheaper than an ICBM or a SLBM in terms of “assured kill for the buck”: its extreme accuracy, penetrability, and low initial cost and minimal maintenance requirements make it more cost-effective than all existing offensive strategic systems. But American deployment of cruise missiles would probably spur Soviet advances in SAMs and look-down radar technology, and concomitantly increase the vulnerability of our penetrating bombers, including the highly touted B-1. The inexpensive high kill-probability with cruise missiles is, therefore, deceptive in the long run; for the inevitable Soviet SAM and radar upgrades will dictate huge U.S. expenditures for development and deployment of effective countermeasures.⁵

And the history of the arms race shows that the Soviets will feel compelled to match any American long-range cruise missile capability, just as they felt obliged to develop their own MIRV, despite belated U.S. interest in restricting it at SALT I. Such a reaction will force the United States either to accept increased vulnerability to attack or to spend huge sums to improve radar coverage and to develop the massive SAM network that is now deemed unnecessary because of the relatively small Soviet bomber and short-range cruise missile threat. Therefore, since the 1972 ABM Treaty prohibits ballistic missile defense, the ultimately cheaper as well as safer course for both sides would be to limit themselves to existing MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs rather than entering a cruise missile and anti-cruise missile race—at the end of which both sides’ security will have been diminished. The United States would do better simply to im-

⁴ See *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, January 27, 1975, pp. 101ff.; February 24, 1975, pp. 19–20; April 21, 1975, pp. 9ff.; August 25, 1975, pp. 14–15; September 15, 1975, pp. 52ff.; for examples of these rationales.

⁵ See Tsipis, *op. cit.*, for an excellent discussion of the real, long-run costs of the cruise missile beyond development and procurement.

prove the accuracy of its ballistic missiles by incorporating in them elements of the cruise missile's guidance technology. The verifiability of ballistic missile deployments makes them more conducive to further reductions and more stabilizing in terms of deterrence.

Nonetheless, some observers argue that long-range cruise missiles actually would enhance strategic stability. According to this rationale, the missiles' slow speed prevents them from appearing to pose a first-strike counterforce threat, since an adversary could launch its ICBMs well before its silos were destroyed. In addition, the cruise missile could reinforce SALT's launcher restrictions by preventing the reloading of ICBM silos. (If an ICBM silo can be reloaded, restricting the number of launchers is rather meaningless. To reload an ICBM silo, however, takes time; while the slow cruise missile could not knock out a silo on a surprise first strike, it could do so during the long reloading process.) Viewed in this light the cruise missile is stabilizing because it is most logically a second-strike-only system.⁶

Yet this same line of argument can just as easily lead to the opposite conclusion. Given the cruise missile's great accuracy and hard-site kill capability, it would be foolish for an adversary either to plan on "waiting out" a strategic cruise missile attack or to spend large sums of money on silo hardening and defense—thus leaving no recourse but a launch-on-warning strategy. Such a strategy is highly destabilizing because the accidental firing of a cruise missile or misinterpretation of radar data—and the latter is particularly likely given the difficulty of detecting cruise missiles—could trigger a massive retaliatory strike and thus lead to nuclear war.

Moreover, even if one accepts the argument that the cruise missile's slow speed makes it strictly a second-strike weapon, its importance may increase as succeeding rounds of SALT impose lower and lower ceilings on ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers. As the numbers of the more obviously first-strike-capable systems are restricted and the threat they pose diminishes, the unrestricted cruise missile may well emerge as a central first-strike threat, albeit a second-best system. In fact, both sides will probably be tempted to circumvent the lower SALT ceilings by deploying more cruise missiles.

Turning to some of the newly conceived missions for the cruise missile, one of the most frequently advocated uses for the long-range air-launched version is as a complement to the B-1 bomber. ALCMs would be deployed in groups of 20 on the older B-52s; fired from that bomber's launchers, they would serve as decoys or penetration aids to saturate the SAM coverage, thereby guaranteeing that the B-1 would

⁶ See *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, February 16, 1976, pp. 12ff.

reach its key targets. The air-launched cruise missile would also enhance the B-52's own air defense penetration ability, extending its chances of surviving, and, perhaps, enabling it to attack strategic Soviet targets without penetrating the U.S.S.R.'s airspace (a strategic standoff capability).⁷ Yet if the Air Force is right to claim that the B-1 can penetrate *without* the cruise missile due to its own capability of firing short-range attack missiles, the ALCM seems unnecessary. By the same token, if the ALCM can in fact penetrate Soviet air defenses as effectively as the B-1, and at much lower cost, it seems unnecessary to spend billions on the new bomber. Since Congress has, after considerable wavering, gone ahead with further funding of B-1 development, this argument is probably moot. Nonetheless, the redundancy of a B-52 armed with long-range ALCMs and the B-1 remains; if the United States must have the one, it need not bother with the other.

Furthermore, deployment of long-range cruise missiles on some bombers would, as suggested earlier, destroy the already troubled SALT process. While the Soviets and Americans, at SALT I, were able to overcome the problem posed by similarly unverifiable MIRVs—by agreeing to assume that all ICBMs and SLBMs that could be MIRVed actually were—a comparable approach to the cruise missile would fail; the number of U.S. and Soviet aircraft that could function as launch platforms is so great that an accord based on a worst-case assumption would lead to absurdly high weapons ceilings.

The need for a long-range SLCM is even less compelling. The Navy argues that existing Soviet cruise missiles pose a strategic threat: with America's population and industrial centers concentrated on the coasts and continental air defenses minimal, even short-range Soviet cruise missiles can inflict a massive blow when fired from surface ships or tactical submarines. And with minor changes those missiles can reach inland cities as well. Following the Navy's rationale, since major Soviet cities and industrial centers are located thousands of miles inland, American SLCMs must logically have longer ranges to match the Soviet threat.⁸

Yet this argument ignores the fact that existing Soviet cruise missiles are big and slow, easy to detect with our advanced radar techniques, and easy to shoot down. Plus, to extend these missiles' range, the Soviets would have to fly them in a higher trajectory—a move that would only render them more vulnerable. Most likely, the So-

⁷ Jan M. Lodal advocated ALCM deployments for these reasons in "Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternate View," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1976, pp. 472-73, 476.

⁸ See *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, January 27, 1975, pp. 101ff.; December 15, 1975, pp. 7ff.; February 16, 1976, pp. 12ff.

viets' principal plan is to use their crude cruise missiles in strictly tactical, anti-shipping roles. If Washington really perceives these cruise missiles as a threat to its cities, it should improve coastal defenses. But if the United States "matches" the Soviet weapons with more accurate, undetectable, and longer range SLCMs, the Soviets would accelerate counter-deployments and/or air defense improvements.

There is a more fundamental question, however: Why should the United States deploy a sea-based strategic system that is now, or will eventually be, vulnerable to Soviet air defenses when it already has sea-launched ballistic missiles against which defenses are prohibited (by the ABM Treaty)? These ballistic missiles are faster, carry larger payloads, and can achieve the cruise missiles' accuracy and kill-probability by incorporating similarly sophisticated technology. Substituting SLCMs for torpedoes on *attack* submarines would seriously limit these vessels' tactical flexibility, while adding a needless increase to the overkill potential of our already invulnerable sea-based deterrent. Plus, the proliferation of sea-based strategic cruise missiles increases the statistical probability of an accidental launch stemming from a command and control breakdown.

Even more dangerous, if attack submarines were armed with SLCMs, the Soviets would have to assume strategic intent no matter what their missions may actually be. In other words, until now only the 53 Polaris, Poseidon and future Trident submarines posed a direct strategic threat to the Soviets; but the deployment of any SLCMs would transform every one of our 65 nuclear attack submarines into a potential strike launch platform. The strategic results would be ominous: the increased uncertainties would lead to a "recoupling" of tactical and strategic antisubmarine warfare, and force the Soviets to intensify their efforts at improving antisubmarine warfare capabilities.⁹ By contrast, such a perceived need would be minimized by confining the sea-based deterrent—as the SALT agreements stipulate—to fixed and verifiable numbers of SLBM launchers, made ever more invulnerable by increases in missile ranges.

IV

Not only can the development of the cruise missile complicate the Soviet-American strategic balance, weaken SALT, and possibly impede other bilateral efforts at arms control, it may also speed the "horizontal" spread of nuclear weapons. Until now, one of the main reasons why more countries have not gone nuclear has been the high

⁹ See Tsipis, *op. cit.*, p. 25, concerning recoupling of tactical and strategic antisubmarine warfare.

cost of constructing reliable delivery systems. The most effective means of delivering a nuclear warhead—the long-range ballistic missile—is prohibitively expensive for most countries, while the cheaper method—the long-range bomber—is much more vulnerable to preemptive strikes on the ground and to air defenses. However, cruise missiles could soon offer an effective and inexpensive delivery system to many countries. Some might choose to build their own missiles, based on published information about U.S. systems; others, perhaps, would buy the weapons from U.S. manufacturers. (It should be noted that those manufacturers have projected large export sales—ostensibly to be confined to our allies, including Israel—to decrease unit costs of cruise missile production.¹⁰)

The acquisition of cruise missiles by America's NATO allies would transform their present token nuclear deterrent into a potent strategic force. With the United States no longer effectively monopolizing the West's defense, the bilateral nature of SALT would become anachronistic. But even if the multilateralization of SALT were possible, it would so complicate negotiations as to make meaningful limitations well-nigh impossible to achieve. More frightening, by facilitating nuclear proliferation, the cruise missile would increase the chances that local wars could escalate to a nuclear level, with the inherent danger of superpower involvement.

Yet another related danger inherent in cruise missile proliferation is the missile's ability to deliver strategic strikes with conventional warheads. Small countries, even without nuclear weapons, could thus acquire a strategic potential. In this way, the cruise missile might become the superpowers' nemesis: no longer would they alone be able to inflict massive destruction from beyond an enemy's territorial frontiers. Instead, the cruise missile might, in effect, decouple "strategic" and "nuclear" war and thereby diminish the deterrent effect of nuclear forces which have, for better or worse, inhibited the outbreak of world war for over 30 years.

V

The Vladivostok aide-mémoire, endorsed as the guideline for a SALT II agreement by the United States and the Soviet Union in the fall of 1974, limited both sides to a total of 2,400 strategic weapons delivery systems—strategic bombers (excluding U.S. forward-based aircraft in Europe) and missile launchers—among which 1,320

¹⁰ Budgetary requests for cruise missile development have based cost estimates on the economies of scale that will be derived from export sales. See *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, July 7, 1975, p. 41.

could be MIRVed. In 1975, it was revealed that the United States interpreted these ceilings as including only ballistic missiles and bombers, but not cruise missiles. In response to Soviet complaints that the United States was changing the rules after the game had begun, the American SALT negotiators disingenuously offered to exclude from the 2,400 ceiling the much less potent Soviet Backfire bomber, a plane with only marginal strategic applicability that probably would have been excluded from SALT II anyway (as a trade-off for our forward-based aircraft in Europe)—if not for the sudden need to find a makeweight to balance against the cruise missile.

The next formal American SALT proposal was to allow 200 Backfires in exchange for 200 “launch vehicles” for cruise missiles above the 2,400 limit. Since cruise missiles can be deployed in groups as large as 20 on bombers, and in larger numbers on transport planes and submarines (where they are reloadable), this was a blatantly self-serving scheme, even if the U.S. limit were hypothetically verifiable.

The Soviets responded with a rather ingenious SALT proposal in January 1976: ALCMs would be unlimited in numbers and range, but aircraft armed with them would (logically) be counted against the 1,320 MIRV ceiling.¹¹ (The reasoning behind this was probably that the range of the air-launched version is less critical than that of the sea-launched version, since the bomber upon which it is deployed can make up for whatever range the missile itself lacks.) SLCMs with ranges over 375 miles would be counted as part of the 2,400 ceiling. But neither element in this plan could be verified by the national technical means integral to SALT. How could either side know for certain which planes had ALCMs? How could either side know whether the other side’s unrestrained tactical SLCMs (under the 375-mile range) were not loaded with enough fuel to propel them to thousand-mile-plus distances? Even if both sides honestly declared which submarines were armed with long-range SLCMs, wouldn’t their reload capability make meaningless their inclusion under the 2,400 launcher limit? And, of course, the fact that cruise missiles are easy to hide means that cheating would be easy. While the free press in the United States might make verification manageable for the Soviets, the closed nature of Soviet society in general, and of the Soviet military in particular, would make verification impossible for the United States.

A superficially appealing attempt to control the cruise missile was made in a U.S. Senate resolution—introduced on February 25,

¹¹ See *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, February 2, 1976, p. 12, for complete Soviet SALT plan.

1976, by Senators Kennedy, Humphrey and Javits—proposing a Soviet-American moratorium on testing of cruise missiles at ranges greater than 375 miles. The reasoning behind this was that if a long-range cruise missile could not be tested, its reliability could not be known, and thus it would not be deployed. Hindsight had indicated that MIRV deployment could have been prevented by a similar test ban, which would have been verifiable without on-site inspection.

However, the test ban analogy with the MIRV has two weaknesses. First, the new cruise missile is so small that satellite reconnaissance could not reliably verify compliance with a test ban; although, arguably, the probability that a few tests could be detected would sufficiently deter against cheating. But more important, the nature of the cruise missile is such that flight tests at short ranges can guarantee its reliability at longer ranges. The missile's guidance technology operates independently of range, and its engine is little more than a miniaturized and extra-efficient jet engine similar to those on conventional aircraft; once you know the missile can fly a few hundred miles you can be confident of its ability to go several thousand miles, just as you know that a 747 which can fly from New York to Chicago can also reach Los Angeles if supplied with enough fuel.¹² Therefore a range limitation on cruise missile tests would not control the weapon. Range limits on the missiles themselves are necessary as well and these raise more difficult verification problems.

Range limits on new missiles are theoretically feasible and verifiable. Reconnaissance satellites can monitor the telemetry of a missile during test flights, and thus determine its maximum range on the basis of the fuel consumption rate and estimated fuel capacity. Therefore it is possible to know whether a newly tested cruise missile has been designed exclusively for short ranges, or whether it has both long- and short-range potential.

This area of verification, however, is more vulnerable to cheating than most. Extra weight could be placed on the test missile, so that fuel consumption would appear faster and derived estimates of maximum range lower. Nonetheless, even a one-in-ten chance that intelligence agencies will detect such cheating efforts would be enough to discourage them entirely. This assumption is common to all arms control agreements, for a requirement of 100-percent certainty for verification procedures is both unrealistic and technically impossible.

But the real problem with range limitations for the cruise missile is

¹² This was the thrust of a press conference given on February 27, 1976, by head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Fred Iklé, at the time of the introduction of the Kennedy-Humphrey-Javits resolution. The resolution was defeated because of intense Administration opposition.

that it is too late to negotiate them. The U.S. cruise missile program is already well-advanced, with test programs under way, and deployments only two or three years off. The dual—long and short—range capability is already built into the system, and cannot be negotiated away. An agreement limiting the range of the SLCM only, as the Soviets desire, would be absurd since the air-launched and sea-launched versions share almost identical propulsion and guidance technologies. Furthermore, the modular design of contemporary weapon systems would allow longer range engines to be tested elsewhere and plugged into cruise missiles.

Recent rumors suggest that President Ford—with the Reagan challenge eliminated—may sacrifice the cruise missile so that a SALT II treaty can be signed before the election.¹³ But Pentagon resistance to such a course is strong, and the more likely prospect is that the cruise missile will simply be detached from a SALT II agreement based on the original Vladivostok ceilings. If that, in fact, occurs, the momentum toward U.S. deployment of cruise missiles in 1978 or 1979 will probably continue unabated. But if one strategic weapon is left uncontrolled or deemed uncontrollable, then success at SALT loses most of its meaning. Lower and lower limits on ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers will seem hollow if both sides can substitute for them hundreds of cheap, almost equally potent cruise missiles. SALT will not have retarded the arms race, but only redirected it from the quantitative to the qualitative realm.

If arms control is to go forward in the future, a new framework must replace that of SALT, which has clearly proven its inadequacy in coping with qualitative improvements in weapons design. A unilateral American decision to halt development or forego deployment of the long-range cruise missile might prevent a new competition which, in the long run, would only further erode both American and Soviet security. But the cruise missile is a mere harbinger of a revolutionary trend in weapons technology: its extraordinary capabilities will inevitably be incorporated (or surpassed) in future generations of existing weapons systems. Thus unilateral restraint in regard to the cruise missile alone will, at best, only delay the imminent crisis in arms control. The complete erosion of the distinctions between strategic, tactical, nuclear and conventional is inevitable unless the qualitative arms race can be brought to a quick and immediate halt.

This is a problem that is not likely to be solved by bilateral Soviet-

¹³ The Ford plan would include cruise missiles under the Vladivostok ceiling, without accompanying restrictions on Backfire. The only concession Washington might seek would be to lower the ceiling from 2,400 to 2,300, or even 2,200. See *The Washington Post*, August 9, 1976, p. 23.

American agreement unless it encompasses intensive on-site inspection that Moscow will never accept, barring a fundamental change in the Soviet system.¹⁴ Rather, both sides must develop an awareness of the arms control implications inherent in their technological advances. The United States, too often the leader (or culprit) in the introduction of new, more deadly technologies, must take the initiative.

A first step toward unilateral restraint might be to integrate arms controllers into the military planning and research bureaucracies. At the earliest stages of research on a newly conceived weapons technology, an "arms control impact statement" could be drawn up, just as new industrial projects now require an environmental impact statement. In this way, the decision as to whether research and development for a new system should proceed can be based not only on the questions: "Can it be done technically?" and "Will it be useful militarily?" Other important questions should also be asked: "Will it enhance the stability of the strategic deterrent balance?" and "Will it be controllable on the basis of realistic, i.e., mutually acceptable, arms control assumptions?"

Beyond this, unilateral restraint in deploying new technologies must be practiced. No longer ought new systems be developed as bargaining chips which, if arms control negotiations stall or break down, cannot be redeemed and, worse yet, may diminish security, since any temporary new advantage in weaponry is likely to be offset by the other side; the end result will be strategic instability coupled with great financial expense. A tacitly accepted, mutual policy of "no first deployment" of new technologies may be the only way to put a lid on the qualitative arms race. And the technological leader should be the first to demonstrate these intentions.

Thus, while military and financial rationales for cruise missiles may be persuasive, from an arms control perspective there can be *no* justification. From this perspective, the United States must, first, halt development of the cruise missile and, second, announce its resolve never to let this particular genie out of its bottle unless the Soviets go ahead with deployments of their own long-range cruise missiles. Finally, Washington should declare a policy of unilateral restraint regarding further deployments of new weapons technologies and try to induce the Soviets to be equally rational by reciprocating. There is no way to have both arms control and a qualitative arms race.

¹⁴ The Soviet acceptance of on-site inspection of peaceful nuclear explosions under the recently signed Threshold Test Ban Treaty should not be interpreted as representing a change in Soviet attitudes toward on-site inspection of *strategic* programs.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

A SOUTH AFRICAN VIEW

By John Barratt



SOUTH AFRICA's external relations since World War II have developed on the basis of an interaction between external and internal factors. The external factors have included the heightened consciousness, particularly in the Western world (and reflected in the United Nations Charter), of human rights as an issue affecting international relations; the anticolonial movement, particularly as expressed in the achievement of independence throughout Africa; and the cold war conflict between the Western and Communist powers. The inability of South Africa's internal political system to adapt adequately to these far-reaching changes in the postwar world caused a progressive deterioration in its external relations, resulting in increasing international isolation on a political level (though not economically).

The intimate link in South Africa's case between external relations and internal domestic policies is obvious, but what is not always appreciated is the important role of external factors in a rapidly changing world in bringing the internal racial situation into the international arena. The basic internal racial features of the country, including discrimination in policy and social custom, denial of political rights to blacks, and economic exploitation, date back to colonial times. Even the political, economic and social discrimination embodied in legislation (which provides the ground for the most serious criticism of the South African system) did not begin with the advent to power of the National Party government in 1948, although it has been greatly deepened since then. Rather, the basic internal political problems, as well as the moral issues involved, have existed since the South African Union was founded in 1910, but external factors have increasingly impinged in recent decades, affecting the attitudes and policies of other countries toward South Africa, as well as the attitudes of blacks and whites within the country.

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In recent years, the South African government has attempted to cope with the changing external environment through its "outward" policy, which was aimed at breaking out of the threatening isolation and establishing new links for South Africa, not only in Africa, but in other regions of the world. The policy was initiated in the mid-1960s, in reaction to the increased pressures which built up after 1960. These were a result of the interaction of internal disturbances (Sharpeville) in 1960 and dramatic external changes occurring at the same time (the nationalist movement for political independence in Africa, which reached its peak in the early 1960s).

With specific reference to Africa, the policy of "dialogue" with the countries of black Africa was developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and it enjoyed some limited success. Previously, the government's main concern had been its relations with the Western world, rather than with Africa, and earlier attempts to develop relations with other African states were intended more as a means of improving its image overseas than of dealing with Africa for its own sake.

However, a sense of urgency was still lacking in these policies, and they did not appear to take realistically into account the increasingly critical issues close to home: that is, the issues dividing South Africa from the rest of the continent—the conflict in the Portuguese territories; the Rhodesian dispute; the South West Africa/Namibia issue and the racial situation within South Africa itself. Although there were many important links between the countries of the region, dating from colonial times, and potential advantages in closer cooperation for mutual benefit, the centrifugal forces were in fact growing stronger, as a result of these unresolved political disputes.

Paradoxically, the sudden collapse of Portuguese authority halted this centrifugal trend, at least temporarily, and forced South Africa, as well as other neighboring countries, to give immediate and serious attention to the problems within the region.

II

For South Africa, the dramatic shift in Portugal on April 25, 1974, resulting in revolutionary changes in Mozambique and later in Angola, removed what had amounted to buffers, both physical and psychological, against the threat of militant black nationalism. Portuguese protection of South Africa's flanks was gone, and in its place movements dedicated to revolutionary change were coming to power. In particular, the issue of Rhodesia, in which the neighboring countries of Zambia, Mozambique and South Africa were already involved to a greater or lesser degree, was seen as the one which could

now lead to direct confrontation, unless action were taken to change direction.

To many outside observers the speed with which policies were reassessed, and the subsequent drawing back from confrontation, was surprising, because they had assumed that, with the collapse of Portuguese resistance, black states and nationalist movements would push right on with the liberation of Rhodesia, Namibia, and then South Africa itself, using the same means of armed struggle as had overcome the Portuguese. But this was an oversimplification; the Zambian government and even Mozambique's ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) no doubt realized that the circumstances which had brought about the collapse of Portuguese rule had no exact parallel in the rest of white-ruled Southern Africa. Moreover, the economic situation in Zambia was not at all propitious for a direct military confrontation, and FRELIMO needed time to consolidate its own position, politically and economically. Diplomatic negotiations began, therefore, soon after the Portuguese collapse, although the negotiations did not emerge into the open until the end of 1974, when agreement was reached to begin discussions on a Rhodesian settlement. The aim at that stage on all sides was to find ways of achieving a peaceful resolution of differences through meaningful accommodations, and the South African Prime Minister stated (in December 1974) that the consequences of failure in these efforts would be "too ghastly to contemplate."

The relaxation of tension and the negotiations which followed were based mainly on a degree of coincidence of interests between South Africa and Zambia, concerning the need for a Rhodesian settlement and for the avoidance of disintegration in Mozambique. The basis of the South African *détente* policy was indicated in Prime Minister John Vorster's speech of October 23, 1974, in which he said *inter alia* that Southern Africa had come to a crossroads, where it had to make a choice between peace and the escalation of strife. Zambia's response came in a speech by President Kenneth Kaunda a few days later, in which he referred to Mr. Vorster's "crossroads" speech as "the voice of reason" which Africa had been waiting a long time to hear.¹

A concerted effort was made to settle differences within and between the countries of the subcontinent through direct negotiations between the parties concerned. Outside powers were not involved, and even the United Kingdom, which claims *de jure* sovereignty over

¹ The texts of these speeches may be found in *Southern Africa Record*, Nos. 1 and 2 (1975), published by the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg.

Rhodesia, was not directly included in the negotiations. South Africa, for its part, has tried to act as a regional power, acknowledging as the first priority in its foreign policy the need to come to terms with the other states of its own region, as well as the need to deal realistically with the unresolved issues dividing it from these states—issues now threatening South Africa's own security.

The efforts to resolve the conflict situation on a regional basis have also had the positive effect of drawing attention to the opportunities for cooperation which exist within the region, if the political divisions can be overcome, for instance in the fields of trade, agricultural and industrial development, technological and scientific progress, transport, the provision of power (based on the region's coal and hydro-electric potential), and the exploitation of vast mineral and other natural resources, etc. These opportunities provide the incentive for efforts to overcome the critical problems. In fact, it is a further paradox of the present conflict situation that the very conflicts themselves have caused more people to think in regional terms about Southern Africa than ever before. One vital fact is that seven of the eleven countries in the region depend for their access to the sea on the four with coastlines (plus Tanzania in East Africa which provides an outlet at Dar es Salaam).

Although the year following Mr. Vorster's "crossroads" speech did not see the beginning of meaningful negotiations within Rhodesia, the détente efforts were continuing in the second half of 1975 within the regional context. In August a South African-Zambian summit meeting was held on the Victoria Falls Bridge in a further major initiative aimed at bringing together the government of Prime Minister Ian Smith and the black nationalist leaders. This main aim was not achieved, although negotiations between Mr. Smith and one of the leaders, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, did begin within a few months. Nevertheless, the meeting between Mr. Vorster and Zambia's President Kaunda was of considerable significance, in that it openly demonstrated the extent to which the two leading governments of Southern Africa were willing to try to find regional means to solve the area's problems. At this time, however, a new conflict was developing, which would soon seriously complicate these regional initiatives, and focus the world spotlight on Southern Africa.

III

While attention was focused on Mozambique and Rhodesia, a critical situation was building up in Angola. Of major significance in the Angolan conflict was the intervention from outside in this war. Apart

from the involvement, on one side or the other, of neighboring African countries (i.e., Congo-Brazzaville, Zaïre, Zambia and South Africa), there was direct involvement of the Soviet Union, Cuba, China and the United States (largely covert in the case of the latter two). This non-African involvement made Angola for a time a focal point of both Soviet-American and Soviet-Chinese rivalries. Although the dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union was more public, the rivalry with China over influence in Africa was probably a more important part of Soviet motivation, and here the U.S.S.R. has won a notable victory with its intervention in Angola.

Chinese support for liberation movements and development projects had steadily been winning China respect and influence, especially in East and Central Africa. But the decisiveness of Soviet action in Angola, in support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), together with the invaluable assistance of the Cuban Army (without which the huge quantities of Soviet weapons would have been ineffective), could not be matched by the Chinese in their initial attempts to support the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The effect has been a decline in Chinese influence on FRELIMO in Mozambique and with the Rhodesian nationalist movements.

South Africa's military intervention in Angola appeared to be a blunder. It also seemed out of character for a government devoted to the principle of nonintervention, which had made a major effort, with considerable success, to maintain cooperative functional relations with the FRELIMO government of Mozambique. Admittedly, South Africa's intervention was a very limited one, and its military capability was by no means fully committed—not even that part present at the time on the borders with Angola. But why was even this limited intervention undertaken? Paradoxical as this may sound, the reason for the involvement must be found in the context of the South African government's policy of *détente* in Africa.

The *détente* policy was conceived as a means of normalizing interstate relations and of working for stability in a region threatened by sudden and uncontrollable change. Change, it was recognized, would have to take place; but as far as possible, the issues threatening to lead to confrontation should be settled by negotiation. In this approach Prime Minister Vorster appeared to have the general support of President Kaunda (although the latter denied that *détente* yet existed in the region while South Africa's policies internally were unchanged). The concrete results of this approach on the Rhodesian

issue were not forthcoming as easily and quickly as was perhaps earlier expected, but discussions were still proceeding in an effort to break the deadlock. Then a situation developed in Angola which was perceived in South Africa as a serious threat to détente—namely the intervention, on behalf of the MPLA, of the Soviet Union and Cuba, powers which, it was felt, could only intend to destroy any possibility of the peaceful resolution of differences in the area.

The decision to become involved in assisting the UNITA/FNLA alliance was made easier by the realization that another important neighbor of Angola, namely Zaïre, was also vitally interested in preventing the Soviet-backed MPLA from achieving domination, while Zambia was committed to a coalition of the three. What the nature of the contacts with other African states was on this question is not known, but that South Africa did not act unilaterally in its Angolan involvement has been corroborated by the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, who said that the South African government consulted Zambia, Zaïre and the Ivory Coast, and did not act without their “approval.” He also said, indicating some disappointment after the South African withdrawal toward the South West Africa/Namibia border in February, that Pretoria had always acted “painfully” correctly.²

The South African government thus considered that it was acting, not only in its own interests, but also in those of other African states, and it hoped to prove by its actions that it was willing to support them in resisting Communist encroachment. This, it was hoped, would further the détente policy, particularly among those considered to be the “moderate” and anti-communist states of Africa. When the Organization of African Unity (OAU) held its special summit meeting in late January 1976, the division of the members equally between those supporting the recognition of the MPLA as the Angolan government and those opposing this recognition was interpreted in South Africa as a vindication of this policy.

Another important element in the South African approach was the belief that the government was acting in the interests of the West, particularly the United States, which was then supporting the anti-MPLA forces too—until the congressional decision to cut off support in December 1975. Whether there was actual encouragement from any source in the U.S. Administration is not known (and officially it has been denied that any U.S. “approval” was given). But at least the indications are that there was no positive *discouragement*, and that in fact the South African presence suited American policy, as the only means of preventing the collapse of the anti-MPLA

² Interview published in *Rapport* (Johannesburg), February 15, 1976.

alliance in Angola, at least until the OAU met in late January.

With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the South African policy was based on four miscalculations. In the first place, the considerable increase in Soviet weapons support and the introduction of large numbers of Cubans were probably not fully anticipated. This meant that a much larger commitment than originally planned would have been required. Second, given the emotional hostility to the South African government in black Africa, it should not have been expected that any black states, even so-called moderate ones, would permit themselves to be publicly associated with South Africa's intervention—even if they secretly connived at it. Third, if continued American support, material or moral, was expected, then there was a serious misunderstanding of the American mood and the working of the American system. This latter miscalculation was even more grave, if there was an expectation that the United States would become more openly and more directly involved itself in Angola, in opposition to the Soviet Union. Fourth, there was apparently a hope, which proved to be misplaced, that the OAU would, if given the chance, act to form a national government out of the three movements.

It must be added, however, that the South African government was apparently misled, to some degree at least, into these miscalculations, and there was considerable bitterness expressed in South Africa after both the United States and Zambia supported condemnations of the South African Angolan involvement in the U.N. Security Council debate at the end of March 1976. For instance, the South African Foreign Minister commented in a speech in Parliament on April 26, 1976, that "the Western attitude is one of uncertainty, indecision, powerlessness, if not one of defeatism" and that "Angola has demonstrated that in times of crisis we cannot rely on the West in general and on the United States in particular, and that at least we know where we stand now."³

Although the eventual complete withdrawal of its forces at the end of March 1976 was not due to a military defeat, the Angolan episode proved to be a serious political embarrassment. But this unfortunate episode has not had the negative effects for South Africa itself which might have been expected. There is no confrontation between South African forces and the MPLA at present on the Namibia-Angola border, and there is even a degree of cooperation which has permitted the continued construction of the joint hydroelectric and irrigation project at Ruacana on the Cunene River, on both sides of the border.

³ South Africa, *House of Assembly Debates*, Fifth Parliament, Third Session, April 26-30, 1976, No. 13, col. 5433.

The incursions by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) units into South West Africa/Namibia have increased since the Angolan war, but this development would probably have taken place in any case, because SWAPO bases were being established across the border in Angola before the war. The one important difference is that previously SWAPO was linked more closely to UNITA, which had effectively controlled the southern part of Angola, whereas now SWAPO has moved closer to the MPLA, as the dominant movement in Angola, and to the Soviet Union from which it no doubt hopes to receive greater material support. But these trends are not a result of the South African intervention; rather they stem from the fact of MPLA dominance as well as the increased prestige of the Soviet Union.

The assumption that South Africa's Angolan intervention brought an end to its détente policy is also not accurate. The setback to the détente policy is due to the Rhodesian impasse, which is the most critical issue threatening peace in Southern Africa, as it was even before the Angolan war. That conflict has certainly affected the efforts to achieve a peaceful Rhodesian settlement because of the encouragement it has given to Rhodesian nationalists to pursue an armed struggle rather than to negotiate for a settlement. The conflict in Angola between black nationalist movements has also negatively affected the attitude of whites in Rhodesia, providing them with a frequently used argument that an Angola-type conflict situation would be repeated in Rhodesia if the whites were to give up power. There has thus been a hardening of attitudes on both sides.

The most significant and far-reaching implication of the Angolan conflict, however, is the direct involvement of non-African powers in the domestic and regional disputes of Southern Africa. New dimensions, including superpower rivalry, have thus been introduced into the Southern African situation. It is no longer possible to look simply for regional solutions; and for South Africa and other countries the circumstances in which their foreign policies must operate have now changed. These new circumstances, which include the current initiatives of the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, are affecting the region's most critical issue, Rhodesia, as well as the issues of South West Africa/Namibia, of South Africa's internal political development, and of the future political stability of both Mozambique and Angola.

IV

Since its Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, Rho-

desia⁴ has always constituted a dilemma for South Africa. At first, the government's main concern was about the effect which this issue might have on relations with the United Kingdom, and Rhodesian independence was therefore not formally recognized, and never has been. As the years passed, this concern was superseded by increasing anxiety about the effect which the issue was clearly having on South Africa's attempts to normalize relations with other African countries. Rhodesia's growing economic dependence on South Africa led to the accusation that South Africa was chiefly responsible for the continued survival of the Rhodesian government—particularly after U.N. sanctions were imposed in December 1966 and May 1968.

The failure of the *détente* policy to produce the hoped-for results in Rhodesia has sorely strained the constructive relationship being developed with Zambia, and President Kaunda has accused Mr. Vorster of preventing majority rule by refusing to take effective action. President Kaunda's attitude has also been hardened by the alleged South African incursions into Zambian territory from South West Africa/Namibia.

In spite of its growing concern, the South African government could not, and cannot, participate in sanctions, for two general reasons. First, sanctions have been recommended by the U.N. General Assembly against South Africa itself, and the government has always considered it against its interests that sanctions should be seen to succeed anywhere. Second, it is highly doubtful that the government could maintain the support of its own white electorate if it took strong measures, such as closing its borders with Rhodesia, to impose pressures on Mr. Smith's government. However, it did take a meaningful step to assist the *détente* negotiating process by withdrawing South African police units from Rhodesia in 1975 and may now have to exert other coercive influences in its own interests and as part of an agreement with the United States.

Mr. Vorster is significantly constrained by the sympathetic identification of many South African whites with Rhodesian whites. This is heightened when terrorist incidents involving the murder of civilians occur in Rhodesia, especially when the occurrences are near the South African border. Mr. Smith's government is aware of this emotional support and, in the interests of its own survival, has tried to appeal to the South African electorate in its public statements, over

⁴ Although the name "Rhodesia" is used in this article, it should be noted that the colonial name of "Southern Rhodesia" has been retained in formal British and U.N. documents, while "Zimbabwe" is the name adopted by African nationalists and increasingly used throughout Africa and elsewhere.

the head of the government. On the basis of his perception of South African attitudes, Mr. Smith no doubt believes that, when the chips are down, South Africa is bound to come to his assistance. Even though the South African policy now is clearly *not* to become directly involved militarily, and in spite of the fact that this policy has wide support from the South African press, business community, etc., there is in fact no certainty that it can be maintained, if in the future there should be a threatened massacre of whites.

A related problem in the relations between the South African and Rhodesian governments concerns the differences between their respective domestic policies. To most people outside the two countries (and many within) there is no basic difference; both are seen as policies of white domination. But the two governments are well aware of the differences: the South African policy is one of separate political development, as between black and white, based on territorial divisions, whereas the stated Rhodesian policy is one of sharing power in the same political institutions, with political rights based on merit. In the normal course of development this announced policy (as distinct from what the private intentions of white political leaders may be⁵) should lead to a black majority government. Pretoria has made no secret of its attitude that the best solution for Rhodesia would be one peacefully reached within the framework of Rhodesia's stated policy.

Basic to this policy analysis is the assumption that the South African government has always seriously desired a settlement in Rhodesia and has accepted that this would involve, sooner or later, a black government in that country. This assumption is borne out by statements made from time to time by government leaders, by the public expressions of hope whenever negotiations were proceeding between Mr. Smith's government and the British or the nationalist movements, and, in particular, by the efforts made by Prime Minister Vorster to bring Mr. Smith and the nationalists together, during the 1974-1976 period.

However, the positive South African attitude toward this issue is somewhat tempered by uncertainty about the nature of whatever black government might take over power after a settlement. Needless to say, the South African preference would be for a "moderate" government which would be prepared to cooperate, at least on functional and

⁵ Proposals have been made within the governing Rhodesian Front Party for a change of policy to a form of "canton" system, which would be nearer the South African policy. While an option of this nature may have to be considered in possible settlement scenarios, there would have to be clear indications, at least, that such a regional decentralization of political power would be a compromise acceptable to a majority of the people concerned, black and white. At this stage it is clear, however, that the South African government has given no encouragement to such proposals.

economic levels, and there is real concern about the possible consequences of a radical and militant government coming to power. The uncertainty and concern among whites generally have increased since the escalation of violence in the past few years, with a militant government in Mozambique now giving full support to the armed struggle in Rhodesia, with the official backing of the Presidents of Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana. For the South African government, therefore, the deterioration in the Rhodesian situation has not only increased the sense of urgency in attempts to find a settlement, but also raised the level of concern about a possible domestic white backlash, if a South African-supported settlement should be seen to threaten the security of whites in Rhodesia and also in South Africa.

The recent retaliatory raids into Mozambique by Rhodesian forces are not approved by the South African government as they complicate settlement efforts, escalate violence and invite greater Russian involvement. Furthermore, they could harm South Africa's own delicate but reasonably cooperative relations with Mozambique. But for many whites, unaware of the political implications, these raids are emotionally satisfying—akin to the Israeli raid at Entebbe.

In all these circumstances Pretoria's room for maneuver is steadily growing smaller. There may be grounds for the view held widely overseas, that Mr. Vorster holds a key (if not *the* key) to a settlement, because of Rhodesian dependence on South Africa, but there are also clearly narrowing limits to this role, which are not always appreciated abroad. These limits are imposed by the domestic constraints interacting with the deteriorating security situation in Rhodesia and in Southern Africa generally. The question now is: How far can Mr. Vorster's government risk going in attempts to influence, even coerce, Mr. Smith's government to agree to proposals which may emerge from U.S. initiatives? The answer, of course, will have to await the outcome of these initiatives, but Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller's statement of August 13 has clearly indicated support for proposals based on majority rule with protection of minority rights.

V

The situation in Rhodesia does not, in any case, lend itself to easy solutions. It is widely assumed outside Southern Africa that effective sanctions, supported by South Africa, would quickly cause the collapse of Mr. Smith's government and that this would then lead almost automatically to "majority rule." A more likely result, however, is a collapse of the economy and complete disorder, with a struggle for power between various groups. In these circumstances, intervention

by neighboring states (including South Africa, Mozambique and Zambia) and also by non-African powers—with serious worldwide consequences—could hardly be avoided. This scenario is the most likely one in the event of effective sanctions, because there are no indications that the present Rhodesian government, or any alternative government representing the whites, would simply agree to hand over power even under the threat of economic collapse. Moreover, there is at present no effective unified black movement to whom power could be handed over even if the whites were willing to do so.

If there is to be a relatively orderly transition, without a major disruption and its likely wider consequences, three basic requirements will first have to be satisfied. First, there must be a unified nationalist movement with which meaningful negotiations for a transfer of power can take place. Second, the relatively sophisticated Rhodesian economy must be maintained in reasonable working order through the transition period. Third, the whites (a) must be persuaded that it is in their long-term interest to agree quickly to a government representing the majority of the people, and (b) must have the confidence to stay in the country. These necessary requirements for an orderly transition are, of course, related: if the whites do not stay, the economy cannot be maintained (which is a reality of the situation, whether or not one approves of the past and present domination of the economy by whites), and the lack of confidence of the whites is aggravated by the disunity among the blacks, which is threatening to lead to an increasingly violent struggle for power among various factions.

The disunity among black nationalists is often cited by whites in Rhodesia as their reason for dismissing, as impracticable and even dangerous, the idea of transferring power to a government representing the majority. In fact, this disunity is seen by many whites as their salvation, making it possible for white rule to continue indefinitely. To this end attempts are even made officially to encourage disunity, for instance, by constantly stressing the tribal differences and rivalry between the Matabele and the Mashona (the two main tribal groupings). What is not appreciated is that, as white rule cannot be maintained indefinitely in any case, the long-term interests of the whites themselves require that there be a peaceful and orderly process of change as soon as possible. Further, such orderly change is only achievable through negotiations, which require a credible, unified nationalist movement. Without negotiations, the situation will continue to deteriorate, with violence escalating as it is at present. (The fact that the nationalists are divided is not preventing the guerrilla and terrorist activities; it may even make them worse from the white

point of view, with various groups competing with each other to be more effective in causing disruption.)

Any plan for a negotiated settlement must, therefore, in the interests of all the people of Rhodesia, include efforts to bring about nationalist unity, as a priority. The four "frontline" Presidents who have been involved in all the settlement attempts, namely those of Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Botswana, have a crucial unifying role to play. Their influence on the factions among the nationalists is still strong, because the nationalists depend almost entirely on these countries for political and military support, including the provision of bases and sanctuaries. Without this support, they could not pursue an armed struggle within Rhodesia. So far, the four Presidents have acted together, and they have maintained a front of unity, at least publicly. However, there are now growing signs of some differences of approach among them, and of differences between them and some of the factions within the nationalist movements. In this regard the role of President Machel of Mozambique is an important factor, as he appears to be increasingly dominating the so-called Third Force, comprising the armed cadres of the nationalist movement, which has its main training camps and bases within Mozambique. Criticism of President Machel's domination has been voiced by black nationalist political leaders, who say their views are being disregarded.⁶ There are also some indications of misgivings on the part of the other three Presidents.

The establishment of a Third Force, based in Mozambique, resulted from the impatience of the four Presidents with the continued disunity among the recognized political leaders (notably Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Mr. Joshua Nkomo) and the conflict between the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), wings of the African National Council (with which the two movements, ZAPU and ZANU, had agreed to merge in December 1974). In January 1976, on the initiative chiefly of President Machel, a military committee was thus established in Mozambique to provide leadership unconnected with particular factions and particularly with past conflicts between ZAPU and ZANU—hence the name, *Third*

⁶ The conclusions here and below, concerning nationalist disunity, are based on private conversations of the author and on reports of statements by nationalist leaders themselves, e.g., *The Times* (London), March 26, 1976; *The Star* (Johannesburg), May 28, June 9, June 29, July 13, 1976; *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg), July 6 and 7, 1976; *Financial Mail* (Johannesburg), June 4, 1976; *Sunday Express* (Johannesburg), June 6, 1976; *The World* (Johannesburg), June 27, 1976. See also "ANC in Disarray" in *Africa Research Bulletin* (London), October 15, 1975, and statement by OAU Secretary-General, as reported in *To the Point* (Johannesburg), June 4, 1976.

Force. However, the unity of the nationalist movement has not been achieved, and even within the Third Force there are said to be serious divisions which include tribal rivalries, with the Karanga tribal element (the largest group among the predominant Shona-speaking people of Rhodesia) taking the lead. President Machel's influence on the Third Force makes him a key figure among the four Presidents in the factional struggles. He also has the closest ideological and military connections with the Soviet Union. Since the Angolan conflict, both President Machel's government and the Third Force have become increasingly dependent on support from the Soviet Union.

With the divisions among the nationalists continuing and with the Rhodesian government unable to move decisively toward a settlement, the similarities with the Angolan situation are becoming clearer. It would not be surprising if both FRELIMO and the Soviet Union were at least thinking about an Angolan-type solution, which would establish a government in Salisbury aligned with them. The factors which still inhibit such a course of events include the continuing influence of the other three Presidents, uncertainty about South Africa's reaction, potential American involvement and the position of black political leaders who still have considerable support in Rhodesia. The military and economic strength of the white Rhodesians is also a factor which must not be discounted, and in this regard the situation is different from that in Angola, where the Portuguese settlers had neither the will nor the means to resist.

The apparent mood of defiance among white Rhodesians is perhaps a natural reaction to the international and internal pressures. The isolation imposed by the international community has also had a very negative effect on their attitudes. Many whites now see only two alternatives: to resist change by force or to leave the country should change become inevitable. The second alternative is not as easily available to them as it was to most Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola, who were taken back to Portugal. But whites are now leaving in greater numbers, and as a discouragement the government has reduced the total emigration allowance to only Rh\$1,000 (approximately U.S.\$1,540) per family. The official immigration and emigration figures show that, while there was a net migration gain of about 600 in 1974 and of nearly 2,000 in 1975, there was a net loss of 873 during the first four months of 1976. (Press reports have stated that the net loss grew to over 2,200 during the first six months of 1976, but the accuracy of this figure has been denied officially.⁷)

These figures do not yet seem very dramatic, until it is realized that

⁷ Information obtained from Rhodesian Diplomatic Mission in Pretoria.

a large number of Portuguese, mainly from Mozambique, have immigrated into Rhodesia over the past two years, totaling over 20,000, according to unconfirmed reports. If this figure is approximately correct, it means that there has been hardly any immigration from any other source during this period, and that, with the Mozambique source now having almost dried up, the net loss of whites will dramatically increase. (Already it appears from the above figures that over 20,000 non-Portuguese have left in the past two years.) With a white population of only around 300,000 (out of a total population of over 6 million), this growing number of whites choosing to leave, in spite of the financial obstacles put in their way, must be a cause for serious concern to the government, and it may indicate the beginning of a crack in white morale behind the outward show of defiance.

This developing situation in and around Rhodesia, in which violence is increasingly seen by blacks and whites as the only means of resolving the issues, underlines the urgency of the need for new constructive initiatives aimed at a negotiated settlement. It is hoped that these initiatives will emerge from the discussions between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Vorster. An American involvement in these initiatives, with even wider Western support, is now necessary—first, to balance the Soviet involvement and, second, to assist those who want a peaceful settlement, but who have been unable to achieve it themselves. External involvement may be regrettable, in the sense that it is moving the issues out of their regional context into the arena of world and superpower politics, but this trend now seems unavoidable. The need for external involvement was recognized by the South African Foreign Minister in a statement on May 17, 1976,⁸ despite South Africa's previous preference for a solution through negotiation between the parties in the region, without outside interference.

There should, however, be no illusions about the complexities of the situation, including the fact that there are deep divisions and conflicting interests which have to be reconciled—not just between black and white, but also between differing groups on both sides. Unless the United Kingdom, with American backing, is willing and able to *impose* a settlement, which is highly unlikely, ways will have to be found to bring together the conflicting parties and persuade them, with the use perhaps of both coercion and incentives, that compromises will be needed on all sides to reach a generally acceptable settlement which will avoid complete disorder throughout the region, and will bring long-term benefits for all concerned. The future healthy

⁸ South Africa, *Senate Debates*, Fifth Parliament, Third Session, May 17–21, 1976, No. 10, cols. 2372–74.

development of the region as a whole, without continuing conflict, will have to be the primary goal, and therefore any solutions proposed must not simply be temporary expedients, but rather ones which are consonant with the realities and which can therefore "stick."

VI

The status of South West Africa/Namibia has been an issue at the United Nations for so long—30 years—and before that a concern of the League of Nations, that South Africans have become accustomed to think of it in the international context simply as a U.N.-South African legal dispute, and not as an African political issue. It is only recently that the focus of the South African approach has shifted, as the implications of this unresolved issue for future relations with the rest of Africa have begun to emerge more clearly. The dramatic developments in the former Portuguese territories have contributed to this shift, increasing the motivation behind attempts to resolve the issue and thus keep it from becoming as critical as Rhodesia.

The announcement in Windhoek on August 18, 1976, of a plan for independence of the territory as one unit by December 31, 1976, has given grounds for hope that a peaceful settlement can be reached. This plan, agreed to by delegates attending the Constitutional Conference which held its first sitting in December 1975, involves the appointment as soon as possible of a multiracial interim government which would be responsible for the drawing up of an independence constitution and for negotiating the transfer of the administration of the country from South Africa. Many questions concerning the implementation of this plan remain to be answered and it still requires formal acceptance by the South African government and parliament. Although there may be some negative reaction within the governing National Party, there is little doubt that the plan in its broad outlines will be accepted. More serious are the indications of a negative reaction on the part of other African states, because SWAPO has had no part in the agreement behind the plan and because of the absence of any reference to U.N.-supervised elections. This negative reaction may be reflected in the Security Council, which is due to meet after August 31 (according to its resolution of January 1976). However, cautious support given to the plan by Western states may prevent any drastic decision by the Security Council at this stage.

In looking at the background to these latest developments, it is clear that the two issues of Rhodesia and South West Africa/Namibia represent for black African states the last serious vestiges of colonialism, in which South Africa in effect plays the role of the

colonial power. Official African declarations, in particular the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 and the Dar es Salaam Declaration of April 1975, make clear the distinction between these two issues and that of South Africa itself, and justify the necessity of negotiating with South Africa about their settlement. (South Africa itself is accepted in these declarations as an independent African state, but with unacceptable policies of racial discrimination.)

Negotiations over the future of these two countries are seen in South Africa as a means of removing disputes which have seriously affected the country's international position and thus as a way of reducing international and African pressures. This, it is felt, would allow more time to deal with the ultimate divisive issue of internal race relations, and at the same time give the South African government more credibility in Africa and the world generally.

Briefly, in the case of South West Africa/Namibia, the African states have pressed for many years for independence of the territory as one integral whole, and for prior recognition of the South West Africa People's Organization as the legitimate representative of the aspirations of the people. At first the demands were for a U.N. administration, leading to independence. Now, however, the declared policy of both the United Nations and the OAU calls for free elections, under U.N. supervision and control, leading directly to independence.

The South African government has in the past resisted these demands—in the United Nations, in the International Court, with visiting U.N. representatives and with African leaders—and instead has proceeded with the implementation of a policy of separate political development of ethnic groups (of which there are 11 identifiable in the territory, of varying population size) in their own territories or "homelands," with the aim that at least some of these should become independent. The notable example of a group, or "nation," which has progressed a long way on the road to separate independence, is that of the Ovambo people, comprising approximately 46 percent of the total population of over 850,000, and occupying an area in the north bordering on Angola. (All the other groups are thus much smaller; the next largest being the whites, numbering nearly 100,000).⁹

However, growing opposition within the territory to the separate development policy, in addition to its categoric rejection by black African states and the United Nations has led in recent years to a more flexible approach, with the emphasis on the right of groups themselves to decide on their own future and that of the territory as

⁹ Population figures from *South West Africa Survey 1974*, published by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs in 1975, p. 4.

a whole. Moreover, the need to come to terms with other African states on this issue, in the context of the *détente* policy, has led the government to recognize that no solution is possible which does not provide for the independence of the territory as one integrated whole. This changed approach was given concrete expression in the Constitutional Conference and particularly in the plan proposed in August by the constitutional committee of that Conference. Even the Ovambo government, which had previously accepted the separate development policy, now supports the maintenance of the territorial integrity of South West Africa/Namibia.

Acceptance of the plan for independence within the territory and by the international community depends on several factors which are still at issue. One is the nature of the Constitutional Conference itself, from which the plan has emanated. The Conference comprises delegates from all the population groups most of which have elected governments. There are, however, objections by nationalist movements, particularly SWAPO, to the whole concept of group representation, excluding national parties or movements as such. While it is probably the most representative gathering to have taken place in the territory, in the view of most black African nations the exclusion of SWAPO casts doubt on the relevance of the talks.

Prime Minister Vorster, for his part, has made it clear that "all options are open" for the people of the territory, as represented in the Conference, to decide on their future, and that the South African government would not stand in the way of any decisions they might make. However, the rule accepted at the beginning of the Conference proceedings was that decisions would be taken by consensus, and this in fact gave the representatives of each group, including whites, a veto. So far, this has not prevented progress on various matters, including the latest decision to opt for early independence. But agreements still have to be reached on the form of the constitution, including such vital matters as whether there will be a unitary or federal state, and obstacles could still arise in the process of reaching agreement. There will be pressure for some form of federal structure in order to take account of group differences, not necessarily because of South African government policy, but because the differences between some groups are very real, with respect to language, culture, economic development and historical rivalries and conflict. For instance, there is the fear of domination by the Ovambos in a unitary state in view of their numerical preponderance.

As suggested above, a major obstacle to finding a generally acceptable agreement on the basis of the Constitutional Conference's plan

for independence is the position of SWAPO. (There are in fact two organizations using the name, one which operates within the territory and which claims to be against violence, and the other which operates outside and which is devoted to liberation through an armed struggle. The latter engages in sporadic incursions across the border from Angola, and it has been responsible for a number of deaths and other casualties.) The South African government has said that as a political movement SWAPO cannot participate in the Conference, unless elected to a government of one of the group homelands. SWAPO has not been willing to take part in such ethnically based elections, even in Ovambo where its strength is considered to be greatest. Both the internal and external wings of SWAPO have also indicated that they would not participate in the Conference even if a special invitation were directed to them, unless prior conditions which are not at this stage acceptable to the Conference¹⁰—e.g., the withdrawal of the South African Administration—were fulfilled.

There is an increasing realization that a viable agreement about the future independence of South West Africa/Namibia, will require the participation of SWAPO for two main reasons. First, SWAPO has strong international backing, particularly in Africa, where it is recognized as the movement representing the people of the territory. Second, although there are no election figures to prove its strength within the territory (because SWAPO has chosen not to participate in such elections as there have been), there are indications that the South African Administration has underestimated SWAPO's strength, and that it has at least stronger support than any other single organization, particularly among the younger and more politically sophisticated Ovambos. As a result, attempts are being made to find ways in which SWAPO could be included in negotiations. Proposals have been made within the Conference to issue an invitation to SWAPO, but there has not yet been any decision on them. Mr. Clemens Kapuuo, leader of the Herero group and the best-known non-SWAPO nationalist has expressed willingness to talk to SWAPO, but criticized SWAPO's avoidance of elections and resort to violence. As far as the South African government is concerned, Mr. Vorster has in the past been adamantly opposed to talking with SWAPO, but he has recently indicated that the Constitutional Conference is free to invite whomsoever it wishes to participate. As it is unlikely that SWAPO will agree to participate in the Conference, if it continues

¹⁰ See, for example, statements as reported in the *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg), May 19, 1976; *The Times* (London), May 29, 1976; and the *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg), May 31, 1976.

on the basis of its present structure, an attempt may be made by the proposed interim government to negotiate with SWAPO, as well as with other political movements. The only alternative to negotiation with SWAPO will be to prove without doubt in a referendum or election that an independence constitution drafted by the Conference or the interim government is acceptable to the people of the territory.

In the immediate future much will depend on the reaction of the South African government and the speed with which it is prepared to take the necessary legislative and administrative steps for the formation of an interim government which is as representative as possible. Indications of the government's position, which will no doubt be influenced by domestic political constraints may be evident by mid-September, at which time the Prime Minister is expected to make a major policy statement at a Party congress. The reaction of the international community, for instance in the Security Council, will in turn be largely determined by Mr. Vorster's position, because he is seen as having ultimate control over the political future of South West Africa/Namibia. For instance, it will be up to him and his National Party to persuade the whites of the territory to accept a political dispensation which is very different from the policies of separate development they have supported for so long. Moreover, the black African states hold Mr. Vorster's government responsible for the decolonization of South West Africa/Namibia and in particular for initiating negotiations with SWAPO to that end. They will have to be persuaded to give the proposed interim government an opportunity to reach an acceptable settlement.

VII

The consideration in some detail above of the Rhodesian and Namibian issues is not intended to imply that the question of South Africa's internal political development is any less important or less complex. Ultimately, the peaceful and constructive development of the region as a whole will depend on a resolution of the potential conflict situation within South Africa itself. Relations between South Africa and other states of the region cannot be normalized until blacks as well as whites are satisfied with the political system within which they must live. Without such normalization of relations, enabling South Africa to play the part for which it is equipped in the development of the region, Southern Africa will be impeded from fulfilling its great potential.

Pretoria has always maintained that the racial situation in South Africa is a domestic matter in which no other state or international

organization has any right to interfere. However, in reality, the internal racial situation is the main divisive issue in the country's external relations, not only with Africa, but also with the West. This fact may seem too obvious to mention, but it is only in recent years that it has been publicly acknowledged by government spokesmen. The most notable such statement was made by the South African Ambassador to the United Nations, during a Security Council debate in October 1974, when he said that the South African government was committed to moving away from discrimination.

The problem is that, important as such a commitment may be in itself, its implementation is obviously very difficult for a government which is elected by a white minority. Authoritarian as the South African government may appear, it is nevertheless responsible (and responsive) to its own electorate, and this imposes a major constraint on it in any attempt to change its racial policies in such a way as would reduce the dominant and privileged position of the very people who elected it. Within South Africa the government has been criticized for arousing expectations which it is either unable or unwilling to satisfy. Attacks on the government's internal policy have increased since the disturbances in urban black townships and in black universities, which began with the Soweto riots in June 1976.

There is no doubt that these riots have had a profound impact, which has perhaps not yet been fully felt, on internal and external relations. Internally they have focused particular attention on the unsettled position of blacks in the urban areas, as distinct from those living in the rural Bantustans or black homelands, and externally they have already complicated the current efforts to initiate a negotiating process to deal with critical issues in Southern Africa.

No longer is it possible for Southern Africa to place these issues in a convenient time span with South African internal conflict being relegated for future settlement after Rhodesia and South West Africa/Namibia. Expectations have been aroused by events in neighboring countries, and the promise of independence in the territory may have an even greater impact, because there the government is seen to be acquiescing in the rejection of its own policy of separate development. Black militancy is still confined largely to the youth, but this could change if the basic grievances now being articulated more clearly and insistently are not taken seriously.

Indications of internal accommodations may come in the important statement expected from the Prime Minister in mid-September. Some administrative steps have recently been taken to reduce discrimination on racial grounds in the social sphere (known in South Africa as

“petty apartheid”), and in the economic sphere there has been decided improvement in recent years in wage levels of black workers and in employment opportunities generally. In addition, in mid-August the government announced measures to extend the rights to long-leasehold to blacks in urban townships. However, the government continues to pursue its policy of separate development, under which urban blacks would not have citizenship in the cities where they work and live but only in the Bantustans. This is a serious bone of contention between the government and black leaders, without any indications at this stage of a compromise, which might basically affect the separate development philosophy.

In October 1976, the Transkei will become the first of these homelands to achieve full independence, and this will provide a crucial test of the acceptability of the government's policy—both internally and externally. The OAU took a definite stand at its July 1976 summit conference against recognition of the Transkei. Possible future recognition, however, may depend very much on how effectively the Transkei exercises its independence, particularly vis-à-vis South Africa. The question for the immediate future is: Will the Transkei become a new focal point of dispute within Southern Africa, or a contribution toward the resolution of conflict?

The current Western initiatives to resolve conflict situations in Southern Africa are bringing new pressures to bear on South Africa, not only to contribute decisively to a Rhodesian settlement and to grant independence to South West Africa/Namibia, but also to bring about change internally. These new pressures are taken seriously, because they come at a time when cold economic winds are also blowing around South Africa, fanned by the fall in the gold price. However, mixed with the trepidation and uncertainty about these new pressures there is some hope that Western involvement will help check the escalation of the violence which threatens blacks and whites alike.

The question of the effectiveness of external pressures for constructive change is not a simple one. While some pressures can have a positive effect, others can be counterproductive, resulting rather in a hardening of attitudes. It is natural to expect, of course, that outside governments should make decisions on policy toward Southern Africa with their own domestic and external interests primarily in mind. But the situation developing now in Southern Africa is such that it is in the interests of other governments, in the West at least, to make a positive contribution to the resolution of conflict and avoid the easy escape of offering simplistic solutions to African problems.

INSIDE THE LAAGER: WHITE POWER IN SOUTH AFRICA

By John de St. Jorre



SOUTHERN AFRICA these days is like a Chinese puzzle. Rhodesia is the first box, exposed on all sides, its lacquer chipped and lusterless. Lift the lid and there is Namibia, waiting its turn. Open up Namibia and South Africa comes into view. Prise the top off South Africa and, a non-Chinese surprise, two boxes lie side by side, one black and the other white. The black box is sealed tight but its shape has been distorted by a series of internal explosions and it no longer rests passively beside its neighbor. The white box also fails to open but that's because it's solid. On it there is an inscription: Afrikaner Nationalism. Therein the muscle and sinew, the visions and the nightmares of Africa's only white tribe are compounded.

II

If it is accepted that the central problem in the region is the immutability of South Africa's racial policies, around which all other problems ultimately turn, then the men who shape them deserve close attention. That a widespread challenge has arisen from the very people whose future is the main concern of South Africa's leaders, notably the new generation of blacks, only underscores the pivotal importance of the Afrikaners. The nature of white power in the southern part of the continent has undergone considerable change since the Lisbon coup in April 1974. The last of the metropolitans, the Portuguese, have gone. A new phase involving white settlers of relatively recent origin and untested nationalism in Rhodesia and Namibia has opened. The length of that phase is debatable; analysts talk in terms ranging from six months to five years. But the outcome—black governments, militant or moderate, stable or unstable—does not seem to be in doubt. By then the friendly white buffers may have been partially replaced by pliant black homelands but the chances of South Africa having to

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face what Rhodesia is confronted with today will have immeasurably increased.

South Africa's friends and foes alike acknowledge that the country is in a different category from the "colonial" countries of Rhodesia and Namibia. Black African nations defined that difference in a statement issued at Lusaka, Zambia, in April 1969. In what has since become a sort of African magna carta on freedom and equality in the white South, the Lusaka Manifesto referred to South Africa as an "independent sovereign state and a member of the United Nations." The recent riots in South Africa may lead the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to revise its attitude—strong opinions were expressed at the recent OAU summit meeting in Mauritius—but for the moment the Manifesto stands and implicitly recognizes the success of Afrikaner nationalism in its strange and unique act of creation at the foot of the African continent.

The Africans also accept that South Africa should be allowed time to work out its own destiny, though precisely what that should be has never been clearly defined by them any more than it has been by the white South Africans themselves. The Africans talk of "ending (or dismantling) apartheid" and privately mean a solution that leads to eventual majority rule in a unitary state. White South Africans talk of "separate development" and "equal freedoms" for all in South Africa and privately aim at maintaining political and economic control over at least four-fifths of the country.

White power in the Republic of South Africa is Afrikaner power. Settled in the country since the seventeenth century, the predominantly Dutch forebears of today's dominant white group were pushed into the interior by the English during the Napoleonic Wars and defeated by the latter in the Boer War in 1902. Since then, however, with their tight-knit ethnic strength and numerical predominance, the Afrikaners have gradually taken over political control and gathered increasing economic strength in the Republic. Their political arm, the National Party, has held the reins of government firmly since 1948.

The English-speaking community, roughly 40 percent of the white population,¹ now counts for virtually nothing in South African politics. Of course, the English have influence, especially in commerce and industry, but they have no power nor have they any prospect of achieving it in the foreseeable future. There are several reasons for

¹ The effective electoral power of the English is probably less when the large number of English-speaking residents who have not taken out South African citizenship is considered. Two years ago, Mr. Piet Koornhof, Minister of Sport and Immigration, said that only 42,000 immigrants out of a total of 400,000 had become citizens since 1961 (*Seek*, an Anglican journal, July 1974.).

this. First, as a minority they cannot hope to oust the Afrikaners under the present electoral system, provided the latter remain united and as long as non-whites are excluded from parliament. Secondly, a process of realignment is going on among the two English opposition parties. The United Party (UP) is steadily losing ground to the more liberal Progressive-Reform Party (as the amalgamation of the Progressive and the breakaway left wing of the United Party is called) on the Left and to the ruling National Party on the Right. The old adage that the English talk Progressive, vote UP and privately thank God for the Nationalists has lost some of its validity. The increased gravity of South Africa's position has spurred a process of ideological polarization. Closet Nationalists and Progressives are tiptoeing cautiously out into the open as the days of wine and roses come to an end. (The same process has occurred in Rhodesia during the last decade, leaving the Center-ground sprinkled with the corpses of moderate politicians and good intentions.)

A third factor is the nature of the English electorate, which tends to be torpid, conservative and apolitical. The large influx of disillusioned white immigrants from other parts of Africa in recent years has strengthened the reactionary ingredient in the community. The idea that industrialists and businessmen, being practical and farsseeing people, represent a political force for change seems to be as illusory in South Africa as it has been in Rhodesia although some individuals such as Harry Oppenheimer never give up urging meaningful reform. A confidential survey of 3,000 leading businessmen in South Africa last year showed that the group remains conservative, the greatest support for the status quo coming from those in the top echelon of management.² Finally, the personality of Prime Minister John Vorster has done much to fragment traditional English political loyalties. His strength and pragmatism appeal to the English voter and opinion polls give him a steady 80-percent backing of the white electorate.

The historical enmity between Afrikaners and English in South Africa has diminished considerably in the last three decades. The consolidation of political power, the urbanization of the Afrikaner, and unprecedented material affluence have blunted the prickly spines of Afrikaner nationalism. After the founding of the Republic in 1961, former Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd began to encourage the concept of a white South African nationalism in which the English were to be drawn closer but still held at arm's length from

² This survey was carried out by Anglo-American, the giant mining conglomerate, which conducts a similar exercise every five years.

the sacred institutions—cultural, religious and political—of Afrikanerdom. Mr. Vorster has continued the policy with greater energy but not without strong criticism from the ethnic purists in the Afrikaner right wing. The group that has been most willing to reach out toward the English is the expanding body of young Afrikaner businessmen and technocrats. They find it relatively easy to identify with their white compatriots, whose affluence they now share and whose more relaxed life-style they admire and emulate.

But, underneath the Afrikaner skin, there still lies a wariness of the English—for their capacity to undermine the unity of the *volk*, for the assimilative power of their culture and, in times of crisis, for their suspect loyalty to the country. There are also the abrasive barbs of English opposition which never cease to hurt although they do no substantive damage. These come, with varying intensity, from three different directions: the English-language press; the English universities, especially Witwatersrand and Cape Town, and the students' union, NUSAS; and from the small but active Progressive-Reform Party in parliament.

An indication of Afrikaner mistrust is the government's refusal to capitalize on the undoubted support it has among the English electorate in order to accelerate even the limited domestic reforms it believes to be necessary. A recent by-election in Albertyn showed the National Party paying an exaggerated amount of attention to the threat from the Afrikaner Right when it was clear that whatever was lost in that direction would be more than compensated by support from the English Left. The crucial determinant, of course, was the ethnic origin of those votes. In this context, Mr. Vorster is no different from any other leader of the *volk*; a single Afrikaner vote is still worth half a dozen English votes any day of the week.

III

The irony is that it was on the anvil of the English that the Afrikaners first forged their nationalist armor. Afrikaners retain a revolutionary image of themselves. Unlike the English, French or Portuguese in Africa, they turned their backs on their European origins. In search of land and solitude they swept north in successive migratory waves and clashed with black tribes pushing south. They were not innovators but a practical people who had a talent for modification. They fashioned a religion out of Calvinism and a language out of seventeenth-century Dutch. The Church and Afrikaans remain as pivotal to Afrikaner nationalism today as Judaism and Hebrew do to Zionism, although their racial ideologies are en-

tirely different. They regard themselves in all seriousness as Africa's first freedom-fighters—against British imperialism—and although they lost the war they finally won the peace.

In all *volk* history there are distortions and myths but they do not necessarily weaken the faith of the believer; on the contrary, they often reinforce it. However, the power of what has been called the Afrikaners' "civil religion"³ has waned since its zenith in the 1930s and 1940s. And there is today no conclusive agreement on the identity of Afrikanerdom or the role it should play in modern Africa. There is, in fact, constant debate and much internal divisiveness. Yet the symbols and the institutions of a durable nationalism are there. The purely ethnic content of Afrikanerdom is certainly being eroded by the need to pull in the English in order to present a unified white front to the black threat. And although the inspirational view of Afrikaners as the Chosen People of an omniscient God has receded into obscurantist backwaters there is no lack of consensus, of moral righteousness, or of will, when it is a matter of who should guide the destiny of the 25 million people of South Africa.

Some of the problems in understanding Afrikaner nationalism arise from the fact that the Afrikaners are, like the Rhodesians, undoubtedly a minority group defending their privileged position against an impoverished and unrepresented majority. But, at the same time and quite unlike the Rhodesians, they have over a slow and painful process lasting 300 years evolved as a distinct ethnic group. The English of Rhodesia and South Africa and the Germans in Namibia still have a European home of sorts. The Afrikaners have none other than the empty land they occupied, and the settled land they bought or conquered. This factor adds a measure of determination, ruthlessness and perhaps, *in extremis*, flexibility to the Afrikaner psyche. Afrikanerdom is based on the reverse principle of European and American (or African) pluralism: that is, in order to survive, it has to exert total and exploitative power over rival nationalisms, if only to guide them to a compatible destiny. Despite its self-conscious act of amputation from Europe, Afrikaners still look with some anguish toward the West for a portion of their physical and psychological needs—weapons, investment, protection and approval. However, Mr. Vorster's government is doing its best to reduce this dependency. The détente policy with black Africa, the overtures to other middle-ranking internationally isolated powers—Israel, Iran, Taiwan—and the huge increases in defense and energy spending over

³ The phrase is T. Dunbar Moodie's, used in his book, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975.

the last few years all stem from this desire.

IV

Afrikaner power in South Africa rests upon a number of traditional institutions all closely intermeshed at the top. It is hard to detect a breath let alone a wind of change in the taut rigging of the three Dutch Reformed churches, the FAK (Afrikaans Cultural Federation), the women's organizations (Afrikaner womanhood, the victim of Zulu massacres and British concentration camps, remains an important symbol of ethnic probity and purity), the state-controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation, the white trade unions, and the powerful fraternal organization, the Broederbond (Band of Brothers). There is dissent, among some of the younger clergy, for example, and there is debate. But there is no sense of urgency, no swelling movement for reform, and although these organizations no longer play such a central role as they did when the Afrikaners were consolidating their power they still perform a dual function of filter and sounding board for Nationalist policy as it descends from the cabinet and party hierarchy.

The Broederbond, in particular, is important here. Founded in 1918 as a way of resisting British influence, it remains the watchdog of Afrikaner life. With a total membership of about 10,000, it is organized on a regional basis consisting of 400 cells or divisions and a central coordinating council which meets regularly in secret. Members are inducted and must be Afrikaner Protestants, belonging to one of the three Dutch Reformed churches, who send their children to Afrikaner schools and universities. While members can admit their own affiliation, they cannot reveal the identity of others. There are masonic overtones: special handshakes, secret words and signs for recognition. There is a chairman, an executive committee (*Uitvoerende*), a junior wing (*Ruiterwag*), and a central exchequer (the Christiaan de Wet Fund) which has over \$1,000,000 in its coffers, and finances special activities. Prominent Afrikaners in all walks of life, including cabinet ministers and other leading politicians, belong to the Broederbond.

Some of the secrecy that formerly cloaked the organization was dissipated by a revelatory series of articles in the South African press in 1973 and 1974.⁴ However, its role of surveillance over Afrikaner morality and coordination of Afrikaner interests remains unimpaired. It also reflects the policy and personality struggles that periodically trouble Afrikanerdom. In 1969, when Albert Hertzog led his fol-

⁴ By Hennie Serfontein, political correspondent of the Johannesburg *Sunday Times*.

lowers into the wilderness to form the right-wing Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), Mr. Vorster himself conducted a purge and ejected them from the Band of Brothers. Another conflict occurred in 1974 when the then-chairman of the Broederbond, Dr. Andries Treurnicht, a conservative, was replaced by Professor Gerrit Viljoen, a moderate, again through the active intervention of the Prime Minister.

The power of the Broederbond is now widely thought to be less than it was; its high point was reached in the 1920s and 1930s when Afrikaner nationalist fervor was at its peak. But it would be wrong to relegate it, as some observers have, to the category of an "Afrikaner employment agency," a kind of British public school "old boy network" or American Eastern establishment—with the inference of declining or peripheral power. No major policy issue escapes its scrutiny; some originate from within its ranks. In 1971, the Broederbond worked out a secret policy for sport in South Africa, anticipating with remarkable accuracy the pressures that would be brought to bear against the government from abroad.⁵ Two other controversial issues, the future of the Coloureds and racial discrimination ("petty apartheid"), are constantly being chewed over by the Brothers, usually with inconclusive results.

The only area that receives less than microscopic attention is foreign diplomacy, which Mr. Vorster has, in recent years, made his own preserve. But even here, the Broederbond has sensitive antennae—especially in Rhodesia where there are 30,000 Afrikaners, many of them farmers in the embattled eastern frontier zone; and in Namibia which has a similar number of the *volk* scattered throughout that huge sparsely populated country. There is a network of cells in each place. In Rhodesia there is a special section called the GRA (*Genoodschap van Rhodesiese Afrikaners*) which contains five divisions and includes several important members of the ruling Rhodesian Front and at least one cabinet minister. The organization provides a convenient channel for all the supporters of right-wing orthodoxy, including some sympathizers of the HNP who escaped the purges in 1969 and 1970.

But although Rhodesia's future has caused some soul searching it has also demonstrated an interesting educative function of the organization. In February 1975, a major policy paper on the government's Rhodesian strategy was circulated by General Hendrik van den Bergh, the head of the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) and the co-architect of the détente policy with Mr. Vorster. The paper

⁵ John Seiler, "South African Response to External Pressures," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, September 1975, p. 458.

made it clear in uncompromising terms that South Africa had no alternative but to modify its traditional attitude toward Rhodesia and work with black Africa for a negotiated settlement. This followed an embarrassing visit to Salisbury by the Prime Minister's brother, then moderator of one of the Dutch Reformed churches and a man of conservative views, in which he had publicly declared that the whites in South Africa had no intention of abandoning Rhodesia. "We either win together or we hang separately," he said.

V

The institution with the greatest power, the National Party, is also in the doldrums, immobilized by the contrary and fitful breezes that spring from its *verligte* and *verkrampste* horizons. It is important to place this division strictly in the context of Afrikanerdom's self-interest. *Verligte* (enlightened) does not mean unadorned liberalism any more than *verkrampste* (narrow) signifies straightforward reaction, for the first implies openness within carefully defined limits and the second contains a streak of right-wing radicalism. The bone of contention between the two is not the shape of South Africa's future but the manner in which it is achieved and the pace at which it should proceed. The strategy is separate development, the creation of a series of independent black homelands to which all the blacks in the urban areas will belong. Many analysts, including some Afrikaners themselves, shrug off the *verligte-verkrampste* struggle as a charade, a tango where one partner first leads and then follows but the steps remain the same. However, it has produced an ideological fissure in Afrikanerdom which has recently shown signs of acquiring new dimensions.

The *verligte* vanguard is to be found in the Afrikaans press, the universities, the think tanks, and the quasi-government research institutes. There is a great rustle of activity: seminars, writing, talking, planning. The *verligte* intellectuals see themselves as loyal Afrikaner nationalists with a pragmatic bent, as ethnic fair-dealers, and as humanists who reject racial discrimination and domination. Their historical view is that the era of crude white *baaskap* (racial despotism) of the 1950s Nationalist leaders Daniel Malan and J. G. Strijdom gave way to the ideological apartheid of Dr. Verwoerd in the 1960s, and then softened into Mr. Vorster's separate development in the 1970s: eventually this will in turn lead to separate but equal freedom in the 1980s. Power-sharing and any form of political integration is as abhorred by them as it is by the *verkrampstes*. Majority rule is out. But separate development, they stress, must be an innovative,

dramatic policy imbued with a pioneering spirit and conducted with self-sacrifice.

They talk of a two-year breathing space while Rhodesia and Namibia attract the limelight. During that time, the government must seize the initiative and build up the tribal homelands, or Bantustans, which will eventually become independent black states; move decisively to eradicate racial discrimination; give the urban blacks a better economic and social deal; find a solution for the Coloureds who have no homeland; and launch a genuine dialogue with the non-white groups. The longer term is less precise. They envisage a patchwork of black and white states linked by federal or confederal structures in which the urban blacks—the biggest problem—will have a significant measure of self-government and perhaps even become small city-states linked at one level with their homeland governments and at another with the white cities from which they can never be wholly detached.

Verligtheid, as one Afrikaner analyst, F. van Zyl Slabbert, has pointed out, is not a movement. It is a collection of individuals with similar ideas on the future of South Africa, although the degree of their enlightenment often varies from issue to issue, e.g., a Cape Nationalist may be *verlig* on the Coloureds but not at all *verlig* on the problems of the urban blacks. Also the thrust of *verligtheid* within Afrikanerdom is not against the political primacy of the Afrikaner but against those who look backwards to cultural purity and ethnic chauvinism. It has little real muscle and has to rely on the intellectual caliber of its adherents and the influence they can exert in high places. Its strongest platform is the Afrikaans press where the current campaign for reform is being led by the respected editor of *Die Transvaaler*, Willem de Klerk, the man who coined the terms *verligte* and *verkrampte* in the mid-1960s. Public support has come from inside the cabinet (Piet Koornhof, Minister of Sport), the Afrikaner-run South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA), from a handful of white trades unionists and, more recently, from the chairman of the Broederbond, Gerrit Viljoen.

The *verkrampte* view is that change has gone far enough for the time being and that change in itself can be the thin end of the wedge: a social or economic concession to the blacks today will lead to a political one tomorrow. Separate development is fine but it must proceed cautiously; racial discrimination can be eased but only in areas where the process will not cause "friction"; and the cultural exclusivity of Afrikanerdom must be preserved at all costs. Regardless of what happens outside South Africa, the government must maintain

firm control of the nature and the pace of change. The forces of *verkramptheid* are large and powerful. They number several seasoned generals: Connie Mulder, Minister of Information and Transvaal party leader; P. W. Botha, Minister of Defense; and M. C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. There is a solid cadre of officers and NCOs in the ranks of the civil service and police, and a broad phalanx of foot-soldiers among the blue-collar workers in the cities and the farmers on the dusty *platteland*.

There is also a high priest, Dr. Andries Treurnicht, a former Dutch Reformed pastor and now a deputy minister. He recently published a book called *Credo of an Afrikaner* setting out the orthodox conservative view of Afrikaner nationalism with its stress on Christian values and ethnic exclusivity. His inclusion in the government last year was something of a shock since he replaced a popular *verligte* in the important Ministry of Bantu Administration. Conventional wisdom has it that Mr. Vorster was boxing him in although it is agreed that this tactic can sometimes boomerang. *Die Burger*, the Cape Nationalist paper, refused to review his book—not so much for what he said but for his assumed motive in saying it, that is, playing up to the right-wing gallery. Few Afrikaners would deny, however, that Dr. Treurnicht articulates a deep and legitimate stream of feeling within Afrikanerdom and that he can muster formidable stopping power against any policies that run counter to the *verkramptes*' concept of their own self-interest.

VI

The National Party is not an island. The men who run it and strive to maintain its cohesion have to look constantly to its flanks. On the Left the forces are more numerous than those on the other end of the spectrum, but most of their menace has been diminished by a combination of tactics: strong government for the English; delay on the Coloureds and Indians; inducements for the Bantustan leaders; and repression for black opponents and their handful of white supporters, many of whom, interestingly, are Afrikaners. Dr. Beyers Naude, director of the Christian Institute, a courageous and outspoken man, is a good example of the truly radical Afrikaner. He predicts majority rule will come within a decade and the sooner the whites accommodate themselves to the idea the better it will be for all the people of South Africa.

To the Right, the threat is miniscule in numerical terms, yet it is capable of provoking a deep neurosis in the leadership because its appeal strikes straight at the breast of the *verkramptes* and because

it comes from within the ranks of Afrikanerdom itself. Albert Hertzog, Jaap Marais, and others in the HNP are regarded by many Afrikaners as a lunatic fringe, yet they undoubtedly exert an influence out of all proportion to their numbers. The party made no impact in the 1970 election, was almost annihilated four years later, and still has no seat in parliament. However, it has been increasing its vote in by-elections since 1974 and remains vocal and active.

Its message is twofold, historical and emotional. It points out that separate development has loosened up society and given black critics, like the Bantustan leaders, platforms they never had before; it is time to tighten the circle of ox-wagons, and the HNP with its crusading brand of ethnic nationalism is the party to do it. Albert Hertzog says, with logic, that if the government's policy is truly based on ethnicity, then the English, as well as the Coloureds and the Indians, should be given their own homelands. If not, then the blacks should be entitled to a *single* united Bantustan. The HNP also has considerable nuisance value, especially over issues such as the future of the whites in Rhodesia and Namibia. The line that it was criminal of the government to send South African boys to be killed fighting for Africans in distant Angola and not be allowed to defend their white kith and kin in neighboring Rhodesia is heady stuff on the stump. It is a theme that will grow louder as the situation deteriorates in Rhodesia and will find an echo in the hearts of many *verkrampte* Nationalists.

Presiding over these conflicting forces is the solid figure of Mr. John Vorster. The levers of Afrikaner power are firmly in his hands and behind him on the bridge stand a few trusted lieutenants. Understanding the process of decision-making in South Africa has been compared to Kremlinology. It is indeed a mysterious business in which the government often seems to move one step forward and then two back, in which ideology plays leapfrog with practical politics, and in which the self-interest of Afrikanerdom is the deciding but not always the most visible factor. The Prime Minister, now 60 years old, has spent a life steeped in politics. He is one of the generation of Afrikaner politicians who vividly remembers the days when the *volk* was divided, when the English were still the enemy. Black power is now the antagonist and Mr. Vorster knows a lot about that since he made his name as Dr. Verwoerd's law-and-order man at the Ministry of Justice in the early 1960s. But he can never forget that he was at the helm when Afrikanerdom split in 1969 and that his hold on the right wing of his people will only be secure as long as he can satisfy their conservative instincts and aspirations.

"What the HNP says in public a third of the Nationalists think in

private," an Afrikaner political correspondent told me recently in South Africa, and most people I bounced it off on agreed that it represented a fair assessment. Fear of the Right is a constant in white politics in Southern Africa—and with good reason. In Rhodesia, the movement of power to the right has become an iron law. Dr. Hertzog and HNP leaders point to precedents in Afrikaner history for successful assaults on the citadel from the same direction and say they are prepared to wait: historical inevitability is on their side.

Mr. Vorster himself entered Nationalist politics from the Right and he knows only too well that the ammunition for such an attack is piling up: concessions linked to black violence, albeit minimal, such as scrapping Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black schools or providing electricity to Soweto residents after the June riots; unresolved conflict with Pretoria's favorite homelands' son, Chief Kaiser Matanzima, over the citizenship issue—and perhaps a delay in the Transkei's independence scheduled for October 26; the Coloureds' stubborn refusal to accept the government's halfway house for them; and, most dangerous of all, Mr. Vorster's understandable reluctance to become physically involved in Rhodesia. In an interview earlier this year he asked himself the rhetorical question, "What would I do if a hundred Afrikaners were killed in a week in Rhodesia?" He did not—or could not—provide an answer.

VII

Where does Mr. Vorster himself stand in Afrikanerdom? He seems to have two basic positions. In foreign affairs he is with the *verligtes*, a supreme realist ready to take risks and meet the changing world face-to-face. His détente policy in Africa, his rationale for the Angolan intervention (fighting for his African allies in order to achieve an *African* solution, an Angolan government of national unity), the stern advice to Ian Smith to get on with majority rule, the new flexibility on Namibia in which he has accepted that the detested South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) could have a role—all these developments attest to Mr. Vorster's adaptability and all have been opposed at varying levels of intensity by the right-wingers.

In domestic affairs, however, his stance is enigmatic and hard to define. He is not *verkrampste* but neither is he *verligte*. On internal change he moves slowly, elliptically, with great caution. He endorsed the famous statement by his Ambassador at the United Nations in 1974—South Africa does not condone discrimination on the basis of color—but he would also agree with Connie Mulder who said on the removal of discrimination, "You can't have a blueprint, you've got to

play it by ear." South African domestic policy sometimes appears to evolve by a process of osmosis rather in the manner in which Tory party leaders used to be chosen in Britain: something finally emerges. Apartheid ideologues will be satisfied with the framing of a law, and separate development pragmatists will be content with its less than rigorous implementation. Playing both ends off against the middle is a minor South African art form; thus the inevitable can be satisfactorily disguised, as in the steady erosion of job reservation and the upward mobility of black labor.

The key to Mr. Vorster is that he is an authoritarian who believes first and foremost in control and then in applying the power at his hand in subtle shifts this way and that according to the balance of pressures. He represents a return to a more traditional kind of Afrikaner leader after the sternly ideological Dr. Verwoerd.⁶ If one had to tie a label on him in this context, I would favor the tag recently used to describe the present chairman of the Broederbond: "a pragmatic conservative." Mr. Vorster strives for consensus but it is a cautious business and if there is strong disagreement or risk of division he will shelve the issue or employ delaying tactics. This preserves a balance in the cabinet between men who represent the various political and ideological differences within Afrikanerdom: Piet Koornhof, the *verligte*; Connie Mulder, the hard-headed Transvaal party chief; P. W. Botha, the Defense "hawk"; and M. C. Botha of Bantu Affairs, Dr. Verwoerd's loyal disciple. But the style also appeals to the Prime Minister's own character and to those close to him, such as General Van den Bergh of BOSS, Professor Viljoen, the Broederbond chairman, and Dr. Muller, the durable Foreign Minister.

But where is he going? The short answer is nowhere very fast and in the meantime his government is accumulating more power. Recent legislation illustrates the steady flow of power to the Executive. The Defense Act, obliging South African soldiers to fight anywhere in the world; the Parliamentary Internal Security Commission (PISCOM), a McCarthyite body set up to investigate suspect individuals and organizations; the Separate Amenities Act which takes certain powers away from municipal authorities and gives them to the government; the Squatters Act ordering landlords and local authorities to demolish squatters' homes and removing the occupant's right to appeal to the courts; and the "SS" Bill⁷ which increases the

⁶ Verwoerd was not technically an Afrikaner at all since he was born in Holland.

⁷ Because of the sinister connotations of its initials, the title of this measure was changed from Promotion of State Security Act to Promotion of *Internal* Security Act. The South African government is often infelicitous in its choice of titles which abbreviate badly, e.g., BOSS, BAD (Bantu Administration and Development), PISCOM, etc.

already draconian powers of the government in the field of individual liberties.

Linked with the centralization of power is Mr. Vorster's determination to maintain Afrikaner unity. His oft-quoted saying that a responsible leader should never move out of sight or earshot of his people is not mere rhetoric. Afrikanerdom is not—and never was—a natural monolith. The mortar that binds it together is the National Party's hold on political power and the strength of its institutions, which reinforce each other. So far the fear of losing political control and the many advantages it brings has kept the centrifugal tendencies within Afrikanerdom in check. Despite the appeal of Dr. Hertzog and the HNP, the serried ranks of *verkramptheid*—the farmers, the white urban workers, the cultural organizations and the churches—have no cause to be discontented with Mr. Vorster's government at the moment. In addition, many of the divisive issues (rivalry between Cape and Transvaal Provinces, trades unionist versus *platteland* farmer, Bantu Department ideologue against *verligte* intellectual) often cut across each other and make a clear rift less likely. If, however, one issue became dominant and swamped all the others, then the party and the institutions could be threatened. This is something Mr. Vorster will be at pains to avoid.

In a few areas he has pushed cautiously forward. A considerable amount of money and effort is being put into the Bantustans, though not as much as the *verligtes* would like. He responded quickly and positively to the challenge presented by the Portuguese collapse in Africa. He has gone some way to ease discrimination. Helen Suzman of the Progressive-Reform Party accurately summed up what these moves meant: "to the outside world—nothing at all; to the blacks in South Africa—very little; to the whites—a hell of a lot!"⁸ He has not, so far, responded to calls for a systematic plan to end racial discrimination. A cabinet committee has been sitting for two years overseeing the problem but its work or views are not published. The Prime Minister has never made a comprehensive statement on racial policy.

In this glacially slow and uncertain process, optimists point to two possible sources of hope for positive change: in the rising, affluent and urbanized Afrikaner middle class which is drifting away from the churches and cultural institutions and is not interested in the sacred symbols of Afrikanerdom; and in the energetic *verligtes* and their campaign for reform. There are probably other factors, as yet unquan-

⁸ In an interview with me in Cape Town in April 1976. Two things struck me at once on returning to South Africa after an absence of a decade: Africans were treated more politely by the whites, and the economic gulf between them was wider than ever.

tifiable, like the effect of television, some changes in education (young Afrikaners are now taught to respect the "Bantu" and his ethnic identity), increasing possibilities of travel abroad, a growing sexual permissiveness, and the infiltration of international fashion and life-styles helped by the astonishing affluence which South African whites now enjoy.

But the power of these factors is limited, and the weight of the *verligte* is behind decent social and economic reform, not radical political change. Moreover, they are reluctant to look beyond the immediate future. Ask a *verligte* for his views in general and he'll give them freely. Ask him for his blueprint and he'll smile and say it's too early. If the plan were put on the table now, the *verkramptes* would pounce on its most vulnerable parts and thus put paid to the whole. Federalism, the logical conclusion of the Bantustan policy and a favorite theme in *verligte* projections, is a touchy subject with the government because it has long been a plank of the opposition United Party's constitutional platform.

VIII

For the longer view the government invariably refers the inquirer to the "unfolding of the plan," meaning the steady evolution of the homelands policy. The assumption is that it is like a huge spool of tape, with no breaks or surprises, and racial harmony at the other end. The strategy may be modified from time to time and the speed at which it is implemented may vary. But nothing will alter its main thrust because it is the only policy that the Afrikaners fundamentally agree on.

There are many imponderables for the government. They include the criticism leveled by the untouchable Bantustan leaders, of whom Chief Gatsha Buthelezi is the most feared, the hydra-headed young black organizations such as the South African Student Organization (SASO) and the Black People's Convention (BPC), the awkward Coloured leaders, the remorseless way in which more, not fewer, Africans are being sucked into the white areas, and, perhaps most important of all, the growing politicization of those people as they live and work cheek-by-jowl with the whites.

The Soweto riots in June and the mass protests which have followed showed that black frustration can erupt on a massive scale and new disturbances, better organized and more politically overt, have taken place since. The impetus came from the students but their feelings mirrored many of the grievances of their parents, the underprivileged labor force that keeps South Africa going. Some black

areas were not seriously affected; many workers continued working; elements of criminality, anarchy and personal feuding were undoubtedly present. Nevertheless there was no mistaking the political overtones of the riots. Young urban blacks, in contrast to their parents who have bowed before the power of the Afrikaner state, decided to strike a blow for their own cause. They have not accepted apartheid. In the townships their targets were government buildings—offices, schools, clinics, liquor stores—while in the rural areas the black “separately developed” universities erupted and the legislative assembly in Bophutatswana, the only homeland apart from Transkei to opt for independence, was burned down. They had been aroused by the exploits of FRELIMO in Mozambique, the MPLA in Angola and, more recently, the expanding guerrilla war in Rhodesia; they have no memory of Sharpeville and the repression that followed. The effect of the violence on the whites has been to strengthen the undercurrent of unease set in motion by the Angolan intervention, a trend exacerbated by the worst economic recession since the 1930s. The government has talked of a “new deal” for the black townships and may continue to make small administrative and economic concessions but that will probably be the limit. What it really fears—a combination of internal revolt and external attack—is not yet in sight.

Meanwhile, the process of polarization in white politics which was already under way—the Left and Right hardening and the majority of Afrikaners and English drawing together in the Center—will continue. A backlash will be resisted by the government but the *verkrampptes* will be in no mood to make more than marginal concessions to the blacks. As Rhodesia has shown, a powerful ruling minority does not voluntarily move in the direction of sharing either economic privileges or political control. Afrikaner philosophy is somewhat different in that it has made a commitment to performing a unique act of self-surgery by slicing off small portions of its own flesh. But John Vorster is subject to the same pressures that work on Ian Smith, those that arise from a fearful, cossetted, myopic and widely prejudiced electorate.

As long as Mr. Vorster is Prime Minister one can expect more *verligtheid* abroad and more conservative pragmatism at home. White Rhodesia is at last beginning to see how insecure and isolated it has become. White, particularly Afrikaner, South Africa still feels enormously strong and relatively secure. The country is, nevertheless, passing through difficult times. The current recession is expected to continue until at least mid-1977; the price of gold, a commodity which accounts for roughly 40 percent of South Africa's foreign exchange,

has plummeted; and while there has been no flight of capital as there was after the Sharpeville shootings in 1960, medium- and long-term investment on which the country depends for growth is slowing down. The result is economic and fiscal retrenchment. There will be less money than ever to remedy the social grievances of the blacks. Defense spending, up 40 percent this year, will have top priority and will probably increase. Unemployment among Africans has been growing rapidly and is expected to rise to about two million at the end of this year.⁹ The whites will also feel the pinch, making them less responsive to pressures for change, especially those that entail economic sacrifice.

None of these difficulties will deflect the government from the path of separate development. However, in order to implement it the leader of the *volk* may need still more power. A change in the constitution, with an executive presidency replacing the present Westminster model, is not ruled out at some future date. Under the present system members of the government must also be members of parliament. An American-style constitution—with, presumably, Mr. Vorster as president—would enable the government to invite leaders of non-white groups, especially the Coloureds, to join the cabinet and yet still deprive them of representation in the all-white political process. Some people in South Africa, looking even further ahead, talk of the inevitability of an Afrikaner dictatorship, ideally an enlightened one, in order to overcome white conservatism on the Right and black radicalism on the Left. There is a strong attachment to the British parliamentary institutions and South Africa cherishes what it regards as a democratic system of government, but part of the Afrikaners' pragmatism consists of being able to devise radical solutions to meet radical situations. The steady erosion of the rule of law during the 1960s shows how single-minded and ruthless the Afrikaner state can be when threatened. Indeed, if a one-party state with an irremovable president at its head were introduced it would be a more accurate expression of the South African polity than the present system, since the majority of the population already have no say in their own government.

To those who assert that it is not too late to scrap separate development and switch tracks to majority rule, Afrikanerdom turns a granite face. To those who say it won't work anyway the Nationalists say it will, it must, there is no other way. Today, many Afrikaners feel smug about Rhodesian white supremacists who compared their own racial policies favorably to apartheid. Mr. Smith is now about to reap the logic of his integrated political system—majority rule. Sep-

⁹ Black unemployment is currently running at 20 percent, compared to .2 percent for whites.


arate development also has a logical conclusion which many Afrikaners shy away from. That, of course, is partition, which implies a reasonably equitable division of the land and wealth of the country. "We've seen plenty of the separation," says Chief Buthelezi, "but what about the equality and the freedom?"

If Afrikaners are sincere about their belief in ethnicity and a fair deal for all the peoples of South Africa then they must demonstrate their sincerity by showing the world more of that tantalizing spool of tape. How much land and resources will be allotted to the Africans? (Current consolidation plans do not materially alter the grossly inequitable 13 percent.) Are the Coloureds and Indians to remain in limbo? What about the eight million urban blacks who demonstrably do not want either to go "back" to the homelands or to express themselves politically there? Separate-but-equal freedoms suggest dialogue, discussion, trade-offs, compromise. Chief Kaiser Matanzima of the Transkei undoubtedly represents a black constituency. But what about Nelson Mandela in prison on Robben Island, Robert Sobukwe restricted to Kimberley, and the new generation of militants in the townships? Mr. Vorster helped secure the release of nationalists in Rhodesia so that they could discuss a common future with Mr. Smith. Does he not believe that the men he holds behind bars and the leaders in the cities and the homelands—the old and the new nationalists of black South Africa—have a legitimate role to play in the destiny of their country?

The Afrikaners can no longer trek; there is nowhere to trek to. They have to dominate, deal, or die. So far they have chosen the first course. Although many South Africans—Afrikaners, English, Coloureds and Africans—are now urging the government to pursue the second, Afrikanerdom does not yet feel sufficiently threatened. If and when it is, the people who lead may react in a surprisingly sensible and practical way, as their forebears did in similar circumstances, jettisoning dogma and working for compromise. But that time has not yet come.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE

By Gordon A. Craig



IN November 1782, during the peace negotiations with Great Britain, John Adams talked with one of the British commissioners about the future relationship of the American republic with the European political system. In his diary he reproduced the exchange.

"You are afraid," says Mr. Otis today, "of being made the tool of the powers of Europe." "Indeed I am," says I. "What powers?" said he. "All of them," said I. "It is obvious that all the powers of Europe will be continually maneuvering with us, to

work us into their real or imaginary balances of power. They will all wish to make of us a make-weight candle, when they are weighing out their pounds. Indeed, it is not surprising, for we shall very often, if not always, be able to turn the scale. But I think it ought to be our rule not to meddle. . . ."

Adams was expressing what, in the course of the next 150 years, was to become an article of faith with many Americans, the belief that, having won its freedom from the old world, the American republic should have as little contact with it as possible. What other course was feasible, given the nature of the European system of politics? Regarded from this side of the Atlantic, it appeared to be animated by the whims of princes and the intrigues of diplomats and characterized by continual friction between its members, by an endless search for an equilibrium that was in reality neither attainable nor desired, and, intermittently, by wasting and destructive wars. It represented a perpetual menace to American liberties because its members were constantly seeking to involve the republic in their tangled affairs, and because American statesmen were not always as deaf as they should be to their seductions. Safety, therefore, lay in complete abstention from political contact with Europe.

This conclusion, formulated more drastically in 1793 by John Quincy Adams when he wrote that, in the face of the European struggle for power, it was the duty of Americans "to remain the peaceable and silent, though sorrowful, spectators of the sanguinary scene," inspired the isolationism that came to be considered by many to be the traditional foreign policy of the United States. Yet from the very beginning of the republic's history, the belief that the American posture should be one of rigorous aloofness from European affairs was challenged by two contrary views. The first held that it was patently impossible for the United States to remain indifferent to the convolutions of European power politics without running intolerable risks to its security and that, therefore, the proper line for American statesmen to follow was one of defensive accommodation to the balance of power, adjusting their policy to its nature at any particular moment, and exploiting the opportunities that it offered for the promotion of American interests. The second

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held that it was ideologically undesirable for the United States to impose self-denying ordinances upon itself, since occasions were bound to arise on which it was its duty to intervene in European affairs; that it must recognize its natural affinity with other peoples struggling to be free and must be willing to support them; that it must understand that there was, indeed, a balance of ideas in the world as well as a balance of power, and that it was only by tipping the former in the direction of liberty that humanity could be freed from the evils of the latter.

II

Although their public declarations sometimes suggested the opposite, Franklin, Hamilton, Washington, and Jefferson all realized that balance-of-power politics was a game that American statesmen would have to learn to play. As a country that had to dispose of its growing agricultural surpluses in order to be able to purchase the manufactured goods it needed, the United States was dependent upon the trading agreements that it could negotiate with mercantilist states that used such agreements as political weapons. In addition, as long as Great Britain, France and Spain retained possessions in North America, it was impossible for the republic's leaders to ignore with impunity the shifting relations among those states. Despite his aversion to what he called "romantick European Continental Connections" and "whims about the balance of power," Benjamin Franklin realized that his country was caught up in the contention of the powers whether it liked it or not. Because he recognized that the United States was vulnerable to attack as long as the British government maintained armed forts along its northern and western frontiers, Franklin became the advocate of a continuation of the wartime alliance with France, and his government followed his advice.

Later on, when the government of the French Republic took advantage of its position as an ally to enlist American citizens for service in its wars and to make propaganda against the U.S. government's policy of neutrality, Hamilton and Washington effected the termination of the French connection, but not because they opposed alliances in principle or believed that the European policy of their country should be a purely negative one. Hamilton, whose instincts were akin to those of the shrewdest Realpolitiker of his time, was perfectly willing to make arrangements with European governments as long as they promised to bring tangible advantages to his country; he objected, however, to the basing of foreign policy upon sentimental affinity or gratitude or any other emotion that would, in his words, involve "sacrifices of our substantial interests, preferences inconsistent with sound policy, or complaisances incompatible with our safety."

As for Washington, in the great political testament of 1796 in which he warned his countrymen against "interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe" and "entangl[ing] our peace and prosperity in the toils of European Ambition, Rivalship, Interest, Humour, or Caprice," he never for a moment recommended that the United States relinquish the freedom of choice that an independent state necessarily possesses in its foreign-political decisions or suggested that it forswear the use of any diplomatic expedients that might serve to support its policies or defend its interests. He declared that "the Great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations" should be "in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible," and he added that, while the United States was building up the material strength that would reduce its present vulnerability to external pressure, "it would be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by

artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of [Europe's] politics." But he also spoke explicitly of the possible necessity of "temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies."

Thomas Jefferson's two terms as President were filled with such emergencies, and he responded to them positively, realistically, and with considerable diplomatic adroitness, having no compunction about resorting to methods that he had reprobated, at other times, when they were employed by old-world statesmen. Indeed, he became a highly sophisticated practitioner of the politics of menace and maneuver and bluff, shrewd in his anticipation of the intrusion of imponderable factors in developing situations and in his judgment of their effects, and quick to seize upon opportunities for advancing American interests by intimations of support or opposition to the embattled powers. The great triumph of his first term, the acquisition of Louisiana, was doubtless due in some part to Napoleon's frustrations in San Domingo and to the distractions caused by the renewal of the war in Europe, but Louisiana could not have been won if Jefferson had not made the most of those circumstances, if he had not been ingenious in playing the powers off against each other, and if he had not, in the end, made it clear to Napoleon's Ministers that any French attempt to take possession at New Orleans would force the United States "to marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation."

During Jefferson's second term, the European balance offered no opportunities for American manipulation in the national interest. After Austerlitz and Trafalgar, politics were polarized in such a way as to deprive the President of any leverage in the European conflict; there was nothing that he could do for either party, short of joining it in the war, that could induce it to support American interests, and no threat that he could make that would be plausible enough to discourage it from violating American rights. In his vain struggle to protect American shipping against British interference and American crews against British impressment, Jefferson was daily confronted with palpable and distressing evidence of how seriously his country could be injured by shifts in the European equilibrium; and, if he was not goaded into declaring war upon the principal violator of American neutral rights, it was certainly in part at least because he realized that the balance of power was capable of undergoing changes that would be even more dangerous to the United States than the polarization of the years after 1805.

The President's ill-starred embargo policy was rooted, on the one hand, in a realistic appraisal of the disparity of force between Great Britain and the United States and, on the other, in the idealistic conviction that the violations were not enough to justify so serious a response as war; but he may have been influenced by an additional consideration: the suspicion that the French Empire was potentially a greater threat to American liberties than Great Britain and that, despite their present differences, Britain and the United States were tacit partners against the possibility of a domination of the Western world by Napoleon. In 1803, in a letter to an English acquaintance, Jefferson had spoken of Great Britain as "a bulwark against the torrent which has for some time been bearing down all before it," and the thought of what the destruction of that wall might mean to the United States was recurrent as the French Emperor went from triumph to triumph. Even after the United States had, through a series of mischances, drifted into war with Great Britain, the former President could write, "Surely none of us wish to see Bonaparte conquer Russia and lay thus at his feet the whole continent of Europe. This done, England would be but a breakfast. . . . No. It cannot be to our interest

that all Europe be reduced to a single monarchy.”

The United States was spared the necessity of confronting such a situation. Napoleon was defeated, and the Congress of Vienna redrew the map of Europe in such a way as to provide a reasonable equilibrium of force among the major powers. For most of the century that followed, the European balance assumed the desirable form that Jefferson had defined in 1812, when he wrote, “We especially ought to pray that the powers of Europe may be so poised and counterpoised among themselves that their own safety may require the presence of all their force at home, leaving the other quarters of the globe in undisturbed tranquillity.” The energies of the European governments were absorbed so completely in protecting the Vienna settlement against the threats posed by nationalism and industrialism that the United States had no reason to fear external interference as it went about the job of overcoming its internal divisions, extending its dominion to the shores of California, developing the economic potential of the united land mass, and laying the basis for its emergence at the end of the century as a power of the first rank. It was doubtless frustrating for politicians like Monroe and Calhoun, who longed to demonstrate that they could exploit the differences among European governments as effectively as Jefferson had done during his first term, to discover that this was no longer necessary and that policy could now, in fact, be made by proclamation; but most American leaders accommodated themselves easily enough to the advantages of being able, as Henry Clay said, “to pursue a course exclusively American, uninfluenced by the policy of My Lord Castlereagh, Count Nesselrode, or any other of the great men of Europe.” So did the American people, who came, as the years passed, to regard this freedom as a natural state of affairs and one that would continue indefinitely.

By the end of the century, however, after the complicated but flexible Bismarckian version of the balance of power had begun to transform itself into what became the fragile bipolar balance between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, there were ominous indications that this was a fallacy. American writers like Brooks Adams and Alfred Thayer Mahan responded to the new European conditions by seeking to awaken their countrymen to an awareness that their position had changed too, that it was unreasonable to talk about American isolation while the nation had economic interests in every part of the globe or to pretend to indifference to foreign developments when instability abroad would have immediate repercussions on the American economy. In his essay *America's Economic Supremacy*, Adams described Germany and Russia as destabilizing factors in the European system, on the one hand, and the Far East on the other, and he intimated that it might become America's responsibility to preserve or restore the equilibrium of those areas. Among those who had the ear of President Theodore Roosevelt, it became doctrine that a policy of active intervention to preserve existing structures was in the American interest, and Henry Cabot Lodge was forever urging the President to use his authority to extricate the other powers from the messes they became involved in.

Roosevelt did not need much persuading. As early as 1897 he had repudiated isolationism as an outmoded idea, and in the first years of the new century his intervention in the ugly Moroccan dispute and his mediation in the Russo-Japanese War were experiments with a new activism designed to strengthen the equilibrium of forces. These interventions, neither of which was entirely happy in its results, were marked by a brash self-confidence that irritated the sensibilities of those old-

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world diplomats who did not, like Sir Arthur Nicholson at Algeciras, find it faintly comic, and by flashes of arrogance that ill-suited a nation that had for so long stood apart from the mainstream of politics. It is difficult to decide whether the presumption or the naïveté is the more pronounced in Lodge's letter of August 21, 1905, to the President: "Japan has got all we wanted her to get and all that she really needs, and it is not our interest or that of the world generally to have Russia too completely crippled."

In the decade that followed, the mere extension of American good offices in attempts to shore up deteriorating situations no longer seemed sufficient to these self-styled realists. The former diplomat Lewis Einstein, who pointed out in a series of articles that the European balance had for almost a century protected the United States and enabled it to avoid the burden of military expenditures, wrote in 1909 that its preservation might well require more positive commitments. It was high time, he wrote, that the lie be given to "the reverence with which we regard a misinterpreted tradition. Alliances can be entangling only when they are disadvantageous. To guard against their becoming so is the duty of a wise statesmanship." Four years later, impressed by the thought that German power was threatening to subvert the balance, Einstein was wondering whether it might not be necessary for the United States to extend the protection of the Monroe Doctrine to Great Britain.

Theodore Roosevelt carried this thinking a step further. As Europe came closer to war, the former President had a conversation with the German diplomat Baron von Eckhardstein, in which Roosevelt, rather indirectly, warned against a German policy that might weaken or destroy Great Britain's role of "keeping the balance of power in Europe." If Britain were no longer able to fulfill that function, he said, "the United States would be obliged to step in, at least temporarily, to reestablish the balance . . . never mind against which country or group of countries our efforts may have to be directed. In fact, we are becoming, owing to our strength and geographical situation, more and more the balance of the whole globe."

III

In addition to those political leaders and writers who were intent upon adjusting American foreign policy to shifts in the European balance of power and to the opportunities and problems that they posed for American interests, there were others whose minds dwelt more on the balance of ideas than on the mere equilibrium of physical force. To these intellectual descendants of the eighteenth-century *philosophes* and the militant radicalism of Thomas Paine, what was usually called the balance of power was merely the physical manifestation of absolutism and militarism, political reaction and religious obscurantism, the Holy Alliance and the Carlsbad Decrees, the Prussian corporal's cane and the Russian knout, and everything else that was inimical to freedom and individual rights.

In their view, it was the duty of the American republic, which had been conceived in liberty and dedicated to its maintenance, to support revolutions against this ideological system whenever and wherever they occurred, and in the first half of the nineteenth century there were frequent demands that the government come to the aid of national and liberal movements in other lands. The Monroe Doctrine was popular because it seemed to strike a blow for freedom not only in Latin America but in Europe as well, and the Greek revolution of the same period was hailed as a defeat for absolutism and the pretensions of the Holy Alliance. When

the news from the Peloponnesus reached the United States, the highly respected *North American Review* demanded that the government give formal recognition to the revolutionary regime, and innumerable public meetings called for moral, financial, and even military assistance for the rebels. The United States Ambassador in France, Albert Gallatin, went so far as to propose that two or three frigates be sent to the Aegean in order to help destroy the Turkish fleet, and such leading members of Congress as Daniel Webster and Henry Clay wanted an open declaration of sympathy with the Greek cause and the sending of a commissioner to Athens.

Similarly, the year 1830 saw excited demonstrations of support for the July revolution in several American cities, and in Washington President Jackson and members of the Cabinet had no hesitation about appearing at them. The pattern was repeated in 1848, when the tide of revolution swept over Central Europe. The American government not only recognized the Frankfurt Assembly and appointed a minister to this provisional government but also dispatched an envoy to make contact with the revolutionary forces in Hungary. The suppression of the Hungarian revolution by Russian troops caused a storm of indignation in the United States that was more passionate and of longer duration than that caused by the repetition of those tragic events a hundred years later.

The bloodletting in Hungary appeared to threaten Europe with a return to the reactionary days of the Holy Alliance, and many Americans seemed to feel that their country should be prepared to intervene in the looming ideological struggle. In October 1851, at a banquet in London in honor of the Hungarian leader Kossuth, the former U. S. Secretary of the Treasury Robert T. Walker said that, if despotism should spread over the whole of the continent and if England were drawn into the struggle against it, the United States would take part "in the last great battle for freedom." And during Kossuth's subsequent trip to the United States he was entertained with a great deal of spread-eagle oratory about how nations outgrow the principles of foreign policy appropriate to their youth and how the day had come for the United States to abandon the defensive posture of the Monroe Doctrine and to take up the fight against European reaction.

Much of this rhetorical ardor was the by-product of the election campaign of 1852, in which the Democratic Party was trying to embarrass the Whigs by making it appear that their foreign policy was both negative and untrue to the principles of the American Revolution. Thus, Senator Stephen A. Douglas, who hoped to win the Democratic nomination, made speeches about defending the cause of European liberty that he probably never meant seriously and soon disavowed. But one cannot charge the movement known as Young America with this kind of disingenuousness. A militant group whose leaders included Edward de Leon, George N. Sanders, Pierre Soulé and William H. Seward, it managed to combine superheated patriotism, expansionism, national self-determination, and democratic internationalism in its philosophy, holding that democracy was the hope of the future and that the United States must lead its forward movement, with weapons in hand if necessary. In May 1852, George N. Sanders wrote in *The Democratic Review* that, in the ultimate clash between freedom and despotism, the United States and Russia would lead the opposing armies and that the confrontation was inevitable and at hand and should be welcomed.

The support that the United States actually gave to liberal and democratic movements in other countries was, in fact, moral in nature, rather than military. When the issues were fairly posed, the government always bethought itself of John

Quincy Adams's sober answer to the ideological zealots. On July 4, 1821, Adams had said of his country: "Wherever the standard of freedom or independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own." Even so, yielding to the cold logic of this advice left many Americans with a guilty conscience and a vague feeling that they had been untrue to the best instincts of their nation. For they had no doubt that the ideological struggle was a real one and that the United States was destined to be in the van when the victory came. *The Democratic Review* expressed this faith in 1852 in an article that declared: "The old nonsense about balance of power is wholly out of date, and the doctrine of the solidarity of mankind is beginning to spread; popular sovereignty is on the point of overcoming legitimacy quickly; every day the system, which is now restricted to Europe and America, is expanding; and soon it will embrace Asia, Africa and Oceania."

This One-World vision, as the German historian Günter Moltmann has called it, which inspired the radical Democrats of the 1850s, faded rapidly in the years of sectional conflict and civil war, and it did not revive until after the European system had collapsed of its own weight in 1914, and Woodrow Wilson had embarked upon his great crusade three years later. Wilson's declared purpose was to make the world safe for democracy, and how seriously he regarded that objective can be seen in his tactics during the negotiations with Prince Max von Baden in October 1918, which made the fall of the Hohenzollern dynasty inevitable. A necessary prerequisite for the creation of the new democratic order was the destruction of the balance-of-power system, which, to Wilson as to the mid-century Democrats, had been the mainstay of all the anti-democratic forces in Europe, the plaything of kings and soldiers and diplomats, and the wellspring of popular suffering for hundreds of years.

That the elimination of the classical diplomatic system was his first order of business, Wilson made perfectly clear in his speech to the United States Senate on the essentials of peace on January 22, 1917. In this moving address, which startled the President's future associates by calling for "a peace without victory," he declared:

there must be not a balance of power but a community of power. . . . I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances that draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

It was characteristic of Wilson that, in demanding that the modalities of the traditional diplomatic system be scrapped, he should insist that he was speaking not for himself or for his government but for the common people, and particularly for the fighting men of the free nations. In his speech at the Guildhall in London on December 28, 1918, he said that the soldiers of the Allied armies had

fought to do away with an older order and to establish a new one, and the center and characteristic of the old order was that venerable thing which we used to call

the "balance of power"—a thing in which the balance was determined by the sword which was thrown in the one side or the other; a balance which was determined by the unstable equilibrium of competitive interests; a balance which was maintained by jealous watchfulness and an antagonism of interests which, though it was generally latent, was always deep-seated. The men who have fought in this war have been the men from free nations who were determined that that sort of thing should end now and forever.

Grateful as they were for America's aid in defeating Germany, the European governments proved to be singularly resistant to this kind of exhortation and to its ideological implications, and their opposition was not slow in manifesting itself. The ardent Wilsonian Walter Lippmann wrote worriedly to a colleague in September 1918: "It is still most tremendously necessary to teach the European mind . . . that back of all our physical display lies a purpose which strikes at the roots of the old European system." He had reason to be concerned: the pupils rejected the lesson. Clemenceau, for one, was an unabashed supporter of the balance-of-power system, convinced that history had shown it to be the most effective regulator of the relationships among nations. He was not inclined to abandon it for what he considered to be the *cloudy formulations of a doctrinaire schoolmaster from a country too young to appreciate the lessons of the past*. Without being as brutally frank as the French Premier, the British and the Italians were inclined to agree. Like the negotiators at Vienna a hundred years earlier, they wanted to place the enemy under restraint, to assure themselves of appropriate territorial and economic compensation for their sacrifices, and, when that was done, to formulate a body of treaties and guarantees that would enable them to maintain the new status quo post bellum.

Their determination about following this traditional procedure was so strong that, in order to win their support for the League of Nations that he hoped would be able to prevent a return to the evils of the past, Wilson felt compelled to make concessions to it and to accept compromises that vitiated the Fourteen Points and defeated his hope of attaining a peace without victory. It is unnecessary to rehearse the details of a familiar story. Wilson's struggle at Paris for a just and lasting peace was gallant but unavailing. He was able to temper the most inordinate of the territorial demands of his associates, but the discrepancies between what the Fourteen Points had promised and what the Treaty of Versailles provided were still so palpable that Wilson's critics in America had no difficulty in arguing that he had betrayed his principles, while the nature of the settlement in general made the League of Nations, which he had hoped would be the symbol and embodiment of a new international order, appear to be merely an instrument in the hands of victorious powers who intended to use it to buttress their position. Indeed, in the American debate over the Treaty, the League was attacked as a subtle conspiracy to involve the United States in the old corrupt system of secret treaties and irresponsible commitments. Membership in Wilson's creation would, in the words of ex-Senator Albert Beveridge, "entangle the American nation in a European-Asiatic balance of power."

In the presidential election of 1920, the nation made it clear that it did not desire such entanglement.

IV

Despite the completeness of his defeat, Woodrow Wilson's influence upon Amer-

ican attitudes toward foreign policy in the subsequent period was profound. His eloquent denunciation of balances-of-power politics were not forgotten; indeed, they served to rationalize a policy of abstention from the affairs of post-Versailles Europe, which, in the course of the 1920s revealed itself to be, in spirit and practice, a somewhat less effective version of the system that had collapsed in 1914. Many of Wilson's staunchest supporters became isolationists in the postwar years, believing as firmly as ever in the essential correctness of the late President's analysis of the faults of the international system but disillusioned about the ability of the United States to do anything to correct them. Among them was Franklin Delano Roosevelt who, as vice-presidential candidate in 1920, had fought vainly for American adherence to the League of Nations.

Despite the attempts of revisionist historians after 1945 to portray Roosevelt as a man who burned with the desire to demonstrate his virtuosity on the world stage and who maneuvered his country into another war in order to gratify that desire, the most reliable evidence indicates that his isolationism was genuine and deeply felt and that he had not entirely overcome it when the Japanese took the power of decision out of his hands. His attitude toward Europe in the 1920s and during his first two terms as President was determined by the continuing popular rejection of Wilsonianism, by his disenchantment with the League as it proved incapable of controlling militarism and maintaining the public law, and by his aversion for war. As troubles multiplied in Europe and war once more became a distinct possibility, his first instinct was to stand clear. The United States, he believed, should remain a beacon of liberty and a model of sanity for other nations, but not a participant in their affairs.

His namesake's view in 1914 that, if the European balance were subverted, the United States would be obliged to step in and set it right, Franklin Roosevelt resisted until very late. His appeal to Adolf Hitler at the height of the Sudeten crisis to seek a solution by conference was accompanied by the somewhat embarrassed addendum, "The United States has no political involvements in Europe and will assume no obligations in the conduct of the present negotiations." In a letter to William Phillips after the Munich conference, the President speculated about the American attitude if war came and talked about "[picking] up the pieces of European civilization" and helping the European peoples "save what remains of the wreck" after the fighting had stopped. He added, "If we get the idea that the future of our form of government is threatened by a coalition of European dictators, we might wade in with everything we have to give"; but he resisted this alternative long after many of his countrymen believed that the threat had become tangible.

After war came to Europe, his efforts to redress the balance in favor of the democracies were hesitant and slow in implementation (the destroyers-bases deal was not consummated until months after his announcement at Charlottesville in June 1940 that he was extending "the material resources of the nation" to the hard-pressed British), and he gave every appearance of leaning over backward to avoid the charge of wanting to repeat Wilson's unhappy adventure.

Once the United States had become a belligerent, American policy became surprisingly, and not altogether fortunately, Wilsonian in its approach to Europe. To the exasperation of the British allies, the President and his advisers were so conscious of the part played by secret treaties in the American people's rejection of Wilson's peace that they could hardly be induced to talk about the political

aspects of the war at all, let alone about the territorial adjustments that would have to be made after the enemy's defeat. British suggestions that it might be well to have firm agreements with the Russians about postwar boundaries in northern Europe and the Balkans met automatic opposition from the Department of State, where the liveliest suspicions reigned concerning British desires to revive the worst aspects of classical diplomacy to the detriment of alliance solidarity. As Cordell Hull explained to Congress after his return from the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow in November 1943, there would, once the Four Power Declaration drafted there had taken effect, "no longer be any need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests."

Six months later, when Lord Halifax asked what his attitude would be toward an Anglo-Soviet agreement that would define the degree of influence to be exerted by the two powers in Greece and Romania respectively, Hull protested that this would be a dangerous departure from past policy, principles and practice. In his memoirs, the Secretary of State wrote: "I was, in fact, opposed to any division of Europe or sections of Europe into spheres of influence. I had argued this strongly at the Moscow Conference. It seemed to me that any creation of zones of influences would inevitably sow the seeds of future conflict." He was not, Hull added, "a believer in the idea of balance of power or spheres of influence as a means of keeping peace"; he had studied the question during the First World War and was "grounded to the taproots in their iniquitous consequences."

The President was more pragmatic in his tactics than the Secretary of State and more willing to make concessions to imperious necessity, but he was historian enough to remember the cost of appearing to have condoned private arrangements, and he was, in any case, inclined to the view that political discussions should be postponed as far as possible until the military victory had been won. As a result, the traditional prejudice against balance-of-power politics made the early development of an American political strategy impossible, and in the last stages of the war the Soviet government took advantage of this to press more exorbitant demands than they might otherwise have done.

There is no reason to believe that this worried Roosevelt unduly, at least not until the very last months of his life. He was confident that the Grand Alliance would overcome differences about things like boundary lines and reparations and would form the nucleus of a global security organization that would be more effective in meeting the problems of maintaining peace than the old diplomatic system had ever been. In his last speech to Congress, he bravely expressed his belief that Allied solidarity at the recently concluded Yalta Conference promised to do away, once and for all, with unilateralism, exclusive alliances, spheres of influence, and balance of power.

V

Most Americans who heard that speech would probably have repudiated with indignation any suggestion that, within five years, the United States would be playing the major role in creating a new European balance and would, for the first time in its history, be concluding what to all intents and purposes was a permanently entangling alliance. When the NATO alliance was ratified in 1949, there was, of course, no very widespread understanding that it represented a diplomatic

revolution. More than a quarter of a century later, when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the German journalist Theo Sommer that "the greatest change in American foreign policy is this, that we are permanently involved in world politics—for America . . . an entirely new experience," he was expressing a conclusion that had been reached only gradually.

In the first years after NATO's creation, there was a reluctance to admit that any long-term commitment had been made; and this was apparent both in Republican attacks upon the defensive nature of containment and in John Foster Dulles' policy of liberation or rollback, which, for a time at least, embodied an optimism about ending the ideological war with a definitive victory that was as unalloyed as that of the Young Democrats of the 1850s. But the liberation policy came to a sorry end in the double crisis of Suez and Hungary in 1956, and the shock caused by the successful Soviet launching of *sputnik* a year later and the confidently menacing tone of Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum in 1958 made the status quo seem to be desirable and its maintenance a sensible policy goal. This implied a permanent U.S. role in supporting the balance, since without it there was little doubt that the Soviets could take Berlin and anything else they wanted. The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 only emphasized this.

As a result, balance-of-power politics, regarded by John Adams and Thomas Paine as a characteristic expression of the corrupt political system from which the colonies had escaped, by Woodrow Wilson as the principal cause of war between nations, and by the isolationists of 1920 as the sinister reality behind the League of Nations, which would erode American liberty if the United States joined the world community, was soon being practiced openly by American diplomats and on an increasingly elaborate scale. "We must," Secretary of State Kissinger told a group of United States Ambassadors in London in December 1975, "balance off Soviet power around the world through a combination of political, military, and economic means. In the Far East, the People's Republic of China must be a part of our political calculations. In the Middle East . . . we must pursue . . . a policy relevant to regional balance." As for Europe, where the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact had become more stable after the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and where the West German treaties with Poland and the Soviet Union, the Four Power Agreement on Berlin, and the decisions reached at the European Security Conference in Helsinki had reduced the possibility of military violation of existing frontiers, it became the keystone of the new multidimensional balance-of-power system. "Western Europe," Mr. Kissinger said, "continues to be the backbone of our foreign policy."

The American people have supported this European commitment with remarkable steadfastness. At the Teheran Conference Franklin Roosevelt told Marshal Stalin that the United States did not plan to maintain a peacekeeping force in Europe after the war, a statement that doubtless pleased the Soviet leader. Almost 35 years have passed since that meeting, and our forces are still in Europe; and neither the balance-of-payments problem, nor exasperation over the not infrequent foot-dragging of some of our allies on the question of military contributions, nor the traumatizing entanglement in Southeast Asia has destroyed our willingness to keep them there. This, as *The Washington Post* said not long ago, is "a demonstration of constancy of historical dimensions." The American people seem to have reached the conclusion, after two world wars, that the United States cannot safely ignore what happens to the European balance of power.

But they have also acquired a lively awareness that the balance of power cannot be maintained by military, diplomatic and economic means alone, and that, unless the balance of ideas is in our favor, the other means are bound to fail. The recent row over the so-called Sonnenfeldt doctrine was the result of an uneasy feeling that the government was perhaps forgetting this, and that Helmut Sonnenfeldt's undifferentiated description of Eastern Europe as a natural sphere of Soviet influence—which the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* described as “elephantine trampling on the rights and sensibilities of people living under actual or threatened Soviet domination”—could only give the impression that we had lost faith in our ideals and were attempting to maintain our position by the crudest and most ignoble kind of Realpolitik.

Similarly, the concern about whether NATO could survive Communist participation in the governments of Italy and France, which some of our European critics have ascribed to American failure to understand the evolution of the Communist parties of Western Europe and their growing independence from Moscow, is really the result of a not unreasonable suspicion that, if the democratic parties in Europe cannot hold their own against communism in the battle for men's minds, it would be idle to suppose that American assistance would do them any good. If there is a revival of isolationism in the United States, it will not be because Americans have reverted to their nineteenth-century fear of entangling alliances, but rather because they have concluded that the balance of ideas in Europe has become so unfavorable to democracy that such alliances would serve no useful purpose.

It was perhaps to forestall that possibility that, in his Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture in London on June 25, 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger, while telling his European auditors that they had no reason to fear competition with communism, in view of the military strength and economic superiority of the Western alliance, placed less emphasis upon the balance of power than upon the balance of ideas, and reminded his allies that, “if there is an ideological competition, the power of our ideas depends only on our will to uphold them.”

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: ENDING THE HEGEMONIC PRESUMPTION

By Abraham F. Lowenthal



LIKE the last streak of lightning in a summer storm, the Chile Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence illuminates the contours of recent relations between the United States and Latin America, even as that landscape is changing. With impressive detail and understated force, the Report not only documents what the United States did in Chile from 1963 through 1973; it also illustrates the hegemonic presumption upon which this country has long based its policies toward Latin America and the Caribbean.

But the days of unchallenged U.S. control of the Western Hemisphere are numbered, if not already past. U.S. relations with Latin America are consequently being transformed. The historic "special relationship" between the United States and Latin America is coming to an end—in fact if not yet in rhetoric. A new U.S. approach toward hemispheric relations is required.

II

The Senate's Chile Report shows that the U.S. government engaged for over a decade in a massive, systematic, and sustained covert campaign against the Chilean Left. The Report removes from further controversy these key facts about U.S. involvement in Chilean politics:

1. The United States spent about \$3 million during the 1964 election campaign in Chile, mostly on behalf of Eduardo Frei's Christian Democratic campaign; an equivalent level of spending in a U.S. election would be over \$75 million, much more than was used to finance Richard Nixon's lavishly funded 1972 election.

2. The United States spent some \$8 million on covert intervention in Chilean politics from 1970 through 1973. Among the items financed were political activities among workers, students, women's groups, professional organizations, and other civic associations; propaganda; planted "news" stories and editorials in Chilean newspapers and magazines; and even the inspiration and subsequent diffusion of articles on Chile by CIA-subsidized "journalists" from other countries.

3. The United States also employed various economic pressures—first to try to prevent the election of Salvador Allende, Chile's Marxist leader, and then to abort his presidency. Although the CIA formally rejected the suggestion of the U.S. corporation, ITT, that the company might contribute up to \$1 million to combat Allende, the Agency did suggest an alternate recipient of anti-Allende financing.

4. President Nixon, his adviser for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Attorney General adopted a highly secret plan, not revealed even to the U.S. Embassy in Santiago, to stimulate a military coup in order to prevent Allende's ever coming to power after the 1970 popular election.

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5. After that coup attempt failed (not without costing the life of René Schneider, Chile's Army Chief of Staff), the U.S. government expressed its hostility to Allende's brand of socialism in many other ways: by cutting off access to international loans and credits and stimulating local capital flight; by feeding misinformation to Chilean military officers to foster fear of supposed Cuban subversive activities; and by financing opposition movements, even from the terrorist Right.¹

What the U.S. government did in and to Chile during the 1960s and early 1970s was not unique in U.S.-Latin American relations, although it was in some ways anachronistic, a residue of programs set in motion early in the 1960s, at the height of the cold war and of the Alliance for Progress. The covert intervention in Chile was probably unprecedented in scope, style and duration, perhaps because the circumstances were so special; no other socialist revolutionary movement has come close to triumph in South America, much less been elected to office.

But though the degree of clandestine U.S. intervention against Allende may have been exceptional, particularly as late as the 1970s, none of the specific activities undertaken in Chile was unprecedented. On the contrary, what the U.S. government did in Chile climaxed an extended era of U.S. interventions in Latin America.

In Argentina in 1945, the United States published a "Blue Book" lambasting Juan Peron's incumbent regime in a vain (and counterproductive) attempt to aid Peron's political opponents.

In Guatemala in 1954, the CIA successfully orchestrated an invasion to oust the Left-leaning Arbenz regime, and the U.S. Ambassador led the effort to establish a successor government.

In Bolivia during the 1950s and 1960s, the United States retained several cabinet officials on the CIA payroll, provided budget support for over one-third of the national government's expenditures and flooded the country with technical assistance advisers. U.S. influence on Bolivian public policy was vast, if not always effective; one key adviser later recalled that "a much needed reform in the real property tax system . . . and an effective income tax . . . went by the board solely because there was no one who had the time, the fluency in Spanish, and the persuasiveness to put the measure across."²

At the Bay of Pigs in 1961, the U.S. Navy convoyed a U.S.-trained and U.S.-supplied anti-Castro army to ignominious defeat, thus culminating (although not concluding) extensive U.S. attempts to oust Fidel Castro's regime. Propaganda, economic pressures, sabotage, covert support for counterrevolutionary groups, even attempts to assassinate Cuba's leaders—all punctuated this hostile campaign.

In Guyana (British Guiana) in the early 1960s, the U.S. government used its penetration of the trade union movement as well as other instruments of covert intervention to thwart Cheddi Jagan's nationalist movement.

In Brazil in 1964, so obvious was U.S. enthusiasm about João Goulart's overthrow that the U.S. government sent official congratulations to the ensuing military government almost before it could be installed. Even prior to that, intense

¹ See *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., December 18, 1975.

² See George J. Eder, *Inflation and Development in Latin America: A History of Inflation and Stability in Bolivia*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968, p. 163.

American concern about Brazil's political course led the United States to influence local decision-making in Brazil's northeast, at the expense of that region's prospects for development.³

In Santo Domingo in 1965, over 22,000 U.S. marines and paratroops landed to forestall what Washington perceived as a possible communist takeover. The "request" for U.S. forces, drafted in English with help from a U.S. attaché, came to the U.S. Embassy from a hastily assembled Dominican junta that had itself been set up with American participation.⁴ And U.S. officials had been meddling frantically in Dominican affairs for years, before the 1965 military intervention, as John Bartlow Martin's memoir *Overtaken By Events* fulsomely reveals.

Even in Ecuador—far from the United States and of little obvious economic or strategic importance—more than half the members of the Communist Party's Central Committee in the mid-1960s were CIA agents or informers, according to Philip Agee's account, *Inside the Company*.

This is not the time or place to judge all these cold-war episodes. Many of them, perhaps all, seemed justified when they occurred because of the threats U.S. policymakers perceived to this country's "national security." Understanding themselves to be locked in a worldwide and all-out contest with the Soviet Union, U.S. officials undertook intervention in Latin America not for its own sake, nor for economic exploitation, but for what they regarded as defensive reasons. But one important point is clear: all these interventionist activities flowed from America's hegemonic presumption—the belief in this country that the entire hemisphere was a rightful sphere of U.S. influence. That belief led U.S. officials to regard as unacceptable the emergence of any anti-American political group in any Latin American country. And overwhelming U.S. power made it feasible for this country to involve itself deeply in internal politics throughout the Americas in order to ensure that any group which challenged U.S. domination did not come to power, or did not last.

III

The hegemonic presumption of the United States in the Western Hemisphere emerged gradually over many decades, asserting itself first in the Caribbean and only later throughout the Americas. During the first few decades of this nation's independent existence the United States seemed mostly indifferent toward Spanish and Portuguese America. Goods sent from the United States to Latin America in 1796 accounted for only three percent of total U.S. exports. This country's political interest in the region was hardly greater than its commercial involvement. The U.S. delegates to the first Pan American Congress, convened in Panama exactly 150 years ago by Simón Bolívar, never arrived. John Quincy Adams, one of the earliest architects of U.S. foreign policy, argued against those who urged more active U.S. involvement in the Latin American struggles for independence; he emphasized that "there is no community of interest between North and South America. There is no basis for an American system." Even the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, often interpreted as a major U.S. policy initiative toward

³ See Riordan Roett, *The Politics of Foreign Aid in Northwest Brazil*, Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972, and Joseph Page, *The Revolution That Never Was: Northeast Brazil, 1955–1964*, New York: Grossman, 1972.

⁴ For details, see Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972.

the hemisphere, may be better understood as a convenient endorsement of British policy, explainable largely in terms of domestic American electoral politics.⁵

Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, however, the burgeoning United States of America became a nation of continental scope and industrial prowess imbued with grand notions of manifest destiny. From that period on, close relations with Latin America and the Caribbean have invariably been an important part of this country's international stance. The United States has made its presence strongly felt in the Americas: economically, politically, militarily, socially and culturally. Sometimes the impact of the United States has been benign, supportive and protective; often it has been stifling or even exploitative. But never in the past century has the North American presence in hemispheric life been insignificant.

The nature of inter-American relations has changed from time to time, mostly reflecting shifts in the wider international position of the United States. Latin America's relationship to this country has been like that of the circus mirror that heightens and exaggerates. Tendencies of U.S. policy that are subordinate in other parts of the world have been enlarged and given free rein in Latin America, often in disturbing ways. "Gunboat diplomacy" and "dollar diplomacy" both found their fullest expression in the Western Hemisphere early in the twentieth century. The unwillingness of the United States to tolerate ideological deviance has been most clearly exemplified in the conduct of hemispheric affairs.

The more noble of North American impulses have also been magnified in the context of U.S.-Latin American relations. The U.S. desire to spread democracy's gospel has been most strongly reflected in the doctrines and practice of Western Hemisphere relations. So have the U.S. aims, often genuine and deeply felt, to promote economic betterment and to champion equality of opportunity.

For many decades, U.S. relations with the other countries of the hemisphere accounted for most of this nation's international involvement. Of the 50 times the United States sent troops outside North America during the nineteenth century, for example, 43 instances were in Latin America and the Caribbean. More than half of all U.S. foreign investment at the end of World War I was within this hemisphere. Sixty percent of all U.S. diplomatic personnel stationed abroad in the 1920s were assigned in Latin America and the Caribbean. At the height of this country's "isolationism" in the 1920s, active U.S. involvement in the Americas continued uninterrupted.

From the mid-nineteenth century to the 1930s, U.S. interest focused on Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. This was the first region to feel the projection of exploding North American power. Washington's expansionist impulse swept across the border with Mexico, incorporating Texas into the United States. Santo Domingo came within one Senator's vote of being annexed by the United States in 1870. Cuba, freed of Spanish rule in 1898, was subjected by 1903 to the Platt Amendment, granting the United States the right to intervene. Panama was forced at its inception to concede to the United States the right to "act as if it were sovereign" within part of Panamanian territory. Puerto Rico was taken over outright.

Financial and commercial interests in the Caribbean were perhaps the main concerns of U.S. foreign policy from the late nineteenth century until World War I. The highest priority of U.S. policy was the preemptive aim to exclude

⁵ See Ernest R. May, *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.

competing influences from this border region. Within the 25 years beginning in 1898, U.S. soldiers landed in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, and even Mexico. Most of these countries became virtual U.S. protectorates. When the United States was not ruling directly, it was forming juntas, training constabularies, collecting taxes and customs, reforming education, or revising laws. American motives were sometimes generous, but U.S. programs were often naïve in the extreme, and respect for local sovereignty or sensibilities was rarely a constraint.

When the U.S. troops departed—as they did from everywhere but Puerto Rico and Guantanamo by 1934—they left behind countries deeply penetrated by the United States and very sensitive to U.S. influence. In the Dominican Republic, the U.S. dollar remained the official currency for years after the U.S. occupation; in Panama, the dollar still circulates as freely as the country's own paper money.

Until the eve of World War II, the "Latin American policy" of the United States mainly dealt with Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. Every time in this century that American troops have been sent to Latin America, they have gone to the circum-Caribbean region. Well over half the total U.S. investment in Latin America in 1929 was concentrated in these nearby countries, especially in Cuba and Mexico. To take another kind of measure, of the 40 articles *Foreign Affairs* had published on hemisphere relations by 1943, 31 primarily discussed Mexico, Central America or the Caribbean; only one article was devoted to Brazil.

It was not until the 1930s that the United States began to extend considerable attention to South America as well. Although its most specific meaning and application was in the Caribbean, the "Good Neighbor Policy" proclaimed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his 1933 Inaugural was conceived and announced as a hemisphere-wide policy. The rhetoric of Pan-Americanism, previously purveyed by the United States largely for commercial reasons, now gained new currency as Latin American desires to constrain U.S. interventionism dovetailed with U.S. aims to secure cordial hemispheric relations in a time of political and economic troubles. President Roosevelt convened an inter-American conference in Buenos Aires in 1936, Secretary of State Hull devoted considerable effort to solidifying neighborly ties, and Ambassador Josephus Daniels invested his formidable energies to secure an amicable resolution of the dispute arising from Mexico's expropriation of U.S. oil companies.

Beneath the level of rhetoric, international conferences, and negotiations, the U.S. War Department was busy by 1940 building airstrips and other military installations in most countries. The FBI was just as busy establishing a major intelligence network. By the time the United States entered World War II, this country was more fully ensconced throughout Latin America (except in Argentina) than ever before.

The foreign policies and military measures taken by most countries of the region during World War II were closely coordinated with the war-making efforts of the United States. All the Latin American states formally entered the war on the Allied side, and Brazil even sent an entire division to fight in Italy. Strategic materials from Latin America contributed importantly to the U.S. campaign. Latin America supplied the United States with all of its quinine and balsa wood; 56 percent of its tin; 43 percent of its crude rubber; 83 percent of this country's copper imports, and 76.7 percent of its imported vanadium.

Regional trade patterns came to concentrate increasingly on commerce with the United States.

After the war—with Germany and Japan defeated, England, France and Russia severely weakened, and the U.S. economy booming—Washington's influence throughout Latin America (as elsewhere) grew to unprecedented dimensions. Economically, Latin America moved increasingly into the U.S. orbit. The share of Latin American exports destined for the United States, which had climbed steadily from about 12 percent in 1910, spurted to 45 percent by 1958. The share of U.S. imports coming from Latin America reached a historic high of some 37 percent in 1950, more than half again what it had been before World War II. U.S. investment in Latin America quintupled in the 25 years after World War II, seeking out new opportunities in manufacturing and in services to complement the earlier involvement in natural resource extraction. American investment gained predominance in practically every country in the region.

Politically, the two decades immediately following World War II marked the zenith of U.S. power in the Americas. An Inter-American System was created, institutionalizing North American paramouncy. The Rio Treaty of 1947 (the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) formalized close political and security relations in the hemisphere. The Organization of American States (OAS), with headquarters in Washington, was established in 1948 as a regional institution authorized to impose and enforce collective sanctions and to act as a forum of first instance for disputes arising within the Americas. A network of inter-American military institutions—schools, defense councils, training programs, and the like—provided a means to ensure continuing U.S. influence in that sphere through devices ranging from standardized weapons and procedures to personal influence. A host of bilateral and multilateral modes of providing foreign aid channeled U.S. technical, educational and economic advice. The Inter-American Development Bank was created in 1959 to channel U.S. and other resources to Latin America, with Washington retaining predominant influence over the use of its funds, and even an effective veto on soft loans.

In their relations with the rest of the world, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean looked to the United States for leadership. Whether for their own motives or because of Washington's pressures (and usually for both reasons) they almost uniformly supported this country's major foreign policy initiatives: in establishing the United Nations and its accompanying postwar international institutions; in opposing presumed Soviet expansionist aims; in backing Israel's creation; in extending assistance for Europe's reconstruction; and in "uniting for peace" to oppose North Korea's invasion in 1950.

The predominant U.S. concern with the cold war was largely (and rather unquestioningly) adopted by the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean as their own. An OAS resolution adopted at Caracas in 1954 barred international communism from this hemisphere, for instance. During this cold-war period, less than half the members of the OAS even maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. No country of the region, except Cuba, had any international relationship remotely comparable in significance to its ties to Washington.

President John F. Kennedy's proclamation of the Alliance for Progress in 1961—itself primarily a response to the Cuban Revolution and its challenge to U.S. hegemony—heralded the apogee of North American involvement in hemisphere affairs. For a brief moment, Washington appeared to care deeply about the whole

region: to be concerned about its economic growth, its social and political development, and its internal security. The number of U.S. government personnel assigned to Latin America jumped, crowding the suburbs of Latin American capitals with embassy officers and "spooks," technicians from the Agency for International Development, cultural and military advisers—and dotting the countryside with Peace Corps volunteers. Predictably, inter-American institutions blossomed as U.S. concerns with the region intensified. The staff and budget of the OAS quintupled after 1961, and the programs of the Inter-American Development Bank expanded at a similar pace.

The U.S. government engaged itself deeply in the domestic affairs of countries as diverse as Venezuela and Chile, Peru and Brazil, Bolivia and Panama, Cuba and the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Honduras. U.S. pressures forced elections to be held, and sometimes determined the results. U.S. influence caused civic action programs to be started, planning boards to be established, and currencies to be devalued. U.S. troops were used only in Santo Domingo in 1965, but the United States also influenced Latin American politics by granting or withholding diplomatic recognition or "aid"; by providing technical assistance and advice; by training military and police units and supplying them with sundry types of equipment; and by all the techniques illustrated in the Chilean and Cuban cases.

By 1965, when the Dominican invasion dramatically reversed this country's prolonged adherence to its pledge to forswear unilateral military intervention, the United States had convincingly asserted its sphere of influence throughout the whole Western Hemisphere. In September of that year, the U.S. House of Representatives provided perhaps the clearest official statement ever that this country has a right to shape political choices throughout the Caribbean, Central and South America. In what amounted to an after-the-fact defense of the Dominican intervention, the House declared that even the threat of intervention by "the subversive forces known as international communism" would justify the United States resorting to armed force, in the "exercise of individual self-defense." This underlying and widely accepted North American attitude—that the U.S. government has a right to remove from hemispheric political life whatever forces it deems threatening—conditioned the Nixon-Kissinger response to Salvador Allende's election in Chile.

Although Washington's hegemonic presumption has been most clearly demonstrated by overt and covert intervention in the name of national security, its influence has by no means been limited to the strategic sphere. The hegemonic presumption helps account for other striking aspects of recent inter-American relations: the intensely active U.S. pressure for reform during the Alliance for Progress years; Washington's efforts in the 1960s to force Latin American regimes to respect democratic procedures, accompanied by covert U.S. measures to influence their results; the attempts by the U.S. Congress to determine what kinds of military equipment Latin American nations could purchase; and the extraordinary lengths to which the U.S. government has been willing to go to aid specific U.S. corporations in their clashes with Latin American hosts.⁶

⁶ The classic, almost pathological, case of Peru's dispute with the International Petroleum Company (IPC) nicely illustrates this final point: over the course of several years Washington repeatedly punished or threatened to punish Peru's government in order to force a settlement acceptable to IPC. The end result, ironically, was to help bring to power a nationalist military regime which expropriated the IPC within weeks of taking office.

IV

Trends in Latin America and elsewhere are, however, quickly eroding the bases for this country's hegemonic presumption which only ten years ago seemed beyond serious challenge.

Cuba's success in institutionalizing a revolutionary socialist regime allied with the Soviet Union provides the most dramatic daily reminder that U.S. hegemony has waned. Having survived countless U.S. efforts to unseat him and having outlasted four American Presidents already, Fidel Castro has shown that "geographical determinism" can be reversed. His Soviet patrons have brought units of their Navy into the Caribbean each of the past several years, ending a 70-year period in which unfriendly fleets were excluded from the American Mediterranean.

The decline of U.S. domination in the security realm is not limited to the extreme case of Cuba. The almost total Latin American dependence on U.S. arms during the period from World War II until 1965 has given way to a remarkable diversification of weapons sources. From 1968 through 1972, 87 percent of Latin America's arms purchases came from countries other than the United States. All six Latin American countries with supersonic jets fly French Mirages. Peru's flirtation with the Soviet Union, moreover, has led to the first significant military training program undertaken by an extra-hemispheric power in South America since World War II.

In economic terms, the degree of U.S. dominance in the hemisphere has declined sharply as Latin American nations have diversified their production and their commerce. Whereas Latin America as a whole sent almost half its exports to the United States in 1950, the regional figure now stands at 32 percent. The share of Latin America's imports coming from the United States has dropped from 57 percent to 37 percent in 25 years and is still declining. Japan has multiplied exports to Latin America tenfold since 1960, and other nations of Eastern and Western Europe are also significantly expanding their trade with the region. Peru, for example, now exports almost exactly as much to the communist countries and to the European Community as it does to the United States.

Although direct U.S. investment in Latin America continues to be very substantial, its nature is changing (mainly from resource extraction to manufacturing and service) and its relative significance for Latin America's development is declining as other nations begin to invest more heavily in the region. In 1964 the United States supplied almost half of the total of Brazil's foreign investment; by now the U.S. share is less than 30 percent. In 1973, new Japanese investment in Brazil exceeded that of the United States for the first time; and since 1973 investors from the oil-rich Arab countries have been attracted to Brazil as well. Across the entire region, the share of private gross capital flow coming from the Eurocurrency market has climbed to over 75 percent.

Nationalizations, compensated or not, have since 1960 removed all U.S. direct investment from Cuba, most from Peru, a good deal from Chile, and much from other countries, including the entire Venezuelan petroleum industry, taken over by Caracas with hardly a hitch on January 1, 1976. The U.S. firms continuing to do business in Latin America are finding their styles cramped and their incomes shaved by host governments that are increasingly able to bargain effectively for more advantageous terms. Strict new rules for foreign investment are

being implemented in countries as different as Peru, Jamaica, Brazil and Guyana. Gaining strength from regional cooperation, the members of the Andean Common Market have been fairly successful, at least until recent setbacks, in establishing new modes of foreign investment.

In general, the weak and dependent governments of Latin America that used to look to Washington for leadership are being replaced by ever more self-confident regimes, eager to exert their influence in international affairs. All over Latin America, the state has been strengthened enormously in recent years. Cuba's socialist experiment provides the most extreme example, of course, but even in Brazil government expenditures now account for 37 percent of the gross national product, compared with 17 percent in 1950, and the Brazilian state now plays a significant entrepreneurial role in the dynamic intermediate and capital goods sectors. In Peru, the state's share of total national investment climbed from 13 percent in 1965 to over 50 percent by 1973. In Venezuela—once a capitalist bastion—state enterprises now run the petroleum, petrochemical, and iron sectors.

Latin American governments tax more, spend more, regulate more, prohibit more, and control more than regimes in the region have ever done before. They have access to a rapidly expanding resource base. Brazil's economic miracle—industrial exports have multiplied 20-fold since 1964 and GNP has climbed at 10 percent a year for almost a decade—has been most impressive. But all over the region Latin America's economies have done well: 5.1 percent growth per year in the 1950s, 5.6 percent in the 1960s, and over 6 percent in the 1970s. However unequally distributed Latin America's growth may be, it has significantly expanded the region's power.

Many of those who actually run the strengthened Latin American states reject U.S. dominance. Traditional elites favorably disposed toward the United States are being replaced by technocrats—civilian and military—often of a nationalistic bent. These new leaders, many of them well-trained (often in U.S. graduate schools), tend to identify their interests independently of and even through confrontation with the United States.

Within the United Nations and elsewhere, the Latin American countries are finding their own way. Mexico's and Brazil's votes on the U.N. resolution identifying Zionism as "racism," Brazil's early recognition of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the many Latin American votes favoring Angola's admission to the General Assembly demonstrate this fact. On many issues—fishing zones, nuclear proliferation, debt management, buffer stocks, special drawing rights, and others—the Latin American nations differ among themselves, but few nations any longer start automatically with a U.S. position or U.S. premises. The eventual influence of the various Latin American countries on the struggle to create a viable "new international economic order" is not yet clear, but they will surely act independently of Washington's dictates. Latin Americans have taken the lead in founding and strengthening the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), establishing cartels, promoting indexing, devising fade-out formulas, and elaborating codes of corporate conduct; their pursuit of these objectives is not likely to cease now that Third World efforts are beginning to pay off.

Nor are the political activities and interests of the Latin American countries beyond the Western Hemisphere any longer easily inhibited by the United States. Venezuela's role as a founding member of the Organization of Petroleum Export-

ing Countries (OPEC); Mexico's initiative in promoting the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States; Peru's close relations with the Soviet Union; Brazil's nuclear arrangement with Germany; Cuba's intervention in Angola—all illustrate the new capacity of Latin American nations to play important parts on the global stage regardless of Washington's script. Latin American states are participating actively not only in UNCTAD (where, as in other U.N. negotiations, they are part of the Third World "Group of 77"), but in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, in the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, and in various cartels and commodity arrangements.

Ever since the Consensus of Viña del Mar statement presented to President Nixon in 1969, the Latin American nations have increasingly organized themselves to exert pressure on the United States: against the import surcharge in 1971, against the anti-OPEC provisions of the 1974 Trade Act, against the continued OAS embargo of Cuba, in solidarity with Panama's struggle to assert its sovereignty in the Canal Zone, and in favor of a proposed OAS charter reform intended primarily to hamstring the United States.

Bilaterally, too, the countries of Latin America are facing up to the Colossus of the North. Brazil, although still in many ways allied with the United States, has begun to clash with Washington on a wide variety of increasingly important matters, including fishing rights, population policy, export subsidies, commodity agreements, and nuclear power. Peru, only a few years ago dependent on the U.S. Embassy for reliable information regarding foreign private investment within the country's own borders, now bargains hard with American and other transnational firms. Panama, a country with no significant natural resource beyond its location, has mobilized regional and even extra-regional support to challenge perpetual U.S. control of the Canal. Colombia ended its bilateral aid accord with the United States because it resented the "aid" relationship, and when Washington criticized Cuba's Angolan involvement, Colombia's President publicly rebuked the United States for its own extra-hemispheric military interventions. Cuba itself, of course, once so overwhelmed by the United States that it was described as "no more independent than Long Island," has fundamentally overturned its relationship with this country.

v

The response of the U.S. government under Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to the quickly changing facts of hemispheric and international life has been doggedly to reassert the "special relationship" and the sense of "hemispheric community" which are said to exist between the United States and Latin America.

Both concepts have a venerable tradition in inter-American discourse. The "Western Hemisphere Idea"—that the countries of the region have a special relation toward one another that sets them apart from the rest of the world—has been a familiar theme since before the Monroe Doctrine.⁷ The notion goes beyond the obvious assertion that nations linked by geography are likely to have some common interests. It maintains that the nations of the Americas share among themselves so much history, so many values, so many cultural traits as to ensure hemispheric amity and the pursuit of regional approaches to common problems. "Pan-Americanism" has been a powerful idea, accepted not just by orators on

⁷ See Arthur P. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1954.

ceremonial occasions but by the architects of numerous regional economic, military, cultural and political institutions.

The idea of an inter-American "community," of a natural harmony between the United States and Latin America, has also influenced U.S. rhetoric and policy toward the region throughout this country's independent history. From John Quincy Adams and Simón Bolívar on, there have always been doubters of the presumed mutuality of interest between the Americas, North and South. But the dominant view, from Henry Clay to Henry Kissinger, has been to emphasize—or simply to assume—shared or compatible interests.

The closely related concepts of "special relationship" and "inter-American community" have often been advanced as the framework for articulating U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. The key speeches outlining John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress and Richard Nixon's Mature Partnership were laced with these doctrines. So was Nelson Rockefeller's 1969 Report, *The Quality of Life in the Americas*. Rockefeller called for reinvigorating the "special relationship" through a series of new regional mechanisms and by reorganizing the U.S. government to deal with Western Hemisphere affairs as a Cabinet-level concern.

Although many of Rockefeller's specific recommendations were rejected or ignored, his vision of U.S.-Latin American relations continues to be accepted by many in the United States, apparently including Secretary Kissinger. When sharply unfavorable international trends helped the Secretary late in 1973 to discover Latin America anew and to seek support there for U.S. initiatives, the message Kissinger carried with him to Tlatelolco in Mexico was that the United States was prepared for a "New Dialogue" with Latin America on the basis of hemispheric "community."

Aside from feeling that a unilaterally proclaimed dialogue—like a unilaterally proclaimed alliance—is inherently problematical, the Latin American Foreign Ministers welcomed Secretary Kissinger's sudden interest in hemispheric problems. One after another, however, they resisted the language of "community," because they felt it obscured, intentionally or not, the unresolved issues between the United States and Latin America; all references to "community" were purged from the communiqué closing the Conference. Thus educated, Secretary Kissinger dropped the phrase but not the concept. As recently as February of this year, speaking in Caracas on the occasion of his second formal visit as Secretary to Latin America, Mr. Kissinger referred no less than 11 times in nine pages to the "special relationship." And reporting to Congress on his return, the Secretary promised further efforts to "perfect the undeniable community which exists in this part of the world."

Latin American leaders from many countries and from various places on the political spectrum are coming to reject the idea of a special and exclusive relationship between their countries and the United States. Previous notions of Pan-American harmony are being replaced all over the continent by perceptions of conflict. Inter-American organizations long overwhelmed by the United States—the OAS (for which the United States pays two-thirds of the budget) being the prime example—are being allowed to atrophy. New intra-Latin American regional and subregional institutions excluding the United States, such as the Latin American Economic System (SELA) and the Andean Common Market, are gaining stature, if not yet proven strength. Most important, many leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean think that their nations' interests may often be closer

to those of developing countries outside the hemisphere than to those of the United States. Few Latin Americans still assume that their countries' interests and Washington's are inevitably the same; on the contrary, many think that the United States will oppose their concerns, as well as those of the rest of the developing world. Few Latin American leaders now expect U.S.-Latin American relations to be overwhelmingly friendly; most anticipate tensions, if not hostility.

In part, this changed Latin American expectation is due to the role the United States has played as a bulwark of the established international economic and political order. In part, the new Latin American approach to the United States and to inter-American relations simply reflects increased assertiveness flowing from enhanced power. But it also reflects an objective change—the transformation of Latin American economies from inward-turned import substitution to outward-oriented export promotion. Most Latin American countries (except for some of the smallest) are no longer mainly interested in obtaining bilateral concessional assistance from the United States; now they care primarily about securing universal trading rules which will facilitate improved access to the industrial world's markets.

As Latin America's economies change, and as the region's stake in global rules and arrangements increases, hostility may deepen between the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (and less-developed countries generally), and those of the industrial North, including the United States. The "new international economic order" will be the rubric. Commodities, tariffs, countervailing duties, debt management, special drawing rights, technology transfer, the conservation and management of resources, the terms on which capital and labor migrate, the making and management of international rules and institutions will be some of the specific issues. The name of the game, however, will be redistribution: of resources, of income, of status and of power. The challenge for U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere for years to come will be to protect essential U.S. interests in an era when real conflict, not unchallenged hegemony, should be presumed.

VI

If hegemony is no longer a fact and the "special relationship" is not an appropriate guide for policy, how should Washington approach its relations with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean? Surely we should base our approach on a thoughtful assessment of our nation's interests and how these relate to those of the other countries in the hemisphere, rather than simply on inherited doctrines or on unexamined habits of thought. But what are our interests, and what should be the aims of our hemispheric relations?

The first step toward an improved Latin American policy would be to realize that for most purposes we probably should not have a distinct Latin American policy at all. The main problems the United States will face in the Western Hemisphere over the next decade are not regional but global questions: making more fair and secure the terms of exchange between producers and consumers of primary products; expanding food and energy production and improving their distribution; using and conserving world resources (of the earth, space and the oceans) efficiently and equitably; curbing the diversion of funds for military purposes; limiting pollution and dealing with its consequences; improving the welfare of individuals and communities; protecting fundamental human rights; trying to end state and antistate terrorism in all its forms; assisting the victims of natural disasters and avoiding man-made catastrophes; and building more effective struc-

tures of global decision-making. The United States could better its relations with Latin America most by focusing seriously, and in a sustained way, on these critical issues.

In taking up these questions, the United States will find that its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean assume renewed importance. As the most powerful and prosperous part of the Third World, Latin America will significantly influence how the international economic order evolves. As major exporters of both primary products and manufactured goods, Latin American countries will greatly affect the future of world trade. As an area with considerable potential to expand agricultural production, Latin America will play a central role in dealing with world food problems. As a region with advanced technological capacity, Latin America will help determine whether or not nuclear technology spreads, and whether industrial pollution worsens. With many of the world's major fishing countries, Latin America will significantly affect the law and future use of the seas. As an arena where long-dormant interstate conflicts have recently been rekindled, Latin America will provide key tests of the prospects for curbing arms races. As a region with long-standing doctrines regarding respect for human rights but one now suffering from a plague of brutal repression, Latin America's evolution will importantly affect the future of human rights and their institutionalized protection or suppression.

The primary aim of U.S. policy toward the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean should be to secure their active cooperation in dealing with this broad global agenda. Their cooperation should not be sought, nor will it be extended, because of special regional ties or bonds of traditional friendship. It should be sought, and may well be granted, because the countries of Latin America have very much to gain from, and a good deal to contribute to, solving these global problems. Mutually profitable economic and cultural exchanges between the United States and Latin America would be aspects of working together on the issues of greatest concern.

In dealing with its global agenda, special sensitivity by the United States to the impact of its actions and inactions on its closest neighbors makes good sense; special regional policies for universal problems do not. On some specific problems—reporting on human rights violations, for instance, or perhaps for cultural exchanges—regional institutions may still have a place; on most issues Latin American countries should be dealt with on the basis of their interests, not their location.

While we should no longer assume that common interests automatically bind the United States and Latin America, we need not accept total hemispheric conflict as inevitable. The challenge for U.S. policy in the Americas is to nurture common interests where they exist or are latent, to help resolve intra-hemispheric tensions when conciliation is feasible, and to mitigate the effects of conflict when clashes occur. We should not be surprised or alarmed by recurrent or even deepening frictions in U.S.-Latin American relations: over tariffs and subsidies, debts and remittances, investments and nationalizations, exchange controls, technology transfer, immigration and other issues. We should neither ignore these frictions nor try to suppress them, but should rather build and fortify structures which anticipate and help resolve conflicts. New formulas should thus be sought to reconcile the interests of importers and exporters, producers and consumers, borrowers and lenders.

Spelling out in detail how the United States should try to gain help from Latin America and the Caribbean for dealing with global concerns would require an-

other essay, but five key principles may be advanced:

1. In the United States we should free ourselves—in rhetoric, attitude, and practice—of the legacy of interventionism and paternalism. We should discipline ourselves to respect the sovereignty of all Latin American countries, regardless of their size or ideology.

Putting this principle into practice means (among other things) renouncing overt and covert intervention, abandoning coercive or discriminatory procedures, reaching an agreement with Panama which treats that country as a juridical equal, and making mutual respect the basis of our approach toward Cuba and every other country in the region—and toward Puerto Rico as well.

2. In dealing with Latin America, we should concern ourselves with the shared problems of economic security and of improving individual and collective welfare, and should focus less on security questions in the narrowly defined military sense.

Putting this principle into practice means accepting the fact that the days of absolute military security in the hemisphere are long and irrevocably gone, and understanding the truth that the greatest threat other countries of the region have perceived has often been from the United States. It means realizing that nations other than Cuba, particularly in the Caribbean, may choose socialist means of production and organization without implying any threat to this country. It also means accepting as natural that the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean will develop various links both among themselves and to nations outside the hemisphere. We ought to concentrate not on trying to limit the ties Latin American countries have outside the hemisphere, but on encouraging the states of Latin America to generate support from across the world for attempts to solve global problems.

3. We should resolve to help make the Americas safe for diversity. Though we should not try to impose on any nation our own ideological or economic preferences, we should make clear our own values—our commitments to freedom, to democracy, to justice and equity, to individual dignity. And we should avoid associating ourselves closely with those who violate standards we regard as fundamental.

Putting this principle into practice means refraining from interference in the domestic affairs of other nations, while maintaining a legitimate concern for the protection of universally recognized rights. More specifically, it means understanding that while we have no right to “destabilize,” we do have an obligation not to aid those who torture and repress, and to assist the victims of repression whether they are victims of the Left or of the Right. And it means facing up to the fact that U.S. influence—still considerable though no longer overwhelming—has too often been used to support those who trample on rights we consider essential.

4. We should recognize that our relations with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are not all similar or of equal priority.

In practice this means analyzing how the interests and objectives of the various states of Latin America and the Caribbean differ among themselves, and how they relate to our own interests. The main unifying feature in recent Latin American history has been shared resistance to U.S. hegemony; as our predominance ebbs, intra-regional and subregional differences may well emerge. The United States ought to devote special priority to improving its understanding of and relations with three sets of countries: those where U.S. economic interests are concentrated (primarily Brazil and Mexico); those likely to exert particular influence in international forums (primarily Brazil and Venezuela, but also Cuba, for different

reasons); and those most closely tied to the United States by patterns of trade and migration (particularly Mexico and the island territories of the Caribbean). As the era of U.S. hegemony throughout the Americas draws to a close, particular thought should be devoted to how the United States might best relate to the Caribbean territories, so many of which appear as satellites in search of an orbit.⁸

5. Finally, we should recognize that the end of U.S. hegemony implies that we cannot expect to achieve all of our goals in the region.

The United States is by far the strongest country in the Western Hemisphere, the only truly great power, and it will remain so for many years to come. We need not fear that our influence will be minimal or our main aims usually thwarted. But we must accept the fact that international and regional changes will limit our capacity to have our way.

One key fact which reduced influence will highlight is that priorities will conflict in the hemisphere. Devising sensible procedures for resolving investment disputes may run counter, at least in the short term, to the perceived interests of particular U.S. corporations. Insisting on the protection of essential human rights may tend to threaten the political stability our corporations expect abroad. The expansion of Latin American exports may involve increasing sectoral unemployment in our country, to which we will have to respond either by restricting imports or by providing effective adjustment assistance to displaced companies and workers. Our desire to deal effectively with the critical danger of nuclear proliferation may bring us into direct conflict with the understandable national ambitions of several Latin American states.

To fashion sound policies, the United States will face difficult choices in a hemisphere in which it is still very powerful but no longer unquestionably in charge. Recognizing that the Western Hemisphere is no longer our "sphere of influence" will therefore be painful, but no other basis for policy toward Latin America will be possible in this country's third century.

⁸ See also my article, "Toward A New Caribbean Policy," *SAIS Review*, Fall 1974, pp. 5-19.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal
Edward L. Morse

THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. EDITED BY LEO GROSS. Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Oceana, 1976, 2 v. \$25.00 per volume.

A panel of experts, sponsored by the American Society of International Law, reviews the roles of the Court in dispute settlements in U.N.-related activities, and vis-à-vis national governments, and puts forward proposals for Court reform. The panel could not reach a unanimous consensus.

THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. BY SIDNEY D. BAILEY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, 424 pp. \$26.00.

Almost everything you ever wanted to know on the subject is reviewed in this handbook, including the status of Charter reform and procedures, short of Charter revision, to reestablish the Council's original role. Highly readable and filled with examples, the book suffers from few of the weaknesses of constitutional guides, but it fails to place prospects for reform in any realistic political context.

THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. VOL. 4: THE CONCLUDING PHASE. EDITED BY RICHARD A. FALK. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, 1051 pp. \$35.00 (Paper, \$13.50).

The final volume of this important compendium of reprinted and original essays and documents on the international legal and American constitutional aspects of the Vietnam War, this book will long be considered a fundamental reference. The American Society of International Law has provided a noteworthy public service in sponsoring its publication.

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY. EDITED BY FRANCIS O. WILCOX AND RICHARD A. FRANK. New York: Praeger, 1976, 145 pp. \$14.00 (Paper, \$4.95).

A panel of the American Society of International Law puts forward recommendations concerning the roles of Congress and the President in the conduct of foreign policy. Like the political debate over the War Powers Act (1973), this book focuses on secrecy, public participation, executive agreements and treaties, and the power to wage war. Since public debate has now shifted focus, the topic is no longer so timely, but the discussion does summarize some major unresolved issues.

GUERRES, RÉVOLUTIONS, CROIX-ROUGE. BY JACQUES FREYMOND. Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1976, 222 pp.

Written by a long-time observer and participant in the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross, this analytic study/memoir reviews the role of a unique private organization whose humanitarian relief operations have made it a central participant in international and civil wars as well as in the administration of disaster relief.

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The book suggests reforms and modes of liaison with other organizations which should be useful to those currently involved in renewing the ICRC.

CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A PERSPECTIVE AND A CRITICAL APPRAISAL. BY DINA A. ZINNES. New York: Free Press, 1976, 477 pp. \$17.95.

It has been a scandal of contemporary political science that "methodology" has been developed as a discrete and autonomous field. This survey is even more narrowly and quantitatively construed than its title indicates and excludes some of the most interesting "scientific" research now available. It will interest only those already initiated into the rites and convince no one.

EMERGING FORMS OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITY. BY BERNARD MENNIS AND KARL P. SAUVANT. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1976, 240 pp. \$18.50.

THE WEB OF WORLD POLITICS: NONSTATE ACTORS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM. BY RICHARD W. MANSBACH, YALE H. FERGUSON, AND DONALD E. LAMPERT. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1976, 326 pp. \$8.95 (Paper).

Mennis and Sauviant analyze the role of transnational business enterprises in regional integration, especially in Europe. Mansbach and others cover the activities of a wider range of "nonstate" entities (such as terrorist groups, labor organizations, individual newspapers). Both books use substantial and sometimes new data to support their interpretations; both are readable and more daring than most quantitative studies.

INTERDEPENDENCE: THE EUROPEAN-AMERICAN CONNECTION IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT. BY GERHARD MALLY. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books (for the Atlantic Council), 1976, 229 pp. \$17.50.

The "management of international interdependence" is today's political and academic byword. Neither punditry nor original scholarship, this study usefully catalogues the conventional wisdom on the subject. It attempts to integrate the manifestations of economic, military, political and ecological interdependence in both the North Atlantic and global settings, and sometimes succeeds. The author has provided an excessively wordy and taxonomic, but convenient, primer.

QUANTITATIVE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: AN APPRAISAL. EDITED BY FRANCIS W. HOOLE AND DINA A. ZINNES. New York: Praeger, 1976, 519 pp. \$35.00.

Specialists and graduate students will find useful this systematic presentation, critical review, and bibliographical compendium of the major projects of the past two decades involving the generation and analysis of data on international politics. They will also debate some of the methodological and theoretical critiques, and should dispute the contention that these projects should be evaluated only by those who have engaged in similar research.

LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS. BY M. B. HOOKER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976, 601 pp. \$37.50.

THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL PLURALISM. BY M. CRAWFORD YOUNG. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976, 560 pp. \$20.00.

Ethnic cleavages within less-developed countries have drawn increasing attention to the relationships among cultural pluralism, political stability and economic growth. Mr. Hooker analyzes the interplay of indigenous and imported legal patterns; Professor Young concentrates on the anthropological and sociological bases of pluralistic regimes and on the sources of communal conflict.

NO EASY CHOICE: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. BY SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON AND JOAN M. NELSON. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976, 195 pp. \$10.50.

Two leading writers on the processes of political development present a lucid analysis of the growth and desirability of political participation in developing countries and the ways it impedes (and is impeded by) the goals of socio-economic equity and economic growth. With an extraordinary ability to pull together abstract theory and empirical data, the authors have made an important contribution to the understanding of one of the major issues of this and coming decades.

THE EROSION OF A RELATIONSHIP: INDIA AND BRITAIN SINCE 1960. BY MICHAEL LIPTON AND JOHN FIRN. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1976, 427 pp. \$32.50.

These economists thoroughly trace the route by which a former great power and its one-time colony went their separate ways, and wistfully propose new approaches to reverse the trend. The task is more Sisyphean than the authors admit.

General: Military, Technological, and Scientific
Andrew J. Pierre

PRECARIOUS SECURITY. BY MAXWELL D. TAYLOR. New York: Norton, 1976, 143 pp. \$7.95.

General Taylor's reputation for clear thought, lucid analysis, and the ability to separate the central issues from the chaff which surrounds them, is once again demonstrated in this pithy book which covers the broad sweep of American security policy. He proposes the replacement of the National Security Council by expanding it into a National Policy Council which would integrate economic, welfare and domestic concerns with foreign and defense policies. But he recognizes that political leadership and public support for government—both of which he sees presently lacking—are more important than organizational charts.

THE SOVIET SOLDIER: SOVIET MILITARY MANAGEMENT AT THE TROOP LEVEL. BY HERBERT GOLDHAMER. London: Leo Cooper/New York: Crane, Russak, 1975, 352 pp. \$17.00 (Paper, \$8.75).

A RAND Corporation study based on a close reading of the military journals of the U.S.S.R. Viewed in the barracks, the Soviet soldier is not ten feet tall; the heavy investment in political indoctrination, the author believes, is an important constraint on his military effectiveness.

GUDERIAN: CENTER OF THE BLITZKRIEG. BY KENNETH MACKSEY. New York: Stein and Day, 1976, 226 pp. \$12.50.

Better than the routine history, this intelligent work depicts the success of the Third Reich's *Panzertruppe* under its strong-willed leader. Guderian, the maverick Prussian, is shown at frequent odds with Hitler during the final months of the war.

WOHIN TREIBT DIE NATO? PROBLEME DER VERTEIDIGUNG WEST-EUROPAS. BY JOHANNES STEINHOFF. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1976, 279 pp. DM. 28.

A professional discussion of the military problems facing NATO in the areas of strategy, force structures, and standardization of weaponry, by one of West Germany's most highly regarded postwar generals.

THE LAST CHANCE: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL. BY WILLIAM EPSTEIN. New York: Free Press, 1976, 341 pp. \$14.95.

An exhaustive, illuminating and often passionate examination of the nuclear proliferation problem. The author was a senior official at the United Nations dealing with arms control and disarmament questions for 25 years; this enables him to articulate especially well the perspectives of the Third World non-nuclear states.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THE NEAR-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES. EDITED BY ONKAR MARWAH AND ANN SCHULZ. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1975, 350 pp. \$16.50.

A collection of relatively up-to-date essays prepared for a Clark University conference. The most interesting chapters deal with individual "threshold" countries such as South Africa, Iran and Brazil.

GOVERNING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. BY W. HENRY LAMBRIGHT. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976, 218 pp. \$9.00 (Paper, \$4.00).

Elegant in concept and style, this is a long essay which skillfully examines the involvement of the United States government in large-scale technological enterprises such as urban transit, space and atomic power. The author suggests that the pluralist, incrementalist and decentralized approach of the "technoscience" agencies, though perhaps well suited to the American system of governance, fails to provide a needed national perspective or an adequately centralized planning process to help set priorities.

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES OF THE FIRST DECADE OF INTELSAT. BY MARCELLUS S. SNOW. New York: Praeger, 1976, 170 pp. \$16.50.

The author, an academic economist who worked for several years for the Communication Satellite Corporation, evaluates the performance of INTELSAT primarily in terms of economic efficiency and finds that from the point of view of its consumers in the member countries it has been doing "a tolerably good job."

THE ELECTRONIC BATTLEFIELD. BY PAUL DICKSON. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976, 244 pp. \$10.00.

A racy, irreverent, somewhat spotty look at the revolution in warfare coming about as the result of sophisticated small-scale technology. Particularly interesting is the author's discussion of the "McNamara line" in Vietnam.

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND: TWO-THIRDS OF THE TRIAD. BY DAVID A. ANDERTON. New York: Scribner, 1976, 316 pp. \$12.50.

A succinct, detailed but sometimes banal history of this important component of America's deterrence forces.

URBAN TERRORISM: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND RESPONSE. BY ANTHONY M. BURTON. New York: Free Press, 1976, 259 pp. \$12.95.

Another addition to the burgeoning shelf on terrorism, this book, like most of the others, is far more descriptive than prescriptive or analytical. The author, now a member of the advisory committee to Parliament on Northern Ireland, was for 16 years in the British Army.

General: Economic and Social
William Diebold, Jr.

THE HOME OF MAN. BY BARBARA WARD. New York: Norton, 1976, 320 pp. \$8.95 (Paper, \$3.95).

Not only cities, but land-use planning, pollution, poverty and social values make up the subjects of this eloquent author's best book.

THE ECONOMIC CYCLE: POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS. BY S. MENSHIKOV. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975, 390 pp.

Marxist theory, Western data and an econometric model combine to make an interesting comparative analysis of postwar Western business cycles. The ratio of fairly close analysis to generalization is high, and the approach is unpolemical. For some years on the United Nations Secretariat, the author is now with the Institute of World Economics and International Relations in Moscow.

DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT DEPENDENCE. BY PIERRE URI. New York: Praeger (for the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs), 1976, 166 pp. \$16.50. (Paper, \$4.95).

The well-known French economist and activist provides a lively and sensible analysis of what is needed to give developing countries a better place in the world economy. Aid is assigned an important part, but reforms are proposed for trade, money, multinationals and the policies of developing countries themselves.

NINE INVESTMENTS ABROAD AND THEIR IMPACT AT HOME. BY ROBERT B. STOBAUGH AND OTHERS. Cambridge: Harvard Business School (Harvard University Press, distributor), 1976, 222 pp. \$12.00.

These case studies of the employment and balance-of-payments effects of different kinds of business decisions are just the sort of work we need to get beyond generalizations about foreign investment and the multinational corporation.

LES SOCIÉTÉS MULTINATIONALES. BY GILLES-Y. BERTIN. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1975, 248 pp. Fr. 38.

CONTROLLING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: PROBLEMS, STRATEGIES, COUNTERSTRATEGIES. EDITED BY KARL P. SAUVANT AND FARID G. LAVIPOUR. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1976, 335 pp. \$25.00.

A leading French expert, Bertin has produced a survey that is comprehensive and balanced and, for a synthesis, fairly concrete. Sauvant and Lavipour have drawn together a number of papers, documents and tables and provided a substantial bibliography.

TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: SELECTED PAPERS OF C. FRED BERGSTEN, 1972-1974. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1975, 519 pp. \$20.00

Liberation from the White House turned Fred Bergsten into one of our most prolific economists. It is convenient to have these three dozen papers in one volume. Covering a wide range of topics, they are given shape by some ideas about remaking the international economic order.

THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM—THE EXCHANGE CRISIS. BY MICHAEL J. BRENNAN. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1976, 144 pp. \$13.50

FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES—THE LESSONS OF RECENT EXPERIENCE. EDITED BY H. FOURNIER AND J. E. WADSWORTH. Leiden: Sijthoff, 1976, 229 pp. \$19.50.

"How we got here" and "where we are" might be the titles for these helpful books. Brenner, a political scientist, deploys all the latest fashions in terms and catchwords but then settles down to a valuable analytic history of how government officials and central bankers coped with the troubles of the early 1970s. He stresses short-run views and partial approaches to what became a major change in the system. The largely European contributors to the other volume, many of them bankers and businessmen, discuss the results as of autumn 1974.

ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1934-1939. BY FREDERICK C. ADAMS. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1976, 289 pp. \$12.50.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND THE WORLD BANK. BY ROBERT W. OLIVER. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975, 421 pp. \$25.00.

BALANCE OF POWER OR HEGEMONY: THE INTERWAR MONETARY SYSTEM. EDITED BY BENJAMIN M. ROWLAND. New York: New York University Press (for the Lehrman Institute), 1976, 266 pp. \$10.95.

Three good history books pertinent to current issues. Adams provides a solid base of analysis of the 1920s and early 1930s before relating the Exim Bank to U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R., China, Japan and Latin America. By stressing the origins of the World Bank, Oliver avoids more than a chapter or two of overlap with the Mason and Asher book of 1973 and provides much original material. The six authors of the Lehrman Institute volume focus sharply on the theme of hegemony or pluralism as a condition for monetary order.

CMEA TODAY: FROM ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. BY NINEL BAUTINA. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975, 178 pp.

DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN BEZIEHUNGEN ZWISCHEN WEST UND OST. BY HANNS-DIETER JACOBSEN. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1975, 175 pp.

As the subtitle hints, Professor Bautina of Moscow University is strong on the advantages of the international division of labor for Comecon countries. The level of discussion leaves some issues a bit general but there is an interesting discussion of prices and the need for flexibility. Jacobsen covers all the aspects of East-West economic relations with copious references to the literature.

EIGHT MINERAL CARTELS: THE NEW CHALLENGE TO INDUSTRIAL NATIONS. EDITED BY K. W. CLARFIELD AND OTHERS. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976, 177 pp. \$45.00.

Facts, narrative and some analysis of producer arrangements in oil, tin, copper, bauxite, iron ore, lead, mercury and tungsten. Uneven but useful.

KOMMUNISMUS OHNE WACHSTUM? BABEUF UND DER "CLUB OF ROME." BY WOLFGANG HARICH. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1975, 206 pp. DM. 18.50.

Slow- or no-growth ideas have not fared well in communist circles, but Harich, an East German philosopher once jailed by his government, invokes Soviet scientists and others in support of the ecological reasoning that makes him opposed to industrial expansion. Equal distribution enforced by strong governments is his prescription (hence Babeuf). Freimut Duve, the West German interlocutor, finds additional implications in these slightly repetitive interviews with Harich.

EMPLOYMENT, INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF H. W. SINGER. EDITED BY SIR ALEC CAIRNCROSS AND MOHINDER PURI. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976, 264 pp. \$24.00.

An impressive group of people writing on important subjects in honor of one of the best of the U.N. development team.

OPEC: SUCCESS AND PROSPECTS. BY DANKWART A. RUSTOW AND JOHN F. MUGNO. New York: New York University Press (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1976, 160 pp. \$8.95.

The rational pursuit of self-interest; skill in seeing that all that need be agreed on is price; a confirmation of the Point Four idea that the vital transfer is technical skill—these are some of the attributes which lead the authors of this lively analysis to conclude that OPEC is solidly based and likely to be durable. They believe the world can live with it.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF ENERGY INTERDEPENDENCE: THE CASE OF PETROLEUM. BY NAZLI CHOUCRI, WITH VINCENT FERRARO. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1976, 250 pp. \$20.00.

OIL: A GUIDE THROUGH THE TOTAL ENERGY JUNGLE. BY PHILIP WINDSOR. Boston: Gambit, 1976, 182 pp. \$8.95.

PETRODOLLAR: CHANCE FÜR DIE KOOPERATIVE WELTWIRTSCHAFT. BY RAINER JONAS AND HORST MINTE. Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1975, 184 pp. DM. 18.

Three books about oil interdependence that all point in the same direction: producer-consumer cooperation. The scholarly work of Professor Choucri of MIT traces many sets of interdependencies in detail, showing whose consent is needed for what. Mr. Windsor of the London School of Economics stresses fundamental political relations. The German authors put their emphasis on moving from partial cooperation (OPEC, recycling) to the larger work necessary to build a new international economic order.

SQUEAKING BY: U.S. ENERGY POLICY SINCE THE EMBARGO. BY RICHARD B. MANCKE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976, 181 pp. \$8.95.

THE ECONOMICS OF THE OIL CRISIS. EDITED BY T. M. RYBCZYNSKI. New York: Holmes & Meier (for the Trade Policy Research Centre, London), 1976, 202 pp. \$24.00.

DEUX ANS DE CRISE PÉTROLIÈRE. BY FRANÇOIS GIHEL. Paris: Éditions Techniques et Économiques, 1975, 174 pp. Fr. 29.

Policies and their defects concern these authors. Professor Mancke of Fletcher School tells his story in his title; a bit breathlessly, he takes a stand on almost every issue of the recent past and near future. The Trade Policy Research Centre brought together the contributors to the second book who worry about the impact of the oil crisis on the international trading and financial system. Gihel's pieces appeared in *La Revue de l'Énergie* during 1974 and 1975 and covered technical, economic and political issues.

A WORLD DIVIDED: THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY. EDITED BY G. K. HELLEINER. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976, 299 pp. \$25.00 (Paper, \$11.95).

Some excellent essays on extremely current issues.

LOSING GROUND: ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS AND WORLD FOOD PROSPECTS. BY ERIK P. ECKHOLM. New York: Norton (for the Worldwatch Institute), 1976, 223 pp. \$7.95.

Much of the title is literal: this is a book about deserts, salination, dust bowls, deforestation, and other factors undermining the ability of the world to feed itself.

ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIONAL POLICY: A SYMPOSIUM ON REGIONAL PROBLEMS IN BRITAIN AND IRELAND. EDITED BY JOHN VAIZEY. New York: Halsted Press, 1976, 281 pp. \$22.50.

Irish, Welsh, Scottish and English contributions to a set of subjects linking regional, national and Community policies.

THE FUTURE OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE. BY PETER J. BUCKLEY AND MARK CASSON. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976, 116 pp. \$16.00.

Emphasizing the internalization of knowledge as a key to profitability and multinationality, two British academics construct a theory and speculate on how slower growth in the future will affect the MNCs. Not revolutionary, their case is well argued; empirical testing and comparison with other theories help make this one of the best recent books on the subject.

THE INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF NATIONAL FIRMS: A STUDY OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT. BY STEPHEN H. HYMER. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976, 253 pp. \$12.50.

Best known for his stimulating and sometimes radical essays on international business, the late Stephen Hymer wrote a doctoral dissertation at MIT in 1960 which was highly influential in exploding the idea that direct investment can largely be explained by capital movements. After a long "underground" existence it is now published, with an attractive introduction by Hymer's teacher Charles Kindleberger, who did his part in spreading its influence.

DEMOCRATISING THE WEALTH OF NATIONS FROM NEW MONEY SOURCES AND PROFIT MOTIVES. BY SHANN TURNBULL. Sydney: Company Directors Association of Australia, Ltd., 1975, 103 pp.

An Australian businessman's prescription for "social capitalism" in which land, resources and manufacturing are cooperatively owned and run by participatory democracy.

The United States
Gaddis Smith

LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM. BY DORIS KEARNS. New York: Harper & Row, 1976, 432 pp. \$12.50.

A fascinating and controversial psychobiography of Lyndon Johnson which relates traumas of childhood to his political behavior. Based primarily on long and extraordinarily intimate monologues delivered by Johnson to the author, an audience of one.

ON WATCH: A MEMOIR. BY ELMO R. ZUMWALT, JR., Admiral USN (Ret.). New York: Quadrangle, 568 pp. \$12.50.

An outspoken, combative account of the author's "watch" as Chief of Naval Operations 1970-74. The heaviest gunfire is directed against Secretary of State Kissinger (quoted as believing that the U.S. is in irreversible decline) and Admiral Rickover ("a persistent and formidable obstacle to . . . modernizing the Navy"). An important book.

THE EDUCATION OF A PUBLIC MAN: MY LIFE AND POLITICS. BY HUBERT H. HUMPHREY. Garden City: Doubleday, 1976, 513 pp. \$12.50.

A political autobiography displaying the author's familiar folksy enthusiasms mixed with some surprisingly barbed criticism and a touch of whine.

THE CREATIVE BALANCE: GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY. BY ELLIOT RICHARDSON. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976, 390 pp. \$12.95.

A reflective philosophical examination, laced with some autobiography, of obstacles to balanced government, order and liberty, broad responsible participation by citizens in government, and a renewed sense of purpose to life and politics.

ATLANTIS LOST: U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR. EDITED BY JAMES CHACE AND EARL C. RAVENAL. New York: New York University Press (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1976, 273 pp. \$20.00.

Thoughtful but rather repetitive essays, by ten American experts including Stanley Hoffmann and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Most of the authors eschew hortatory rhetoric while speculating about the unknowable future. None believe a closer U.S.-European relationship is probable.

THE ALMS RACE: THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN VOLUNTARY AID ABROAD. BY EUGENE LINDEN. New York: Random House, 1976, 275 pp. \$10.00.

A young free-lance writer's dissection, using Lesotho as a case study, of the mixed motives and counter-productive results of American charity overseas.

THE BEST-LAID SCHEMES: A TALE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH AND BUREAUCRACY. BY SEYMOUR J. DEITCHMAN. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976, 483 pp. \$14.95.

A personal account by a responsible participant of the fiasco which resulted from the U.S. government's efforts in the mid-1960s to sponsor social science research as an aid to the waging of counterinsurgency warfare.

MEN AGAINST MCCARTHY. BY RICHARD M. FRIED. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976, 428 pp. \$14.95.

There are many theories concerning the origins of McCarthyism. This one argues that the Wisconsin Senator's campaign was the product primarily of a Republican effort to discredit a Democratic Administration and that the Democratic defense was inept.

THE MAN WHO PARDONED NIXON. BY CLARK MOLLENHOFF. New York: St. Martin, 1976, 312 pp. \$10.00.

An angry but careful polemic by a veteran investigative reporter. The book conveys the same sense of betrayal as the author's earlier (1975) *Game Plan for Disaster*.

"I NEVER WANTED TO BE VICE-PRESIDENT OF ANYTHING!" AN INVESTIGATIVE BIOGRAPHY OF NELSON ROCKEFELLER. BY MICHAEL KRAMER AND SAM ROBERTS. New York: Basic Books, 1976, 410 pp. \$12.50.

Lively, fast-paced political journalism. The authors stress Rockefeller's total devotion to political ambition and the power derived from family money.

V WAS FOR VICTORY: POLITICS AND AMERICAN CULTURE DURING WORLD WAR II. BY JOHN MORTON BLUM. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976, 372 pp. \$12.95.

Learned commentary on the limitations of American aims in both the domestic and international arenas during the Second World War. Visionaries like Wendell Willkie and Henry A. Wallace offered great dreams and were repudiated. American society wanted military victory and economic security, not sacrifice for a reformed world.

NEWS FOR EVERYMAN: RADIO AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THIRTIES AMERICA. BY DAVID HOLBROOK CULBERT. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1976, 238 pp. \$13.50.

A pioneering analysis of the content and impact of radio broadcast journalism on American public awareness of foreign affairs. Detailed chapters on Boake Carter, H. V. Kaltenborn, Raymond Gram Swing, Elmer Davis, Fulton Lewis, Jr., and Edward R. Murrow.

THE IMPERIAL YEARS: THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1939. BY ALONZO L. HAMBY. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1976, 429 pp. \$14.95 (Paper, \$6.95).

A readable synthesis emphasizing national politics and public events. Thin on the economic side.

THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA: SINCE 1945. BY GEORGE H. NASH. New York: Basic Books, 1976, 463 pp. \$20.00.

Historians of American thought have written predominantly about liberals and radicals; this well-written study is the first to take seriously a group of conservative writers who have achieved prominence since the Second World War.

THE BEST YEARS: 1945-1950. BY JOSEPH C. GOULDEN. New York: Atheneum, 1976, 468 pp. \$12.95.

Popular social history at its best in a style developed years ago by Frederick Lewis Allen. Any American over 40 will recognize the accuracy of this portrait of five extraordinary years.

ROOSEVELT AND ROMANISM: CATHOLICS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1937-1945. BY GEORGE Q. FLYNN. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1976, 268 pp. \$13.95.

A detailed and competent study of the opinions of Catholic leaders as they shifted from isolationism to interventionism and, toward the end of World War II, began to criticize President Roosevelt's policies toward the Soviet Union. Extensive use of Catholic newspapers and periodicals.

THE ORIGINS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN. BY JOHN GIMBEL. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976, 344 pp. \$15.00.

The best historical discussion of the Marshall Plan yet to appear. The author has an original thesis: the Plan flowed from an American effort to circumvent French, not Russian, obstruction to German economic revival. Excellent on the bureaucratic antagonisms within the U.S. government.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. BY THOMAS S. ESTES AND E. ALLAN LIGHTNER, JR. New York: Praeger, 1976, 272 pp. \$10.00.

A straightforward, useful description by two former Foreign Service officers of long experience. The book is one of a series on U.S. Government Departments and Agencies.

The Western Hemisphere
Robert D. Crassweller

THE ARCTIC IN QUESTION. EDITED BY E. J. DOSMAN. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976, 206 pp. \$4.95 (Paper).

Historical and policy-oriented essays which share the conviction that the Canadian government has neglected to assert and defend Canada's sovereignty over Arctic waters with sufficient vigor. The tone is nationalistic and anti-American. The content is highly informative. G.S.

BRITAIN AND CANADA: SURVEY OF A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP. EDITED BY PETER LYON. London: Frank Cass, 1976, 191 pp. (Portland, Ore.: International Scholarly Book Services, distributor, \$22.50).

The fact that this volume is the first to examine Canada's relations with Great Britain in many years, while U.S.-Canadian studies breed like rabbits, is in itself a commentary on how the meaning has drained from what was once the Dominion's most important external tie. The essays, by Canadian and British scholars and public figures, are of high quality. G.S.

CANADIANS IN RUSSIA 1918-1919. BY ROY MACLAREN. Toronto: Maclean-Hunter Press, 1976, 301 pp. \$15.95.

This is the best written and most comprehensive of several recent studies which have retrieved from near oblivion the fact that Canadian troops participated in the Allied interventions of 1918-19 in Russia. G.S.

L'ACCESSION À LA SOUVERAINETÉ ET LE CAS DU QUÉBEC. BY JACQUES BROSSARD. Montreal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1976, 800 pp. \$8.25 (Paper).

A thorough, dispassionate examination of the political and legal ramifications which would accompany the acquisition of national sovereignty by Quebec. G.S.

GOVERNMENT IN CANADA. BY THOMAS A. HOCKIN. New York: Norton, 1976, 252 pp. \$11.95.

A useful descriptive introduction to Canadian federal and provincial government. The author emphasizes government's role as initiator rather than mirror of change in society. G.S.

LATIN AMERICA'S NEW INTERNATIONALISM: THE END OF HEMISPHERIC ISOLATION. EDITED BY ROBERT W. FONTAINE AND JAMES D. THEBERGE. New York: Praeger, 1976, 327 pp. \$21.50.

More useful, and more skillfully assembled than most such compilations, these twelve essays devoted to an important and often neglected subject cover all geographic regions and political groupings as well as specific topics such as energy, arms, nuclear proliferation and raw materials. Robert Fontaine contributes a salutary and interesting historical overview.

EDUCATION, CLASS AND NATION: THE EXPERIENCES OF CHILE AND VENEZUELA. BY KALMAN H. SILVERT AND LEONARD REISSMAN. New York: Elsevier, 1976, 242 pp. \$13.50.

The authors regard education as the most important socializing agency and therefore approach their theme of social and political change through its impact on the "attitudes and abilities of students in civic life." The methodology blends theory, quantitative and historical evidence, and interpretation.

THE GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO ALLENDE. BY MARKOS J. MAMALAKIS. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976, 390 pp. \$20.00.

This is a technically oriented and thoroughly footnoted analysis in depth of economic growth, defined in terms of changes in production, distribution, and capital formation, and the morphology and interactions of these developments.

THE MILITARY IN CHILEAN HISTORY: ESSAYS ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, 1810-1973. BY FREDERICK M. NUNN. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976, 343 pp. \$15.00.

The distinctive and often misunderstood role of the military receives detailed and sound analysis. Recognizing the reality of various foreign pressures directed against the Allende government, the author concludes that it is incorrect to "assume that economic sanctions, cutbacks in aid, grants and loans, and the expenditure of millions for harassment of the Chilean government *caused* that government's demise."

ALLENDE'S CHILE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE UNIDAD POPULAR. BY STEFAN DE VYLDER. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976, 251 pp. \$13.95.

Noting that the Unidad Popular never came close to its goal of attaining power in society as a whole, and rejecting economic crisis as the cause of the anti-Allende coup, the author argues that by the time the military assumed power, the administration had already been politically and economically defeated on other battlegrounds.

STRUGGLE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE: POLITICS AND RURAL LABOR IN CHILE, 1919-1973. BY BRIAN LOVEMAN. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976, 439 pp. \$12.50.

The subject is the transformations of property in the countryside and rural activism and labor conflict. ". . . it was the radical alterations of the political meaning of property in rural land from 1964 to 1973 that destroyed the foundations of Chilean formal democracy—a democracy that rested heavily on the back of the Chilean *campesino*."

THE LATIN AMERICAN PEASANT. BY ANDREW PEARCE. London: Frank Cass, 1975, 289 pp. (Forest Grove, Ore.: International Scholarly Book Services, distributor, \$19.50; Paper, \$10.00).

Utilizing field material from nine countries (Cuba is included; Venezuela and Argentina are not), a British sociologist describes and analyzes land tenure, peasant and labor force organizations, rural life patterns, activism, production, and related topics.

OIL AND POLITICS IN MODERN BRAZIL. BY PETER SEABORN SMITH. Toronto: Maclean-Hunter Press, 1976, 289 pp. \$19.95.

OIL IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF VENEZUELA. BY JORGE SALAZAR-CARRILLO. New York: Praeger, 1976, 215 pp. \$17.50.

The origins and evolution of the petroleum industries in both Brazil and Venezuela have been atypical, but in every other aspect the policies and experiences of the two countries have been almost completely divergent. The contrasts thus engendered are striking.

THE HOVERING GIANT: U.S. RESPONSES TO REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA. BY COLE BLASIER. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976, 315 pp. \$15.95.

Dr. Blasier, who possesses both diplomatic and academic credentials, defines three stages of revolutionary change and investigates the U.S. response to each of them in the cases of Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala and Cuba. He also refers to U.S. policy in Peru, Chile and the Dominican Republic, and provides a detailed description of Latin American seizures of U.S. property.

THE EMBATTLED COLOSSUS: ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND UNITED STATES INVESTORS IN LATIN AMERICA. BY ROBERT H. SWANSBOROUGH. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1976, 251 pp. \$12.50.

Recent policies and activities generated in this hyperactive field are reviewed. The author attributes attacks on U.S. interests in part to our government's neglect of Latin America, and urges a revival of Alliance for Progress goals through a partnership between the U.S. and local governments and U.S. investors.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE MULTINATIONALS: A STRATEGY FOR TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA. BY STEPHAN H. HELLINGER AND DOUGLAS A. HELLINGER. Port Washington (N.Y.): Kennikat Press, 1976, 158 pp. \$12.50.

The activities of multinational corporations are analyzed here from the point of view of their impact on local labor and employment. The authors advocate labor-intensive investment and more reliance on local resources.

Western Europe
Fritz Stern

MENSCHEN, DIE WISSEN, WORUM ES GEHT. BY MARION GRÄFIN DÖNHOF. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1976, 259 pp. DM. 28.

The longtime editor of *Die Zeit*, in one of Germany's most eloquent voices of reason, presents the portraits of 17 men she has known, among them some of the quiet heroes of her youth who belonged to the Resistance against Hitler and were killed in the aftermath of the 20th of July, as well as Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, Helmut Schmidt and other present-day figures. A haunting evocation of the essence of men in past and present, written with moral passion and political realism; an example of a great forgotten art, the biographical essay as history.

MUSSOLINI'S ROMAN EMPIRE. BY DENIS MACK SMITH. New York: Viking, 1976, 322 pp. \$12.95.

A superb analysis of Mussolini's march from Rome to imperial adventure and ultimate doom. Written by an outstanding historian, with a fine sense of the interplay of personality and historical condition and with a deft literary touch. A vivid picture of Mussolini's skills as a dramatist and his many political misapprehensions. A major work on Fascism as it really was.

L'AUTRE REGARD. BY MICHEL JOBERT. Paris: Grasset, 1976, 416 pp. Fr. 48.

The former French Foreign Minister, a Gaullist by conviction and temperament, recalls important episodes of the past 10 years, always from his independent and acerbic viewpoint, articulate and revealing.

THE PAST MASTERS: POLITICS AND POLITICIANS, 1906-1939. BY HAROLD MACMILLAN. New York: Harper & Row, 1976, 240 pp. \$15.00.

Portraits of some of his notable predecessors (including Baldwin, Churchill, and Neville Chamberlain) and essays on major themes (including "women in politics"), all from a time when Parliament was at the center of British public life. A wise and splendid work, obviously sharpened by the author's intimate knowledge of the political milieu. Superbly illustrated.

LECTURES ON FASCISM. BY PALMIRO TOGLIATTI. New York: International Publishers, 1976, 172 pp. \$6.95 (Paper, \$2.95).

In 1935 in Moscow, the former leader of the Italian Communist Party delivered these intelligent and relatively self-critical variations on the Comintern's sterile definition: "Fascism is the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, most imperialist elements of finance capital." This is still Soviet orthodoxy today.

L'ALLEMAGNE ET LE GÉNÉRAL DE GAULLE. BY JACQUES BINOCHÉ. Paris: Plon, 1975, 228 pp.

The first book in a new series dedicated to the cultivation of de Gaulle's memory is a fascinating selection of various German views on the General over nearly 50 years. Judging from de Gaulle's remarkable *La Discorde chez l'ennemi* and this work, one must conclude that de Gaulle understood the Germans far better than they him.

EUROPE AND THE WORLD: THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE COMMON MARKET. EDITED BY KENNETH J. TWITCHETT. New York: St. Martin (for the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, London), 1976, 210 pp. \$16.95.

Seven essays by well-known British experts on various aspects of the foreign relations of the EEC. The volume is singularly informative, and the assessment realistic: there is little likelihood of the emergence of a Community foreign policy, but the Community presence, gradually more cohesive, will be felt ever more keenly in the world.

30 ANS D'EUROPE, 1945-1975. BY FRANÇOIS VISINE. Paris: Éditions Techniques et Économiques, 1975, 148 pp. Fr. 29.

A skeleton history and detailed chronology of the movement toward European unity by a committed Europeanist, written for the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Schuman Plan. A useful reference work.

POLITICS OF FRUSTRATION: THE UNITED STATES IN GERMAN NAVAL PLANNING, 1889-1941. BY HOLGER H. HERWIG. Boston: Little, Brown, 1976, 320 pp. \$18.00.

A scholarly study of the perception of the U.S. in German naval planning from the first clash of interests in the Pacific from the end of the last century to the early years of Hitler's war. The book attempts to analyze German planning in the context of the often divided German leadership, and scrutinizes rather critically the currently fashionable emphasis on purely economic motives for defense and imperial policies.

THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS IN BRITAIN. BY WILLIAM WALLACE. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1976, 320 pp. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, distributor, \$22.50).

A major study of the origins and constraints of foreign policy, the mechanics of its evolution, and the pattern of its execution in certain key areas. A British scholar regrets the absence of sharp, clear-cut debate on foreign policy issues and offers some recommendations for reform.

THE NEW GERMANS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER. BY JOHN DORNBERG. New York: Macmillan, 1976, 293 pp. \$11.95.

A former bureau chief of *Newsweek* in Bonn writes an optimistic assessment of present-day Germany, though with some concern about such issues as the fate of foreign workers in the Federal Republic and the plight of educational reforms. The book is better than its opening chapter title: "Is schizophrenia curable?" Is sensationalism necessary?

THREE FRENCH WRITERS AND THE GREAT WAR: STUDIES IN THE RISE OF COMMUNISM AND FASCISM. BY FRANK FIELD. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 212 pp. \$13.95.

The literary origins of three writers—Barbusse, Drieu La Rochelle and Bernanos—in the horror of the trenches, and how they responded by rallying to the meta-political ideologies of energy and salvation. A suggestive contribution to the study of the appeal of totalitarianism and of the intellectual climate of the interwar years. To emphasize the relevance of his work the author, an English historian, quotes Bernanos: "Every twenty years the youth of the world pose a question to which our society cannot make an answer. For the lack of an answer it mobilises."

LAW AND STATE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. BY KEVIN BOYLE, TOM HADDEN AND PADDY HILLYARD. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1975, 194 pp. \$10.00.

A short, trenchant analysis of the changing role of law during the last five years of growing communal conflict in Ulster. An unusual mixture of detachment, expertise, and *engagement*, with important observations on the place of law in society generally.

SPAIN IN THE 1970s: ECONOMICS, SOCIAL STRUCTURE, FOREIGN POLICY. EDITED BY WILLIAM T. SALISBURY AND JAMES D. THEBERGE. New York: Praeger, 1976, 187 pp. \$22.00.

A collection of essays, uneven but generally informative, on the modernization of the Spanish economy and society, and on the problems of its foreign policy; an outgrowth of a conference held in 1973, with some additional papers commissioned since.

DER ADENAUER: SUBJEKTIVE BEOBACHTUNGEN EINES UNBEQUEMEN WEGGENOSSEN. BY GERD BUCERIOUS. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1976, 110 pp. DM. 9.80.

A former member of the Bundestag and a leading publisher recalls various facets of Adenauer's political style and career. The two men collaborated and quarreled and this pleasant little book emphasizes the foxiness of the great leader. Much of it is familiar—with, however, some new nuances.

DIPLOMATS AND BUREAUCRATS: THE FIRST INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO TWENTIETH-CENTURY DIPLOMACY IN FRANCE AND GERMANY. BY PAUL GORDON LAUREN. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976, 294 pp. \$11.00.

A useful but rather mechanical study of the changing structures and organizations of the French and German Foreign Offices from 1900 to 1920. Based on archival sources and of interest to specialists.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe John C. Campbell

THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV. EDITED BY ARCHIE BROWN AND MICHAEL KASER. New York: Free Press, 1976, 284 pp. \$13.95.

Well-balanced essays by a group of Britain's best-known experts on the U.S.S.R. Writing ostensibly for the general reader, they give their cautious and carefully defined judgments on the Brezhnev regime with an eye over the shoulder to the critical views of their fellow experts.

SOVIET STRATEGY IN EUROPE. EDITED BY RICHARD PIPES. New York: Crane, Russak, 1976, 316 pp. \$14.50 (Paper, \$7.50).

The Soviet view and practice of détente—political, military, economic—interpreted by a number of knowledgeable Western observers. As might be expected from the list of authors (which includes Michel Tatu, Thomas Wolfe and John Erickson) the tone is one of tough realism.

FROM THE COLD WAR TO DETENTE. EDITED BY PETER J. POTICHNYJ AND JANE P. SHAPIRO. New York: Praeger, 1976, 223 pp. \$20.00.

Various reassessments of the origins of the cold war and speculations about détente (as of 1974) mainly as it affects Eastern Europe. The essays are competent, some even stimulating, but the book's reach is well beyond its performance.

DETENTE AND SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY: A DISCUSSION WITH ROY MEDVEDEV. EDITED BY KEN COATES. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976, 163 pp. \$9.00 (Paper, \$2.45).

Medvedev's views on détente and its relation to the growth of freedom reprinted from *New Left Review* and discussed in separate essays by a number of European socialists.

VOORUZHENNYE SILY SOVETSKOGO GOSUDARSTVA. BY A. A. GRECHKO. Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1975, 2nd ed., 438 pp.

MORSKAIA MOSHCH' GOSUDARSTVA. BY S. G. GORSHKOV. Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1976, 463 pp.

Much in these works is standard boilerplate, but the eminence of the authors, the late Minister of Defense and the Commander of the Fleet respectively, lends authority to the doctrines, facts and opinions here presented. They deserve careful study in Western capitals.

STALIN AS MILITARY COMMANDER. BY ALBERT SEATON. New York: Praeger, 1976, 312 pp. \$15.00.

The author of the massive *Russo-German War 1941-1945* has the best of credentials for assessing Stalin's military role. This excellent, careful study gives him ample blame for the defeats of the first years of the war and ungrudging credit for the great victories of 1944.

STALIN'S MASTERPIECE: THE SHOW TRIALS AND PURGES OF THE THIRTIES—THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK DICTATORSHIP. BY JOEL CARMICHAEL. New York: St. Martin, 1976, 238 pp. \$10.00.

This history of Stalin's "charades" does not rival Robert Conquest's *The Great Terror*, but Carmichael is always interesting and he skillfully illustrates his argument that the entire enterprise reflected not just Stalin's paranoia but the logic of the Soviet system.

VLADIVOSTOK UNDER RED AND WHITE RULE: REVOLUTION AND COUNTERREVOLUTION IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST, 1920-1922. BY CANFIELD F. SMITH. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976, 304 pp. \$11.00.

A model monograph on the Far Eastern phase of the Civil War hitherto largely ignored by Western scholars. Careful research illuminates the record and especially the failures of the White regime and the key role of the Japanese.

ON TROTSKYISM: PROBLEMS OF THEORY AND HISTORY. BY KOSTAS MAVRAKIS. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976, 248 pp. \$12.50 (Paper).

A demolition of Trotsky as theorist and of Trotskyism as a valid revolutionary movement by a former member of the French Communist Party, now a Maoist. The original French edition was published in 1971.

ENERGY AS A FACTOR IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. BY JEREMY RUSSELL. Westmead (Eng.): Saxon House/Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1976, 241 pp. £7.50.

The latest and best, by an experienced oil man, on Soviet energy resources and policy, using Soviet data extensively and interpreting them cautiously. No literary gem, but a really valuable reference work.

THE GREEN FLAG: POLISH POPULIST POLITICS 1867-1970. BY OLGA A. NARKIEWICZ. Totowa (N.J.): Rowman and Littlefield, 1976, 293 pp. \$17.50.

Not traditional history but an absorbing narrative of the peasant movement in Poland over the past century, based on thorough scholarship and marked by keen judgments and frank opinions. A major point is the persistence of peasant populism as a political factor in present-day Poland.

POLAND AND THE COMING OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE DIPLOMATIC PAPERS OF A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR., UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO POLAND, 1937-1939. EDITED BY PHILIP V. CANNISTRARO, EDWARD D. WYNOT, JR., AND THEODORE P. KOVALEFF. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976, 358 pp. \$17.50.

Biddle's "Report," written in Paris after the fall of Poland, is a real find. It is admirably annotated by the editors, who have also appended 150 pages of letters to President Roosevelt and diplomatic dispatches written by Biddle when in Poland.

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF EAST GERMANY. BY KURT SONTHEIMER AND WILHELM BLEEK. New York: St. Martin, 1976, 205 pp. \$10.95.

Two West German scholars give a concise and objective picture of the G.D.R., from origins and political institutions to foreign relations and "inner German" policy.

THE MASARYKS: THE MAKING OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. BY ZBYNĚK ZEMAN. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976, 230 pp. \$16.50.

A popular biography of Thomas Masaryk, with brief final chapters on the tragic career of his son. Zeman is sympathetic to his subjects but completely honest in presenting them as men, not myths.

LA QUESTIONE DEI SUDETI, 1918-1938. BY FRANCESCO LEONCINI. Padua: Liviana, 1976, 512 pp. L.18.00.

One more in the long succession of books on the Sudeten German question and the Munich crisis. The author has consulted all the others (his bibliography covers 127 pages) but his lucid text is not quite overwhelmed by the footnotes.

THE PARISH REPUBLIC: HLINKA'S SLOVAK PEOPLE'S PARTY, 1939-1945. BY YESHAYAHU A. JELINEK. Boulder (Col.): East European Quarterly, 1976, 206 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, \$11.50).

This is a rarity, a balanced and factual book about Slovakia's clerical fascists and the "independent" wartime state. The author, an Israeli scholar, could not consult primary sources in Czechoslovakia but has found much material elsewhere.

BRITISH POLICY IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. BY ELISABETH BARKER. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976, 320 pp. \$27.50.

Burrowing in the now-open British wartime documents, Miss Barker has unearthed much fascinating material and given us a most welcome book—clear, judicious, and (despite the author's disclaimers) thorough. It dispels the fog long surrounding a number of controversial issues.

ALBANIA DEFIANT. BY JAN MYRDAL AND GUN KESSLE. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976, 185 pp. \$11.95.

A left-wing Swedish view of Communist Albania, mixing romantic history with contemporary (1969) observation and suffused with enthusiasm for the Hoxha regime and the Albanian people, regarded here as synonymous. The Swedish original appeared in 1970.

The Middle East and North Africa
John C. Campbell

ISRAEL DIVIDED: IDEOLOGICAL POLITICS IN THE JEWISH STATE. BY RAELEEN ISAAC. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, 227 pp. \$10.95.

The end of consensus on Israeli foreign policy with the rising influence of the Land of Israel Movement on the right and the Peace Movement on the left. The polarization of politics described in this penetrating study leads to deeply pessimistic conclusions.

THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE ISRAELI LABOUR PARTY: THE ORGANIZATION OF POWER 1919-1930. BY YONATHAN SHAPIRO. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976, 278 pp. \$13.50.

The story of Ahdut Ha'avodah—its origins in Russian political culture, its ideology, leadership, and factional struggles—up to the formation of Mapai in 1930. Essential background to the politics of independent Israel.

ISRAEL IN THE THIRD WORLD. EDITED BY MICHAEL CURTIS AND SUSAN AURELIA GITELSON. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1976, 410 pp. \$19.95 (Paper, \$6.95).

Two dozen short essays, many by Israeli practitioners, on Israel's political strategy and aid programs in Asia, Latin America, and particularly Africa. Those describing the accomplishments of the earlier years are better than those which attempt to explain Third World attitudes and record the political disasters that overtook those accomplishments.

THE ARABS IN ISRAEL. BY SABRI JIRYIS. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976, 314 pp. \$12.50.

Essentially an exposé and denunciation of Israel's policies toward its Arab citizens, this book by a member of that minority, now living abroad, is worth reading for information as well as for its reflection of Arab feelings. An earlier version was published in Hebrew in 1966.

FROM THE WINGS: AMMAN MEMOIRS 1947-1951. BY SIR ALEC KIRKBRIDE. London: Frank Cass, 1976, 159 pp. (Portland, Ore.: International Scholarly Book Services, distributor, \$13.50).

Informal and informative recollections of a British public servant who was 30 years in Transjordan and a close friend of King Abdullah. Supplementing his earlier *A Crackle of Thorns*, they cover the period of Jordan's takeover of the West Bank, Abdullah's abortive talks with Golda Meir, and his assassination.

ARAFAT: THE MAN AND THE MYTH. BY THOMAS KIERNAN. New York: Norton, 1976, 281 pp. \$9.95.

Better than the standard journalist's quickie, this fairly substantial biography is based on an impressive amount of little-known information on the PLO leader's early career tracked down in the Middle East. Not much on the more recent period.

MIDDLE EAST OIL MONEY AND ITS FUTURE EXPENDITURE. BY NICHOLAS FALLON. New York: Crane, Russak, 1975, 230 pp. \$25.50.

ARAB OIL: IMPACT ON THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS. EDITED BY NAJEM A. SHERBINY AND MARK A. TESSLER. New York: Praeger, 1976, 327 pp. \$21.50.

SAUDI ARABIA AND OIL DIPLOMACY. BY SHEIKH RUSTUM ALI. New York: Praeger, 1976, 197 pp. \$18.50.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRANIAN OIL INDUSTRY. BY FEREIDUN FESHARAKI. New York: Praeger, 1976, 315 pp. \$21.50.

The flow of books spurred by the energy crisis continues. Fallon writes mainly for businessmen and provides useful data as of the time of writing. The Sherbiny and Tessler book is a mixed bag of essays which do not shine with originality but represent a fairly high level of scholarship. The book on Iranian oil is comprehensive; that on Saudi Arabia is focused on use of the "oil weapon" in 1973-74 and concludes that it cannot be effectively used in the future.

THE KUWAIT FUND AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARAB REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT. BY SOLIMAN DEMIR. New York: Praeger, 1976, 138 pp. \$16.50.

A survey of the Kuwait Fund, rather sketchy but useful for basic information and statistics and for light on the Fund's relation both to specific Kuwait interests and to larger Arab concerns.

BAHRAIN: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN A MODERNIZING SOCIETY. BY EMILE A. NAKHLEH. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1976, 191 pp. \$16.00.

For the political scientists in search of a model, Bahrain illustrates "urban tribalism" as a logical synthesis of traditional tribalism and modernity. On the way to his conclusion Nakhleh tells us a great deal about politics and society in a small Gulf state.

THE WARRIOR DIPLOMATS. BY METIN TAMKOÇ. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976, 394 pp. \$12.00.

A curious book which is simultaneously a set of biographical sketches of Turkey's leaders from the time of Ataturk, a handbook of politics, and a disjointed survey of foreign policy. Extensive use of Turkish sources adds to its value.

Asia and the Pacific *Lewis C. Austin*

WIND IN THE TOWER: MAO TSETUNG AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION, 1949-1975. BY HAN SUYIN. Boston: Little, Brown, 1976, 376 pp. \$12.95.

This second volume completes a massive and sympathetic biography of Mao which is at the same time a penetrating assessment of the complex development of modern Chinese politics.

MAO TSETUNG AND CHINA. BY C. P. FITZGERALD. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976, 166 pp. \$9.00.

"I can appreciate a first-class book when it comes my way," says the writer of the foreword, A. L. Rowse; and the reviewer can only agree. This is the best short book on Mao yet to appear: the historian's craft at its classic best.

CHINA IN WORLD POLITICS. BY J. P. JAIN. New Delhi: Radiant, 1976, 373 pp. Rs. 65.

AFTER MAO WHAT? ARMY, PARTY AND GROUP RIVALRIES IN CHINA. BY J. P. JAIN. New Delhi: Radiant, 1976, 276 pp. Rs. 60.

The first book is concerned particularly with Chinese relations with Great Britain. The second predicts that, in the China that will follow Mao, army will outweigh party.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: A BIOGRAPHY. VOLUME ONE, 1889-1947. BY SARVEPALLI GOPAL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976, 398 pp. \$17.50.

This first volume inaugurates what is very much an official biography. The author was Director of the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs under his hero, and was granted access to personal papers by his hero's daughter and dynastic heir. It is not a book that deals in complexities, political or personal.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND GROUP CONFLICT IN COMMUNIST CHINA. By ALAN P. L. LIU. Santa Barbara (Calif.): ABC-Clio Press, 1976, 205 pp. \$17.95 (Paper, \$5.75).

This study of the Cultural Revolution suffers from a tendency toward psychological reductionism—not only are the Red Guards suffering from “role confusion” and other unsavory aspects of adolescent psychology, but Mao desires “an ideological superego that will keep the compromising bureaucratic ego in line.” The author hopes for a future “revolution” in which “conflict is regulated by explicit rules, predictable behavior and continuity,” a hope not likely, he grants, to be satisfied.

WOMAN-WORK: WOMEN AND THE PARTY IN REVOLUTIONARY CHINA. By DELIA DAVIN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976, 244 pp. \$10.95.

In traditional China women were routinely crippled, their feet crushed to three-inch stumps to make their walk more seductively “graceful.” Modern China adheres to Mao's dictum: “What men comrades can accomplish women can too.” This progress report finds that Chinese women have indeed come a long way; but there is a long way to go.

JAPAN IS A CIRCLE. By KENICHI YOSHIDA. New York: Kodansha International, 1976, 149 pp. \$7.95.

Yoshida is one of his country's best known men of letters, and his English essays, collected here, reflect a stylish sensuality which is very characteristically Japanese.

JAPANESE AND AMERICANS: CULTURAL PARALLELS AND PARADOXES. By CHARLES GRINNELL CLEAVER. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976, 290 pp. \$12.75.

These ruminations on Japanese and American styles in literature, architecture and sensibility from a scholar of the two cultures constitute a plea for mutual understanding and cultural diversity.

JAPAN AT THE BRINK. By KONOSUKE MATSUSHITA. New York: Kodansha International, 1976, 133 pp. \$6.95.

Matsushita, the 82-year old electrical entrepreneur and tycoon, sees Japan living beyond its means and losing its moral fiber. He proposes a three-year freeze on wages and prices, the universal compulsory purchase of low-interest government bonds, and the abolition of half the country's students and universities. These Draconian visions found a surprising response in Japan, to judge from the 620,000 copies of this book sold there.

MODERNIZATION AND THE JAPANESE FACTORY. By ROBERT M. MARSH AND HIROSHI MANNARI. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, 437 pp. \$27.50 (Paper, \$11.50).

A comparative story of three Japanese firms indicates that the factors that motivate high performance by workers are likely to be the same East or West: chance for promotion, knowledge, high status, and the work ethic. Lifetime commitment of the characteristic Japanese sort is also associated with high worker performance, but the authors suggest that it is less important than the universal factors they uncover.

CHOICES FOR THE JAPANESE ECONOMY. By HIROSHI KITAMURA. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1976, 211 pp. £7.00.

The Japanese postwar economic miracle, argues the author, was paid for at the cost of a drastic decline in the share of national income going to labor, from 93 percent in 1951 to 68 percent in 1970—not to mention the other costs of pollution, congestion and urban decay. The miracle was self-terminating, its end hastened by the energy crisis; and the task this book sets itself is to consider alternatives, which it does cogently and lucidly.

DAS AUSSENHANDELSRECHT DER VOLKSREPUBLIK CHINA. BY OSKAR WEGGEL. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1976, 493 pp. DM. 118.

A carefully researched and detailed treatment of the rules governing China's foreign trade activity, this book should be invaluable to those who are concerned with Chinese legal, financial, or mercantile relations.

ECONOMIC NEOCOLONIALISM: PROBLEMS OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES' STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE. BY L. L. KLOCH-KOVSKY. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975, 309 pp. (Chicago: Imported Publications, distributor, \$3.50).

The author is head of the Department of Economic Research of the Latin American Institute of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. His carefully documented but rigidly doctrinaire view of North-South economic relations argues that imperialism now no longer seeks to block industrialization in the Third World, but to keep it dependent by a monopoly of technological advance.

KOREAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION. EDITED BY EDWARD REYNOLDS WRIGHT. Seattle: University of Washington Press (for the Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch), 1976, 399 pp. \$12.50.

Professors of political science in Seoul and the Republic of Korea's Ambassador to the U.S. are among the contributors. They conclude that the Park regime "has succeeded in establishing a highly developed mechanism of control over potential or manifested elements of threat" and that "public policy can be . . . efficiently implemented," being free from "irrational" elements like "popular participation in politics."

GIAI PHONG! THE FALL AND LIBERATION OF SAIGON. BY TIZIANO TERZANI. New York: St. Martin, 1976, 317 pp. \$10.00.

The author, Asian correspondent for *Der Spiegel*, managed to remain in Saigon after the collapse of the Thieu regime. He tells a vividly detailed story of a social earthquake: the seismic shift from pre- to post-revolutionary civilization.

COMMUNITY AND REVOLUTION IN MODERN VIETNAM. BY ALEXANDER B. WOODSIDE. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976, 351 pp. \$9.95.

An intellectual and political history of modern Vietnam which traces in fascinating and erudite detail the development of the idea of "society" in a traditional milieu, and its revolutionary consequences.

INDIA'S NUCLEAR OPTION: ATOMIC DIPLOMACY AND DECISION MAKING. BY ASHOK KAPUR. New York: Praeger, 1976, 295 pp. \$20.00.

This subtle, well-reasoned and coolly lucid book defends India's peaceful nuclear explosion and the policy it represents of preparing a nuclear military option without actually producing weapons. It ought to be read by all concerned with nuclear diplomacy.

HISTORY OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC. TRANSLATED BY WILLIAM A. BROWN AND URGUNGE ONON. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976, 897 pp. \$19.00.

With this annotated translation of the 3rd volume of the official history of modern Mongolia (Ulan Bator, 1969, edited by B. Shirendev and M. Sanjdorj), the Harvard East Asian Research Center has made available to English readers a document of some—rather specialized—interest and importance.

THE UNITED STATES AND BURMA. BY JOHN F. CADY. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976, 303 pp. \$17.50.

Part of the American Foreign Policy Library series, this careful study deals with a country which, as the author candidly notes, "has never loomed very large in American eyes, nor is it likely to do so soon." The Ne Win dictatorship does have the distinction of being the most inefficient in the world, but this is no bad thing in a dictatorship.

MILITARY ROLES IN MODERNIZATION: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THAILAND AND BURMA. BY MOSHE LISSAK. Beverly Hills (Calif.): Sage, 1976, 255 pp. \$15.00.

MILITARY AND STATE IN MODERN ASIA. EDITED BY HAROLD Z. SCHIFFRIN. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic Press, 1976, 309 pp.

Lissak discusses the army regimes in Thailand and Burma; the papers from the 1974 Truman Institute symposium on Military and State in Modern Asia at the Hebrew University range farther afield to the Middle East and Imperial Japan. Agreement emerges, however, on essential points: military men are better at guns than government; and the military is not an agent of modernization, but of "pseudo-modernization."

AUSTRALIA IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER: FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1970s. EDITED BY J. A. C. MACKIE. West Melbourne: Nelson (with the Australian Institute of International Affairs), 1976, 156 pp. A\$14.95.

This solid AIIA study attempts to come to grips with defining what is the Australian national interest. Firm alliances with strong allies, equilibrium between the nuclear superpowers, good relations with Indonesia and Japan, and determined resistance to any policy of "spheres of influence" emerge as the foundation.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

THE "TAR BABY" OPTION: AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN RHODESIA. BY ANTHONY LAKE. New York: Columbia University Press (for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1976, 316 pp. \$17.50 (Paper, \$5.95).

This lucid and dispassionate analysis of recent U.S. policy toward Rhodesia constitutes the first major account of how our African policy is made in terms of bureaucratic politics. In the negative evolution of Rhodesian policy (i.e., the Byrd Amendment and Nixon-Kissinger policy of increased "communication" with white minority governments), the low priority of African issues for U.S. liberals and blacks was perhaps more important than the active efforts of the conservative pro-Rhodesian lobbies. In Lake's view this low priority requires a "clearly stated and easily understood" policy that can be carried out by the bureaucracy without constant, high-level supervision.

THE SHRINKING POLITICAL ARENA: PARTICIPATION AND ETHNICITY IN AFRICAN POLITICS, WITH A CASE STUDY OF UGANDA. BY NELSON KASFIR. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, 323 pp. \$23.50.

The author goes to some length to demonstrate the obvious: that popular participation in African politics is on the wane. He advocates increased use of the civil services to marshal "low-level political involvement."

THE POLITICS OF NATURAL DISASTER: THE CASE OF THE SAHEL DROUGHT. EDITED BY MICHAEL H. GLANTZ. New York: Praeger, 1976, 340 pp. \$21.50.

To sum up the collected wisdom of the political scientists, public health experts, climatologists and agronomists assembled here: both coordination—between donors and recipients—and balance—in ecological planning—are essential to save the Sahel and its people.

COUPS AND ARMY RULE IN AFRICA: STUDIES IN MILITARY STYLE. By SAMUEL DECALO. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976, 284 pp. \$17.50 (Paper, \$4.95).

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SIERRA LEONE: A CASE STUDY OF AFRICAN SOLDIERS IN POLITICS. By THOMAS S. COX. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976, 271 pp. \$14.00.

In Decalo's view, current theory about military intervention in African politics does not sufficiently emphasize the internal structure of each country's military and the idiosyncracies of their leaders. From studies of Togo, Dahomey, the Congo and Uganda, he concludes that the most significant factor in military regime stability is consistency and equity in army promotions and benefits. Cox analyzes the interaction with civilian elites which has characterized the role of the military in Sierra Leone politics.

ARAB DOLLARS FOR AFRICA. By E. C. CHIBWE. London: Croom Helm, 1976, 147 pp. £5.95.

The Zambian Ambassador to West Germany candidly expresses African disappointment at the paucity of Arab aid and investment south of the Sahara and suggests ways and means for increasing the flow.

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF EMPEROR HAILE SELLESSIE I: "MY LIFE AND ETHIOPIA'S PROGRESS" 1892-1937. TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED BY EDWARD ULLENDORFF. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976, 335 pp. \$13.75.

A prime source for historians, this account of the Emperor's early life (dictated by Haile Sellassie in exile in England in 1937) is formal rather than personal, long on facts and short on motivation; but glimpses of the intelligent and large-spirited Lion of Judah of that day can be discerned.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AFRICAN WORKING CLASS: STUDIES IN CLASS FORMATION AND ACTION. EDITED BY RICHARD SANDBROOK AND ROBIN COHEN. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976, 330 pp. \$25.00 (Paper, \$9.00).

Do African unions work for the workers? Will African workers work for the revolution? A qualified yes to both questions emerges from this collection, whose unifying theme is the African wage-laborer's community of interests with those outside the modern sector—not with the bourgeoisie.

THE POLITICS OF CHANGE IN A ZAMBIAN COMMUNITY. By GEORGE C. BOND. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, 178 pp. \$13.50.

A case study in Zambian rural politics around the time of independence (1963-65). The author views this period as a brief flowering of local participation, which, even as he watched, began to wither again.

THE SEARCH FOR NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA. EDITED BY DAVID R. SMOCK AND KWAMENA BENTSI-ENCHILL. New York: Free Press, 1976, 340 pp. \$13.95.

This useful, low-keyed collection of essays focuses on tools for achieving national integration, including government structures, economic planning and education, language and communications.

Erratum: April 1976 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, p. 623, l. 27, the price of KOMMUNISMUS IN PALÄSTINA by Mario Offenbergl (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1975) should read DM. 49.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Janet Rigney

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *United Nations, International Court of Justice*: United Nations, Sales Section, New York 10017. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org. and Food and Agric. Org.*: Unipub, Inc., P.O. Box 433, New York 10016. *Int. Labor Office*: 917 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. *European Communities*: 2100 M. St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development*: 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 94th Congress. New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

AFRICA

RESTRICTIONS on assistance to Angola. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S. J. Res. 156, Dec. 18, 1975. Washington, 1976. 6 pp.

— Hearings, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Jan. 29 and Feb. 3-6, 1976. Washington, 1976. 212 pp.

U.S. policy toward Africa. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S. Res. 436, May 5, 1976. Washington, 1976. 13 pp. (S. Rept. 94-780.)

AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURAL policy in Austria. Paris, OECD, 1976. 45 pp. (Agricultural Policy Reports.) \$2.75.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC OCEAN

SOUTH Asia. Report on Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, by Francis R. Valeo, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Apr. 1976. Washington, 1976. 16 pp. (Com. Print.)

SOUTH Asia: 1976. A report by Senator George McGovern to the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Apr. 1976. Washington, 1976. 22 pp. (Com. Print.)

COMMERCIAL POLICY AND TRADE

THE Aims and instruments of industrial policy: a comparative study. Paris, OECD, 1975. 137 pp. \$6.00.

YEARBOOK of industrial statistics (formerly The Growth of World Industry), 1974 edition. N.Y., 1976. 2v. (76.XVII. 3-4.) \$62.00.

DISARMAMENT

NUCLEAR proliferation: future U.S. foreign policy implications. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Committee on International Relations, House, Oct. 21-30 and Nov. 4-5, 1975. Washington, 1975. 506 pp. \$4.60.

— Report, Committee on International Relations, House, to accompany H. Con. Res. 570, Apr. 28, 1976. Washington, 1976. 7 pp. (H. Rept. 94-1051.)

A SHORT history of non-proliferation. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1976. 50 pp. VERIFICATION: the critical element of arms control. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976. 32 pp. (Publications, 85.) 50¢.

WORLD military expenditures and arms transfers, 1965-1974. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1975. 76 pp. (Publications, 84.) \$1.80.

EASTERN EUROPE

GUIDELINES of the Eleventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party on the socio-economic development of the People's Republic of Bulgaria under the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1976-1980). Sofia, Sofia-Press, 1976. 57 pp.

POLITICAL Documents of the German Democratic Republic. Berlin, Panorama DDR, 1976. 4. Joint decision on the further systematic improvement of working and living conditions in the GDR from 1976 to 1980, adopted by the SED Central Committee, the FDGB National Executive and the GDR Council of Ministers on 27 May 1976. 15 pp.

PROGRAMME of the Romanian Communist Party for the Building of the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society and Romania's Advance toward Communism. Bucharest, Meridiane Publishing House, 1975. 219 pp. Lei 3.50.

THESES of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party on the Further Implementation of the December Programme on Raising the People's Living Standards under the Seventh Five-Year Plan and up to 1990. Sofia, Sofia-Press, 1976. 59 pp.

U.S.S.R. and grain. A staff report, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Apr. 1976. Washington, 1976. 33 pp. (Com. Print.)

ENVIRONMENT

ECONOMICS of transfrontier pollution. Paris, OECD, 1976. 218 pp. \$10.00.

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CAUSES and cures of world inflation. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Finance and Resources, Committee on Finance, Senate, Jan. 26, and Feb. 17, 1976. Washington, 1976. 101 pp.

DEVELOPMENT finance companies. Washington, World Bank, 1976. 65 pp. (Sector Policy Paper.)

NATIONAL accounts statistics. Vol. I: Aggregates. Paris, OECD, 1976. 128 pp. \$4.50.

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FOREIGN AID

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INTERNATIONAL LAW

Who legislates in the modern world? IVth Inter-Parliamentary Symposium, Geneva, 29–31 January 1976: verbatim record of the debates. Geneva, International Centre for Parliamentary Documentation, 1976. 279 pp. (Series "Reports and Documents," 5.)

YEARBOOK of world problems and human potential. Brussels, Union of International Associations, 1976. 1136 pp. \$65.00.

LATIN AMERICA

II PND: II National Development Plan (1975–1979); statement by His Excellency the President of the Republic, General Ernesto Geisel, at a meeting of ministers on the 10th of September 1974. Rio de Janeiro, Federative Republic of Brazil, n.d. 152 pp.

MIDDLE EAST

DISCRIMINATORY Arab pressure on U.S. business. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce, Committee on International Relations, House, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 6–Dec. 11, 1975. Washington, 1976. 232 pp. \$2.70.

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INCREASED energy economy and efficiency in the ECE region. N.Y., 1976. 101 pp. (E/ECE/883/Rev. 1.) \$6.00.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

APPROPRIATE technology: problems and promises, ed. by Nicolas Jéquier. Paris, OECD, 1976. 344 pp. (Development Centre Studies.) \$12.50.

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